I would first like to thank the editors of Archaeological dialogues for inviting me to comment on Kerstin P. Hofmann and Philipp W. Stockhammer's paper on the present situation of archaeological theory in German-speaking prehistoric archaeology (GSA). The message the authors wish to communicate to an international audience is relatively simple and straightforward. GSA, which for a long time seemed ‘generally uninterested in theoretical debates’ (p. 1), has since about the year 2000 radically changed its outlook. This change is seen reflected in a large corpus of theoretically oriented case studies (represented in a list of some four hundred titles added to the paper), that in the eyes of the authors deserves the attention of the international scientific community. This positive development is interpreted as a result both of a growing interest in overarching research questions of cultural studies and of the public funding of large-scale cooperative research projects.

The development described is in a certain sense mirrored in the academic careers of the authors, who both entered the scientific community around the year 2000 and after long years of engagement only recently took permanent positions. In this regard the paper might also be read as an attempt by the authors to put their own contributions to this academic field in a proper relation to their discipline's recent achievements. In any case the paper has to be looked on as a ‘grand narrative’, which formulates a new historical identity for GSA. This new identity is defined in opposition to two other academic traditions: traditional GSA before the year 2000 (as the historical basis for this new paradigm) and the theoretical archaeology of anglophone countries that greatly contributed to the recent developments within GSA by setting up new agendas for archaeological research which inspired young scholars even in the German-speaking countries.

Traditional GSA is characterized by the authors as ‘antiquarianism’, a term normally used to describe a complex of epistemological practices common in early modern times in dealing with material relics. In this sense it represents a paradigm which is strictly opposed to that of (modern) historiography. But this statement does not include a value judgement (e.g. Dick Reference Dick1988, 155; cf. Sawilla Reference Sawilla, Wallnig, Stockinger, Peper and Fiska2012). Hofmann and Stockhammer, on the other hand, clearly use the term not only for a different historical context but also in a clearly pejorative sense: antiquarianism for them represents a practice of collecting, preserving and ordering of archaeological materials without a clearly formulated research agenda.

Such a positivistic orientation indeed has repeatedly been associated with post-war GSA in recent decades and there are, of course, some arguments supporting this thesis. Nevertheless it is fair to say that similar ideas are at least in part still present in the discipline today. Such a kind of reasoning, for example, forms the basis of modern archaeological heritage management (Bodendenkmalpflege), for which the preservation and classification of sites and finds are still imperative. The ideal here is not problem-oriented research, but the saving of monuments of the past, and the building of a broad archive still accessible in the distant future – and of practical value even under quite different epistemological premises compared with the present.

For this reason the rather strict distinction between an ‘antiquarianism’ of the past and a ‘theory-based’ archaeology of the present in the paper is misleading. The same applies to the term ‘antiquarianism’ itself. It would be better replaced by the term ‘positivism’, which points to a direction of reasoning that became fashionable in the sciences at the end of the 19th century far beyond Central Europe and archaeology. Among its leading exponents in the late 19th century in Germany were scholars like the pathologist Rudolf Virchow (1821–1902) and the historian Theodor Mommsen (1817–1903), who both exerted a strong influence on the early development of prehistoric archaeology (see Veit Reference Veit, Callmer, Meyer, Struwe and Theune2006b). Mommsen saw it as the central task of the historian to order the archives of the past, hoping that in future times it would become clear which items would prove worthy of preservation. In this context it is also worth mentioning that exactly this paradigm gave rise to the first large-scale collaborative state-financed research projects (Großforschung), an achievement that the authors of the present paper see as a constitutive element of the present theory-laden GSA.

Despite strong tendencies towards a historical individualization and strong reservations with regard to generalization, 19th-century positivism had a major impact on German prehistoric archaeology throughout the entire 20th century. It is popular in some contexts still today – even among theoretical archaeologists (cf. e.g. M.K.H. Eggert's (Reference Eggert2006, 65–67) effusive reference to the work of Sophus Müller (1846–1934)).

What follows from these observations? Either the roots of theoretical archaeology go back in time much further than postulated by Hofmann and Stockhammer, or modern GSA is less modern (and theoretical) than presented to us here. In any case, the paper lacks a sound empirical grounding with regard to the characterization of GSA concerning epistemology. And the same applies with regard to the presentation of anglophone archaeology, which is portrayed as the shining counterpart of traditional GSA, but whose contours largely remain blurred. A closer look at the history of ideas would have shown more clearly the similarities and differences between these two traditions.

These points certainly weaken the central thesis of the authors, which they themselves qualify in the course of their presentation by pointing to the persistence of antiquarian-style research today. But the aim of my comment is neither to reject nor to confirm this thesis. Instead I am interested primarily in the concept of archaeological theory that becomes visible behind the narrative presented.

The authors overtly subscribe to a comparatively broad understanding of ‘theory’, which comprises ‘all reflections on and assumptions about archaeological practice’ (p. 2). They regard it as imperative that ‘theories’ be operationalized ‘as methods in order to be used in the epistemological process’ (p. 2). On the other hand they avoid ‘“grand theory” in a rather philosophical sense’ (p. 2) and see the apparent lack of this kind of reasoning within modern GSA as not a major drawback. In this sense it seems fair to read this text as a plea for a kind of ‘theory-lite’. Such a position clearly has the advantage of making theory attractive not only for a minority but for a comparatively large number of scholars. At the same time it is in contradiction to the self-understanding of theorists within the humanities and social sciences. For them theory always is in opposition to the mainstream. As avant-garde it promises a release from the shackles of the established scholarly world view and a questioning of common sense. As enlightenment, theory searches for rational explanations of what formerly had been accepted without further questioning. As a critique of ideology, theory uncovers the social biases of actual research, and makes explicit its hidden prejudices. For this reason theoretical debates of the past even in archaeology often were presented as a fight against the scholarly as well as against the political establishment, and in this sense as an engagement for the underprivileged.

In other words, ‘theory’ always is in opposition to ‘normal science’ and aims at a perpetuation of T.S. Kuhn's famous ‘scientific revolution’. For the same reason, in the eyes of a ‘practitioner’ of archaeology, theory is primarily an offence, as in his eyes it hinders scientific progress. In this sense ‘theory’ has to be qualified as ‘dangerous’ and ‘subversive’. That is also the reason why theoretical archaeologists are always in danger of being regarded as arrogant. In this way this fact also may help us to understand why adherence to theory by some scholars is experienced as a kind of stigma.

These ideas are far away from the way ‘theory’ is presented in the present paper. For Hofmann and Stockhammer, theory clearly has not much to do with competition, conflict and crisis, but mainly with the peaceful coexistence of an array of diverging approaches that complement each other. Critical comments on allegedly ‘innovative approaches’ (described here as ‘harsh rejection’ (p. 4)) are seen as a danger for theoretical debate rather than as its indispensable prerequisite.

If we take ‘theory’ seriously, in my opinion we need to formulate our own theoretical position not only so that our ideas are intelligible. They also should be formulated as a challenge to former statements in order to provoke a reply. In any case, it is not enough to praise the multiplicity and complementarity of contributions within recent GSA and at the same time to ignore the existing incompatibilities between extant approaches. In this sense the apparent lack of dominant schools of thinking within modern GSA, positively interpreted by the authors as ‘flexibility’, perhaps more likely points to a lasting structural deficit in this scholarly tradition.

This situation is matched in the paper, in which a large number of contributions to different popular fields of investigation are presented, but only in exceptional cases is reference made to diverging positions. Apart from the wholesale condemnation of antiquarian archaeology, the authors themselves largely abstain from any critique. Only Burmeister is criticized for his adherence to old prejudices with regard to modern GSA. The actual fault lines between different factions within the community of German-speaking theoretical archaeologists remain largely unnoticed. This is especially unfortunate with regard to the international audience the authors wish to address, an observation which underlines the fact that the mission of the authors primarily is a ‘political’ and not a ‘theoretical’ one. In this sense the paper should primarily be read as a contribution to theory marketing.

This point is underlined by the fact that the more negative sides of recent theoretical discourse in GSA (and beyond) are ignored, as they would have become visible if the authors had studied in more detail the process of argumentation in some of the papers cited. When we take a closer look at recent publications, it is not unusual to find cases where name dropping replaces a critical evaluation of theories adopted from other disciplines or scholarly traditions within archaeology. At the same time we are often confronted with a lack of clear definitions of theoretical key terms, with the confusion of basic epistemological concepts and with sweeping statements and much too broad generalizations (e.g. Veit Reference Veit2016).

In this respect I see an urgent need to critically evaluate the outcome of recent large-scale corporate research projects from the point of view of archaeological theory. Not all of these projects have been equally successful in this point, even in the sense that the research started from sound hypotheses and was framed by well-defined terms and concepts. The DFG Fürstensitz project (Krausse Reference Krausse2008), for example, produced some remarkable new insights with new fieldwork and the application of new methods and techniques, but with regard to (culture) theory the results were meagre.

Nevertheless there is no reason for despair with GSA, since from time to time positive examples could also be discovered within the recent theory debate. In this sense we should perhaps for a moment forget our anger about missed chances and enjoy the rare moments when we find a wise comment, an unexpected comparison or a stunning new insight in a new theory-driven case study. And exactly these points seem worthy of being shared with the international community. Simple proclamations that GSA as a whole is back at the forefront of theoretical reasoning in archaeology instead are of rather limited value.

Taken altogether, the perspective offered by the present paper in my personal view is that of a ‘theory-lite’ that largely excludes contradiction and conflict. The central message is that antiquarianism is dead and those who chose to do theory are clearly on the right path. The question of which kind of ‘theory’ should be preferred, and for what reasons, is left open. At the same time some of the most worrying questions of contemporary theoretical debate are not even formulated: what shall we do with archaeologists or culture theorists who argue from a theoretical point of view (and for different reasons) for an at least partial return to ‘antiquarianism’ (e.g. Krausse Reference Krausse2006; Ernst Reference Ernst, Ebeling and Altekamp2004; Raulff Reference Raulff2014, 54 f.)? What is the position of GSA in relation to recent debates in the contemporary philosophy of both science and society? How can we accommodate the worrying recent debates about ‘post-theory’ (Jarvis and Oakley-Brown Reference Jarvis and Oakley-Brown2004; Grizelj and Jahraus Reference Grizelj and Jahraus2011; Felsch Reference Felsch2015) and ‘post-truth’ with the image of archaeological theory that is presented here? And finally, is GSA today really as open with respect to theory in its proper sense as the authors would have us believe?

There remain doubts not only with regard to the position formulated in the present article but with regard to GSA as a whole. In a recent archaeological textbook the authors explicitly argue, for example, for a dissociation of archaeology from the theoretical avant-garde within the humanities and sciences. The widespread metaphorical use of the term ‘archaeology’ in modern culture studies (e.g. Ebeling and Altekamp Reference Ebeling and Altekamp2004) is portrayed as a danger for what is called ‘true’ archaeology (Eggert and Samida Reference Eggert and Samida2009, 306). In my view such an erection of danger signs for students is not helpful for an archaeology that is proud of its theoretical orientation. And in the long run such a strategy might even prove not to be very effective, as obeying warnings in any way is at odds with the nature of theory.