Studies on the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique identify the late twentieth century as a period of fundamental change, during which state planning was replaced by a transnational form of statehood and a market-oriented approach to development. The neoliberal reforms that international lenders such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) demanded in return for financial aid supposedly prompted the regulation of domestic politics via the ‘adoption of internationally mandated mechanisms of governance’.Footnote 1 According to this view, after an initial transition period, policies were no longer imposed from the outside. Rather, external agencies became part of domestic political decision-making, thereby turning sovereignty over economic state functions into a zone of interaction that linked representatives of the West with those of Mozambique. Graham Harrison has described these processes as the emergence of a ‘governance state’ within which the boundaries between internal and external and between the state and the private sector became blurred. This new form of statehood is said to have superseded the previous dominance of socialist planning that was initiated after Mozambican independence in 1975. In this sense, the rise of the ‘governance state’ supposedly put an end to the national organisation of modernisation projects by establishing a transnational network of actors that began to drive economic development according to neoliberal principles.Footnote 2
This article calls this account into question. There is no doubt that the 1980s and 1990s were a period of transformation for Mozambique’s political economy. However, I will argue that planning was not a victim, but rather a catalyst for these changes. Neoliberal reforms did not replace planning, but built upon the conditions that were created by both colonial and socialist planning schemes. The Portuguese colonial government had already based key modernisation projects on transnational partnerships with Western governments and companies in the 1960s, and this practice did not change significantly after Mozambican independence. Taking the case of the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, I show that the transnational anchoring of planning projects became an asset for the implementation of neoliberal reforms during the period of political and economic transformation in the late 1980s and 1990s.Footnote 3 Instead of being dismantled by the process of economic policy reorientation, the existing repertoire of actors and agencies that were committed to modernisation projects provided a resource for shifts in political economy. As a consequence, planning did not disappear, but rather remained an important component of Mozambique’s economic development in the form of mega-projects in which Western companies continued to play a central role.
This argument connects to recent studies that question the revolutionary character of the neoliberal turn in the late twentieth century. While well-known accounts have emphasised the ruptures generated by national and international efforts to cope with the ‘Shock of the Global’ of the 1970s, Amy Offner, Stephen Macekura and others point out that new orders emerge from the conditions and possibilities of their predecessors.Footnote 4 Looking for the historical prerequisites underlying neoliberal demands for the privatisation of state-led projects and the opening up to foreign direct investment, they highlight the delegation of state contracts to private intermediaries and the practice of the decentralised fulfilment of planning projects in previous decades. From this perspective, neoliberal principles were only able to gain traction by being embedded within longer-term development practices.Footnote 5
My analysis of the history of transnational planning in Mozambique since the 1960s complements these observations. It ties in with a series of recent findings on the continuities between colonial contexts and the emergence of neoliberal policies. For example, Anne Pitcher has drawn attention to the role of colonial firms in Mozambique during the neoliberal transition; Emma Park has highlighted the significance of colonial austerity policies for the emergence of contemporary statehood in Kenya; and Tanushree Kaushal has shown the persistence of colonial-era racial hierarchies in the current system of granting microloans in India.Footnote 6 Building upon these studies, I focus on what is often considered the arch-enemy of neoliberal policy: planning. Using the case of the construction of Cahora Bassa, I show that planning in Mozambique had its origins in the transnational configuration of colonial modernisation projects. Subsequently, the relations that Western European firms established under Portuguese rule became instrumental in the initiation and planning of mega-projects in neoliberal Mozambique. The article is based upon research conducted in national and private archives in Portugal, Germany and France, as well as in European Community archives. Bringing together these sources allows us to reconstruct the transformation of planning projects between the 1960s and the early 2000s. Drawing upon these archival records, I argue that the neoliberal transition neither initiated the participation of Western companies in Mozambique’s development policy nor led to the end of state planning. Instead, it was part of a longer process of the development of transnational modernisation schemes, which was driven by international cooperation between private and state actors that began in the Portuguese colonial era.
This article breaks with familiar interpretations of the terms of planning and neoliberalism, which have been commonly understood as opposing concepts from the perspective of economic theory in the tradition of Friedrich Hayek and others. Interpretations that focus primarily on the meaning of concepts ignore the preconditions that were created by the planned economy and which made it possible to meet the neoliberal expectations of international organisations. Focusing on the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam and the associated industrialisation schemes that were initiated under Portuguese rule, I show how planning projects in Mozambique were not centrally controlled by government agencies even during the colonial period, but rather resulted from public–private cooperation. For reasons that I will discuss below, the Portuguese colonial government chose to build these connections on a European transnational basis. After this, transnational cooperation in modernisation efforts continued under independent Mozambique’s new government, but within the framework of a socialist planned economy. These practices supported and shaped the adaptation of Mozambique’s economic policy when the government turned to international donor institutions in the mid-1980s, thereby inaugurating a period of neoliberal planning. Rather than representing the result of a neoliberal revolution, Mozambique’s governance state grew out of the transnational planning legacy that had its roots in Portuguese colonialism.
Neoliberalism, the ‘Governance State’ and the Colonial Legacy
Both neoliberalism and planning are terms that allow for a multitude of possible interpretations.Footnote 7 Despite this variety of meaning, however, there is general agreement that they represent economic dogmas in contradiction to one another. Ever since their emergence, the theoretical and ideological foundations of neoliberalism have become known for their fierce opposition to planning concepts.Footnote 8 Against this backdrop, considering planning as a stepping stone for neoliberal reforms may appear to be a contradiction in terms. Although recent literature on the history of neoliberalism has acknowledged that neoliberal principles aimed at liberalising the market economy could only be implemented with the help of national and supranational governments, it has nevertheless confirmed that these measures were directed against state planning policies. Studies on the transnationalisation of statehood in Mozambique, which supposedly replaced the socialist planned economy in the 1980s, adhere to this narrative by noting the emergence of a transnational entanglement between the state, international institutions and foreign companies. In this sense, scholars have defined shifts in Mozambique’s political economy as consequences of a fundamental transformation that neoliberal reformers implemented with the help of international financial institutions, drawing on concepts developed by Friedrich Hayek and his intellectual adherents.
According to Hayek, the key problem in guiding economic processes was acquiring the right knowledge for economic action. From his point of view, a planned economy ignored individual knowledge of local conditions and the fact that centrally directed planning could not react to the constant changes within economic contexts.Footnote 9 By contrast, the price mechanism on a potentially global market presented an adequate solution for providing the necessary knowledge. According to Hayek, prices were able to indicate the relative ease or difficulty of acquiring goods to all market participants and thus to provide participants with the necessary information upon which to base their actions. Ensuring that market prices were correlated meant that prices reacted to each other and thus regulated themselves through their interdependence. From this perspective, the deliberate intervention of a central planning authority would necessarily disrupt the price mechanism and conceal the information it was supposed to convey. Put differently, global prices were able to manage the economy much more effectively than any conceivable state government.Footnote 10
According to recent studies, Hayek’s ideas had a long-term impact. When, in the 1970s, an association of states in the Global South called for the legacy of colonial dependency structures to be dismantled through a New International Economic Order (NIEO) Hayek’s ideas took on practical relevance.Footnote 11 For Hayek’s followers, the demands in the name of the NIEO – which included national sovereignty over domestic raw materials, a stabilisation of global commodity prices and increased Western support for national industrialisation projects – threatened to make the regulation of economic interaction through the price mechanism impossible. By highlighting the need to comply with the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in order to establish a global trade system, they questioned the preferential tariffs that had been granted to former colonial territories alongside commitments to secure export revenues. When looking for possibilities to enforce their ideas, neoliberal reformers came to believe that international organisations were able to act as regulatory bodies that could take decision-making power away from national governments and pave the way for global market liberalisation.Footnote 12
Subsequently, a much-discussed mechanism for shaping the policies of developing countries in line with neoliberal principles evolved with the granting of loans by International Financial Institutions based on Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). Beginning in the 1980s, Structural Adjustment Loans were tied to the condition that, among other things, trade and exchange rate systems were liberalised and state-owned companies privatised. The specific effects of these measures would be missed if it were not taken into account that states in the Global South remained formally sovereign. The concept of the ‘governance state’ points to the fact that the so-called neoliberal shift was not brought about by the direct intervention of Western donors. Rather, the governments of the developing countries led the process of economic policy change themselves.Footnote 13
According to the literature referred to above, this internalisation of neoliberal economic policy was at the heart of the transnationalisation of statehood, which both defined the new nature of governance and was characterised by international advisors as a departure from misled postcolonial policies. When Jeffrey Sachs, the director of the Harvard Institute for International Development, presented his suggestions to improve collaboration between international institutions and African governments in 1996, he presented contemporary difficulties as a legacy of the colonial past. ‘After almost a century of colonial depredations, African nations understandably if erroneously viewed open trade and foreign capital as a threat to national sovereignty’, he explained.Footnote 14 Sachs claimed that sub-Saharan African states were leaving behind an episode of misguided development by opening up to the global market, making their currencies convertible, limiting public spending to the necessary minimum and encouraging private companies to provide key infrastructures.Footnote 15 Accounts of the emergence of the ‘governance state’ rely on a similar periodisation to argue that statehood in Mozambique has been geared towards the transnational organisation of external funding and technical assistance to major international corporations. According to this view, in the wake of the neoliberal transition, international experts and local government officials came to agree that the coordination of development projects based on these structures was crucial for the maintenance of political stability.Footnote 16
However, this characterisation overlooks the fact that many of these allegedly new practices were echoes of planning activities rooted in the Portuguese colonial era.Footnote 17 Neither economic dogma nor international institutions could radically transform existing economic relations and practices. The focus on the conceptual contrast between neoliberalism and planning has obscured the preconditions for the supposedly fundamental changes of the 1980s. If this dimension is taken into account, the past of planning no longer appears as an obstacle to be overcome nor as a principle of economic activity that was buried by reform. Rather, as I will argue, the foundations created by colonial and socialist planning formed a productive framework for the subsequent neoliberal transformation in Mozambique. Two characteristics of modernisation projects that had already been established during the era under Portuguese rule were crucial in this regard: firstly, transnational cooperation in planning, and secondly, the delegation of state planning projects to private companies. I will focus on international private–public cooperation during and after the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam in order to show how the neoliberal transition in Mozambique drew upon modernisation plans that originated in the 1960s.
Portugal’s Late Colonialism and the Transnationalisation of Planning
The specific forms of planning in Mozambique arose from the colonial conditions under which they were conceived. In particular, they reflected the fact that Portugal, as the last European state to hold on to its colonial empire, had a keen interest in transnational cooperation for the modernisation of domestic and colonial economic structures. Faced with increasing international and local resistance beginning in the early 1960s, the authoritarian Portuguese leadership hoped that foreign participation in their development efforts would alleviate budgetary problems and generate foreign material interest in preserving the Portuguese colonial empire.Footnote 18 At the same time, the governments of Western European countries were concerned by the competition that US companies posed to domestic businesses and were prepared to participate in development projects in Portugal and its African colonies, in particular with the goals of promoting and showcasing the development of new technologies. Following the establishment of large American corporations in Europe, Western European governments sought to improve the economic position of their domestic companies through the establishment of European business mergers and European collaboration on third markets.Footnote 19
Efforts to establish joint projects with Portugal received further impetus from the mid-1960s onwards. In this period, a group of leading technocratically oriented officials in Lisbon became increasingly influential. They campaigned for far-reaching planning projects through negotiations with governments and business associations in Western European capitals.Footnote 20 Through these efforts, they succeeded in establishing or reviving bilateral economic commissions comprised of representatives from Portuguese and French, and Portuguese and West German business associations in order to attract investments. Within the Portuguese Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs, they pushed for the ‘greater use of foreign capital for private investment’ when discussing the need for coherent development plans in the colonies.Footnote 21 At the same time, both the French and West German governments were calling for closer ties between the two countries’ business communities in order to strengthen their international economic standing. In a 1968 joint appeal, French and West German ministries encouraged entrepreneurs to coordinate their endeavours within a Franco-German Economic Committee. One of the main objectives of the committee – which included senior officials from the economic, finance and foreign ministries as well as leading business representatives from both countries – was to strengthen cooperation between technologically promising industries both on the European market and with third countries.Footnote 22 During this period, Portugal’s ambitions to expand its steelworks, mining, shipyards, deep-sea ports and oil refineries offered Western European companies a wealth of opportunities to enhance their expertise and market position. But no other project appeared as promising as the plan to build a dam on the Zambezi River in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique.
The energy produced by dams was at the heart of modernisation and development plans around the world since the beginning of the twentieth century. The number of dams built, with ever-increasing capacity, reached a new peak in the 1960s. Against this backdrop, the technological improvement of the performance of hydroelectric power became an area of expertise that was in particular demand internationally.Footnote 23 The Portuguese authorities planned the hydroelectric power plant on the Zambezi as the largest in Africa and one of the largest worldwide. It was to be at the centre of a comprehensive economic support for the region. The energy generated by the dam was to enable mining, the river was to become navigable, and both the control of the annual floods and the installation of an irrigation system were to improve agriculture. Surplus energy was to be sold to South Africa, which would generate revenue to finance the construction in the long term. Connecting Cahora Bassa with South African consumers generated an important business opportunity because it involved the development of a technically innovative solution for transmitting direct current via high-voltage lines over long distances.Footnote 24
After prolonged preparatory consultations with interested parties, the Portuguese government put the project out to international tender in late 1967. Given the large scale of the project, leading Western European companies formed a consortium called ZAMCO for the purpose of submitting a joint bid. In addition to Siemens, AEG and Brown, Boveri & Cie (BBC), Compagnie Générale Électrique, Alsthom, Società Anonima Elettrificazione and General Swedish Electrical Limited Company (ASEA) were involved in the electrical part of the project. Grands Travaux Marseille, Hochtief, Voith GmbH and LTA Engineering from Johannesburg were to be responsible for the construction of the dam. This group was joined by several smaller Portuguese companies, which were responsible for the wiring and cabling, among other things.Footnote 25
The French and West German companies were strongly supported in their efforts to win the contract by their domestic governments. The ambassadors of both countries consulted the relevant authorities in Lisbon several times together, and the foreign ministries in Paris and Bonn openly expressed their keen interest in ZAMCO being commissioned to build the dam and power plant to Portuguese government representatives.Footnote 26 In fact, the close cooperation between the private sector and governments was a key factor in prompting the Portuguese commission that was responsible for evaluating the international bids to issue a recommendation in favour of ZAMCO. Although the project design submitted by the American-dominated Cabora Bassa Builders consortium promised slightly lower costs and was proposed by companies with greater experience in dam construction, the commission members in Lisbon were counting on the French and West German governments to support their companies with export credits and to show further willingness to negotiate the credit amount.Footnote 27 By delegating the construction of Cahora Bassa – a centrepiece of its modernisation plan for Mozambique – to a foreign consortium, the Portuguese leadership deliberately sought to win over Western European governments as financial partners and potential allies against critics of Portuguese imperialism. They made use of the prevailing concern in Paris and Bonn that domestic companies could fall behind in competition with their US rivals, and persuaded Western European governments to generously support private sector participation in the dam’s construction with state export credits.Footnote 28
As a result, the largest colonial planning project in Mozambique became an endeavour based on an international partnership between governments and companies. This situation arose from the specific circumstances that marked the end of the Portuguese colonial empire and Western European economic needs, but also offered opportunities to promote dam construction as a means to reduce the gap in development between Europe and Africa in a specific way. Instead of presenting Cahora Bassa primarily as a national achievement, government and private sector actors on the Portuguese and Western European sides emphasised international cooperation when highlighting the dam’s contribution to Mozambique’s progress. In this sense, the Portuguese colonial minister declared Cahora Bassa a symbol of human development that extended far beyond Portugal’s borders because of the broad European cooperation involved.Footnote 29 With less fanfare, but essentially along the same lines, French and West German politicians also emphasised Cahora Bassa’s important contribution to Mozambique’s modernisation, which was made possible through the cooperation of European forces. During a visit to Portugal, a national parliamentary delegate of the German Christian Democrats told Portuguese journalists in 1970:
Portugal is successfully carrying out its mission to bring Europe closer to Africa. Africa, for its part, needs external aid in order to develop and achieve its goals, and if this aid does not come from Europe, it will inevitably have to come from the United States, Russia, or China, which would certainly not be good for either Europeans or Africans.Footnote 30
Highlighting transnational cooperation successfully defused international criticism of Portuguese colonialism and the involvement of Western European companies. By emphasizing international planning, governments and private companies tried to render the political dimension of the Cahora Bassa project less visible.Footnote 31 When confronted with the accusation that their participation served strategic or, worse, imperialist interests, the West German companies in the ZAMCO consortium sought to draw attention to the fact that the project would have an impact regardless of the political regime in Mozambique. They argued that it was not the relationship with a transitory form of government that was decisive, but rather the economic and social progress furthered by the project that would occur under all circumstances thereafter. ‘[S]uch structures as dams and the power plants built in connection with them outlast all governments and contribute to raising the standard of living of the entire population and not just a privileged class.’Footnote 32
This strategy proved effective at the international level. Despite a heated global campaign against European involvement in Cahora Bassa, the European Parliament’s Political Committee decided that ‘it [did] not seem appropriate to examine in depth the possible political implications of the Cabora Bassa power plant project.’Footnote 33 In the United Nations Decolonization Committee, Western members prevented a unanimous decision on the dam construction by pointing to the positive effects of foreign investment on economic development and subsequently undermined the political weight of the committee by giving up their seats.Footnote 34 Due to the circumstances surrounding the project’s conception, Cahora Bassa cannot be regarded as the product of centralised state planning as condemned by Hayek in his characterisation of planned economies. Rather, a chain of factors led to the project becoming somewhat detached from the control of the colonial state. This was actually the aim of the Portuguese leadership itself, who hoped that delegating the dam construction to private companies would provide international support and favourable financing conditions. The assistance that the participating Western European companies received from their governments further blurred the boundaries between private and public throughout the project’s realisation. Cahora Bassa did not become the core of Mozambique’s economic and social modernisation in either a state or national form, but rather as a hybrid creature. Despite statements to the contrary by Mozambique’s new socialist government after independence from Portugal in 1975, this hybrid structure proved to be long lasting.
Mozambique’s Road to Socialism along Colonial Planning Paths
After the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, the new political leadership in Lisbon pursued negotiations to end the colonial empire with remarkable speed. At meetings in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka in August and September 1974, the Portuguese government’s delegation widely accepted the Mozambican independence movement FRELIMO’s (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) demand for independence in June of the following year.Footnote 35
However, due to the large investments in the construction by the Portuguese colonial administration and the ensuing financial obligations, Cahora Bassa was not included in these contractual arrangements.Footnote 36 At this point, work on the dam was well advanced, the reservoir was expected to start filling up by the end of the year and the first stage of the power plant was scheduled to go into operation in early 1975. As the construction costs could only be covered once energy production had begun, the Western European partners tried to make sure that the Cahora Bassa project went ahead as planned despite the radical political changes.Footnote 37 But it was only in June 1975 when the Portuguese government and FRELIMO agreed to turn the hydropower plant into a public company – the Hidroeléctrica de Cabora Bassa (HCB), in which Portugal would hold 82 per cent of the shares and Mozambique the remaining 18 per cent – that the financial questions appeared to be solved. In this arrangement, the export and sale of electricity to South Africa was given priority.Footnote 38 Subsequently, Western European corporate executives and government officials coordinated closely with each other in order to ensure that the completion of the power plant and the repayment of the loans proceeded according to schedule. At the same time, however, they saw Mozambique’s independence from Portugal as an opportunity to initiate further projects with the new leadership in Maputo.
The French ambassador was instructed to report continuously on opportunities for French companies in the country, while the European Economic Commission lobbied for Mozambique to join the Lomé Convention – a treaty on trade relations and development aid that linked most former European colonies with the European Economic Community (EEC).Footnote 39 According to a French official in the Foreign Ministry, Mozambique was less exposed to Anglo-American influence than other parts of Africa and thus offered more favourable opportunities to extend European business relations.Footnote 40
However, this view was contradicted by the fact that, shortly after independence, Mozambique’s new government announced its intention to build a socialist state, break ties with the former colonial powers, and embrace a new future guided by Marxist–Leninist policies. President Samora Machel publicly declared his preference for close alliances with the Eastern bloc: ‘Our close cooperation with other sister socialist states is a guarantee of our victory against underdevelopment. By combining our different resources, we are in a position to develop and consolidate our economies, gain mutual advantages and prevent imperialism from blackmailing us politically and economically.’Footnote 41 At its Third Party Congress in February 1977, FRELIMO officially announced the building of a sovereign nation state, the nationalisation of central branches of the economy and their subjection to a planned economy.Footnote 42 The path to socialism, FRELIMO explained, was synonymous with the country’s modernisation, which in turn depended on a centrally managed expansion of agricultural and industrial production.Footnote 43 Subsequently, Mozambique concluded agreements with the Soviet Union and other socialist states on future economic cooperation and benefited, among other things, from the opportunity to compensate for a growing trade deficit with East Germany by sending guest workers to East German factories.Footnote 44
Still, introducing socialism through development schemes into a country that was dominated by agriculture, had only begun to establish industrial means of production that could be socialised, and which lacked a distinctive national identity proved to be a challenging endeavour. Jeremy Friedman has characterised the realisation of socialist development models in the Global South as a ‘process of trial and error’.Footnote 45 At the same time, potential socialist partners did not seem convinced of the ideological reliability of the new leadership in Maputo. This was particularly true in the Soviet Union, where scepticism towards Machel’s government persisted.Footnote 46 According to Michel Cahen, FRELIMO’s proclamation of socialism based on Marxist principles was merely a tool used in the attempt to build a nation-state, which was far from existing at that point, modelled on FRELIMO's own ideas. The presentation of a new political economy thus also served to provide an elite group of former independence fighters with the resources they needed to legitimise their claims of control over a heterogeneous society. These resources were all the more necessary given the fact that many FRELIMO leaders belonged to the privileged assimilados during the colonial period, without close ties to the various social and cultural groups in Mozambique.Footnote 47
Against this backdrop, planning remained a central concept for the goal of establishing an independent socialist state, but its implementation soon showed signs of pragmatism. While FRELIMO sought admission to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and to modernise the domestic coal mining industry with the help of East German engineers, it did not abandon the contacts with Western European companies that had been established during the colonial era.Footnote 48 Given the multitude of problems caused by the flight of hundreds of thousands of Portuguese, many of whom had held leading positions in business and administration, the new leadership tried to make the best possible use of the infrastructure, projects and partners left behind by the colonial administration rather than sacrificing potential support for ideological principles.Footnote 49 Soon, the benefits of the energy produced by Cahora Bassa reached the centre of domestic and international attention.
According to the resolutions of FRELIMO’s Third Party Congress, a state-controlled economy was to lead Mozambican society into the modern age. To this end, a National Planning Commission drew up planning concepts based on drafts from different ministries, in particular from the Ministry of Industry and Energy. The ‘Political and Organizational Offensive’, which was a ten-year plan scheduled to start in 1980, included the establishment of production facilities for the aluminium, iron and steel industries, as well as cement factories, paper mills and an expansion of textile production.Footnote 50 Making use of the energy from Cahora Bassa was a vital factor in this context. In fact, the French ambassador to Portugal had reported even before Mozambique's official independence that, contrary to statements made during the colonial war, FRELIMO was aware of the economic importance of Cahora Bassa and counting on using the energy produced by the dam.Footnote 51 However, such use was limited by the fact that, according to the contract with HCB, the electricity produced was initially to be reserved for sale to South Africa to cover construction costs. Under these circumstances, the idea of extending the dam’s hydroelectric power plant and creating additional energy capacities for national modernisation projects appeared to be an obvious way forward. Portuguese preparatory studies for such an extension by another hydroelectric power plant on the other side of the Zambezi River existed since 1974. They promised to increase the annual output from 12 to 20 billion kWh.Footnote 52 Rather than turning to new partners from socialist states, the FRELIMO government and the state-owned company Electricidade de Moçambique preferred to fall back on the practical experience and the state creditors of the Western European companies who had been responsible for the original dam construction.Footnote 53
As early as November 1977, the French ambassador reported that there were plans to expand the hydroelectric power plant at Cahora Bassa in order to meet the energy needs of large-scale projects and that French companies were interested in participating. In addition to expanding the power plant itself, the expansion of the high-voltage lines to supply the rest of the country with electricity was under consideration. Furthermore, FRELIMO intended to establish a training centre under Western management for local technicians.Footnote 54 These plans paved the way for renewed cooperation between private and public partners on a national and transnational basis. Before a meeting with Mozambican President Samora Machel, the German companies of ZAMCO instructed West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher and subsequently the West German Minister for Economic Cooperation Rainer Offergeld to lobby for the project to be awarded to the ZAMCO consortium.Footnote 55 In subsequent talks on the construction of Cahora Bassa Norte between company and government representatives, the issue of financing the estimated costs of US$1.2 billion proved again to be central.Footnote 56 In previous years, the French and West German export credit agencies had closely monitored the progress of the hydroelectric power plant's commissioning and agreed to increase the credit volume due to rising costs and construction delays. When HCB requested an extension of its payment obligations for 1977 and 1978, the economic and finance ministries of both countries gave their approval.Footnote 57 In light of this experience, the representatives of the French and West German companies could expect that the plans to expand Cahora Bassa would once again be secured by government loans. In fact, the French Foreign Ministry considered Western government financial support for the project to be ‘justified by the political interest in stabilising Southern Africa.’Footnote 58 The proposal that was finally presented to the Mozambican authorities in the fall of 1980 was based on the idea of outbidding competing Western companies by offering a more generous financing package. While the export insurance agencies were prepared to secure the costs for Cahora Bassa Norte as requested by the responsible ministries, additional modernisation projects related to the expansion were to be financed with French and West German development aid funds.Footnote 59
While the socialist government in Maputo thus drew on colonial planning strategies and wanted to use the Cahora Bassa dam for modernisation projects, the European companies responsible for the construction emerged unscathed from regime change and continued their cooperation in the completion of the power plant. During subsequent negotiations on the expansion of Cahora Bassa, the arrangements that had been established during the Portuguese colonial period were largely reconstituted. The execution of the project of Cahora Bassa Norte was to be delegated to the ZAMCO consortium of Western European companies on site, which in turn were supported and financially secured by their national governments. Even though Cahora Bassa was now set to take on a key role in developing Mozambique’s socialist nation-state, the project continued to be backed by a transnational cooperation with public and private partners from Western Europe. Rather than depending on centralised state agencies, the planning of energy production, crucial as it was for Mozambique’s industrialisation, was based upon connections that had originally been developed in the colonial context between private companies as contractors, Western European governments as financiers and national planning authorities. Still, despite these continuities, the proposed financing scheme pointed to a reordering of economic models in the future. The combination of development aid and credit insurance for foreign investments became the preferred instrument for shaping relations between Mozambique and Western Europe and between public and private interests since the mid-1980s.
Neoliberalism Riding on the Back of Planning Projects
When FRELIMO began the 1980s with the objectives of fundamentally reforming Mozambican society and creating a ‘new man’ (homem novo), their plans were soon overshadowed by serious internal and external difficulties. The attempt to relocate the rural population to communal villages in order to increase agricultural production, improve healthcare and facilitate access to education was met with local resistance, partly because many of the new settlements were built on the sites of the much-hated strategic villages (aldeamentos) that had been established by the Portuguese during the colonial war.Footnote 60 In addition, after the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia, South Africa’s new prime minister, Pieter Willem Botha, began to support the RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) resistance group in Mozambique, in which opponents of FRELIMO organised. Dissatisfaction in rural areas and foreign assistance contributed to the rapid development of internal conflict into a brutal civil war. At the same time, international socialist support for Mozambique waned. In 1981, COMECON rejected Mozambique's requests to join as members saw the country primarily as a potential burden. The government in East Berlin was increasingly focused on securing loans that had already been granted and payment for goods that had already been delivered.Footnote 61
Under these conditions, large-scale industrialisation projects came to a standstill. In view of the rapidly deteriorating economic situation, FRELIMO leadership responded by attempting to secure new international support. In 1984, Samora Machel reached an agreement with South Africa, acceded to the Lomé III Agreement with the EEC and made Mozambique a member country of the World Bank. As a consequence, financial support from Western donors rose sharply. Following the visit of a delegation from the European Community led by the Director-General for Development, Dieter Frisch, in February 1986, commitments for financial aid from the EEC increased from 18.7 million ECU in 1984 to 145 million ECU in 1986. By 1987, international financial aid for development projects in Mozambique had reached US$500 million.Footnote 62
These support measures rested upon the expectation, prominently presented by the World Bank, that Mozambican economic policy would significantly change. From the perspective of leading representatives of international organisations, Mozambique’s economic problems could only be solved through structural adjustments. As Dieter Frisch explained with regard to sub-Saharan Africa, inefficient state intervention in production and trade, strictly managed exchange rates and the tariff protection of the domestic market had to be ended in order to encourage new private investment.Footnote 63 Smaller government and privatisation were supposed to help integrate Mozambique into the global market and thus trigger economic growth.Footnote 64
In the years that followed, FRELIMO embarked on an ‘Economic Rehabilitation Programme’ which aimed to highlight the efforts to bring about economic change in line with international reform demands. The government now avoided the term ‘socialism’ in official documents and removed socialist principles from the new constitution of 1990. It sought to attract foreign investors through new legislation and established a separate Office for Foreign Investment Promotion (GPIE) within the Ministry of Planning and Finance to attract project participation from abroad. The office’s task was to advise foreign investors, facilitate contact with state authorities and participate in the evaluation of investment proposals.Footnote 65 The subsequent attempt to relaunch the expansion project of the Cahora Bassa dam with the ZAMCO consortium fell victim to the continuing civil war, during which RENAMO destroyed the high-voltage pylons carrying electricity from Cahora Bassa to South Africa.Footnote 66 Still, transnational cooperation in the planning, construction and operation of the dam, which had continued under the conditions of postcolonial socialism, served as a springboard for Mozambique’s neoliberal reorientation and became instrumental once peace was established.
After the civil war in Mozambique finally came to an end with the Rome General Peace Agreement in 1992, large-scale economic projects received a boost with the help of foreign capital. One of the key practices of donor institutions within the framework of structural adjustments was to promote projects that were capable of generating their own financial resources. In this sense, the EIB had stated in 1986 that its objective under the Lomé III convention was to promote the creation of an investment climate in developing countries that would ensure the emergence of economically viable enterprises.Footnote 67 International Financial Institutions therefore gave projects that involved private sector participation particular preference. The mobilisation of private investments was supposed to shift development projects away from central government control and towards market actors.Footnote 68 In this respect, the previous international cooperation to build Cahora Bassa not only provided a network of private investors familiar with Mozambique, but could also be used to campaign for foreign investments in new projects that would benefit from the energy resources produced by the hydroelectric power plant. Even though this involved the development of new lines of argument for obtaining international financial aid, it did little to change the specific projects proposed. New mega-projects were strikingly reminiscent of those pursued first by the Portuguese colonial government and then continued by the socialist regime after independence. Both the specific projects and the transnational framework that supported them thus became key conditions upon which the neoliberal transformation of the Mozambican economy was built.
The first and most important of these projects was the construction of an aluminium smelter near Maputo. In 1995, the Mozambican government began negotiations with MOZAL, a consortium of Australian, Japanese, British and South African companies. The plan was to build a smelter that would be capable of producing 245,000 tons of aluminium per year by 2001. Subsequently, this production capacity was to be doubled, resulting in MOZAL holding approximately 5 per cent of the world’s smelting capacity. According to estimates, due to the scope of the endeavour, MOZAL would contribute around 7 per cent to Mozambique’s annual GDP and significantly increase foreign exchange earnings.Footnote 69 Two factors in particular made Mozambique an attractive location for these plans. Firstly, the Lomé Convention with the European Union guaranteed the export of aluminium to the European market tariff free. Secondly, the supply of cheap electricity from the Cahora Bassa dam made it possible to produce aluminium, which was a particularly energy-intensive process, at low cost. In this sense, the project built on the specific advantages the GPIE highlighted to convince foreign investors of Mozambique’s economic potential. In its ‘Investor's Guide to Mozambique’, GPIE explained ‘Cahora Bassa currently has energy-producing capacity exceeding 2000 MW, which will expand to 4000 MW when stage two of the dam project is complete. Development of this non-polluting and renewable energy potential is particularly attractive.’Footnote 70 Although this was not actually emphasised by anybody involved, the project was facilitated by the planning activities of previous decades: on the one hand, because the hydroelectric power plant was a source of cheap energy, and on the other, because Cahora Bassa already provided links to foreign investors, which now had a beneficial effect on the search for international financing for new industrialisation projects.
At the same time that consultations on the MOZAL project were underway, a committee comprised of representatives of the Mozambican and South African governments and the Portuguese-led HCB, which continued to be in charge of operating Cahora Bassa, planned to refurbish the power plant and power lines. Relying on the ZAMCO veterans of the dam construction had the advantage of drawing upon the existing knowledge of the companies and accommodating the Portuguese operators’ interest in improving their business connections with Western European partners. It also showed international donors that private companies were willing to participate in larger projects in Mozambique, thus laying the foundation for new investments in further projects. The joint committee commissioned Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), a company formed from the merger of BBC and the Swedish company ASEA, to carry out the refurbishment work on the power plant, while the contract to renovate the transmission lines, worth $125 million, was awarded to Siemens AG.Footnote 71
While these contracts were concluded, GPIE assisted in setting up a committee to prepare the MOZAL project that was comprised of representatives from the ministries and the companies involved, and which contributed to MOZAL being granted considerable tax and customs advantages. Both sides kept in mind the positive outcome that their negotiations would have on international support for the project. Indeed, the cooperation between the Mozambican government and private foreign companies, as well as the state incentives, met expectations that were guided by neoliberal principles and contributed to international and national European donor institutions providing financial support. The Mozambican government received a $20 million loan as risk capital from the EIB to cover the costs for its share of 4 per cent of the aluminium plant. In addition, the EIB secured another $40 million of the debt required for the construction. German and French export insurance companies covered $130 million, and the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank contributed $110 million in credit assistance.Footnote 72 Subsequently, the EIB granted a further €46 million to the newly founded Mozambican company Motraco for the expansion of the high-voltage power lines that would increase the supply of MOZAL with electricity.Footnote 73 Part of these funds were allocated to modernise and extend the capacities of the Cahora Bassa power plant and power lines, while still relying on the former members of ZAMCO. Alstom, which had in the meantime acquired the energy technology shares of the former AEG, won the contract to rehabilitate the hydro-mechanical equipment of the plant and to install control systems for two control operator stations in 2002. In 2006, ABB became responsible for the first upgrade of the converter stations to boost the transmission capacity.Footnote 74
Based on these measures, MOZAL began production in December 2000 and doubled capacities through its planned expansion starting in August 2003. From the perspective of the World Bank and the EIB, their strategy of financing projects that stimulated new economic growth based on public–private cooperation was a complete success. The promotion of mega-projects such as MOZAL, they held, was responsible for a new chapter in Mozambique’s national economic history. Looking back on their financial cooperation with Mozambican authorities after the smelter had started operating, they argued: ‘The largest foreign investment in Mozambique's history, the project demonstrated that large scale investments could be successful in the country’s post-conflict environment.’Footnote 75 As a consequence of these developments, Mozambican leadership earned a reputation for model behaviour and was considered a ‘donor darling’. When the head of an IMF mission in 2005 summarised the cooperation of the past years, he declared Mozambique to be ‘first in the class’.Footnote 76
Interpreting these statements in terms of radical changes in Mozambican economic policy met the needs of representatives of international organisations and national agencies. Cast as the effect of SAPs and the encouragement of foreign investments, Mozambique’s (temporary) economic growth seemed to correspond directly to the new economic order and its transnationally oriented principles. However, this description of a neoliberal, post-socialist Mozambique cannot be understood independently of the claims and interests of the actors involved. Highlighting the shift in economic principles since the late 1980s concealed the fact that economic practice drew upon previous arrangements. As before, Mozambique’s economic policies remained focused on large-scale projects whose financing and implementation were based on international public–private cooperation. The alleged new conditions of financial support since the late 1980s, which were intended to pave the way for integrating the Mozambican economy into the global market by requiring foreign private companies to be involved in the projects, built on previously pursued strategies of delegating modernisation projects to international consortia. Creating structures that could generate their own financial resources in this way was one of the ideas behind the preparations for the construction of Cahora Bassa in the late 1960s, which both the Western European lenders and the Portuguese state as the commissioning party expected to bring economic benefits in the medium term – both through the export of the energy produced and through the commercialisation of newly developed technologies. In this sense, it was already the Portuguese colonial state that transnationalised its sovereign decision-making power because it hoped to create a network of external support by integrating itself into international lending and corporate partnerships. As a consequence, planning projects such as those that arose in the context of the construction of Cahora Bassa must be seen as a core prerequisite for the neoliberal transition in Mozambique. The shift in the dogmatic orientation of international institutions did not bring about an economic revolution but was rather built on practices that had determined ideas about Mozambique's economic future for decades.
Conclusion
The development of economic planning from a colonially ruled to a neoliberally governed Mozambique can neither be understood as a history of fundamental rupture nor as a history of continuous economic practice. Rather, it shows how colonial planning projects and their continuation under Mozambican socialism created conditions that proved to be instrumental in meeting the expectations of neoliberal reformers.
This involved an economic transformation based on significant changes. The financial support from the World Bank and the EIB only became possible because Mozambique was no longer part of a colonial empire and because the government in Maputo subsequently abandoned its socialist aspirations. At the same time, Western partners changed key development policy guidelines in the 1980s, giving foreign private investment a new status in applications for project funding. It was only through this change that the companies involved in the construction of Cahora Bassa became not only technically and financially useful partners, but also showcases that could be used to source international funding for further projects. New government agencies in Maputo were responsible for attracting foreign investors in this sense.
However, at the same time, these changes did not represent a paradigm shift. Rather, neoliberal reforms made use of resources that had been created by previous planning projects. This was true of the mega-projects that began in the 1990s: the construction of the MOZAL aluminium plant was based on plans made during the colonial era, which already sought to take advantage of the low-cost electricity production at Cahora Bassa, which then became a key competitive advantage for MOZAL. At the same time, the modernisation projects that were conceived of and implemented by the Portuguese colonial administration with the help of transnational cooperation established links with Western European governments and companies that persisted beyond political ruptures. They helped establish the public–private partnerships that were demanded by neoliberal reformers from the 1980s onwards. The corporate structures that had emerged in previous decades now contributed under neoliberal auspices to convince Western donor institutions to increase financial support and relaunch projects. It was part of the institutional logic and ideological justification to attribute the perceived success of these measures to a radical economic reorientation and not to dwell on what was required for their successful implementation. This gave rise to the description of a new, transnational form of statehood in Mozambique, which emerged through the blurring of boundaries between inside and outside, as well as between private and public.
However, this description obscures the long-term effects of planning projects since the 1960s. Portuguese modernisation schemes had good reason to seek supranational membership with the help of transnational development policies and therefore did not fit into the Hayekian image of national planning. The colonial regime had hoped to secure its place in the world through the international embedding of modernisation projects and cast this goal in stone by delegating the construction of Cahora Bassa to a consortium of European companies. This transnational public–private cooperation at the origins of Cahora Bassa proved to have a lasting legacy. The advent of neoliberalism did not put an end to this legacy, but rather led to planning new mega-projects, whose proponents stood on the shoulders of their predecessors. As Mozambique’s deep economic crisis of the 2010s showed, this development was not synonymous with economic success.Footnote 77 It rather demonstrates the significance of the practices and connections beneath the surface of economic concepts, which created the conditions for the neoliberal reorientation of Mozambique’s economic and development policy.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
