Western Scholars and students with an interest in the history of Oman no doubt are familiar with the name and some of the extensive work of John Wilkinson, who has been the foremost Western scholar in the field of Oman studies for the last four decades. In the present book he resumes much of his previous research and carries it further on the basis of previously unavailable or unused sources. Ibadi Islam became the predominant religion in Oman at an early stage a century after the death of the Prophet Muhammad and has ever since remained a major factor in the political, legal, and intellectual history of the country. The book deals with the origins of Ibadism outside Oman and compares its later development in the Maghrib and elsewhere, but the primary focus is on its development in Oman until the 12th century. The other primary factor in the political history of Oman, the tribal composition of its people, is analyzed at length in the book. Wilkinson here relies in particular on a newly discovered source, the Kitab Ansab al-ʿArab of Salama ibn Muslim al-ʿAwtabi, in order to describe the migrations of the South Arabian tribes, especially the Azd, to Oman in pre-Islamic times as well as their rivalries.
The book well deserves to become the standard history of Oman in medieval Islamic times and to serve as a groundbreaking reference work for further research in the field. It is not, however, an introductory work easily read by students without previous acquaintance with Oman and Ibadism. Wilkinson expects the reader to be familiar with basic facts and earlier research and often uses Arabic terms and phrases without explaining their meaning.
Concerning the origins of Ibadism and its early development in Basra, there is still significant uncertainty among historians of Islam. Modern Ibadi scholars have generally highlighted the leadership role of Jabir ibn Zayd (d. 711), a disciple of ʿAbd Allah ibn al-ʿAbbas, and after him Abu ʿUbayda Muslim ibn Abi Karima (d. after 757), sometimes describing them as the first Ibadi imams operating in secrecy (kitmān). Wilkinson proposes to “deconstruct this model” on the basis of the early Omani sources (pp. ix–x). With regard to Jabir, he recognizes, after initially questioning his being an Ibadi, his key role as a religious teacher, rather than a leader, of the proto-Ibadis. He denies Abu ʿUbayda's having been the successor, or even a pupil, of Jabir and considers his authority as insignificant at least among the Ibadis in Oman. The real founders of Ibadism were more militant figures who “activated” its teaching, striving for the establishment of Ibadi imamates rather than seeking accommodation with the Muslim community at large. The heroes of the Ibadiyya were the shārīs, who were prepared to sell their lives for the cause of an Ibadi state.
Wilkinson's perspective here is evidently informed by his special interest in the Omani imamate tradition, which provided Oman with an independent autonomous state within the Muslim world. Yet it may be questioned to what extent the imamate in Oman represented authentic Ibadi aspirations rather than local patriotic ambitions. Ibadism was part of the Muhakkima movement of the early Kharijites, which professed that rule on earth belongs to God alone (lā ḥukma illā li-llāh). Already ‘Ali had, when faced with the demands of the early Kharijites, complained that these amounted to a denial of the need for an amir. The primary motivation of the Kharijites was to secure the Kingdom of God on earth, not to establish a Kharijite imamate to rule the Muslim community. Whoever did not rule in accordance with the rule of God was an infidel and must not be obeyed. The thesis that the Muslims, if they truly obeyed the rule of God, did not really need an imam found fertile ground among the Muhakkima in contrast to Sunnism and Shiʿism. Its adoption by some of the Kharijite Najadat has been duly noted by P. Crone. The Muʿtazili kalām theologian al-Asamm, who was famous as a promoter of it, is known to have been close to the Ibadis in Basra. A generation earlier, the deviant Kufan Ibadi ʿIsa ibn ʿUmayr had championed the thesis. Adherents of his teaching were still active in Jabal Nafusa during the 9th century.
It is generally acknowledged that the Ibadiyya were the only branch of the Muhakkima to survive until the present because of their moderation and nonviolence. They were taught their moderate ideology by Jabir ibn Zayd, who was no Kharijite and undoubtedly had little sympathy for the killing of the caliphs ʿUthman and ʿAli but who shared the Kharijite view that Muslims have the right and duty to resist the rule of tyrants and oppressive imams in violation of the just rule of God. He taught them to build their society under the rule of the divine law secretly wherever they could in defiance of tyrannical government and to practice precautionary dissimulation (taqiyya) for self-preservation as allowed by the Qurʾan. He also taught them that the Muslims obeying the tyrants were not polytheists (mushrikūn) to be fought at all costs as the more radical Kharijites held, but remained monotheists and ahl al-qibla with whom they could live in peace as long as these were prepared to treat the Muhakkima as Muslims. He taught them that they could even perform the communal prayer behind the unjust rulers and their governors without accepting their unjust rule. He had no sympathy for the Kharijite shārīs whose aggressive armed struggle could only lead to self-destruction. Ibadi Islam has survived and is thriving without an imam not because of its shārīs but rather because most Ibadis were opposed to shirāʾ except in self-defense.
Misleading is Wilkinson's portrayal of the early Muhakkima in general as motivated by anti-Quraysh tribal sentiment and the Ibadiyya in particular by Yamanite political ambition. The Kharijites did not revolt against ‘Uthman and ‘Ali because they were of Quraysh. The two imams they all unreservedly praised and admired were Abu Bakr and ʿUmar, both Qurayshites and founders of the caliphate of Quraysh on the basis that only Quraysh was entitled to rule in Islam because the Arab tribes would never obey anyone but Quraysh. Wilkinson describes the proto-Ibadi delegation that offered the Umayyad Qurayshite caliph ʿUmar II and his son ʿAbd al-Malik their support if only they would adopt the Ibadi view of the early caliphate and proclaim their dissociation from the caliph ʿUthman (pp. 170–71). There was serious tribally based resentment against the domination of Quraysh in early Islam among the Yamanites and Rabiʿa, but Ibadi and other Khariji ideology was distinctly opposed to tribalist rivalry. The “great Arabian revolt” led by the Kindi leader Talib al-Haqq who became the first Ibadi imam probably was not a “purely Yamani affair” as suggested by Wilkinson (p. 179). There is evidence that it was supported by the Tamimi Nizari Arab ʿ Abd Allah ibn Ibad. It may well be that some proud Azdi tribesmen in Oman were not prepared to accept the leadership role of a Tamimi mawlā such as Abu ʿUbayda (p. 178), but they can hardly be considered true Ibadis.
