Professor Button centers his deft, accessible rereading of four major social contract theorists (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls) around the catchy claim that “contract makes citizens, never simply the other way around” (3). That is, the social contract, instead of being thought of as a rational settlement of affairs based on some given anatomy of the contracting persons, should be thought of as the opening act in an indefinite process of democratic cultivation, “a substantive formative project concerned with civic fidelity, allegiance, and political (moral) virtue” (5). To that end, Button tries to demonstrate that the theorists in question were not as concerned with the bare foundational acts of their different, well-ordered polities as previous attention to this aspect of their writings would indicate. Conversely, they are more amenable to “an ethics of character formation,” to “the ways in which social and political institutions give shape to culture and character of citizenship” (9, 11) than detractors—and also partisans—have allowed. Its contemporary purchase is admitted to be the by now well-trod domain of liberalism's need to defend itself against accusations that it is anomic, or even antidemocratic. If what we seek, Button says, is “an answer to widespread and still lively concerns about the sustainability of liberal political societies,” and to “anxiety about the moral and ethical qualities necessary for modern citizenship,” we should look for it in the “ideal of ethical-civic transformation” he finds “within the (broadly nonperfectionist) social contract tradition,” a tradition that “was always less atomistic, disengaged, and deontological (or relentlessly anti-Aristotelian) than we have long supposed” (17–18).
How successful is Button in this enterprise? It is unsurprising, perhaps, that he devotes the most space to a reading of Locke (chapters 2 and 3—Hobbes, Rousseau, and Rawls get one chapter each). Despite the recent exegetical tendency to make Locke a dedicated seventeenth-century political theologian (and Button agrees that Locke's political theory is “deeply theistic” [90]), Locke is, I think, the most amenable of the early modern theorists featured here to the sort of updated liberalism plus cultivation Button hopes to offer. Rousseau's dedication to cultivating les moeurs is easy to prove; his amenability to modern liberal politics is a far tougher sell. Hobbes, it almost goes without saying, while certainly an inexhaustible theorist of contract, makes a strange bedfellow for virtue. Indeed, Button's reading of Hobbes as a stealth virtue-theorist begs the question of what that difficult term is supposed to mean. Certainly, Button's avowal to reject other readers' “desire to give Hobbes a monological voice and a philosophical consistency that he frankly does not have and that may not have been available to him at the time” (78) is well founded. That Hobbes was concerned with loyalty beyond mere fearful obedience may not be as pregnant with meaning as Button thinks. What political theorist has not argued, implicitly or explicitly, that “the tension between conscience and commonwealth,” and the problem of “sustaining political bonds over generations” (37, 47) would not be best served by a regime that had sources of legitimacy beyond naked fear of the sword? None of this quite indicates that Hobbes was concerned with virtue in any way that contemporary diffidence toward liberalism would require. Consider, for example, those magnificent Hobbesian set pieces, the anatomical redescriptions of passions, virtues, and other qualities, in chapters 6, 7, and 10 of Leviathan (Richard Tuck, ed., Cambridge University Press, 1991). Here is where courage equals “the hope of avoiding … hurt by resistance,” compassion or grief “the imagination that [a] like calamity may befall himselfe,” and “The Value, or WORTH of a man … his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power” (Tuck, 41, 43, 63); and so forth. Hobbes sounds like a sociobiologist avant la lettre as often as (perhaps more often than) a cultivator of virtue: scratch virtue, find self-interest.
Of course, Button limits his objectives sufficiently to make all of his readings (backed up, it should be said, by extensive secondary sourcing) plausible enough. But on the flipside of this is a dilemma: What, exactly, does the making of citizens by the social contract actually entail? Often, here, it veers dangerously close to tautology. Button introduces his final chapter on Rawls and the work's contemporary purchase: “Contract makes citizens by embedding and educating subjects, over time, into particular sociocultural systems of civic self-understanding and collective identity” (207). An ungenerous parsing of Button's conclusions in the final chapter, though, could probably go no further than to affirm that an important task for liberal democracies is to produce citizens who accept and are satisfied with the premises of liberal democracies.
This error lies somewhere between a sin of omission and a sin of commission. There is nothing wrong with writing a book that is purely theoretical, of course, but one gets the sense that some discussion of interrelated policy questions would be of use. How is this task of culture- and citizen-formation to be done? Education? Button explores Locke's and Rousseau's writings on education much less than their imaginings of contract. Town meetings, ward republics? Here we meet a blatant sin of omission, one where I'd actually flatter Button by wishing he had written a longer book. Despite saying at several points that the Declaration of Independence is one of the “greatest … expressions of the modern period” as to “this fertile relationship between social contract theory and political action” (37 n.), he writes nearly nothing about the American founders. This is a shame, as the scattered but profound writings of Jefferson, Madison, and others as to many of the very interesting problems Button lays out—aligning modern commercial liberalism with civic virtue, renewing consent over time, and so on—have been generally less picked over by political theorists than the by now perennial Hobbes-Locke-Rousseau-Rawls series.
Button also succumbs to the (understandable) temptation to makes one's position sound like the beleaguered minority report of its discipline. What is “needed today is a greater measure of critical self-consciousness about the nature and direction of liberalism's transformative ethos,” a “greater appreciation for the mutually transformative possibilities that can arise in any public encounter between citizens in a pluralistic democratic society.” This sort of attitude he names “Democratic humility”: “[A] cultivated sensibility toward the limitations, incompleteness, and contingency of both one's personal moral powers and commitments and the particular forms, laws, and institutions that structure one's political and social life with others” (211–12, 229). Actually, there seems to be no shortage of critical, not to mention ostentatiously humble, accounts of liberalism, and no shortage of dreams for “mutually transformative” encounters between citizens, or groups, within a pluralistic democracy. As to declarations about the “limitations, incompleteness, and contingency” of anything and everything political, these are so common that they themselves risk becoming imperious. Button does offer an admirably direct defense of Rawlsian “public reason” (216) that does not dodge or apologize for its rationalist and exclusionary premises. But attacks are surrounded by retreats and feints, and this hardly indicates that liberalism's central problem is excessive certainty. Indeed, it often seems there is no sector of political theory more uncritically sure of itself than the one whose language pivots around the limited/incomplete/contingent—and perhaps the most honest use of a Thomas Hobbes would not embrace it.
