In A Social Theory of Congress, Brian Alexander provides welcomed insights into our understanding of legislative process in the US Congress. Borrowing heavily from the work of Martha Finnemore (National Interests in International Society, 1996) and Alexander Wendt (Social Theory of International Politics, 1999), he uses their assessment of international relations to inform his own unique understanding of contemporary Congresses. Specifically, Alexander suggests that evolving congressional norms circumscribe member identities and interests. This view embraces the notion that ideas can independently determine member interests divorced from any consideration of what is rational. In the end, the ideas define what is appropriate and become both member preferences and part of their identity as sitting legislators. Alexander argues that real-world or “material” consequences are secondary to these preferences. For instance, the idea, or norm, of partisanship may shape member behavior irrespective of any rational consideration of what defines good public policy or even the best interests of the party organization.

The book’s subtitle, Legislative Norms in the Twenty-First Century, suggests that this new way of thinking about the behavior of our elected members of Congress is tied to the contemporary period. Yet, it is wholly possible that Alexander is uncovering and discussing the reality of what has motivated members of Congress throughout its storied history. Upon entering Congress, members find themselves in a workplace with defined parameters for acceptable social behavior, and these guardrails presumably work to modify and define each member’s distinctiveness and professional pursuits. This thinking represents a significant—and important—break from the notion that members are simply trying to get reelected or gain prestige and power within the institution. Notably, Alexander does not attempt to discredit the vast amount of scholarship that uses a rational choice perspective to define legislative activities and instead adds another antecedent layer to our understanding of member behavior.

Alexander makes use of his several years of experience on Capitol Hill to accumulate interview, observational, and survey data. Appendices in the book offer details regarding data collection and other methodological issues. He uses the accumulation of evidence to identify existing norms in contemporary Congresses. In particular, he notes that conflict norms of nonconformity and disruptiveness have become an important component of legislative deliberation. He aptly points out that ideology, or political objectives, are not sufficient to explain the emerging conflict norms. Disruptive behavior has taken on a purpose and meaning that does not comport with purely rational motives. Paradoxically, he finds that the norm of cooperation is alive and well in the modern Congress. The cooperation identified by Donald Mathews (1960) in his study of the Senate 60 years ago, Alexander finds still present. Moreover, Alexander suggests that without the consistency of norms of cooperation, Congress would be even “more confrontational and disruptive than it already is” (p. 89).

In addition, ideological extremism cannot account for the emergent norms of nonconformity. Alexander notes that moderate members of Congress have also engaged in sit-ins and used other disruptive tactics. Instead of ideology, he argues that disruptive conduct has simply become an acceptable mode of behavior. In other words, disorder has become a new norm. Similarly, Alexander recognizes that partisanship, in contemporary Congresses, is often not intended to produce desired policy or electoral outcomes. Instead, the new norm of hyper-partisanship precedes member desires. This point is an important one and arguably one that is not fully understood or appreciated by most members of Congress today. It is easy to imagine that many members believe that their strong party loyalty serves a well-defined purpose, when it may be little more than an idea that informs what they perceive as appropriate. In turn, their preferences are established via a new custom and are not the product of their calculated self-interest.

A concern with this work is the failure to fully appreciate that there are other congressional periods, which are as partisan and conflict laden as the twenty-first-century Congresses. Alexander does note that the pre–Civil War period experienced norms of nonconformity or instances when disruption was fitting. However, he fails to explicitly recognize that conflict norms have, undoubtedly, waxed and waned throughout congressional history. The ability to test this might seem difficult at first glance. But if one were to identify corollaries to changing norms of conflict and cooperation, one could measure these occurrences in different times. For instance, if nonconformity leads to greater stalemate, or less meaningful legislative output, one could assess this relationship over time. It is quite possible to imagine a linear relationship wherein varying levels of conformity affect legislative outcomes in a predictable manner throughout congressional history. Alexander does recognize that the origins of the norms of conflict “can perhaps be traced back to Thomas Jefferson” (p. 96). Others routinely recognize the role party-system polarization plays in legislative productivity. Is there a similar role played by adherence to conformity norms? Although Alexander cautions us to not think exclusively in a positivist manner, his social theory of Congress does lend itself to this type of testing, and it would be a welcomed extension of the current work.

Beyond norms of nonconformity and partisanship, and their important implications, Alexander also identifies new congressional norms of sobriety and sexual propriety. The latter he notes has changed formal rules, which indicates progress in gender parity. This important observation is welcomed, although Alexander leaves the reader wanting more in the way of an analysis of its implications. A logical extension might be that these changes have helped to perpetuate the norm of cooperation. In other words, the evolution of norms associated with basic decencies might cause a coalescing around the norm of cooperation with implications for a more competent institutional setting. Alexander fails to explore this possibility. In fact, we are not even afforded an opportunity, based on the presentation of his data, to conjecture whether Congress lags behind or leads social institutions in the embrace of basic norms of solemnity and sexual decency.

In all, A Social Theory of Congress represents a welcomed break from rational choice-centric studies of congressional behavior. Alexander’s insights represent an important contribution that may lead to a paradigm shift in our understanding of legislatures. Explicitly, Alexander’s call is for a better understanding of the origins and qualities of new norms or “ideas” (p. 125). One possible explanation for the growing acceptance of nonconformity and partisanship would be a recruitment bias, or a fundamental shift in who retires and who subsequently runs to fill those vacancies. It is not difficult to imagine that the need to raise extraordinary sums of money in election campaigns—or to have extraordinary sums of money at one’s disposal—colors the type of individual who can or will run for congressional office in contemporary times. An examination of the relative level of wealth, education, or the occupational backgrounds of sitting legislators, over time, might prompt a better understanding of the arrival of conflict norms and move us closer to a standardizing ideal of appropriate norm-based preferences.