For those who like their history neat and theory parsimonious, Eric Trager's Arab Fall offers a treat. One of the most important, complex, and elusive of contemporary Islamic movements is treated with breathtaking simplicity. The Arab Fall asks the right question: should the Society of Muslim Brothers be taken as an important part of a moderate Islamic trend that can be incorporated into democratic politics? Trager's answer is unequivocal—no, for the Muslim Brothers are judged to be antidemocratic totalitarians—but it is the empirical and conceptual underpinnings for that judgment which are weak.
Trager asks how the rise and decline of the Muslim Brothers can be explained. In the wake of Egypt's Tahrir Revolution, the Brothers rode to parliamentary victory in the February 2011 legislative elections. Yet 891 days later, the freely elected Muslim Brother President Muhammad Mursi was removed by a military putsch in July 2013. The author's hypothesis for this has directness and simplicity. The Brothers rose to power thanks to organizational strength unmatched by any other Egyptian political trend. However, those very same strengths paradoxically incapacitated the Brothers organization as an instrument of governance. Given their rigidly hierarchical organizational structures and disciplined culture of obedience, the Brothers came to democratic power with no sense of the give-and-take needed to negotiate modern politics. They failed to cultivate allies and showed little inclination to build necessary support for policies. The skills of political compromise essentially eluded them, and in the end, they were easily dismantled through a coup followed by crackdown. There are no loose ends or theoretical nuances in this streamlined logic.
The highly abstract character of this argument may not be immediately apparent. The work presents itself as the product of extensive interviews over a number of years with high- and mid-high-level Muslim Brothers. It is reassuring to readers to review the appendix with the impressive chart of names, positions, and dates of interviews for so many upper and mid-level Brothers. Missing, however, is thoughtful analysis of the substantive content of the interviews. Exactly what comes out of the interviews that is new and not already implicit in the institutional analysis is not at all clear. What did Trager actually learn from those many hours of structured discussion and questioning?
What we hear is Trager's confident voice as the questioner. That voice overwhelms all others. Responses from the Brothers are cherry-picked, providing selective confirmations of the prior hypothesis. The author himself makes it clear just how important “racking up” this interview count was to his research strategy. Those familiar with the Egyptian political landscape may understand how difficult securing such interviews must have been; but an impressive interview count is not the same thing as serious reflection and explication of what of value has been learned. Astonishingly, readers are given little opportunity to overhear the conversations that must have been part of the formal encounters; they only hear the bits and pieces filtered through Trager. Readers thus cannot judge for themselves if other contextual forces mattered—for instance, if the Islamic dimensions of political commitments shaped political choices by the Brothers. Indeed, it is very strange to pay so little attention to the role Islam itself plays in Trager's story about an Islamic political group. Was there really nothing in all those interviews about commitment to Islam that meaningfully challenged the author's fixed view of the Brothers? Does the theocratic and totalitarian characterization with which the book begins and ends really say it all?
On the conceptual plane, Trager's work is thin. The relevance of key concepts is simply asserted. The concepts themselves, such as totalitarianism and theocracy, are unexplained. The rich literature in which they are embedded remains unexamined. Not surprisingly, false equivalencies abound. Most often, these concepts are deployed simply as blunt pejoratives. For instance, Hasan al-Banna's “all-embracing” characterization of Islam as a comprehensive worldview is pronounced totalitarian and theocratic. I know of no Islamic intellectuals who would question al-Banna's summary view; what they would object to is the unstated assumption that Islam's comprehensive character requires it to behave in a totalitarian and theocratic manner within the political arena. Perhaps Trager's analysis should not surprise in this regard. After all, there is an established tradition of not taking the religious dimension of Islamic political movements seriously, a mistake that has its deepest roots in the Orientalist tradition of scholarship in which I was initially trained. Sadly, Trager's book would suggest the influence of that viewpoint remains strong. For scholars like him, Islamic movements have very little to do with Islam. Consequently, such forces offer no instruction on the prospect of an Islamic renewal that engages so many serious intellectuals in Islamic lands, including many who passed through the Muslim Brothers. Such studied inattention is odd, not least because major participants in ongoing dialogues in Islamic intellectual circles, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi or Muhammad al-Ghazalli, always described themselves as coming from the “school” of the Muslim Brothers.
With Islam itself pushed to the side, it will come as no surprise that Trager's hermetically sealed, self-contained explanation provides no opening for consideration of even the most instructive side issues. There is no room, for example, for a consideration of why Egyptian leftists and liberals threw themselves with such abandon into the arms of the military figures who ended the tenure of Egypt's first democratically elected president. Surely, that betrayal too is part of the story.
Few observers would question that the organizational prowess of the Brothers factored into their historical development. Yet even fewer, I suspect, would agree with Trager that these organizational strengths alone were determinative in the ways this study seems to suggest. The narrowness of the theoretical focus suggests that all key questions can be posed and dispatched in narrow institutional terms. Moreover, Trager assures us that prospects of change in a Brotherhood trajectory devoid of religious weight or even serious intellectual content are nil. The author's theoretical perspective rules out consideration of the possibility of transformative evolution. It is all so neat, buttoned-down—and un-Egyptian. Readers will no doubt be left with the nagging question of how an Islamic movement so impervious to change, so unresponsive to its environment, and so slow to learning, could ever manage to survive and flourish for almost a century.
