Since the publication of Professor Bantekas' book in 2009, the world has witnessed the Pakistan floods, Haiti earthquake and Deepwater oil spill. Intergovernmental trusts play a major role in the provision of international aid. Yet as Bantekas observes, no legal mechanism exists by which their normative characteristics can be assessed (p 10). Bantekas' monograph provides a critical taxonomy of their core legal attributes as well as their latent accountability and legitimacy deficits. For Bantekas, the most salient question is the absence of a regulatory framework that protects legitimate expectations (p 8).

The book comprises a Preface, Introduction and five Chapters. Chapter 1 explores the legal-theoretical status of intergovernmental trusts as ‘sui generis creatures of self-regulation’ (pp 12–13), their primary sources and normative characteristics, including inter alia their investment capacity and arbitral character.

Chapter 2 explores the legal bases of intergovernmental trusts and the international and private law dimensions of the contractual, non-contractual and institutional relationships that govern donor and trustee relations. It examines their treaty (and resolution) origins, including the unique characteristics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations special accounts, mixed and single donor funds. Further, the contractual relationships between donor and trustee are explored, in particular the donor agreement by which a contribution is deposited or transferred to the trustee.

Chapter 3 explores the legal personality of intergovernmental trusts, as full and limited international organizations. Case studies are discussed in depth, including the ‘quasi-intergovernmental’ Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (pp 115–120), the IMF's trust status, subsidiary organ funds, trust accounts as well as related tax, liability and immunity issues. Bantekas' discussion of the donor's personal liability is particularly interesting, not least because it demonstrates the intriguing paradox of the intergovernmental trust model. On one hand, intergovernmental trusts can facilitate the beneficent acts of States. Yet, the equivocal nature of the donor's legal relationship with the trust provides a perceived justification for excluding liability.Footnote ¹ In other words, the trust may constitute a ‘clever mechanism’ to avoid liability (p 205). Bantekas argues that through use of limitation clauses in donor agreements, a presumption against liability has arisen. This practice is premised on the logic of Member States excluding liability towards international organizations, an approximation which is neither valid nor empirically tested. Bantekas contends that whilst a customary rule negating liability is beginning to crystallize, donors are only protected to the extent that their contribution is not knowingly provided for unlawful purposes and where a trustee agreement does not give rise to an unlawful act.

Bantekas' contention that donor liability should be based on ‘abuse of the trust vehicle’, notwithstanding that certain acts are not unlawful per se, is also interesting. Bantekas discusses how an abuse may theoretically constitute an unlawful act (n 181, 155) such as violation of the trusts terms under its founding instrument or donor agreement, general principles of intergovernmental trust law, or the convention establishing the trust. However, Bantekas' case for liability may face practical constraints. For instance, there may well be difficulties in establishing that any violation can be equated with an unlawful act sufficient to constitute an abuse. In addition, any such determination raises difficult questions about the standard of liability. Principled determinations in this regard might be rendered all the more difficult by the need to ensure that donor contributions are not discouraged. Further, as Bantekas himself acknowledges, beneficiaries are unlikely to claim, fearing that funding may cease (p 156). Nevertheless, Bantekas' unique insight here provides just one example of many issues in the book which could provide the basis for further research, and which he himself acknowledges are not amenable to straightforward answers (p 156). Chapter 3 finishes with an analysis of fund dissolution and succession.

Chapter 4 examines various modes of governance including, inter alia, trustees decisional competences, voting rights and powers of public and private participants (181–183). The trustee's duties towards donors are also examined. Bantekas posits the question: ‘why is it that we describe the relationship as a trust rather than as a type of agency or a contractual arrangement?’ (p 185). Building on Chapter 1, Bantekas explores this ‘fine line’ (p 187), and reinforces the trust analysis by identifying the legal nature of duties owed to beneficiaries and their enforceability. In particular, Bantekas observes that trust instruments severely limit trustee responsibilities (or fiduciary duties) ‘to the brink of extinction’ (p 191). He concludes that if any domestic comparison is tenable, intergovernmental trusts may be compared to charitable or purpose funds, given that beneficiaries have neither enforceable rights prior to disbursement, nor equitable ownership of assets (205). On the premise that custom supports the trustee's assumption of ownership (pp 208–209), Bantekas then identifies trustees' fiduciary duties and concludes with a discussion of the donor's reimbursement obligations.

In Chapter 5 Bantekas shifts focus towards the contribution of intergovernmental trusts to international affairs. First, he examines how public participation in budgetary decision-making improves participatory democracy, arguing for greater provision of this sort in trust instruments (p 229), as well as local ownership. He then illustrates the role of trusts in revenue sharing and fiscal management, as well as their role alongside the IMF in the financial crisis. Stabilization funds are also considered in addition to the economic growth potential of intergovernmental trusts. Bantekas also adverts throughout to certain institutional failures and provides an ‘ideal trust model’ that ‘may curb corruption and promote democratic governance’ (pp 258–259). Developmental, human rights, poverty alleviation and environmental impacts are also considered in detail, before concluding with a discussion of intergenerational trusts.

An absent concluding chapter might have sketched a research agenda, although Bantekas adverts to important research issues throughout—for example, competition issues (pp 28 and 35), incorporation into the system of charities (p 61), and questions of corporate governance (pp 157–158 and 195). Bantekas displays an incisive command of the international organizational framework within which the subject is largely constituted, and in doing so offers an important contribution that far exceeds its modest aim of providing a useful tool for international lawyers, academics and international organizations.