Those anxious about the influence of “originalist” constitutional interpretation might take some solace from these books. Not only are both unlikely to persuade uncommitted readers, but each author also views the other's position, along with those of other originalists, as fair game. It seems that among Straussians, those loosely associated with the “West Coast” (Hadley Arkes) and the “East Coast” (Gary McDowell) do not advance a wholly shared perspective, even if both promote “original intent” jurisprudence. What these scholars most importantly do share, however, is a desire to provide the United States with a foundational history that, in opposition to most early-American historians and many political scientists, is neither particularly British nor at all Protestant, but rather is a history of one of two universal variants. Additionally, both seek to imbue the Constitution with a political philosophy putatively found in a few lines of the Declaration of Independence that, they then claim, provides the Constitution with its missing philosophical content.
Readers should keep in mind, then, that beyond their unsupported claimed linkage of the Declaration and Constitution, and their pronounced hostility to the originalism of Justice Anthony Scalia, these books and their respective schools of interpretation do not agree on much. Most importantly for Arkes is a certain understanding of Catholic natural law that is to provide the foundation of American political thought and institutions, with sources in Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Locke, “the Founders,” Kant, Thomas Reid, and Lincoln—as though they are all readily interchangeable. Arkes's representation here of a natural-law foundation of the Declaration and the Constitution, though, is surprisingly modest, being limited to three plausible holdings: reason and noncontradiction, the necessity of universal political consent, and, oddly enough during a period of African enslavement, opposition to racial discrimination (pp. 63, 231). McDowell, however, attempts to remove American political thought and institutions from the particularism of Anglo-American legalism and Reformed Protestantism, and to replace them with a modern, secular, positive-law foundation resting on the teachings of the mid-seventeenth century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes.
Although both visions are demonstrably at odds with the actual seventeenth- and eighteenth-century history of the North American British colonies, with their manifest hostility to Catholicism and Hobbes and fervent adherence to all things British and Protestant, it is McDowell's more heavily researched take that is the less convincing of the two. This results from his defending universal natural rights while eschewing any foundational reference to natural law, God, or religion; his viewing Jefferson and his followers as misguided states-rights localists and defenders of constitutional strict constructionism and, thus, not deserving consideration as authentic interpreters of the “Founders' Constitution” (pp. 1–8, 309); and, above all, his making Hobbes—a man who was cited less often, and almost always more critically, than such distant figures as Plutarch and the vastly more influential David Hume, who is never mentioned in either book—the foundational thinker in the genesis of American constitutionalism and interpretation.
Each of these works is unpersuasive in advancing its central thesis and, in important ways, is not truly a unified book. Arkes begins his eight chapters with three after-dinner talks on ex post facto law, on natural law, and on Lochner v. New York (1905) that he passionately defends against both the Left and Right. Much of the rest of Constitutional Illusions and Anchoring Truths is concerned with the issue of “prior restraint” in publishing and the author's view that the Supreme Court got it wrong, in contradictory ways, in each of three following linked cases that are discussed in questionable detail in successive chapters: Near v. Minnesota (1931), New York Times v. Sullivan (1971), and Snepp v. United States (1980). In a final chapter that builds on Arkes's view of the Court's inconsistencies and errors, the approach of New York and Washington elites to the Watergate break-in is claimed, by a curious extension, to have been similarly confused (pp. 212, 256).
Although at times eloquently written, the chapters are repetitive and, most critically, Arkes never clarifies/defends why the lion's share of this book, defending original constitutional interpretation and the Constitution's link to natural law, is devoted to “prior restraint.” Why this particular corner of contemporary free speech jurisprudence is elevated to this status demands an explanation. Similarly and more importantly, Arkes needs to show why the series of Supreme Court cases under review, in particular, demonstrates that the philosophical foundation of the Constitution is to be found in natural law.
McDowell's massively—even if misguidedly so—researched work is also in important ways not a truly unified book. The first four of eight chapters of The Language of Law and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism argue that there was a tradition of positive-law constitutionalism (p. 81) and “private language” interpretation that began with Hobbes, and which Locke, Blackstone, and various early-modern natural law theorists made available to the American “Founders.” None of this, even if true, supports his later case for the superiority/necessity of this understanding of original-intent jurisprudence in making sense of the American Constitution. Possibly, then, of greater importance for McDowell in the book's first half is proving that Locke and those who came after him, in spite of their denials, were secret followers of Hobbes (pp. 91, 165, and following). Yet again, even if true, it is unclear how such a claim is closely tied to the claims of this work's second half.
The thesis of the second half is that the Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall defended an originalism that McDowell believes should continue to guide us. Moreover, Marshall's view is more authentically “originalist” and like that of the “Founders” than Jefferson's and Madison's strict constructionism that by 1800 had come to enjoy the support of a majority of the political nation, or than Madison's secondary strategy of deferring to the State Ratifiers for proper interpretive guidance. Marshall is to be followed, according to McDowell, for defending “the intent of the Founders” as if it were the same as the intent of legislators in authoring a statute. And, thus, the author's claims that Marshall insisted that judges in interpreting the Constitution must turn to the “‘mind of the Convention’” (p. 331 and again p. 336). It is hard to know, though, given McDowell's scanty evidence, whether Marshall was unmindful that a record of the Convention would be unavailable for another 37 years after his landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison, or that McDowell simply is mistaken in attributing this at-the-time untenable position to him.
To put the authors' originalist positions in context, consider that there are three dominant, even if overlapping, contemporary approaches to originalism (see Ralph A. Rossum, The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, forthcoming). The first of these approaches—“original public meaning” of the Constitution, and the one most closely associated with the much disparaged (in these works) Justice Scalia—eschews any effort to provide an exogenous philosophical foundation to the narrow legalism of the actual words and phrases of the eighteenth-century text. According to this school of interpretation, it is the Court's primary responsibility to make sense of the actual written words and phrases of the Constitution as then understood, and little else.
A second approach is also closely tied to eighteenth-century meanings: It is “original understanding.” This approach counsels a wide canvassing of contemporaneous eighteenth-century political materials in an effort to get as good a sense as possible of the underlying political values that shaped particular constitutional language and institutions. Of special importance to those following this approach is the meaning given to the Constitution by the State Ratifying Conventions. Indeed, James Madison, an opponent of the school of originalism defended by Arkes and McDowell, made the following observation in 1821 shortly after the publication of the first incomplete notes of the debates of the Philadelphia Convention. He wrote that “the debates and incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative character…. [T]he legitimate meaning of the Instrument must be derived from the text itself [original public meaning]; or if a key is to be sought elsewhere, it must be, not in the opinions or intentions of the body which planned and proposed the Constitution [original intent], but in the sense attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions [original understanding], where it received all the authority which it possesses.” Arkes and McDowell, however, ignore Madison's apt guidance and defend the third approach that he cautioned against, that is, “original intent.” This approach holds that to understand the language of the Constitution properly, one has to go beyond the mere words or the general political culture of the late-eighteenth century to discover the hidden philosophical intention of the Framers of the Constitution gathered in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.
Although each of these originalist approaches suffers from substantial difficulties, that of original intent is perhaps the most worrisome, for it has a certain advantage over the other two, especially for those not interested in the onerous task of slogging, at minimum, through the first two volumes of Max Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention (1,250 pages)—that is, it furnishes rather easy solutions to complex interpretive difficulties. In particular, for followers of Harry Jaffa, such as Arkes (p. 11), one can instead uncover the true philosophical intent of the Constitution's Framers in the natural-law references of a sentence or two of the Declaration of Independence. This is quite remarkable, for no one at the time recognized or defended this connection between the two documents, certainly not anyone at the Constitutional Convention as recorded in Farrand. Alternatively, for McDowell, one need only reach out to the seventeenth-century writings of the much reviled atheist Thomas Hobbes to discover the true intent of the Constitution's Founders, no matter how often Americans publicly denied any such connection.
It seems eminently plausible that each of the approaches (or some combination of all three that Rossum attributes to Justice Thomas), if done with professional competence, must be assessed on the merits of the particular author's case. What is certain, though, is that the originalist approach defended by Arkes and McDowell is prone to subjectivist excesses and in their hands offers readers little reason to be convinced. Remarkably, both authors seem, in fact, surprisingly uninterested in the evidence necessary to mount a persuasive case for original intent jurisprudence.
Indeed, almost every imaginable pre-1776 British metropolitan or colonial source necessary for understanding the development of American constitutionalism that would culminate in the 1787 text is left unexamined. Among those historical elements missing are the antecedent English municipal and corporate law; the colonial constitutional and legal record that had developed, in some cases, over 140 years; the corresponding development under the British Empire and its North American colonies of a federalism that arose without guidance from any philosophical text; the colonial constitutional arguments developed during the Imperial Crisis of 1764–76 that led to the War for Independence (of some 230 pamphlets published in the colonies, to say nothing of the 1,400 published in Britain, McDowell briefly comments on two or three); and the continental proceedings of the Albany, Stamp Act, and Continental Congresses that did so much to shape what would become “American” constitutionalism.
Arkes and McDowell show only slightly more interest in evolving American constitutionalism even after the colonies declared their independence. Accordingly, absent, too, are the issues debated during the drafting of the “Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union” and, again, those debates recorded in The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (McDowell makes some 10 or so references to its 1,250 pages in the first two of four volumes). Similarly, neither author offers a close reading of the Ratifying Debates as found in the contemporary press and state conventions, that is, beyond The Federalist. Finally, in both periods, neither author shows any interest in the remarkably abundant political-sermon literature and congressional proclamations for “Days of Fasting, Prayer, and Humiliation” that would, with their Protestant focus on Christ and the unmediated redemptive power of the Holy Spirit, do little to support McDowell's claims for the influence of the atheist Hobbes or Arkes's Catholic natural-law interpretation.
Both authors, in spite of such historical lacunae, suggest that they have provided readers with defensible understandings of the philosophical “intent of the Founders”—as if such a singular understanding makes sense across 30-plus years, rather diverse social classes, remarkably deep political divisions, and 3,000 miles—as embodied first in the Declaration of Independence and then in the Constitution (ignoring that these, too, were in tension). For both authors, this philosophy is to be found in the “natural rights” philosophy of the Declaration (Arkes, pp. 55–56, and McDowell, p. 228). What this means, though, is never truly developed, nor is the evidence provided with which they might have defended the widespread influence of this philosophy, or the Constitution having rested on this foundation.
These books, for those not already “believers,” will prove incapable of achieving their declared purpose, that is, advancing the cause of original–intent jurisprudence. Fair-minded readers, though, should not view these unpersuasive efforts as rendering originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation indefensible. The failures of these works stem from their authors' execution, not necessarily from originalist strategies per se. Still, Constitutional Illusions and The Language of Law are likely to be lauded both by those on the Right whose prejudices they endorse and those on the Left who would like to offer them as examples of the best that originalism can offer, thus allowing them to dismiss such approaches. Neither conclusion is warranted. Interested readers should, instead, look elsewhere for defenses of originalism capable of garnering their respect and/or worthy of their challenge.
