This is a strange book. From the title, one might expect that it would take up Oakeshott's complicated understanding and deployment of skepticism throughout his philosophical career; perhaps also his relationship to such favorite skeptical authors as Montaigne, Hobbes, Pascal, Hume, and F. H. Bradley. But Aryeh Botwinick has something else in mind in his book; something both more ambitious and less satisfying. Instead of providing a detailed analysis of Oakeshott's own views on and uses of skepticism, Botwinick uses Oakeshott to illustrate a larger thesis about how skepticism—which he construes largely in terms of a radical antifoundationalism—issues in a profoundly religious or mystical view of the world. This is not an uninteresting thesis, but whether it captures what is most important and distinctive about Oakeshott's skepticism or his philosophy in general is doubtful.
In reconstructing Botwinick's argument, let me begin with his specific understanding of skepticism. He does not, as Oakeshott primarily did, identify skepticism with a deep distrust about the application of reason to politics or about utopianism in politics. Nor does he identify it with the kind of radical questioning that Oakeshott associated with his philosophical heroes Hobbes, Hegel, and Bradley. Rather, Botwinick construes skepticism mainly in terms of the metaphysical position that “highlights the role of conceptualization and categorization in yielding the world that we take for granted”: what he refers to as “skeptical idealism,” a position that eventually ripens into postmodernism (1). He does not spend a great deal of time developing this metaphysical view out of a detailed analysis of Oakeshott's works—Experience and Its Modes, “The Voice of Poetry in Mankind,” and On Human Conduct would be the most relevant ones. Rather, he grounds it almost exclusively on Oakeshott's contention that there is no absolute factual foundation for our theories, that everything we call “fact” is really a low-level theory. This “underdetermination of theory by fact” constitutes the “hard conceptual core of skepticism” (64). Somewhat surprisingly, Botwinick sees Plato, not Bradley or Hegel, as the great philosophical inspiration for Oakeshott's antifoundationalism here.
The second step in Botwinick's argument is to show how skepticism thus understood “issues forth in mysticism” (2). The underdetermination of theory by fact leads to the possibility that any “factual” condition can be accounted for by a variety of different and even contradictory theories. Because contradiction is unavoidable, skepticism turns into a “generalized agnosticism” (yes, there is a fair amount of jargon in the book), which paves the way for the rehabilitation of all the concepts that skepticism has traditionally discredited—God, truth, morality, and so forth. Skepticism about skepticism allows the world to be filled again with the beautiful possibilities that have traditionally given life meaning, thus leading to the “mysticism of everyday life.” Botwinick finds the link he is making between skepticism and mysticism perfectly illustrated in the famous ending of Wittgenstein's Tractatus: “That of which we cannot speak we must pass over in silence.” He also traces it back to a wide variety of more religious writers, ranging from Augustine and Anselm to Avicenna, Maimonides, and Nicholas of Cusa.
Where does Oakeshott fit into all of this? That, indeed, is the question, especially since Botwinick spends so little time (again) exploring Oakeshott's actual views on religion. He only briefly alludes to Oakeshott's profound evocation of religious sentiment in On Human Conduct; and he fails to bring out the central significance of religion for Oakeshott as an attempt to overcome the inherently unsatisfying character of practical life, the “deadliness of doing.” Most problematically of all, he relies heavily on the very early, unpublished “Essay on the Relations of Philosophy, Poetry, and Reality” to establish Oakeshott's affinity for mysticism, claiming implausibly that this essay forms the basis of “virtually the whole corpus of [Oakeshott's] later philosophy beginning with Experience and Its Modes” (69). It is true that in this youthful essay (dubiously identified as his fellowship dissertation of 1924–25) Oakeshott argued that ultimate reality can only be grasped by the intuitive forms of experience of religion and poetry. But he decisively rejected this view in Experience and Its Modes, where only philosophy is said to pursue the concrete whole of experience. While Botwinick acknowledges Oakeshott's rejection of religion as an abstract and defective form of experience in Experience and Its Modes, he tries to blunt the damage this does to his thesis about Oakeshott's mysticism by claiming that the latter denied that any form of experience, including philosophy, escaped such abstractness and contingency. In this way, he makes Oakeshott into an antifoundationalist malgré lui.
As far as Oakeshott's political philosophy is concerned, Botwinick sees it—specifically Oakeshott's liberal conception of the state—as flowing directly from his understanding of the mysticism of everyday life. As he puts it in one place: “for [Oakeshott] liberal society … represents … an institutionalized political translation of a mystical sensibility” (166). Here, perhaps more than in any other part of the book, Botwinick's portrayal of Oakeshott is nearly unrecognizable. Whereas Oakeshott himself defends liberalism largely on a nonmetaphysical basis as the theory of government most appropriate to our historical circumstances, Botwinick claims that he “gives us a metaphysicalized liberalism where the structure and design of political society are crucially responsive to a number of independently argued philosophical imperatives” (118–19). Oakeshott's monumental effort to specify the postulates of civil association and categorically differentiate this mode of association from any sort of enterprise association dissolves into a featureless mush when subjected to Botwinick's antifoundationalist reading of it. According to the latter, Oakeshott's liberal state encodes “metaphysical emptiness” (42) and “institutionalizes deferral” (139); it replicates the “openness and persistent flux of our metaphysical condition” (165). If this were all there were to Oakeshott's political philosophy, it is not clear why anyone would take it seriously for very long.
Botwinick's antifoundationalist reading of Oakeshott's philosophy exhibits the weaknesses of all such readings: it reduces the richness and specificity of Oakeshott's theorizing about a variety of subjects—from politics and law to history, religion, art, and education—to a monotonous repetition of a metaphilosophical theme. It is not that Oakeshott's skepticism doesn't have some important affinities with contemporary antifoundationalism or postmodernism. But what makes it distinctive and worth studying is that it does not lead to a radical skepticism about the possibility or value of philosophy itself. In this respect, postmodernist interpreters like Botwinick would do well to try to learn from Oakeshott's skepticism rather than uncritically assimilating it to their own brand of relativistic antifoundationalism.
