This book attempts to answer a million-dollar question: What are the conditions for the emergence of competitive electoral politics in the Middle East that could eventually evolve into a free, democratic political system? This is a worthy topic, for as the author notes, it is not only an intellectual exercise but a practical one in light of the bleak political reality in the region and the recently purported attempts by the United States to introduce democracy into the Middle East.
Michelle Penner Angrist seeks to answer this question through an historical comparative analysis of Turkey—the only country in the Muslim Middle East that has developed a competitively political system—and Tunisia, South Yemen, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt that have not, establishing instead authoritarian regimes. “Why, in a region so homogeneously authoritarian,” she asks, “was Turkey able to evolve competitive political institutions? How did patterns of political development there contrast with those of the rest of the postcolonial, Muslim Middle East to yield Turkey's exceptional regime outcome?” (4). According to the author, the answers to these questions lie in the shape and character of the political parties that were established when these countries attainted independence in the early- to mid-twentieth century. “Several characteristics of the nascent party systems that were in existence at the crucial independence juncture significantly affected the shape of the political regimes that would emerge in the region.” (5) Angrist divides the nine case studies into two groups: states that developed authoritarian regimes immediately after independence (Tunisia, South Yemen, and Algeria) and states that, according to her analysis, developed competitively political regimes after independence. From the latter group of six, five states (Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt) eventually also became authoritarian regimes while Turkey sustained its competitively political system from the 1950s to the present. The reason for this, according to the author, lies primarily in the fact that in the five states, polarization between conservative elites and their challengers led eventually to a situation in which the challengers lost faith in the political system and in their ability to mobilize voters in their favor (in the author's language, “mobilization asymmetry” between the competing parties). This dynamic destroyed the democratic arena and eventually brought on the collapse of the competitive political system, establishing instead authoritarian regimes.
Turkey was different from these cases in three variables that are examined by Angrist. First, Turkey developed a two-party system, as opposed to the other five case studies that developed multiparty systems. Second, both the opposition and the ruling party in Turkey went through a gradual process of depolarization of their political stands, and third, they mutually increased their mobilization within the Turkish population. Thus, in 1950, “the status quo party, feeling confident of its ability to defend its interests democratically, agreed to compete with its opponents in free and fair elections” (18).
As Angrist notes, she is not the first to try to explain analytically the important issue of the absence of democracy in the Middle East. Her contribution to this theme lies in bringing political parties to the forefront of analysis of Middle Eastern political regimes. As she rightly argues, parties “are agents that deserve our analytical attention,” and they “are collective actors that give us sound theoretical reason to expect them to play important roles in regime formation processes.” (11) Be that as it may, one still needs to first explain the nature and character of political parties in the Middle East before embarking on such an ambitious project. After all, it is problematic to analyze party behavior in the Middle East in isolation from the sociopolitical and economic contexts of their emergence and actions. Although Angrist does provide some historical background of the parties she studies, overall she analyzes these parties as units that play the political game in isolation from this very background, as if they were players in a game with set rules. Moreover, when studying political parties in the Middle East, particularly in the two to three decades of World War II, it is essential to take into consideration the fact that many parties functioned as disguised sectarian, regional, ethnic, and sometimes even familial affiliations. Many lacked a modern apparatus, did not establish branches throughout the newly founded states, and many were were missing cohesive and thoughtful ideological platforms. In fact, despite the growing strength of the state in the Middle East, it was ethnopolitics that shaped and determined the political arena of many of these states. Therefore, to study parties in the Middle East and their political behavior, in isolation from their sociopolitical contexts, is challenging.
Second, putting these nine case studies within the same comparative matrix poses some problems in historical analysis, for their only common denominators are that they vaguely share a region and a religion. In terms of political development and historical experience, there are stark differences among states such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and South Yemen. Moreover, the political parties in these nine states and their participation in the political game also differ immensely from each other. After all, the Ba‘th party in Syria differed from the Wafd party in Egypt and even more so from other parties in Jordan. Although the latter state had seven parties, according to the count of the author, most did not really function as modern parties in the western sense of the word and did not truly participate in a “competitive political system.”
Finally, the attempt to put all these case studies into one comparative analysis creates strange historical descriptions. Here is one example out of several I noted. In order to put these states into one analytical matrix, the author seems to define the postcolonial independence era (“postimperial” in her words) in a very liberal way. Iran of 1941 was anything but independent, and the same applies for Iraq of 1932 or Egypt of 1936. This is not only a problem in dating, but a problem in understanding the politics of these states and the powers, including foreign powers, that played decisive roles in determining the political game.
Angrist's book is an example of the potential of comparative politics but also its limits. As I read her work, I could not but remember Haim Gerber's excellent book, The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East, which tries to tackle the same issue, but through a thoughtful, historical analysis and through an excellent integration of the social and political background of the modern Middle East. Despite the fact that she disregards “cultural attributes, levels of modernization or class configurations” (188), as important factors in shaping the political arenas in the modern Middle East, Angrist's book makes sense only if juxtaposed next to these themes that are absent from her own analysis.
