Terry F. Godlove's book explores the resources Kant's epistemic theory of conceptual content has for current scholarly debates regarding the meaning of the term “religion.” According to Godlove, the stress Kant lays upon the fundamental incompleteness of conceptual definitions means that philosophers of religion need to take on a concomitantly flexible attitude toward the legitimacy and necessity of generalizations. This flexibility is paramount for anyone taking part in the study of religion, which in recent years has come to see the term “religion” as a hopelessly Procrustean imposition of rigid boundaries upon multifarious practices that admit of no shared universal feature. Godlove's thesis is that Kant's “spatial theory of concepts” provides us with a way to remain faithful to local details and variation, while simultaneously allowing us to make useful (albeit provisional and defeasible) explanatory connections between these richly variegated phenomena. Godlove carefully unpacks Kant's epistemology through continual elucidation of passages in the Critique of Pure Reason with parallel insights from major figures in analytic philosophy, such as Quine, Brandom, and Proudfoot. Rather than set forth a comprehensive view of Kant's “moral religion,” Godlove uses the main concepts involved therein—“God,” “soul,” and the like—as test cases for how one might apply the aforementioned “spatial theory of concepts” to issues of contemporary religious study. The result is an ambitious and engaging book that promises to unsettle and provoke serious reflection on the way philosophers of religion do their philosophizing.
Godlove sets forth this challenge in six chapters of roughly equal size. After a brief introduction announcing his aims, Godlove grounds his first chapter in a close study of a fascinating passage from the first Critique (A655–56/B683–84), wherein Kant compares concepts to regions of space which admit of infinite subdivision (hence this is a “spatial theory of concepts”), with no infima species. Because Kant holds all concepts to be composed out of narrower concepts—which are in turn composed of still more minute concepts, nested ad infinitum—the level of specificity demanded of any concept hinges upon the work that we call upon it to do in organizing the phenomenon in question. Since the human mind is finite and works discursively, it is impossible for us to exhaustively comprehend all this nested detail just from a concept alone (unlike the Leibnizian divinity), and thus we must have sensible intuitions for there to be any content to our concepts. Godlove accordingly sees a kinship between Kant and contemporary anti-essentialist scholars who critique the possibility of giving conclusive definitions of religion(s), which forms the subject of the second chapter. One provocative and intriguing result Godlove draws from this inherent incompleteness of all our definitions is that contemporary scholars who insist on particularistic theories of religion are erroneously presuming our minds have the infinite scrutiny of Leibniz's God. The third chapter interprets Kant's regulative principles to have no kind of objective validity (even of an indeterminate sort), and thus reason's search for systematicity need only stretch as far as our sensible intuitions require organization. Our experiences, however immediate and receptive they may be, never provide access to supernatural causes, as Godlove argues (contra Schleiermacher) in the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter uses Kant's agnosticism about a substantial soul to conclude that debates about the capacity for individual religious observations to stand apart from social conditioning are irresolvable. In the final chapter, Godlove moves from a deflationary account of God-talk as theoretically inert (164) and practically superfluous (166) to the claim that explanations of the hidden logic in religious movements—that capitalism recreates the structure of Protestantism (Weber), or that religion consists in social density (Durkheim), for example—are tenable to the extent that they usefully (but defeasibly) organize the phenomena. Godlove concludes with brief remarks about how Kantian epistemology necessarily entails a thin concept of religion, as is evident in the philosophy of religion's eclipse by sociological study.
Stylistically, this book's tone is winsome and clear, although it occasionally creaks under the weight of sundry discussions of luminaries from the twentieth century. On one emblematic page (108), Godlove discusses Proudfoot, Schleiermacher, Van Harvey, Richard Crouter, McDowell, and Quine, on the way to Kant. His broader point that all experience is conceptually determinable gets lost under such density of allusion. Particularly in the second half of the book, readers may wonder whether every one of these invocations is essential—or, conversely, whether Kant is equally essential to Godlove's thesis as these other thinkers.
Godlove repeatedly finds himself torn between emulating Kant's approach and distancing himself from the substantive claims Kant took that approach to entail. While he is hardly alone in taking a deflationary reading of Kant, Godlove frequently begs off from explaining how this reading can fit with passages about the primacy of practical reason and its intrinsic demand to instantiate ideas of moral integrity. In other words, Godlove continually underplays the extent to which Kant takes some ideas of reason (and not just empirical concepts) to have meaningful content. In fact, Godlove has no substantive discussion of the difference between the key terms “concept” (Begriff) and “idea” (Idee), when Kant frequently stresses the importance of this distinction for coherent theorizing and consistent praxis (Critique of Pure Reason, A319/B375). Godlove does not bring up the technical term “idea” until relatively late in his book (72), elides its importance by elsewhere treating it as “higher-order generalization” (e.g., 72, 73), and at times uses “idea” interchangeably with “concept” (e.g., 53). This neglect serves to shore up Godlove's reading of Kant as embarked upon a “humanizing project,” as though Kant took ideas (such as the idea of God) to be functionally vacuous and meaningless (160). It is no wonder that Godlove repeatedly dismisses Kant's moral religion as unappealingly devoid of content when he has stacked the deck to regard all content as empirical.
Godlove's neglect fails to account for the practically significant role Kant affords symbolic ways of talking about God, as these can indicate some kind of meaningful content without lapsing into anthropomorphism (see, for example, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:353). At one point, Godlove approvingly cites an interpreter (Ferreira) who holds that “the moral law is the stand-in for the sensible intuition that is lacking” (216), yet he does not appear to notice how this admission is at odds with the fundamental thesis of his book. He momentarily edges toward this possibility of morally meaningful content (164–65), only to dismiss it without argument, saying that when it comes to his practical postulates, Kant is not “interested in understanding what anyone actually means by using the term ‘God’” (167). In fact, Kant strenuously criticizes priests on this very issue in the fourth section of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, a text that receives curiously little attention for a book on the resources Kant offers philosophers of religion. These objections aside, Godlove's argument that particularistic accounts of religion implicitly presuppose Leibnizian omniscience is quite potent and well demonstrated, and by itself makes this book merit the attention of scholars in the fields of philosophy, religious studies, and sociology.
