China’s rapid rise in international relations has spawned a veritable industry of publications dissecting how Beijing is likely to navigate the future. The recent slowdown of the Chinese economy has raised questions about how fast China’s rise will track over the next few years, but only the most grudging of China skeptics would argue that the country’s ascent is in danger of being reversed in the foreseeable future. China’s (re)emergence as the world’s newest great power is a key feature of our time. A major question, however, that continues to vex policymakers is how to engage China as it redefines its international role. What does China want? And when does it want it? On this, there is little consensus among practitioners, but academic scholarship has an important role to play in explaining the underlying dynamics that drive Beijing’s foreign policy.
Stripped to the bare essentials, in contemporary commentary there are two alternative scenarios for the way in which China’s rise will have an impact on regional security in Asia. The first is that China will be a relatively benign great power concerned with safeguarding its core national interests and not interested in seeking to dominate other countries. In this world, China will establish a modus vivendi with the United States, become more engaged in multilateral forums in Asia, and possibly even underwrite public goods for other states in the region, for instance, by helping to protect sea lanes of communication. The second, more pessimistic world is one in which China increasingly seeks to dominate other countries as it becomes more powerful. In this world, Sino-American relations remain acutely vulnerable to confrontation, Beijing uses coercion or the threat of coercion to achieve its territorial claims, and Chinese policymakers refuse to brook opposition to their vision of regional order.
In this excellent book—published as part of Columbia’s “Contemporary Asia and the World” series—longtime China watcher Denny Roy presents a nuanced and highly sophisticated analysis of China’s impact on Asian regional security. A major strength of Return of the Dragon is that Roy is explicit at the outset in outlining where his contribution fits within the existing literature on China’s rise and foreign policy. He distinguishes his analysis from similar prominent contributions, including Susan Shirk’s China: Fragile Superpower (2007), Aaron Friedberg’s A Contest for Supremacy (2011), and David Kang’s China Rising (2007). Roy is also explicit in stating the theoretical assumptions and biases informing his analysis. He identifies himself as a neorealist in privileging the structural makeup of the international system as the independent variable shaping behavior and outcomes, but he also acknowledges the strong influence of constructivism (ideas matter a lot) and liberalism (economic advancement requires international cooperation). In an age in which theoretical purity is often reified over policy relevance in scholarship, Roy refreshingly repudiates “parsimony at the expense of accuracy. International relations in Asia involve a complex set of factors that demand an eclectic approach” (p. 7).
The book is comprehensive in scope, and the chapters range across the key indicators of China’s impact on regional security—from bilateral relations with the United States, Japan, North Korea, and Taiwan to global security issues, China’s military modernization, and the ways in which the security dilemma is inflamed/mitigated by China’s regional interactions over time (Chapters 7 and 8).
Roy rejects the optimistic vision of China’s rise in favor of a more pessimistic argument that the stronger China becomes, the more assertive it will be, and that this will inevitably lessen the security of other states in Asia. Asia’s security future is therefore a zero-sum proposition in which China’s gains will result in net losses for other states. The nexus between the worldview of Chinese governing elites and the country’s citizenry is stronger than usually acknowledged, and this manifests itself in Beijing’s demand for greater deference and compliance from its neighbors as its power grows. Roy bluntly argues that “Chinese assurances that ‘China does not seek regional hegemony or a sphere of influence’ should not be taken seriously” (p. 258).
According to the author, China has a strong sense of entitlement stemming from its return to great-power status (“arguably the first in history”; p. 2). This, combined with a combustible mix of boilerplate nationalism and a deep sense that the West is intent on “keeping China down,” makes for a foreign policy that is at times heavy-handed and shrill. This is particularly apparent with respect to territorial issues in the East and South China Seas, as well as the long-standing issue of Taiwan. In a telling observation, Roy argues that “Beijing will prefer to dominate the region not through warfare and conquest but through what could be described as self-righteous bullying: political and economic pressure (backed by superior military force) carried out with pompous moralism”(p. 260).
The associated arguments presented in the book are persuasive: China extols the principle of noninterference and respect for others’ sovereignty, but it expects deference within what it sees as a hierarchical system; the People’s Liberation Army will probably remain on a par with the British and French militaries in terms of global force projection, but China threatens U.S. military dominance in East Asia; and Chinese elites exaggerate the underlying intent of counterbalancing by the United States and its allies (“what the Chinese see as containment the Americans see as insurance”; p. 41).
To be sure, the book has very few flaws, but I wondered why a book with “regional security” in its subtitle included a chapter on global security, and why there was not more attention devoted to the perspectives of pivotal regional countries themselves (e.g., a mere three pages referring to Indonesia, one page to Thailand). Moreover, the absence of a bibliography and a somewhat minimalist index were disappointing features.
Despite these minor quibbles, this book represents a significant contribution to our understanding of how China sees its place in Asia, what its demands are likely to be as its power increases, and how this will impact the region in the years ahead. Indeed, Return of the Dragon is an excellent fit in the all-too-rare category of being equally valuable to policy practitioners and scholars alike.
