Introduction
Rousseau devoted the final quarter of his life to composing the Confessions, Dialogues, and The Reveries of a Solitary Walker.Footnote 1 Through them Rousseau explores his philosophical development, his life's undertakings, and his changing social conditions with such elaborate profundity that the autobiographical writings mark a sea change in the history of literature, philosophy, and the psychology of the self.Footnote 2 And yet, the autobiographical works have traditionally held an uneasy place in Rousseau's corpus. In recent decades, as Rousseau scholars have increasingly come to appreciate the complex subtlety of Rousseau's thought as it is manifest in his political works and novels, as well as to see the integrity of his grand système, the autobiographical works have nonetheless—with some notable exceptions—typically been studied apart.Footnote 3 It is not difficult to understand why this is. For all the charm and profundity of Rousseau's autobiographical writings, the man they describe is impossible: he is at once prankster and scoundrel, innocent and sophisticate, lover and libertine, philanthropist and misanthrope, genius and hypocrite. What is more, he seems to be descending into an ever darker state of misery, isolation, and paranoia.
The scholarly orthodoxy concludes that Rousseau's psychological well-being suffered tremendously during the period in which he composed the autobiographical works.Footnote 4 And the autobiographical works do confront us squarely with the question of Rousseau's sanity, as well as with the question of his happiness. Indeed, the autobiographical works push us to consider the value of enlightenment—that great Rousseauian theme—from the perspective of his life. Is such manifest unhappiness and delusion the true price of genius? Furthermore, is this a man to be trusted? As a Citizen, an Educator, a Legislator-Philosopher? While the paradoxes of Rousseau's oeuvre are perplexing, the antitheses and histrionics of the man are sad and discomfiting. It is no wonder that Rousseau is often held at bay by political theorists.
In this article I challenge the orthodox view of Rousseau's life. I explore the question of the relationship between Rousseau's autobiographical writings and the rest of his “system,” primarily by means of an analysis of the rhetoric of the Confessions. My argument is that, despite all appearances to the contrary, Rousseau's autobiography is a rigorously rhetorical work that provides a testament to his lasting sanity. More specifically, Rousseau's pathos-filled self-presentation in the Confessions intentionally privileges his experiences of pain and suffering, while rhetorically minimizing his pleasures and happiness. For all the misfortunes that Rousseau would have us witness, the truth is that the Confessions tells the story of a happy life.Footnote 5 I am much indebted to the arguments and perspectives of others as I endeavor both to provide a more systematic account of the rhetoric of the Confessions and to shed light on Rousseau's reasons for his complicated approach.Footnote 6 I go further than others have, however, in my claims about Rousseau's autobiographical deceptiveness, for my suggestion is that the Confessions represents one of his great rhetorical stunts. My hope is that this controversial reading will add some depth to our understanding of Rousseau's critique of enlightenment, some weight to our sense of his commitment to authorial responsibility, and some levity to our understanding of the life he lived.
In order to situate my reading of the Confessions, I begin in the first section with a discussion of Rousseau's thoughts on enlightenment, sincerity, and truth telling. I show how Rousseau's views of sincerity and truth telling, as they appear in the autobiographical works, are commensurate with the reservations about enlightenment that characterize his first published work, the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences. I then turn in the second section to my analysis of the Confessions. I explore the rhetorical surface of Rousseau's Confessions, as well as the understated counterpoint to Rousseau's loud rhetoric of misery: his quiet but persistent good cheer. I call attention here to some of the psychological peculiarities Rousseau acknowledges throughout the Confessions, which I argue are humorous “fictions” Rousseau invents to further disguise his happiness.Footnote 7 In section 3, I return to the themes of truth and enlightenment as I consider the guiding motives behind Rousseau's autobiographical concealment.
I: Enlightenment, Justice, and Truth Telling
In Book VIII of the Confessions, Rousseau describes in vivid detail the epiphany that would forever alter the course of his life.Footnote 8 It is a terrific moment of philosophic drama that captures much of what is controversial in his thought. In 1749, already thirty-seven years old but as yet relatively unknown, Rousseau made near-daily trips to Vincennes to visit his good friend Diderot, who had been imprisoned by the French king for a controversial work that hinted at a materialistic understanding of the world (the “Letter on the Blind for the Use of Those Who See”). En route on one such visit, Rousseau came across the most recent essay competition question posed by the Academy of Dijon, concerning the moral consequences of the arts and sciences. According to Rousseau's account, the question inspired a revolution in his thinking—a revolution that was soon inscribed in the prize-winning First Discourse, and that would inform the rest of his life's work. Prompted to consider the moral implications of the intellectualism of his age, Rousseau breaks with his contemporaries by declaring the arts and sciences generally bad for morality. The loyal Rousseau, visiting his imprisoned philosophe friend, would soon be renowned as an apostate of the Enlightenment and a defender of the common man; by many prominent thinkers of his day, he would be reviled for gross hypocrisy.Footnote 9
The origins of the hypocrisy charge are not difficult to detect in the pages of the First Discourse, and the First Discourse, Rousseau also tells us, is the foundation upon which the rest of his paradoxical corpus is systematically built.Footnote 10 The First Discourse contains an early articulation of signature Rousseauian arguments against the arts and sciences, but it also contains a few frank and nuanced statements about his positive understanding of enlightenment. A brief consideration of these two contrasting dimensions of the First Discourse prepares the way for a discussion of autobiographical disclosure and truth telling in Rousseau.
The bulk of the First Discourse consists of an attack on the notion that the restoration of the arts and sciences has contributed to a general improvement in the well-being of mankind. Rousseau makes a series of powerful arguments about the decline of virtue and rise of corruption that comes with enlightenment. Early on he highlights the difference between the appearance of virtue and its reality, arguing that, for all the finesse and refinement of eighteenth-century Europe, real virtue is in decline: sincere friendship, genuine patriotism, and religion have been replaced by festering hatreds and a dreadful urbanity (38). Such general decline in morals is, and has always been, directly proportionate to the degree of civilization (39–40). Rousseau offers a complex account of why this is so. To form accurate judgments in the sciences and the arts, expertise is required, but, unlike in more straightforward arenas like physical contests, such expertise is difficult to acquire and easy to mimic; as such, the sciences and the arts tend to trade in mistaken and vain evaluations.Footnote 11 This contributes to the rise of decadent pursuits (namely, wealth), and eventually popular tastes corrupt culture (51–53). Ultimately, honor and wealth are bestowed on men of superficial talents over men of simple, natural virtue, and, as a result, unjust inequalities arise, based on false evaluations of merit (58). The basic argument against the sciences and the arts, then, is that they tend to corrupt true judgment and reward artifice and pretension, resulting in vast social injustice—as well as vast unhappiness.Footnote 12 This is the Rousseau we all know and love.
The other Rousseau that speaks out about enlightenment in the course of the First Discourse is quieter and less familiar to us. He is far from making a blanket renouncement of the arts and sciences, nor does he advocate a return to simpler times. Indeed, the arguments against enlightenment in the First Discourse are framed by, on the one hand, a glowing defense of the contemporary age over the medieval (scholastic) past, and, on the other, high praise for a certain type of elite intellectual exemplar. For all of its problems, modern enlightenment is infinitely preferable to the “barbarism” that recently plagued Europe (wherein “a nondescript scientific jargon, even more despicable than ignorance, had usurped the name of knowledge,” 35). By the end of the essay, it is also evident that Rousseau objects not to the arts and sciences as such, but to their popularization. In tones that grate on our democratic ears, he explicitly blames his “elementary” contemporaries for failing to guard the “temple of the muses” from a “populace unworthy of approaching it” (62). At the same time, he expresses great hopes for a new cohort of thinkers, who might disseminate “throughout the human race not merely pleasant enlightenment, but also salutary teachings” (60). To these true “disciples of nature” (men such as Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and Cicero: 62–63), Rousseau assigns the task of raising monuments to the glory of the human intellect, and of hereby “contributing by their influence to the happiness of the people to whom they will have taught wisdom” (63–64). The First Discourse, then, is not against intellectualism per se, but against pseudoscientific religious, and corrupt “elementary” marketplace, intellectualisms.Footnote 13 Here we encounter the less than lovable Rousseau—the one who, in addition to being a hypocrite, might well be perceived as an arrogant recluse.
If the theme of Rousseau's earliest published works is enlightenment, the great theme of his late works is the self. And in the autobiographical works we see Rousseau struggle to present his elite self in a way that will not interfere with his stance against popular enlightenment. On the one hand, Rousseau's anti-enlightenment streak is reflected in his famous autobiographical pleas for sincerity and authenticity. What is less obvious, however, is that the claims to sincerity are accompanied by a sophisticated, even convoluted, understanding of autobiographical truth-telling. The latter reflects Rousseau's quieter message of sophisticated, but responsible, elite enlightenment. Let us turn to consider each side of the paradox in turn.
There is no better place to witness Rousseau's commitment to sincerity than the Confessions. The form of the work is itself indicative of Rousseau's desire to be truthful, insofar as confessions entail complete self-effacing acknowledgement of one's sinfulness (see Neuchâtel Preface to the Confessions, 589, 592).Footnote 14 The epigraph to the work, Intus, et in Cute (inside and under the skin, taken from Persius's third Satire) also conveys Rousseau's desire to disclose his inner self with real transparency. Consider next his earnest declaration to the Sovereign Judge in the third paragraph of the text:
I have told the good and the evil with the same frankness. I have been silent about nothing bad, added nothing good, and if I have happened to use some inconsequential ornament, this has never happened except to fill up a gap occasioned by my lack of memory; I may have assumed to be true what I knew might have been so, never what I knew to be false. I have shown myself as I was, contemptible and low when I was so, good, generous, sublime when I was so: I have unveiled my interior as Thou has seen it Thyself. (5)
Rousseau concludes Part I of the work by stating that his heart is satisfied with the fidelity with which he has narrated the history of his youth (228). In Part II, Rousseau continues to make overt claims to frankness, and he concludes the work by declaring that he has told the truth, and that anyone believing him to be a dishonest man is “himself a man fit to be stifled” (550). From start to finish, Rousseau petitions for his readers' trust with these explicit pleas, and indeed, the work doubtless contains its share of audacious honesty.
And yet, I suggest, even Rousseau's honesty is paradoxical—which is to say that it is also, in its own way, false and untrue. We can begin to see some of the fractures in Rousseau's honesty through a careful consideration of his choice of form: confessional, after all, is not without a bias in favor of the sinful and faulty dimensions of one's life. Though Rousseau departs from the catholic understanding of the confession slightly insofar as he repeatedly insists on disclosing everything—the good as well as the bad—he nevertheless offers several indications that his work privileges the latter over the former. We can see this clearly if we look more closely at the declaration from the Confessions noted above. As McCardle says of this section, “in the midst of the very passage in which he promises complete candor, Rousseau clearly indicates that he has provided himself greatest latitude.”Footnote 15 And yet, the latitude Rousseau allows himself is directed. Rousseau states that he has “told the good and the evil with the same frankness.” But equal frankness does not necessarily imply a proportional or even-handed emphasis. Rousseau next suggests that he will omit nothing bad about himself, and will add nothing good, leaving wide open the distinct possibility that he is silent about some good things, and inventive when it comes to the bad. With this obfuscating logic, Rousseau quietly alerts us to his strange propensity: in keeping with the spirit of the confessional, but contrary, it would seem, to human nature, he tends to exaggerate the bad and omit the good. Rousseau confirms that this is his tendency when he pointedly distinguishes his own confessional activity from that of the Socratic apologia. Anticipating a common interpretive reaction to the work, Rousseau explicitly says that his goal in the Confessions is not self-defense: “I do not fear that the reader will ever forget that I am making my confessions and thereby believe that I am making my apology” (234).Footnote 16 In other words, Rousseau will skew his self-portrait such that it cannot be taken as a defensive gesture.
Just as enlightenment is complicated in Rousseau, so too is autobiographical honesty. And, significantly, the complicated honesty of the Confessions becomes the central concern of the most involved treatment of honesty in Rousseau's whole corpus—the Fourth Walk of his Reveries. What remains a tentative interpretive possibility for the reader of the Confessions is confirmed with dialectical precision in the Fourth Walk. There, in a meditation prompted by doubts about his life's motto, vitam impendere vero (to consecrate one's life to truth, from Juvenal's fourth Satire), and by accompanying doubts about the probity of the Confessions, Rousseau unearths the full unorthodoxy of his conception of truth telling.Footnote 17 While others have recognized the import of this passage, it is important to discern how the rigorous logic of the Fourth Walk delineates the specific causes and dimensions of Rousseau's autobiographical falsifications.Footnote 18
Rousseau begins the Fourth Walk by recounting how he had recently been considering his life's motto in light of the Confessions. He asks himself, “by what strange inconsistency did I thus lie with gaiety of heart, unnecessarily, without profit, and by what inconceivable contradiction did I feel not the least regret, I who for fifty years have not ceased to be afflicted by remorse for a lie?” (44). Rousseau's elaborate reply to himself constitutes the rest of the reverie, which is explicitly concerned with the justice of lying. When is the truth owed, Rousseau wonders, and when is something other than the truth (be it concealment or an alternate fabrication) justified? His answer is twofold. First, “general and abstract truth” is always owed, since it “is the most precious of all goods” (44). When it comes to specifics, however, there is far more freedom.Footnote 19 Lying about particulars is permitted so long as it does not hurt justice “in any way whatsoever” (50); in fact, according to Rousseau, “To lie without profit or prejudice to ourselves or another is not to lie: it is not a lie; it is a fiction” (48). Only lying that is both contrary to truth and harmful to justice, then, is properly called a lie (50). In keeping with the message of philosophic responsibility in the First Discourse, Rousseau explains that would-be deceivers must be certain that their fictions will do no harm to anyone, and explicitly articulates the great extent to which he trusts himself in making such complicated assessments about what is harmful (48). Humorously, what does weigh heavy on Rousseau's mind in this meditation is whether he has been just enough to himself. He first articulates this concern in abstract terms, wondering if it is possible to do injustice to oneself in lying, and as a consequence to do some harm to the truth (47). These musings bring Rousseau back to the Confessions.
Rousseau closes the fourth Reverie by accusing himself of violating his own rules. Since “to deceive to our detriment is also a real lie,” Rousseau confesses that he may be guilty of genuine injustice. This is not because he has indulgently hidden anything incriminating, but rather because he has accused himself too severely (54). Rousseau goes on further to disclose that this error is accompanied by a tendency to understate the happiness and charm of his life:
If, without thinking about it and by an involuntary movement, I sometimes hid my deformed side and depicted my good side, these reticences have been well compensated for by other more bizarre reticences which often made me remain more assiduously silent about the good than about the evil. This is a peculiarity of my temperament which it is quite excusable for men not to believe but which, entirely unbelievable as it is, is no less real. I have often told the evil in all its baseness. I have rarely told the good in all its charm and I have often been completely silent about it because it honoured me too much and because in making my Confessions I would appear to have made my eulogy. (55)
With this remarkable statement Rousseau explicitly affirms the truth of what had heretofore been merely a conspicuous possibility: so determined is he not to make an apology or eulogy, Rousseau actively and with care (soigneusement) silences the good on behalf of the bad. Kelly suggests that such reticences represent only a “slight but real defect in the Confessions.”Footnote 20 Rousseau himself is less forgiving: “In weighing so carefully what I owed to others, have I sufficiently examined what I owed myself?” (58). With gravitas and humility, he pleads guilty: he erred in producing fictions that cast him in such negative light, and his motto should have precluded such imaginative fancy (see 58–59). This is Rousseau at his ironic heights.
II. Rousseau's Confessions: Impressions of Misery, Habits of Happiness, and a Cloak of Idiosyncrasy
The quiet elitism of the First Discourse, grounded in that work's complicated evaluation of enlightenment, comes to be matched by a sophisticated apparatus of deceptive, but presumably just, truth telling in the autobiographical writings. More specifically, the Fourth Walk provides a retrospective look at the honesty of the Confessions, and alerts us in a rather abstract way to be on guard for exaggerations, biases, and silences, that cast Jean-Jacques in a negative light.Footnote 21 With this in mind, the Confessions must be read differently. But how so? In this section, I begin with a treatment of the most prominent dramatic feature of the work: Rousseau's anticipation of future misery and misfortune. I then turn to discuss some of the ways in which Rousseau, in the course of his narrative, invites us to question this story of decline. This leads, finally, to consideration of Rousseau's well-hidden happiness, and of the “fictions” that make up his disguise.
We are confronted with emotional outcries on page one, where Rousseau pithily describes his birth: “I cost my mother her life, and my birth was the first of my misfortunes” (6); he concludes Book I pathetically: “Ah! Let us not anticipate the miseries of my life! I will be occupying my readers only too much with this sad subject” (35). Despite such protestations, Rousseau is seemingly unable to resist any opportunity to do this very thing. The whole of Part I is peppered with apprehensive statements about the misfortunes that lie ahead (see 73, 97, 111, 113, 124, 132, 156, 172, 204, 213, 218, 220, and 221; these lists are not exhaustive). And while comments about Jean-Jacques's future misfortunes color the tone of Part I, they come to pervade Part II. Rousseau, writing after a two-year hiatus shrouded in some mystery, opens Part II by highlighting the contrast between the two parts. Rousseau says that, while he wrote the previous section with pleasure, the second half offers him “nothing but misfortunes, betrayals, perfidies, saddening, and heart-rending remembrances” (234). Throughout Part II, he continues to foreshadow the cruel consequences of narrated events, to regret the narrated past with nostalgia, and to speak of his present vantage point abysmally (see 222, 243, 287, 291, 293, 336, 367, 375, 455, 493, and 542). The Confessions seems to proceed, then, as a suspenseful wind-up to culminating disaster, written from the perspective of an aged, dejected, and nostalgic Rousseau.
Indeed, the traditional reading of the Confessions takes it to be a straightforward story of decline, but several narrative features of the work challenge this reading. Perhaps most significantly, within the Confessions, Rousseau never quite delivers on the much-anticipated culminating episode of deep suffering and pathos. Here it is helpful to consider some dates. Rousseau starts writing the Confessions in 1763 in Switzerland and continues to write Part I while in England (see 151, 153, 178); as we have seen, from the outset of the narrative he prefigures doom. Therefore, it is the reader's reasonable assumption that the Rousseau of 1763 was already effectively in the pit of miseries he anticipates for the young Jean-Jacques. And yet, when Rousseau finally arrives to recount the period in which he started writing the Confessions, in the course of the narrative of Part II (composed in 1769 back in France: see 512 and 521), misery is still something that he anticipates for the Jean-Jacques of his narrative, not something that has come to pass. Further, the last book of the Confessions contains the same suspenseful foreshadowing that dominates the rest of the work, despite its having been composed long after his departure and return to France (see 493). Rousseau's narrative passes through the period of anticipated crisis without fanfare, and finishes on what has become a familiar note of suspense.
The most obvious solution to this difficulty would be to say that Rousseau begins his work in the midst of unhappiness, which allows him to predict the future miseries of Jean-Jacques from the outset, but then, as he continues to compose his Confessions, his circumstances worsen such that what previously appeared to be the height of misfortune starts, in hindsight, to look relatively tolerable. According to such a reading, the anticipated misery of the early parts not only comes to pass, it is surpassed in the course of a general descent that culminates during Rousseau's trip to England, and later translates into the full-fledged paranoia that many believe tainted the rest of his oeuvre. This explanation of the dramatic trajectory of Rousseau's Confessions has some immediate appeal since it seems to account for some of Rousseau's narrative choices, and satisfies our suspicions about Rousseau's psychological well-being in those later years.
My reasons for rejecting such an explanation are twofold. On the one hand, there are several inconsistencies, operating over various narrative time frames of the text, which are too conspicuous to be explained by Rousseau's changing moods. On the other, there is a counternarrative of persistent happiness in the Confessions that contradicts the story of radical decline.
Let us consider two specific examples of narrative inconsistencies. First, early on in Part I, Rousseau melodramatically describes a later return to Geneva as a time of deep confusion in which he is hardly master of himself, being “so continuously besieged” that he could not find a moment for a visit to one of his childhood homes; he would have watered the ground with his tears, but he could not even find time for this (21). When he comes to narrate this period in the course of Part II, however, we discover that he is indeed besieged, but by adorers (329), and that he also finds time to spend a week traveling in complete leisure through the countryside with Thérèse and some other friends. Furthermore, he tells us: “I did not lose either the taste or the habit of my solitary walks, and I often made rather long ones on the banks of the lake, during which my head did not remain idle since it was accustomed to work” (331). Though Rousseau is consistent with some of the details, the contrasting affect is plain.
A second revealing inconsistency occurs in the course of Part I. In Book V, which was written in England in 1766, Rousseau mentions his present happiness, and suggests that this condition of enduring happiness has encompassed the past ten years or so of his life. The statement reads as follows: “I know no study in the world that mixes better with my natural tastes than that of plants, and the life that I have been leading for the past ten years in the country is hardly anything but a continuous herborization, in truth without object and without progress” (151). On its own this statement is innocuous enough, and describes a period of time in which circumstances accorded with Rousseau's well-known partiality to idleness and botany. But consider the period that Rousseau is describing: the years span 1756–66, the very decade that Rousseau has anticipated for the whole first part of the Confessions as one full of misery and misfortune, and which he will continue to foreshadow as such through to the end of the book. It is a period that includes his departure from the Hermitage, his departure from Montmorency, his departure from Môtiers, and his eventual flight from the Continent. What is more, this is the period in which Rousseau wrote Julie, Emile, The Social Contract, and the Letter to d'Alembert and began his Confessions. Rousseau's seems to be a strange understanding of herborization.
Between Parts I and II, and within Part I, then, we see the same incongruity with regards to misfortune and happiness that is replicated in the whole work: just as the whole work anticipates a great crisis that is never described, so too are specific episodes anticipated with apprehension which then come to pass pleasantly and productively. Such major contradictions are hard to attribute to sloppiness or moodiness on Rousseau's part. My suggestion is that they provide a clear indication that the constant anticipation of misery is “fictional.” Still more compelling, however, than these perplexing inconsistencies is the fact that the bulk of the narrative is quietly imbued with the author's good cheer.
A humorous narrative pattern emerges early on in the Confessions. Already in Book I, we see the pattern of retrospective worry on the part of our author, followed by a depiction of Jean-Jacques's happy-go-lucky experience. Rousseau anticipates Jean-Jacques's departure from Geneva in tones of foreboding (see 36–38), but young Jean-Jacques's experiences a rush of freedom, independence, vast hopes, and ambition (see 38). While the reader is encouraged to assume that such hopes are vain and ridiculous, over the course of the Confessions, the pattern of anticipated misery followed by actual happiness persists, and examples of Jean-Jacques's unflappable resilience accumulate. We learn throughout Part I, for example, about how he contends with desperate poverty. Though the mature Rousseau thinks Jean-Jacques ought to have been terribly worried by the abject misery that overtakes him (see 59–60), Jean-Jacques relishes the freedom that poverty affords him, not to mention the company it summons (see 60–72). Jean-Jacques's financial situation reaches its nadir in Book IV (see 141–43), but this only increases the tranquility of his sleep and enlivens his creative imagination (see 141–44). Similarly, an early encounter with desperate illness in Book VI, while at Les Charmettes (191–94), serves to make way for study and learning: Jean-Jacques enjoyed some of the happiest years of his life under conditions of extreme illness (see 194–99).Footnote 22
Indeed, the interval at Les Charmettes is the period in which Rousseau claims his character became fixed (see 146). He introduces this period as follows: “It is during this precious interval that my mixed and incoherent education acquired some consistency so as to make me what I never again ceased to be through the storms that were waiting for me” (150; emphasis added). When Rousseau returns again later to describe the overall impression of his life at Les Charmettes, he concludes: “true happiness cannot be described, it is felt, and is felt all the better when it can be described least, because it does not result from a combination of facts, but is a permanent condition. I repeat myself often, but I would repeat myself still more, if I said the same thing as many times as it comes to my mind” (198). We will return to explore the implications of the claim that, according to Rousseau, true happiness is indescribable. Just as astonishing is that, when Rousseau describes his fixed character toward the end of Part I, it is one of permanent happiness and well-being—a state of mind that continually calls itself to mind, and which therefore cannot be expressed in writing. No reader of the Confessions would deny that Rousseau's period at Les Charmettes is a highlight of the work, and constitutes a peak in Rousseau's happiness. But few take seriously his explicit claims in Books V and VI that the happiness he achieves there carries on through the rest of his life (and thus the rest of the work) as a lasting psychological condition. And while it is true that in Part II of the Confessions Rousseau returns to the refrain of anticipated misery, it is also true that the pattern of robust happiness in the face of misfortune continues quietly through to the end of the work.
A few more examples—spanning the years of Part II—should suffice to illustrate the stubborn persistence of this pattern. In Book VII, much time is spent describing Jean-Jacques's woeful rise and decline as secretary for the French ambassador in Venice in 1743 (248–76). And yet, having recounted just how unhappy a time this was for the noble youth, Rousseau lingers to briefly recount how he was feted by French society in Venice upon his dismissal (262). Furthermore, though Rousseau earlier had asserted that, aside from a few distractions, Jean-Jacques made his duties into his only pleasures (257), we soon learn that his small share of distractions involved daily trips to the theater (259), Sunday Vespers, weekly music rehearsals with musicians from the symphony, and a few significant encounters with Venetian women. When he arrives back in Paris, Jean-Jacques renounces all ambition (not for the last time), but the pattern of foreseen miseries and actual happiness and creative productivity persists here too (see 279, 293, 308), as well as at the Hermitage (340, 346, 359, 362, 365, 367, 368, 370, and 373) and in Montmorency (compare 410–14 and 414–21). Again and again, Jean-Jacques proves capable of overcoming even the worst ordeals of civilized life. Rousseau explains how, at Montmorency, he lived an “even and peaceable enough life; having been deprived of the charm of excessively lively attachments [he] was also free of the weight of their chains” (421); he then digresses to provide a six-page accounting of his latest acquaintances (422–28; see 501–5 and 512–15 for similar lists).
Suffice it to say, Jean-Jacques's ability to overcome adversity is generally understated by the narrator. Rousseau does not fail to mention periods of stability and happiness, but he does nothing rhetorically to foresee or highlight such intervals—which always come as narrative surprises, but in fact make up the bulk of the life he describes. This becomes most obvious in the final books of the work, when Jean-Jacques is at his most vulnerable. We see, for example, the perfect calm with which he finally departs from Montmorency under threat of arrest: he is most confident and self-assured precisely at the moment of his greatest difficulties (481). He arrives in Neuchâtel and in no time at all has settled back into a schedule of steady work (521). When, after several years in Môtiers, Jean-Jacques is forced to flee again owing to the extreme disapproval of the Swiss public, he remains nearly unaffected, much to the chagrin of the surrounding mobs: “I nevertheless continued to take walks calmly in the midst of hoots, and the taste for botany … gave a new interest to my walks and made me scour the country while botanizing without being alarmed by the outcries of all that rabble, whose rage was only irritated by this cool-headedness” (528). As the end of the Confessions draws near, we see him happy once more enjoying such activities on the Island of St. Pierre (537–39), before being forced again to depart. The book concludes on a note of despair and looming misery.
What are we to make of the conclusion of Rousseau's Confessions? The question that remains is whether the pattern of presaged misfortune followed by robust well-being can be carried through beyond the end of the Confessions, as a general pattern for Rousseau's life. Ought we to take the concluding premonitions of the work at their heart-rending word, or to trust what we have learned in the book about Rousseau's good humor? The evidence continues to pile up in favor of the latter.Footnote 23 Let me briefly identify one additional Rousseauian “fiction” from the Confessions that helps us to untangle the puzzle further.
This final fiction involves Rousseau's peculiar relationship to past and future.Footnote 24 Remarkably, we learn over the course of the work, Rousseau is at once blessed by a strange sort of selective amnesia and plagued by a seemingly dreadful variety of foresight: “my memory, which retraces only pleasant objects, is the happy counterweight to my frightened imagination which makes me foresee only cruel futures” (233). As it so happens, however, for Rousseau both of these mental tendencies prove very useful: their cumulative effect is that Rousseau remains all but unaffected by his misfortunes. Past evil, we learn, is soon forgotten (“It is surprising how easily I forget past evil, however recent it might be. As soon as it has happened its remembrance returns to me weakly and passes away without difficulty,” 490). Present misfortune is alleviated by recollection of past happiness (see 189: “I no longer see anything in the future that tempts me; only returns to the past can soothe me, and these returns, so lively and so true in the epoch about which I am speaking often make me live happily in spite of my misfortunes”). And, what is perhaps most surprising, even fearful foresight has its advantages:
My cruel imagination, which ceaselessly torments itself by foreseeing evils that do not yet exist, diverts my memory and keeps me from recalling the ones that do not exist any longer. There are no longer any precautions to take against what is done, and it is useless to be concerned about it. In some ways I consume my unhappiness in advance. The more I have suffered by foreseeing it, the easier it is for me to forget it; while, on the contrary, since I am ceaselessly occupied with my past happiness, I recall it and ruminate, so to speak, to the point of enjoying it all over again when I want to. (490)
It is worth noting that Rousseau's mental portrait here occurs in Book XI, as he describes his forced departure from Montmorency. He continues in his description of this period of great upset as follows: “From the day of my departure I so perfectly forgot everything that had just passed … I would not even have thought about them again on my whole trip, except for the precautions I was obliged to take” (490). His anticipatory fears are rarely vindicated even in the most extreme circumstances, and when they are, are soon forgotten.Footnote 25 While we cannot deny that the cruelties of Rousseau's imagination are real in some ways, it is amusing when, toward the end of this most pathos-filled work, we learn that he considers even this tormenting habit of mind to be heureuse, or fortunate (490). His good-naturedness is irrepressible.
Rousseau, then, alleges that he has several idiosyncrasies of character, which, conveniently, turn out to have particular cumulative effects on his autobiography. First, he has a strange propensity to exaggerate his flaws at the expense of his virtues, at the cost of some real injustice to himself. Second, he tends to foresee great unhappiness, while at the same time weathering misfortune well, forgetting it soon, and recollecting only happiness with any facility. These so-called “habits” of mind go some ways toward explaining the relentless foreboding of the Confessions. Alas, recall too that pauvre Rousseau is unable to capture happiness in writing. Though his memory dwells on what is happy, his pen is bent against it (he fears that simplicity and sweetness make for uninteresting narrative: 197–200 and 189; see also 136, 361, and 437). The happy interludes that do occur in the Confessions, then, represent a mere fraction of the moments of this kind that constitute his actual life, not to mention the endless pleasant intervals spent recollecting and writing about them. This being the case, the Confessions is a thoroughly stymied work, for it is the autobiography of a consummately happy man who is able only to foreshadow misery and gloom, and to recall a past happiness that he is incapable of describing. Thankfully, Rousseau identifies the “fictions” that give the lie to his despair—as well as to the despairing conclusion of his Confessions.
III. Rethinking the Paradoxes of Rousseau's Self-Disclosure
In the Confessions, Rousseau playfully but methodically creates an exaggerated public persona whereby he makes himself appear unhappy, unfortunate, weak, and tormented, even though he is actually very happy, fortunate, strong, and robust. He is a philosopher who has achieved that rarest of goods—happiness—and who might, therefore, have presented himself as a gleaming model for humankind. What could Rousseau possibly have had to gain, then, from cloaking his well-being and showcasing his misery? To answer this question, I consider Rousseau's autobiographical choices in light of his complicated, justice-driven stance on enlightenment and truth telling. In keeping with the concerns of the First Discourse and the Fourth Walk, Rousseau ensures that what is potentially harmful in his autobiographical works is well concealed, while what is harmless or beneficial is placed in the foreground. How, then, is Rousseau's actual happiness harmful? How is his apparent misery beneficial?
A full treatment of the potential harmfulness of Rousseau's happiness would require a systematic study of Rousseau's happiness and its sources.Footnote 26 Such a study would involve a reconsideration of some of the concepts associated with the Rousseauian way of life, including, among Rousseau's plurality of enjoyments, imaginative reverie, botany or “herborization,” idleness, walking, friendship, and writing/composition.Footnote 27 And yet, while such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is not such a stretch to infer that Rousseau's essential activity—the one that brings him genuine and consistent happiness—involves not just the passive reverie of, say, the Fifth Walk, but also a lot of thinking and writing.Footnote 28 By all indications, and like those rarified disciples of nature mentioned fleetingly already in the First Discourse, Rousseau dedicates most of his mature years to composing works that aim at the happiness of the human race and act as monuments to the glory of the human intellect.
If this is right, and Rousseau identifies himself with the quiet heroes of the First Discourse, then it is easier to see why he dissembles: he conceals this central source of his happiness because it is not something that is widely attainable, nor is it beneficial for most. According to the First Discourse, most people suffer from enlightenment. As a result, Rousseau's status as one of the exceptions to this general rule is a problematic one, and his quietness about his own happiness reflects his concern for the health of society; indeed, it is not clear that, according to Rousseau's own reflections on the psychological effects of envy and ambition, he could have openly disclosed the truth about his self-fulfillment without endangering his audience. Rousseau is attuned to the alienating dangers posed by fictitious characters, and he wishes to be no such exemplar.Footnote 29 As is clear in Rousseauian psychology, unattainable ambitions are a vast source of psychological distress and alienation, especially in the modern world.Footnote 30 Too frank an exposition of his great health of soul would only stir up his poor readers' amour-propre, and, as he makes clear in the Fourth Walk, justice toward his readers is Rousseau's guiding principle. To the extent that Rousseau does mean to be a positive role model, therefore, he works to exemplify a preference for wholesome, rural ways, and a passive happiness available more broadly.Footnote 31 Seen in this light, Rousseau's autobiographical dissembling is rooted in a generous, if patronizing, modesty that serves to save readers from dangerous hopes and mistaken choices.
Of course, justice toward the reader is not Rousseau's only concern, and, in several respects, the concealment of happiness is also in Rousseau's own interest. Most obvious in this regard is the fact that, by hiding his happiness, Rousseau is able to pre-empt envy. While it is perhaps impossible to prove that such concerns were Rousseau's own, it is telling that, over the course of the Confessions, he does offer several examples of men and women endangered and/or ruined by the envy and resentment of their peers. Consider, for example, his short description early in the book of the fate of Father Caton, a monk whom Rousseau greatly admired:
Let me complete this sad story in two words. The other monks, jealous or rather furious at seeing a merit and an elegance of morals in him that had nothing of monastic scum, acquired a hatred for him, because he was not as hateful as they were. The Leaders conspired against him and roused up the young monks who envied his place, and who previously did not dare to look at it. (156)
Rousseau speaks of his own fate in Venice in similar terms, referring to the envy and hatred incurred by “the upright eye of a decent man” and the extent to which such envy can be turned to slander when the object of hatred is not just good but virtuous (see 258). He will occasionally allude to his elaborate efforts to disguise his own supremacy of character, and to needing to write in such a way that he might be “pardoned” for seeing further than his contemporaries on matters concerning the happiness of the human race, and of his fatherland in particular (340). Such examples illustrate what Rousseau feared could happen if he were too forthcoming about his happiness (and, perhaps additionally, if he were too forthcoming about his virtue).
Ultimately, the choice rhetorically to minimize his happiness also helps Rousseau contend with his existing accusers. From the time of the First Discourse, Rousseau was accused of arrogance, misanthropy, and hypocrisy; against the background of Rousseau's critique of enlightenment values, and its accompanying backlash, frank autobiographical disclosure of his sense of superiority, solitary happiness, and enlightened well-being would have been especially inflammatory. Rousseau's decision to conceal his happiness in the autobiographical works can thus be understood in terms of justice toward his community of readers, and justice and prudence toward himself. To appreciate the peculiar character of his justice and prudence, however, it is necessary to turn from his quietness about happiness to his noisiness about despair.
It is here that we see the distance between Rousseau's desire for absolution and the Socratic apologia: in contrast to the Platonic Socrates's rather robust defense of the philosophic way of life, Rousseau takes on the role of vulnerable antihero, and this persona of victimhood addresses the several charges against him in a manner consistent with his critique of enlightenment. First, with his oft-repeated expressions of weakness, ill health, and victimhood, the charge of arrogance is craftily undermined. Far from overestimating his own powers and excellence, Jean-Jacques becomes the hapless victim of the corrupt social world. Second, Rousseau's rhetoric of misery turns the charge of misanthropy on its head: Jean-Jacques is not the hater, but the hated, and if he must remove himself from the cruelty of modern society, it is because he suffers too much from his unrequited natural love of man. Finally, Rousseau's frank willingness to acknowledge his worst personal faults and misdeeds throughout the autobiographical works undercuts the charge of hypocrisy, for hypocrisy involves saying one thing and doing another, but Rousseau admits everything bad openly.Footnote 32 His variety of self-defense involves a kind of rhetorical surrender: far from posing a danger to society, Rousseau comes to light as a weak but sincere lover of mankind.Footnote 33
This is not, however, to say that Rousseau's self-presentation is unappealing. In fact, the emotional tenor of the Confessions arguably also makes the work more enjoyable to a broader audience. Rousseau suggests throughout the Confessions that to be lovable one must be flawed. Consider what he has to say about his friend Gauffrecourt: “That man who was so charming nevertheless had his flaws, just as others do, as will be seen below; but if he did not have them perhaps he might have been less lovable. To render him as interesting as possible it is necessary that one have something for which to pardon him” (179). The reflexive implications of this statement are evident. Rousseau knows that emotional appeals are more pleasant to most readers than, say, drawn-out descriptions of intellectual well-being; as we have seen, he repeatedly apologizes for how boring he fears the passages dealing with his happiness will be to his readers, but never expresses similar concerns about the more emotionally excruciating portions of his narrative. Ultimately, then, Rousseau becomes a beneficiary of his own teaching on compassion.Footnote 34 Since compassion is pleasant, an emphasis on Jean-Jacques's suffering adds to the reader's enjoyment.
If Rousseau thinks it will be more pleasant for his readers to read about the unfortunate aspects of his life, his dictates of truth telling, again, require that such disclosures in no way be harmful to justice. Here too we can think back to Rousseau's treatment of compassion, and see how, with his own unhappy example, Rousseau fuels his readers' sense of relative happiness and wholeness: many readers will simply enjoy the experience of reading about someone so hard done by. Furthermore, just as he thwarts potential amour-propre and envy by hiding his happiness, putting the most unpleasant dimensions of his life in the foreground has a complementary effect. With his rhetoric, Rousseau makes sure that his life—a life manifestly devoted to the arts and sciences—does not look particularly worthy of imitation, since it is a life that he thinks most of his readers are unsuited for, and which would therefore be harmful for them. Finally, by so vividly portraying the most extreme pathologies of his temperament, Rousseau may also awaken readers to similar tendencies in themselves.Footnote 35
Rousseau's pathos-filled self-disclosure walks a fine line between pathetic victim and admirable role model. The general effect of his approach, I think, is that a typical reader comes away from the autobiographical works with a new sense of compassion for Rousseau's peculiar mode of existence. In this way Rousseau's rhetoric further serves the cause of justice by implicitly recommending a new object for society's compassion: the much-maligned bohemian thinker. The suggestion that Rousseau aims to promote cultural sympathy for men of science and the arts may seem far-fetched in light of his general skepticism regarding their social value, but it is important in this regard to note just how different sympathy and toleration are from honor and accolades. The former are compatible with the skepticism and public distrust toward the arts and sciences that Rousseau promotes, while the latter are not. Rousseau's antiheroic public persona thus helps to inspire a new kind of intellectual freedom grounded on tolerance, rather than on honor. His rhetorical self-portrait serves to secure a middle ground for intellectual activity that is the special object of neither public contempt nor public admiration.Footnote 36 It helps to protect the “temples of the muses” from an “unworthy populace” (see First Discourse, 62), and from the influence of wealth and vain prestige. We might add that such a position of sympathy and toleration toward men of letters is consistent with Rousseau's conduct throughout life.Footnote 37
Conclusion
The Confessions is a work designed to resonate with Rousseau's larger philosophical oeuvre, all the way back to that central insight into the paradox of enlightenment that came to him on the road to Vincennes. The question posed by the Academy of Dijon concerned the moral value of enlightenment; here we have seen how, for Rousseau, the central question concerns the relationship between enlightenment and human happiness. Rousseau is skeptical about the public value of enlightenment because he doubts that it can make most men happy; this being the case, he forges a persona that reflects and promotes this ambiguity regarding intellectual life. Ever attentive to the well-being of his readers, he is at pains to shape his legacy in a beneficial (or, in the very least, harmless) way. Rousseau is willing to appear morose, unstable, and paranoid if it means creating toleration for a new kind of thinker, while at the same time diminishing the public appeal of intellectual life. Far from seeking honors and wealth, influence and power, the Rousseauian intellectual is apparently content to be left alone on the fringes. Only in scattered glimpses does Rousseau show us just how contented he is on the sidelines of the Enlightenment, and only through sustained study do we see the artful and ambitious character of his marginal life.
Questions doubtless arise here concerning the compatibility of my reading with the historical record, a full response to which would take us well beyond the scope of this article. What we do know is that the evidence is varied enough that it is inconsistent with Rousseau's surface story of steady and irremediable decline.Footnote 38 Indeed, this reading of the Confessions calls for a fresh look at the historical record, in keeping with the following remark by Chamayou:
Most of the time, testimonies about Rousseau ignore the historical facts in order to establish a truth about the public figure—one conforming to that which his works fashioned in the spirit of his readers, and also conforming to the image he wanted to give of himself after the appearance of the First Discourse.Footnote 39
Furthermore, it is not unlikely that Rousseau's way of life—and not just his way of writing—was devoted to this same artful self-creation.Footnote 40 The question, it seems to me, is not so much whether Rousseau indulged in intentionally dramatic gestures, but rather concerns the extent to which such conduct permeated his life. Rousseau only knows the answer here; what is clearer is that he succeeded in making this life a central act of the eighteenth century.
By the end of his life, Rousseau was a cult figure in France. For all his coyness, history reminds us that he was in fact a cultural powerhouse—and, once we have come to know him better, we can see that he is that rare individual whose legacy equals his vast self-regard. In the end it is sufficient to note that, in rare but important moments, he admits that he considers himself to be the best of men (see C 433), has naturally happy inclinations that serve him well (490), entertains vast ambitions beyond the grave (228 and 336), and spends much of his time contemplating not only plants, but also the future of all mankind in its justice and virtue (218, 221, 237, 285, and 430). While we may well disagree with Rousseau's evaluation of enlightenment, or of himself, or question his intense personal engagement with and against the eighteenth-century world, an exploration of his life cannot but deepen our thinking about the popular value of the arts and sciences, and about how an intellectual elite might function responsibly. In a skeptical age such as our own, it is perhaps also of some use to piece together a fuller picture of the sort of man Rousseau was truly: not essentially fragmented, but a lucid unity, an idle man only in light of his own unorthodox understanding of idleness, and, finally, a splendid study in the examined life well lived.
