Both of these books focus on efforts to create a new nation-state based in Saigon in the wake of France's defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. Jessica Chapman focuses on the struggle of southern politico-religious organizations in 1954–55 to protect their interests while prime minister, then president Ngo Dinh Diem maneuvered to neutralize opponents and construct a centralized state. Edward Miller takes the story forward skillfully to late 1963, when Diem was overthrown and killed. Both authors downgrade Cold War causation in favor of southern Vietnamese political agency. Miller also demonstrates multiple American theories of nation building at work.
Chapman offers readers valuable new information on three southern organizations, the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen, each of which she contends had national political ambitions and substantial power and influence south of the 17th parallel. Cao Dai leaders even foresaw their faith becoming the national religion of a unified Vietnam, although a quarter-century of prior effort had failed to gain them more than a handful of converts beyond the Mekong delta. As Chapman acknowledges, leaders of politico-religious organizations proved unable to sustain a united front alternative to Diem. Chapman repeatedly talks of Diem “annihilating” the politico-religious organizations, yet they never received the draconian treatment meted out to alleged communist adherents. The Cao Dai and Hoa Hao reentered the political scene following Diem's elimination, endured a decade of repression after 1975, but today can be found wielding influence in a number of southern provinces.
Miller asks, “What explains the spectacular early triumphs and equally spectacular demise of the Ngo Dinh Diem government? And what accounts for the tumultuous course of his relationship with the United States between 1954 and 1963?” (p. 8). He tackles these questions systematically and in large part convincingly. Diem, unlike his 1954–55 opponents, adhered to a coherent strategy and proved quite adept at divide-and-rule tactics, aided by his younger brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. It certainly helped that the United States began providing Diem with huge amounts of military and economic aid. When we get to 1963, however, I think Miller overstates Diem's rationality in dealing with growing threats. And his brother Nhu seemed to be on cloud nine. Partly this was due to an increasingly narrow intelligence base. On November 1, the day of the army coup, Nhu was still putting all of his faith in a single general who had already switched sides.
The late 1950s and 1960s in America saw an explosion of “development studies” aimed at societies like Vietnam. Miller delineates adroitly the high modernist and low modernist policies that different agencies applied in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Unfortunately, he neglects to point out that the quest for modernity also preoccupied members of the Vietnamese intelligentsia for three decades. Some of them moved to implement their ideas in power following the formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in late 1945. By 1961, American developmental discourse on Vietnam had been subsumed to counterinsurgency planning. Some practitioners insisted that physical security be achieved first; others argued that sociopolitical reforms had to come first. Both groups insisted that thousands of American “advisors” possess domestic powers and an independent chain of command. Nobody insisted that such individuals needed to serve for five years or more to be effective, or that the entire project might take ten or fifteen years. Meanwhile, Ngo Dinh Nhu's prescient fear was that a massive increase in U.S. involvement might be followed by an American change of heart and precipitous withdrawal.
Of course the target of counterinsurgency was “insurgents.” But what if many opponents of Diem and his RVN retained loyalty to another existing state, the DRV, which vigorously affirmed the territorial integrity of Vietnam? Chapman and Miller say almost nothing about the DRV. Chapman mistakenly refers to the “1946 Viet Minh election” (p. 164) and labels the DRV National Assembly and People's Army of Vietnam as “Viet Minh.” Miller has the French being defeated by the Viet Minh. Later his “Viet Minh” term is replaced by communist insurgents, communist operatives, and a communist radio network. While the intention of the Vietnam Workers' Party to exercise control over the entire country is indisputable, it does not follow that all adherents of the DRV or National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam were communists or operated under Workers' Party command.
Chapman and Miller both focus heavily on Saigon and the Mekong delta (“Cochinchina” under the French), neglecting the central region extending to the 17th parallel. When Chapman refers to “southern Vietnamese nationalism,” it is not clear whether she means the Cochinchina irredentism still fashionable among some better-off residents, or southern believers in a nation of Vietnam extending from the Chinese border to the Ca Mau peninsula. Ngo Dinh Diem believed in the latter and insisted that one day the RVN would rule over the entire country. He also understood that Ho Chi Minh was his main rival. Twelve years after Diem's death, Saigon became Ho Chi Minh City, an idea first touted in 1946.
Mining recently available archival files and newspaper collections, Chapman and Miller demonstrate the considerable complexity of southern political culture in the 1950s. Chapman sees a “multi-sided tug-of-war” (p. 196) rather than a tide moving steadily in one direction. She concludes that alternatives to Diem did exist, ranging from installation of a coalition government to a total U.S. exit from Vietnam. Miller acknowledges that “Diem and his American allies were bound by a common failing: an unwillingness to accommodate South Vietnam's myriad and diverse revolutionary organizations” (p. 18). He also shows us how Diem imposed his authority with vital help from part of the Associated State of Vietnam army created by the French, then proceded to concentrate power in the office of the presidency.
In retrospect, southern Vietnam's only hope for sustaining a new state was federalism, whereby both local and central interests could be protected. Unfortunately, no federalist tradition existed in Vietnam, nor apparently did any of the politico-religious organizations table a federalist constitution. Interestingly, the Michigan State University Group in 1956 recommended making the RVN more like the United States, with area chiefs and councils functioning like U.S. state governors and legislatures. But Diem had no interest in federalism.
One reason why both Diem and the United States rejected any federal or coalition proposal was concern that political opinion might drift towards a neutral or nonaligned RVN. The U.S. ambassador worried that Pham Cong Tac, the Cao Dai “pope,” would be lured by the will-of-the-wisp of neutralism. Diem condemned intellectuals who sought a “third way” between American and Soviet blocs, eventually jailing or deporting them. Nonalignment became a serious option after Diem was overthrown, only to be snuffed out by the U.S.-sponsored second coup of January 30, 1964. The Cold War continued to play a key role in the fate of Vietnam until the late 1980s.
