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The Evolution of Japanese Studies of International Relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2010

KOJI MURATA
KOJI MURATA*
Affiliation:
Doshisha University, Kyoto
*
Corresponding Author: KOJI MURATA, Doshisha University, Kyoto e-mail kmurata@mail.doshisha.ac.jp
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Abstract

This paper aims to examine the evolution of Japanese studies of international relations since the end of World War II. In so doing, in particular, this paper first looks at the dominant trends and characteristics of Japanese scholarship in this field, and, second, the correlations between the scholarship and Japan's experiences in real international relations. In discussing the evolution of Japanese studies of international relations, I shall divide the years since 1945 into three separate periods: (1) 1945–60, (2) 1961–89, and (3) 1990 and after. Then, taking the current US–Japan relationship as a case study, I will examine the contemporary characteristics of Japanese scholarship in this field.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 11 , Special Issue 3: Japan as Studied in Japan's Neighbors and Japan Itself , December 2010, pp. 355 - 365
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

Introduction

This paper aims to examine the evolution of Japanese studies of International Relations since the end of the World War II.Footnote 1 In particular, this paper first looks at the dominant trends and characteristics of Japanese scholarship in this field, and, second, the correlations between scholarship and Japan's experiences in real international relations. In discussing the evolution of Japanese studies of international relations, I shall divide the years since 1945 into three separate periods: (1) 1945–60, (2) 1961–89, and (3) 1990 and after. Then, taking the current US–Japan relationship as a case study, I will examine the contemporary characteristics of Japanese scholarship in this field.

The first period (1945–60)

The first period was the embryonic period for the scholarship of international relations in Japan. During this period, for example, the Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR) was established in 1956, and the Japan Institute for International Affairs was created by former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in 1959.

Prior to this period, of course, the groundwork for Japanese scholarship in this field had been already laid by predecessors in the prewar and wartime periods. According to Hosoya Chihiro, former president of the JAIR, ‘area studies in prewar Japan were focused overwhelmingly on East Asia’. ‘Historically, the development of research in this field had been tied to the practical needs of Japan's Continental policy since the Meiji period, and area studies in Japan, particularly on China, had reached a high standard in which Japan might justifiably take pride’, he said.Footnote 2 The Research Department of the South Manchuria Railway Company, for example, was a center of study, and trained many specialists in the field.

Japanese scholarship of international politics other than area studies in the prewar period was based on the disciplines of diplomatic history and international law. Gaiko Jiho (Review of Diplomacy) was published in 1898, and Kokusaiho Zashi (Journal of International Law) was published in 1902 (later, renamed Kokusaiho Gaiko Zashi – Journal of International Law and Diplomacy – in 1919). Many of them were legalistic and/or idealistic. ‘The European affairs are very much complicated’, Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichiro noted when he resigned at the conclusion of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1938. It is easy to imagine that Japanese intellectuals were more naïve than Japanese politicians over power politics.

Then, after the end of World War II, during the first period, so-called realism was widely imported to Japanese scholarship from the West. E. H. Carr's Twenty Years’ Crisis was translated into Japanese in 1952, for example, and so were George Kennan's American Diplomacy 1900–1950, Hans Morgenthau's In Defense of the National Interest, and Reinhold Niebuhr's The Irony of American History in 1951.

Needless to say, it is not easy to define realism as academic thoughts. As for the background to this concept during the first period, Penguin's Dictionary of International Relations says that ‘as a theory, or a set of propositions about the individual, the state, and the state-system, it [realism] reached the height of its appeal, especially in the Anglo-American world, in the years after 1940 when it appeared to explain the “lessons” of appeasement and the inception of the Cold War era’.Footnote 3

In fact, Japanese political scientists and diplomatic historians were also deeply influenced by the experiences of World War II and the American occupation of Japan after that. Thus, they became more aware of power politics than before. In the first volume of Kokusaiseiji, JAIR's academic organ, Kamikawa Hikomatsu, the first president of the JAIR, said that ‘from the viewpoint of international political science, the history of international politics has been the history of war’ and that ‘from the viewpoint of international political scientific predictions, the international society will still remain in a world of war and threats of war’.Footnote 4

During the first period, Japan experienced the Korean War, the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US–Japan Security Treaty in 1951, and the revision of the latter in 1960. Through these experiences, the Japanese public and intellectuals were sharply divided into pro Article 9 of the Constitution and pro US–Japan Security Treaty. The majority of both the public and intellectuals strongly supported Article 9 of the Constitution. Thus, specialists of international politics, who emphasized the importance of power politics, were rather in the minority. They were criticized by not only liberals but also by Marxists, who were quite strong during this period. According to Eto Shinkichi, a prominent China specialist, when he was a research associate of the Institute for Oriental Studies, at the University of Tokyo, one of his senior colleagues confidently said in public that ‘Stalin would never tell a lie!’Footnote 5

It should be also noted that many of the scholars in the field of international politics were originally educated as historians, philosophers, area specialists, and legal specialists under strong European influences. They converted to international politics as a new academic discipline during this period.

The second period (1961–89)

During this period, the Cold War structure was well established, and Japan became an economic superpower. In the field of study of international politics, younger scholars, who were often called ‘Realists’, emerged dramatically. They included Kosaka Masataka, Nagai Konosuke, Kamiya Fuji, Sato Seizaburo, Wakaizumi Kei, and others. They had experienced studying in the United States after the occupation era. Thus, they were products of the philanthropy of the American government and private endowments.Footnote 6 Also, given the development of the media, they played more important roles in journalism than in scholarship.

Kosaka and Nagai reevaluated the foreign policies by Yoshida Shigeru and his successors. They wanted to establish Japan's new identity as an economic superpower in the Cold War structure. As US–Japan trade frictions were intensified, they expanded their interest from national security affairs to complex economic interdependency during the 1980s. In other words, the concept of security expanded during this period.

Without any doubt, Kosaka represented these ‘Realists’. According to him, ‘as is Idealism, Realism is a way of thinking, and has several characteristics’. First, it utilizes the concept of interest defined by power. Second, it accepts the unknowable about society, history, and politics, and does not apply simple themes to them. And third, it recognizes the co-relations between aims and means, and emphasizes the importance of conversations between them.Footnote 7

Japanese ‘Realists’ were far less ideological than both the liberals and Marxists and the scholars during the first period. Gerald Curtis, Columbia University professor of Japanese politics, says: ‘more precisely speaking, they were not conservative but ‘non-progressive’ and post-ideological intellectuals’.Footnote 8

They were different from American ‘Realists’ in two ways. First, they were not interested in theorizing their thoughts. While they had already provided the idea of defensive realism, for example, they were critical of over-generalization of structural realism. ‘These kinds of arguments seem to me quite unreal’, says Kosaka in his posthumous essay.Footnote 9 As a consequence, dialogues or controversies between Realists and non-Realists over methodology were sterile. Second, Japanese ‘Realists’ were not directly involved in the government. Wakaizumi was a special envoy of Prime Minister Sato Eisaku over the reversion of Okinawa, but only in secret.

Some Japanese scholars other than ‘Realists’ were eager to introduce advanced theoretical studies such as behavioral sciences from the United States to Japan. James Rosenau's linkage politics paradigm and Graham Alison's bureaucratic politics model were, for example, immediately introduced to Japan. Although Japanese scholars tended to ‘be hasty in the direct importation of foreign theories’, based on these theoretical frameworks, unique case studies, in particular in the fields of diplomatic history, were cultivated later.Footnote 10 Nevertheless, in general, they failed to establish their own theoretical frameworks.

During this period, Japanese scholarship in the field was better organized. For example, the Japan Peace Studies Association was established in 1973, a zenith of the Vietnam War. Behavioral sciences were often combined with Peace Studies in Japan. The Japan Association of EC Studies was also created in 1981. Reflecting severe US–Japan trade frictions in those days, the first issue of its Bulletin covered the topics of competitive policy and industrial policy in the EC.

Also, reflecting tensions in the new Cold War era and the emergence of Japan's position in the international community, some security policy-oriented think tanks were established during this period. Inoki Masamichi, former president of Japan's National Defense Academy, established the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) in 1978, and former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) in 1988.

(3)The Third Period (1990 and after)

The end of the Cold War did not necessarily make the world safer. Although the possibility of all-out nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union was gone, the dangers of regional conflicts, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism were rather increased.

The Gulf War, in particular, raised a serious question about security for Japan. Iokibe Makoto, a prominent diplomatic historian, noted: ‘for the Japanese, the Gulf War was neither a defensive war nor a offensive war. Therefore, this was a new item for Japanese people's dictionary in mind.’Footnote 11 While Japan was considered to be the real winner of the Cold War due to its economic success, it then became a diplomatic loser of the Gulf War, without timely and visible contribution to the coalition forces.

Entering into the 1990s, given the significant changes in the international system, the controversies between neo-realism or structural realism and neo-liberal institutionalism were imported into Japanese scholarship. Those who imported neo-realism into Japanese scholarship intended to criticize the US unipolar dominance of international politics.Footnote 12 Although there was a time delay, between the United States in the 1980s and Japan in the 1990s for the importation of the controversies, Japanese understanding of them still was not sufficient, as the contexts – of society, culture, and philosophy – of the West were missing. A senior scholar criticized the hasty and incomplete importation of US theories to Japan as the ‘studies on the studies of international politics.’Footnote 13

During this period, there were several other changes in Japanese scholarship of international politics. First, thanks to the deregulation of the Ministry of Education and Science, the number of graduate students in the field of international relations was considerably increased. Then, of the younger generations, more and more tended to study in the United States, and brought back new theories but without the time delay. Constructivism was one of these theories. Due to the characteristic of avoiding overgeneralization, constructivism has been rapidly and widely accepted in Japanese academic circles. Second, as a reaction to Americanization of Japanese scholarship, many scholars paid more attention to the so-called British school. Third, almost all of the Realists of the previous period were gone. Now, how to bridge the studies of international politics and journalism and how to cope with emerging nationalism remain big challenges to Japanese scholarship, which the old Realists were devoted to.

The current US–Japan relations: a case study

The world is faced with significant changes. Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that the international system is now moving from unipolarity to nonpolarity.Footnote 14 Also, Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek asserts that we are now living in the post-American world, based on the rise of the rest.Footnote 15 Both of them point to the relative decline of American power. Robert Altman joins them by calling it a ‘geopolitical setback’.Footnote 16 Or, Tanaka Akihiko, University of Tokyo professor, calls the period from the end of the Cold War in 1989 to the current economic crisis in 2009 a ‘new twenty-year crisis’.Footnote 17 American military, economic, and moral supremacies are now in relative decline.

This is a systemic change in international politics. Since Japan has been a one-dimensional superpower, i.e. an economic superpower, Japanese scholarship has not developed enough global or systemic viewpoints on international politics. As mentioned above, systemic analyses of international politics have been mainly imported from the United States to Japan.

Barack Obama's victory in the US Presidential election in 2008 represented these changes in international politics. It also reflected changes in American society and politics: the end of conservative era or the age of Ronald Reagan, whom George W. Bush tried to imitate.Footnote 18 Now, military, economic, and social conservatives have lost influence, as did the liberals in the late 1970s. Also, the first non-Caucasian president represents demographic changes in the more diversified American society.

These changes must be covered by American studies as area studies. Recent American studies in Japan are, however, deeply influenced by post-modern and post-colonial thoughts, and tend to lack social scientific frameworks. In spite of the importance of the United States and the US–Japan relations for Japan, very few research institutes or centers conduct policy-oriented research on topics such as ethnic, religious, and demographic changes in American society.

Obama's victory was widely and warmly welcomed by the international community. Japan was no exception. Some Japanese commentators and decision-makers have had some concerns, however, that a Democratic administration may be protectionist and pro-China. As a matter of fact, while Mike Mansfield, former US Ambassador to Tokyo, once called the US–Japan relationship the most important bilateral relationship in the world, during her campaign, Hilary Clinton, former Democratic Presidential candidate and now Secretary of State, clearly said that the Sino-US relationship was the most important one, which is true without doubt.

Yomiuri Shimbun, the largest centralist newspaper in Japan, for example, noted in its editorial on 6 November 2008 that there was concern about rising protectionism in the United States and that Mr Obama in person had not yet mentioned the importance of the US–Japan alliance. Similarly, Sankei Shimbun, a more conservative newspaper, in the same day's editorial, urged the coming US administration not to fall into the temptation of protectionism.

While these concerns and comments were mainly based on the experiences of the Clinton years and are no longer valid, some psychological distance may exist between Japanese policy-elites and intellectuals and the US Democratic administration. A former Clinton senior official told me that Japan was considered to be a ‘Red State’ for many Democratic foreign policy specialists. This is mainly because the US–Japan alliance has functioned as a ‘secretarial alliance’, basically managed by a small number of bureaucrats.Footnote 19 Tokyo and Washington should do their best to shorten this psychological distance and widen the ties between the two parties.

While a great deal has been published on alliance theories, it is still difficult to explain fully US–Japan relations, an asymmetrical alliance relationship between asymmetrical major powers. In order to do so, we need to further develop comparative studies of alliances.Footnote 20

Washington had difficulties in understanding the new government of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) under Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio. On the US side, they also need qualified Japanese studies.Footnote 21 Japan should, of course, encourage Japanese studies in the United Sates and elsewhere, as China does for China studies. It should be also noted that the number of Japanese students studying abroad has decreased dramatically. Only one Japanese student was enrolled into the undergraduate program of Harvard University in the academic year 2010, for instance.

The Obama administration has repeatedly emphasized the importance of US–Japan relations. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton chose Tokyo as her first visit abroad, and Prime Minister Aso Taro was invited to the Obama’ White House as the first foreign leader in February 2009. At the first meeting in New York on 23 September 2009, President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama also confirmed the importance of the alliance.

In practice, the US–Japan alliance, once said to be the most important bilateral relationship in the world, is faced with various tasks and challenges. Let me point them out at the micro- to macro-levels.

First, the US military realignment in Japan is in trouble. In particular, the transformation of Futenma Air base to the offshore Henoko area is an obstacle for promoting this task. This mission was agreed upon between the two governments in 1996 during the Clinton years. The implementation has been delayed mainly because of failed coordination between Tokyo and Okinawa. Those who were involved in this agreement during the Clinton administration are now, under the Obama administration, even more frustrated by this issue. For the United States, policy toward Okinawa has been bipartisan since the Clinton years. In her visit to Tokyo, Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, concluded the executive agreement by confirming the relocation of US Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in Tokyo, however, raised the possibility of removing the Futenma Air base out of Okinawa without any clear plans.

In order to understand the difficulties of this issue, first the history of Japan and the United Sates over Okinawa must be further examined. While the so-called secret agreements between the two governments were recently declassified, the Japanese government should provide more systematic declassification of diplomatic documents by promoting historical surveys and transparency in Japanese diplomacy. Also, policy studies by Japanese scholars about the US grand strategy in the Asian-Pacific region surrounding Japan should be promoted in total and in depth. How to bridge the gaps between scholarship, on the one hand, and journalism and policy studies, on the other hand, have been serious challenges for Japanese intellectuals after the age of active and thoughtful ‘Realists’ during the 1960s and 1970s.

Second, North Korea is an extremely difficult and sensitive topic for the US–Japan alliance. In October 2008, President Bush, who once called North Korea one of the ‘axis of evil’, lifted economic sanctions because at this time North Korea had met a key requirement of its promise to abandon its nuclear weapons program. This decision was also welcomed by then Senator Obama. For Japan, North Korea poses three challenges: nuclear weapons, missiles, and abduction issues. While North Korean development of nuclear weapons is a common concern for Japan and the United States, the abduction issues are very sensitive mainly for the Japanese.

According to the Yomiuri-Gallup joint opinion survey in November 2008, while 77% of American respondents consider the US–Japan alliance to be useful, only 60% of Japanese respondents say so, a decrease of 5 points compared to the previous year's survey. Also, while about 40% of American respondents believe that the US–Japan relations in future will become better, 25.7% of Japanese respondents do so. One of the major reasons why the Japanese are more pessimistic about the US–Japan alliance than the Americans may be the US policy shift on North Korea during the last days of the Bush administration.

In April 2009, North Korea repeated provocative missile and nuclear tests. Furthermore, in April 2010, a South Korean navy vessel was sunk by a North Korean attack. Now, the United States must pay more attention to Asia, in particular North Korea, and promote further cooperation with Japan as well as South Korea, China, and Russia. Japanese commitment to nuclear disarmament calls for credible nuclear deterrence by the US, and Japan must be cautious enough not to be provoked by North Korea. Japan going nuclear would never be a solution for the North Korean challenges.

Although the United States and Japan need more policy coordination over North Korean issues, the Japanese political leadership must make clear what is required to resolve the abduction issues and what kinds of resources and strategies they have to achieve a solution. Otherwise, the abduction issues will become another Northern Territories issue, a deadlock under which no one has pragmatic ideas, strategies, and solutions. I am afraid that the abduction issues may have already reached the Pareto optimum. Under the current situation, all kinds of sentiments including patriotic, humanitarian, anti-Chinese, anti-American, as well as anti-North Korean are satisfied when condemning the abduction issues. As a consequence, in order to maintain this delicate balance, no one really wants to seek a solution. If this is true, the political leadership must definitely overcome this impass.

Probably, thanks to the traditions of area studies in East Asia from the prewar period, Korean studies in Japan is wider and deeper than that in the United Sates. However, Japanese scholars have not examined enough important topics such as crisis management, nuclear deterrence, bargaining theories, and nuclear non-proliferation. Now, we need to combine these functional studies with traditional area studies.

Third, the Obama administration more and more focuses on Afghanistan, which is now much more dangerous than Iraq. Due to constitutional and domestic political constraints, so far, Tokyo cannot send troops to Afghanistan. While Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya pledged Japan's contribution for stabilizing Afghanistan through civilian efforts, the DPJ government terminated Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces’ refuelling operations in the Indian Ocean. The Japanese may feel entrapped by the US global strategy and yet not appreciated enough, if the United States is going to abandon them over the abduction issues.

Aside from a policy judgment over Afghanistan, however, Tokyo must proactively reexamine Japan's international contributions as a whole. The number of SDF (self-defence forces) personnel all over the world under the UN Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) is only about forty; that of Chinese armed forces, including engineering forces, is more than 10,000. Also, the Chinese government has announced it will dispatch its navy to the Indian Ocean for anti-piracy activities. Even in terms of Official Development Aid (ODA), Japan, who was the top donor in the early 1990s, is now the fifth largest donor country in the world. Unfortunately, the Japanese ODA budget is getting tighter. Under these conditions, it is extremely difficult for Japan to obtain permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Tokyo should not forget that the G-8 Summit is going to be expanded to the G-20 Summit, including China.

Younger Japanese scholars tend to pay more attention to non-traditional security issues, such as peace-building measures and global issues about the environment and energy rather than traditional security issues. As a global civilian power, Japan should promote both the study and the practice of these issues. Also, the balance between the study of traditional security issues and non-traditional ones should be considered.

As mentioned above, the US–Japan alliance is faced with various difficult challenges. At the same time, however, it has opportunities for strengthening its ties over global issues such as environment, energy, and nuclear disarmament.

In particular, future US initiative in promoting substantial nuclear disarmament among nuclear powers will be more than welcomed by Japan. Such an action will help stabilize the US–Russian strategic relations and East Asian security environment, and increase international legitimacy and pressure when asking Iran and North Korea not to develop nuclear weapons.

On 5 April 2009, a day on which North Korea launched a long-range missile over the Japanese Islands, in Prague President Obama announced his willingness to move toward a ‘Nuclear Free World’. While the way to the ‘Nuclear Free World’ is far away, and we still need to maintain US extended deterrence to its non-nuclear allies and friends, the US and Japanese views on nuclear disarmament are now becoming more and more congruent. Further, Chinese cooperation in promoting nuclear disarmament is essentially important.

As for US–Japan relations, in September 2008, US Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, visited Hiroshima when attending the G-8 Speakers of the House meeting. Why not President Obama next? If he delivers an important policy speech for promoting nuclear disarmament in Hiroshima, as in Prague, it would certainly give moral power to American diplomacy and strengthen the US–Japan relations further. In this sense, it was a pity that Japan could not host the next nuclear summit meeting in 2012, which is supposed to be held in Seoul.

So, we have various opportunities as well as challenges for our future relations. On the US side, while global policies over the issues of nuclear disarmament and climate change, for example, are going to change drastically, regional policies in East Asia and bilateral policies with Japan such as the Okinawa issues are rather continuous, from Clinton, to Bush, to Obama. On the Japanese side, however, the DPJ government has tried to not only expand its global policies such as climate change, but will also soon change its policies in East Asia and with the United States. In order to promote bilateral cooperation over global issues or security in the global commons, the two countries must promote cooperation over regional and bilateral issues.

As is the US, Japan is also faced with significant changes at the international and domestic levels. On the one hand, Japan is going to loose the position of the second largest economy in the world, which Japan has enjoyed since 1968. The rise of China is inevitable. Japan needs, however, a new national identity, substituting for the material definition of the second largest economy in the world. For this, the studies of constructivism will be of great help. On the other hand, the so-called 1955 system under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is over. Now, we need to further facilitate the combined studies of international relations and comparative politics.

Given these changes, at elite level, the DPJ government must differentiate between necessary policy changes and unnecessary ones, only reactions to and denials of LDP policies. At the mass level, the Japanese must elaborate more balanced views on international politics. They tend to take a dichotomous view of either power politics or idealistic fraternity.

Now, we should mobilize all wisdoms of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. In order to make Japan survive as a major power in this changing and complicated world, the studies of international politics in Japan must be further widened and deepened. As in the past phases of the evolution of Japanese studies of International Relations, the task we are now faced with is the reflection of the international environment which Japan is surrounded by.

About the author

Koji Murata is currently Professor of Political Science, Doshisha University, Kyoto. He holds his B.A. in Political Science from Doshisha University, and M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Kobe University. He also received his M. Phil. in Political Science from the George Washington University where he studied as a Fulbright student. Dr. Murata's specialities include US foreign policy and Japanese foreign and defense policy. He received various academic awards including the Suntory Academic Award. Professor Murata is an author of many books, articles, and chapters both in Japanese and English.

References

1 In English, the following two volumes provide a bird's-eye view of postwar developments in the field: Asada, Sadao (ed.), International Studies in Japan: A Bibliographic Guide (Tokyo: The Japan Association of International Relations, 1988)Google Scholar; Asada, Sadao (ed.), Japan and the World, 1853–1952: A Bibliographical Guide to Recent Scholarship in Japanese Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988)Google Scholar. Also, in Japanese, the followings should be referred to: Kokusai, NihonGakkai, Seiji (Japan Association of International Relations) (ed.), Sengo Nihon no Kokusaiseijigaku (Studies of International Politics in the Postwar Japan) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1979)Google Scholar; Kokusai, NihonGakkai, Seiji (Japan Association of International Relations) (ed.), Nihon no Kokusaiseijigaku: 1 Gaku toshiteno Kokusaiseiji (Studies of International Politics in Japan: International Politics as Scholarship) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2009)Google Scholar.

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