Nigeria, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country with an estimated population of over 180 million people, is rich in natural resources, especially oil. It won independence from Britain in 1960, but it continually faces socioeconomic and political challenges that have bedeviled it for several decades. The precariousness of Nigeria's socioeconomic situation is further compounded by endemic corruption, a dysfunctional state system, and gross mismanagement of the nation's oil wealth. Stephen Ellis's This Present Darkness situates many of the challenges faced by Nigeria and Nigerians through a focus on the history of organized crime, which he locates within a purview that dates back to the precolonial times.
Ellis argues that the history of organized crime in Nigeria cannot be separated from important milestones that are sometimes local and other times global. To Ellis, mapping the history of organized crime in Nigeria involves recognizing the significant but devastating role of people-smuggling, which has roots in the trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic slave trade but continues today in the form of transnational prostitution gangs. More importantly, Ellis argues that organized crime in Nigeria does not exist in isolation of the Nigerian state. The Nigerian state, itself the inheritor of a particular colonial legacy that thrived on criminality and criminal behavior, continues to play an ignoble role in placing corrupt practices – which Ellis defines as organized crime – at the center of state policies and practices. As Ellis maintains, ‘while the survival of precolonial notions of honour and gift-giving have contributed to the rise of Nigeria's brand of political and state corruption, there has never been anything inevitable about this process. It has come about through the actions and inactions of individuals, especially powerful ones’ (224). The practice of gift-giving and demonstrating honor, which was once highly revered in the precolonial era in in many parts of Nigeria, has today been debased and inserted in a form of practice that renders honor itself an object of ridicule. Ellis traces the deterioration of honor and the corruption of gift-giving to colonial times and specifically to Fredrick Lugard, who recognized the important social and political forms of the colonial territories, and built a system of indirect rule around them. As Ellis notes, ‘colonialism opened vast new areas of social and economic space where traders and entrepreneurs, licit and otherwise, often continued to organize themselves in ways rooted in local history rather than in the form of the Western-style business firm or corporation’ (224).
Ellis identifies three individuals – Lugard, the colonial architect; Festus Okotie-Eboh, the Federal Minister of Finance in Nigeria's first republic; and General Ibrahim Babangida, president of Nigeria from 1985 to 1993 – who ‘have had a crucial effect in bringing about the situation that now prevails in Nigeria’. That is, these three leaders contributed to practices that are now rooted in state and corporate institutions and personal relationships as organized crime (225). While Ellis did not place the blame for organized crime squarely on Lugard, he suggests that Nigerians tend to blame the complexity of Nigeria's social, economic, and political problems on Lugard's 1914 amalgamation into a single territory of various colonial territories around the Niger Valley; in this setting, indirect rule was elevated from a mere ‘instrument of government into a dogma’ (225). For his part, Oktoie-Eboh was, according to Ellis, the ‘chief organizer of financial corruption at both national and regional level and the main builder of a system that still bears the marks of his handiwork’, while Babangida's government elevated corruption into a ‘coherent system’ at a time when ‘the relationship of political corruption to business and organized crime was in flux all over the world’ (225–6). This characterization of Babangida is appropriate, considering the role Babangida played and continues to play in the making of today's Nigeria; he has been a persistent figure in the Nigerian political landscape since he took part in the first military coup in 1966.
However, what is most fascinating about Ellis's analysis is his suggestion that the political space alone cannot account for the phenomenon of organized crime, because Nigerian crime has become a complex, dynamic, and all-encompassing enterprise that also dwells in the realm of spirits. A proper understanding of how Nigerians apprehend the spiritual world helps to illuminate the place of crime in its socioeconomic and political context. Ellis argues convincingly that, ‘Nigerians have thought, and generally still believe today, that wealth and prosperity have their ultimate origins in the spirit world and that no one can succeed in their career, whether in crime or in some legitimate profession, without securing blessings from the spirit world’ (4). Nowhere is this truer than in the growth of religious movements in Nigeria. Many of the religious groups, particularly the Pentecostal churches, often promise prosperity and wealth even in the face of a dire economic crisis. Organized crime in Nigeria is likewise woven through political, economic, and spiritual connections. That process reaches its apex in oil windfalls, which invite corrupt state officials to use their spiritual resources to fortify their political and economic relations. The result has been the proliferation of criminal gangs in many communities around the country. Nowhere is this process more prevalent than in the Niger Delta where government officials, politicians, and businessmen – both local and transnational – work in cahoots with criminal gangs to smuggle oil. In this setting, politics becomes a business transaction that is built around criminal behavior. This process ultimately shapes the democratic process: ‘in effect, democracy Nigerian-style involves plutocrats doing deals behind closed doors and offering candidates for public election who are most likely to triumph, at least in a party's heartlands, through rigged votes’ (146).
Throughout the book, Ellis draws attention to why it is important to see the evidence he presents as a form of organized crime even if, as he writes, ‘the typical Nigerian modus operandi stands in contrast to the more corporate-style structure of classic American organized crime groups that have exerted such a powerful influence on popular ideas about how organized crime works via films like The Godfather or the TV series The Sopranos’ (174).
This Present Darkness makes an important contribution by showing how crime – economic and political – is embedded in Nigeria's entire history. The book will, in many years to come, provoke intellectual debate about the place of crime in Nigeria's history. Unfortunately, Stephen Ellis died in 2015, so he will not be with us to further engage with many of the questions that This Present Darkness raises. But Ellis's place in the intellectual history of the academy will remain evergreen.
