Tracy Strong, eminent interpreter of Rousseau and Nietzsche, has delivered, with his Politics without Vision: Thinking without a Banister in the Twentieth Century, a learned, wonderfully measured, insightful consideration of a number of twentieth-century authors—and two important antecedents in Kant and Nietzsche—motivated by the hope that they can supply some guidance for us today as we endeavor to think about politics. Strong takes as given the massive fact, announced by Nietzsche, of the death of God and thus our situation in a world that is inherently chaotic and bereft of meaning, and where all authoritative standards have been shown to be suspect in their foundations. We are thus enjoined to look for help, as it were, from the cohort of political thinkers who first faced this disturbing realization. Strong, to his credit, has no illusions about the ghastly politics of several of the authors under consideration (Schmitt's and Heidegger's Nazism, the “often brutal” Lenin). He insists, however, that we cannot simply cast their efforts aside without any further thought; it is incumbent on us to understand such grisly politics, because we still share, whether we like it or not, in much of what led to the horrors of the twentieth century. Can we find, in working our way through the paths of thought followed by such figures, byways or tracks yet untraveled and perhaps less awful than those courses already taken?
The problem with which the book is concerned is less what to think than how to think about “the political,” given the inaccessibility of the noumenal, or, as Strong construes it following Nietzsche, the death of God. The book is structured such that chapters on Kant and Nietzsche introduce us to the style of thinking in the set of authors with whom Strong is concerned (Weber, Freud, Lenin, Schmitt, Heidegger, and Arendt). The tour through Weber, Freud, Lenin, Schmitt, and Heidegger has the ambiguous quality of never laying out, in advance or even in conclusion, really, where they fit in the argument as a whole, or of summarily evaluating them. We wait until the chapter on Arendt to see confirmed what the quotation of her in the subtitle (“thinking without a banister”) already announced: that Arendt is, if not our hero then our guide through the problems discerned by and in the other thinkers. We are given a Kantian Arendt—Kantian by way of Heidegger and the others, to be sure—where the Third Critique supplies guidance for our thinking the political.
The treatments of each thinker in the main core of the book—Nietzsche through Arendt—is very fine. The individual discussions might easily stand on their own as highly worthwhile introductions to each thinker. The considerations of Kant and Nietzsche are handled with a view to the arc of the book as a whole and are supported by some very elegant textual exegeses. The assessments of Schmitt's and Heidegger's Nazism are most thoughtful; the discussion of Heidegger's politics in particular is, in my opinion, in the first ranks of such studies.
The reader might pull together elements from each chapter of the book to compose the following set of considerations. What now of political life, now that we have dispensed with our tutelage and come into our maturity? What sort of authority is appropriate in such a time? For an answer, Strong looks to Kant's aesthetic, rather than his moral or political, writings, to understand how a judgment made in the first-person singular might be broadened, without compulsion, to enlist the response of one's fellows, and thus apply to the first-person plural. Given that the noumenal is unavailable for orienting aesthetic-political judgment, then “the political” is the space in which such claims may be offered and received. Such claims require more than mere reception, however. As Strong articulates it in his study of Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy, such claims—like the musical language of the Greeks—inherently require a response, they summon assent or dissent necessarily, not with recourse to a preexisting standard, but as elements contributed to a composition. Such musical responsiveness formed a community.
Strong reads each of the next three thinkers he treats as responding to the absence of accessible meaning in the world along the lines he has drawn out from Nietzsche and Kant. Weber, Freud, and Lenin confront this problem: what is to be done when rationality presents the world to us in such a crushing, alienating, meaning-destroying, “steel casing” (Strong's preferred translation of stahlhartes Gehäuse, Weber's “iron cage”). For Weber, the rational-bureaucratic organization, rule-making and -following, response to the meaning-bereft world has (nearly) foreclosed the possibility of a genuinely human, in Strong's reading political, existence. For Freud, civilization requires the internal disorder of our selves; this condition perhaps only being ameliorated by apostles such as himself. For Lenin, rational reflection upon current conditions points to nothing more radical than trade unionism; the party alone, disciplined professional characters, might convey us into the future. Each envisions, one way or another, the asphyxiating condition that rationality amidst a world where all structures of meaning have collapsed has led and can lead to nothing but alienation. Something other is required. Strong traces the endeavors of Schmitt and Heidegger to confront a similar assessment of our condition. He recovers from them a sense of the political as conjuring its own dignity “from nothing,” and as taking place in the polis, being the location of our genuinely communal existence.
Drawing together elements from the work of his preceding chapters, Strong sees in Arendt a composition that responds to the political perils—sometimes diagnosed, sometimes exacerbated—at work in the other authors treated in the book. He construes her position thus: A mature person, of “enlarged consciousness,” suitably called, might venture both to accept our condition and yet offer into the public—that is, the polis—a new response, generated from nothing, which summons up from others a new response of their own. Such responses may form the elements, in turn, of a political community. The nucleus of responders might (initially?) form a party or share in a movement with one another. This venture must, however, be new, lest it simply be a tedious recapitulation of what already is, and as such sink back into the rule-oriented scrim disguising the torturous chaos of reality. Strong, it is fair to say, hopes that such visionary expectations for the possibility of the political—if not discredited politics itself—might repair us from the quiet desperation of our lives amidst capitalist imperialism.
The foregoing barely scratches the surface of a most wending, learned book. Strong's creditable thoughtfulness has already made much possible criticism internal to his work. I should like, however, to press a few points about criteria. By what criteria should we accept Strong's claims, for example, that democracy is a preferable political system to what Lenin or Schmitt envisioned? The basis seems to be a broad “we” who agree with him. But in seeking to move our claims from the first-person singular to the first-person plural, are we entitled to deny the need to attempt what might be called third-person claims—criteria, as it were, or banisters—such as were reasoned out by Plato, Aristotle, and others? This difficulty may be applied to other areas of Strong's analysis: Strong repeatedly acknowledges the difficulty in distinguishing a madman from a genius, given the lack of sound criteria. A related difficulty arises when evaluating claims to maturity. Some of the picture Strong gives of the mature person—purportedly autonomous, refusing all preexisting forms of guidance, insisting “I can do it myself!”—sounds petulant and childish, precisely immature. If maturity consists, though, in some part, in accepting our situation—as in Strong's sketch of Weber's noble call—might it not require us to accept that, whether we like it or not, we are in some respects provided with “banisters”? Can we evaluate maturity without referring to (our) nature?
That “God is dead” is a premise, not a conclusion, of Strong's book, and not argued for so much as referred to. Strong, quoting Arendt, concludes: “If our ‘essence is a beginning,’” then “the ‘customary’ will be inadequate to understand what has come to be” (375). It is then incumbent on us to think about our supposedly unprecedented circumstances without a banister. If our essence is a beginning… But if not?
