This book is a piece of philosophical work of extremely high intellectual quality. Its purpose is to defend in detail a ‘resolute’ reading of the Tractatus. It succeeds in this aim. It thus accomplishes something that has not yet been accomplished even by Conant or Diamond. It is therefore a major contribution to ‘Wittgenstein studies’, to contemporary philosophy and to the philosophical history of recent philosophy. (It has significant implications, for instance, for the work of Freudians, Sartreans, Griceans, Davidsonians.)
The main argument of the book might summed up somewhat as follows: If we keep working at Wittgenstein's work, if we think through the implications of his remarks about ‘internal relations’, ‘objects’, and so forth (summed up somewhat by McManus under the attractive heading of our fantasising a ‘con-formity’ between language and world), then it will become clear to us that we cannot be left hanging on to anything, any doctrines, truths, etc., once we have realized fully why we reached for these ideas, these terms (‘internal relations’, etc.) in the first place. Thus we have to take quite seriously that one who reads Wittgenstein ‘with understanding’ will be continually overcoming his work. One does not have to wait for the end of the book (Wittgenstein's book) to see that this must be so. Only our enchantment with and by words, which seem to take on a life of their own, as we let them out of the sight of our on going use of them, can shield from us quasi—indefinitely that not even Wittgenstein has any magic words to offer.
I believe much of the above to be implicit in what Conant and Diamond have argued. (But McManus sets out very beautifully and clearly just how, and he does so paying attention to the whole text of Tractatus in a way that they have not (yet).) It is also I believe implicit in their work then that that work, as well as Wittgenstein's work, is to take on the aspect of nonsense. Rather as with Kierkegaard, who felt that he had not been understood, and so wrote his The point of view for my work as an author, Wittgenstein has needed to be somewhat spelt out to people (99.9% of people) who just haven't got it. But therein lies a great risk: that one will be misunderstood if one's own prose is too plain; e.g., then it will seem as though one's own work surely does not itself have to be seen under the aspect of nonsense.
For instance, would it not be wise for McManus to be clearer that the powerful material he generates concerning ‘con-formity’cannot be said? Shouldn't McManus be more willing to speak nonsense, hereabouts; or rather, to acknowledge that he inevitably IS doing so?
Pretty much the same point again: We have ‘the picture picture’, given to us by Wittgenstein, as McManus, quite rightly, reads it; McManus beautifully and very originally argues that the picture picture is a therapeutic device. And then we overcome even that device. Because even pursuing the picture picture, in the way that McManus represents, still ends up misleading. For example, “Not con-formity!” is ultimately as misleading a slogan as “Con-formity!”
But as I say, this is a brilliant book. It is arguably the closest we have as yet to a working out of the ‘programme’ of resolution (the ‘programme’ of Conant and Diamond and Kremer et al) by way of (a) reading (of) the text of the Tractatus; but it is also much more than that. For instance, it offers also an outline but very stimulating account of why, on the resolute reading of the Tractatus, the writing of the Investigations was still absolutely necessary. On this account, Wittgenstein's abandonment of the fantasy of ‘the complete analysis’ of a proposition, his new ‘family-resemblance’ picture, and his full recognition of the indefinite variety of kinds of ‘language-game’, entailed a different kind of writing in which there was no (or at least, much less) danger of ‘our method’ in philosophy being deluded into thinking of itself as unified. McManus draws attention, valuably (250f.), to the qualifiedness (modal or simply quantitative), blandness, or metaphorical fertility and thus vagueness or allusiveness of virtually all of Wittgenstein's mature remarks upon the nature of (his) philosophical method. And he efficaciously rejects suggestions, such as those from Hacker's school, that later Wittgenstein held any general theses concerning language or philosophy; for instance, he brings helpfully into prominence how the alleged ‘arbitrariness of grammar’ is as wrong as a general thesis as it is right.
And this book offers much of interest beyond any interest in Wittgenstein's philosophy, too; for instance, as part of his development of the logico-ethical conception of the Tractatus, McManus offers implicitly, I believe, a powerful and (unlike Hacker's) effective and convincing set of criticisms of broadly Chomskian ideas concerning syntax, compositionality and ‘cognitive science’. Take this illuminating passage, on 200; “When confronted with a noun, it may be natural to assimilate the word to something like a referring expression. This generates an image of ‘how the word represents’ by virtue of its character as a noun: it represents in the way that ‘that kind of word’ represents. So we now have a standard before our mind, by reference to which the ‘application’ of that word might be evaluated. The confusion at work here is that, where the division of language into ‘parts of speech’ is more than a merely superficial exercise, it arises out of similarities in the use of words. So for our labelling of a word as a noun to do more than merely remark on a surface similarity between signs, it must depend on an already established appreciation of how the word is used”. (Emphases mine)
McManus's facility in re-attuning us to our language with all its manifold possibilities helps us recover (and see/use aright) words such as “theory”, “realism” and even “metaphysics”. No word is condemned; none has to be legislated or policed out of existence.
At the same time, McManus is profoundly sensitive to the deep and ongoing difficulty in attaining clarity; just as no word is condemned, so no formulation and no care in formulation decisively immunizes or guarantees one against the risk of confusion. Take for instance McManus's several discussions (especially that on 55), which it would be easy but wrong to pass over as of merely terminological or introductory interest, of both the need for and the insufficiency of the use of scare-quotes, in doing philosophy. Roughly: it is impossible to attain complete consistency with respect to how to use scare-quotes etc.; at least, if one wants to keep achieving philosophical perspicuity and ongoingly attain one's therapeutic goals. We might express the point this way: Language must take care of itself. One cannot decisively take care of it—frame it, certify how exactly to take it—by any punctuational or other device whatsoever.
My main criticism of the book would be that McManus does not take seriously the possibility of a ‘strong’ or ‘Jacobin’ or ‘severely’ resolute reading of the Tractatus, according to which every sentence of the Tractatus is an expression of an illness—an illness that the Tractatus itself inspires in the reader the tools to work through, to cure. McManus rightly argues (84f.) that the Begriffsschrift in Wittgenstein's hands is a “mechanical expedient”, and nothing more, because it presupposes that one can use it aright. No symbolism is self-applying, not even a Begriffsschrift. But the full implication of this seems to me that already, for the author of the Tractatus, the Begriffsschrift is something like what Wittgenstein later calls ‘an object of comparison’; and, furthermore, that ordinary language can itself already be viewed as such a Begriffschrift … What one does in philosophy is to use one's facility in language in order to reflect upon where one's language may be deceiving one. One does not escape to anywhere else.
McManus claims (59) that some of the Tractatus's sätze are not candidates for nonsensicality, not possible elucidations. I am much less sure. He cites 4.003 as a key for-instance. But 4.003 says we “cannot” answer philosophical questions, which is transitional, systematically misleading; it says we “do not understand” our language's logic, as if it were clear what it would be to understand it … Every Satz in the book, I suggest, probably needs overcoming at some point in one's reading.
The Tractatus is (on my way of reading it) an ‘engine’ that with the aid of a suitable mechanic (its ideal reader) can over time turn itself into the later work (This is ‘severe’ mono-Wittgensteinianism, to use Conant's term). The essential difference between the early and the later work is then, on the severist reading, that the latter is more reader-friendly, less liable to be utterly misunderstood, more carefully designed to be therapeutically effective. It brings better into prominence the indefinite variety of forms of language, that the reader of the Tractatus largely has to work out for herself. And, what is not-at-all-well-understood: It too expels itself completely, as any effective purgative must, when its work is done (which is almost certainly: never).
On 211, McManus writes that perhaps the key difference between himself and Michael Kremer is over “just what the questionable craving or ideal is that marks philosophers: my sense is that, for Kremer's Wittgenstein, that craving is the crazy hubris of wanting to become God; whereas, for my Wittgenstein, it is something more like a craving not to exist at all.” I believe that both are right; or, to be exact, that early Wittgenstein already offers the tools to a perpetual overcoming of the inclination not to exist, not to become the ghost that philosophers have taken God to be, if God were anything. And to reaccustom oneself, without illusion but without apology, to existence; to being and becoming.
Be that as it may, McManus's brilliant variant mild mono-Wittgensteinian reading of Tractatus is hugely to be welcomed. It will prove a key text in the ongoing struggles over how to interpret Wittgenstein, early and late; and in how to apply his work, so that it truly lives.
