This edited collection of articles on the economics of Friedrich A. Hayek was begun more than a decade ago by Norman Barry, but it remained as one of his unfinished pieces of work when he died in 2008. The mantle was taken up, however, by Roger Garrison, who saw the task to its completion. The long gestation period and the uncertainty regarding ultimate publication apparently led a few of the authors to publish their materials elsewhere, so some of the chapters will seem familiar to those who keep up with the literature. That said, there are some interesting pieces gathered together here, and a good mixture to boot, with some expository, some laudatory, and some critical.
The book begins with a short appreciation of Norman Barry by Martin Ricketts, one that made me wish that I had known Barry himself, rather than just of him. Then comes a substantial paper by Denis O’Brien on “Hayek in the History of Economic Thought.” O’Brien knows the primary and secondary sources intimately (the reference section for the chapter runs to eight pages) and has himself written often and with great insight about Hayek. The chapter does not disappoint: it is a masterful commentary on a number of themes, from Hayek’s relationships with economists in England to the details of his economics, with an emphasis on his monetary and capital theory, and closing with a useful citation count that traces the rise, fall, and subsequent renewal of interest in Hayek’s work. O’Brien is not shy about expressing his opinions. He thinks, for example, that Cambridge treated Hayek shabbily, characterizing John Maynard Keynes’s attack on Hayek’s Prices and Production (cum defense of his own A Treatise on Money) “abusive,” and Piero Sraffa’s subsequent review of Hayek’s book “both pompous and abusive” (p. 14). O’Brien is equally unequivocal in his assessments of what is valuable and what not in Hayek’s theoretical work. And he is even willing to offer some conjectures about things we will never know: for example, why Hayek stuck so long with the Böhm-Bawerkian “average period of production” construct (p. 25). It is a detailed and entertaining read and a fine start to the volume. My only complaint is that he does not tell us how the numbers in the citation count were derived, except to say that John Creedy provided him with them.
The next two chapters can be read together. The first, by Martin Ricketts, is a critical examination of Hayek’s theoretical work in the 1930s, showing how Hayek struggled to come up with a model of a dynamic, capital-using monetary economy. The second piece, by Gerald Steele, offers an explication and appreciation of the culmination of Hayek’s 1930s work, The Pure Theory of Capital ([Reference Hayek and White1941] 2007). Both authors do fine jobs at what they set out to do, particularly given the difficulty of this material. I particularly liked Steele’s offering some concrete illustrations to clarify Hayek’s abstruse capital theory. Given the very different assessments that the two authors provide, it would have been instructive had they responded to each other’s chapter, but alas, that opportunity was missed. I cannot miss this opportunity to note that the Collective Works of F. A. Hayek editions that cover the material discussed in these chapters contain quite valuable introductions by the respective volume editors Hansjoerg Klausinger and Lawrence White that should be consulted by anyone who wants to dig further.
The next four chapters cover Hayek’s relationships with four different men and their ideas: Keynes (by Roger Backhouse), Milton Friedman (Roger Garrison), Ludwig von Mises (Richard Ebeling), and Ludwig Lachmann (Peter Lewin). These are uniformly excellent studies by people who know their stuff. Each person takes his own approach to the chosen topic. Backhouse usefully divides up Hayek’s encounters with Keynes and Keynesianism into three periods: their famous initial battle in the early 1930s, their rapprochement in the late 1930s (Hayek by and large supported Keynes’s proposals with respect to wartime finance, for example), and Hayek’s later campaigns against Keynesian economics. I will simply note in passing that Backhouse offers a somewhat different take from O’Brien regarding the initial encounter, saying that by invoking Knut Wicksell in his review of A Treatise on Money Hayek had “effectively invited Keynes to consider his own theory” (p. 105). Garrison in his chapter on Friedman and Hayek makes the initially surprising but ultimately convincing argument that Friedman had more in common with Keynes than he did with Hayek when it came to macroeconomics. The key point is that Keynes and Friedman agreed on the characteristics that the “right kind of macroeconomics” should have: namely, simplicity, concentration on a few key magnitudes, and potential fruitfulness—and presumably this last includes empirical fruitfulness (p. 120). Friedman apparently later regretted introducing a “common model” in which he could set out his own ideas using Keynesian language (he called it his “biggest academic blunder”), but it did at least allow his ideas to be compared with those of Keynes (p. 136n5). The methodological differences between Hayek and the Austrians on one hand, and Keynes and Friedman on the other, are certainly an important part of the story of why the contributions of the former were neglected. Hayek’s own view, of course, was that Keynes, Friedman, and their followers were victims of the “scientistic” prejudice that increasingly infected economics as the twentieth century progressed: this was the “pretence of knowledge” he decried in his Nobel address.
Richard Ebeling’s chapter on Mises and Hayek was my favorite of the volume. Ebeling’s knowledge of the early Vienna years is on full display, and his claim that Hayek’s distinction between the “master of the subject” and the “puzzler” (one that Hayek applied to Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser, respectively) could as easily be applied to Mises and Hayek seems right. Ebeling has an eye for the entertaining anecdote: one should not neglect his very rich endnotes, where some of these may be found. In the last of these chapters, Peter Lewin demonstrates the truth of the claim that Lachmann did the most to extend Hayek’s work on capital theory. Lewin does more, however, by showing how Hayek’s writings on the capital structure (and especially his ideas about capital complementarity) can be fitted in with Hayek’s later work on complex adaptive orders, which he then links back to Lachmann’s work on how social institutions make plans, and actions, possible in a kaleidic world.
Lewin’s chapter provides a nice segue to the next two, which deal in different ways with Hayek’s movement away from being an equilibrium theorist and towards a theorist of market process and spontaneous order. Paul Lewis invokes social ontology to describe two key elements of this movement: Hayek’s psychological writings as providing the underpinning for describing people as “constitutionally ignorant beings,” and the further idea that such beings interact by engaging in rule-following behavior within larger structured orders. For Hayek, the socio-economic world is “constituted not only by individual people but also by inherited social structures” (p. 210). In such a world, the job of the social theorist is to engage in comparative institutional analysis, to see what set of institutions is best able to allow social coordination to occur. Craig Smith’s related chapter on “Hayek and Spontaneous Order” contains an excellent general exposition of Hayek’s writings on spontaneous order, one that also shows how it relates to his psychological theory, his ideas about freedom, and his approach to the methodology of the sciences. Smith goes beyond exposition in his closing, revealing some tensions in Hayek’s thought that arise when he links the “twin” concepts of spontaneous order and evolution. Smith’s command of the primary and secondary literature is impressive and his account is a model of clarity.
The next two chapters are again on common themes: namely, lessons from the socialist calculation debate. Mark Pennington shows how Hayek’s writings on the “knowledge problem” and on spontaneous orders may be enlisted to criticize more recent developments. The positions Pennington criticizes are Joseph Stiglitz’s “new market failure” claim that market prices are informationally inefficient and can be improved by various forms of government intervention, the communitarian position that market processes work best when they are controlled by the collective decisions of the community at large, and the continued use of the concept of “social justice” to justify the welfare state. In “Hayek versus the Neoclassicals,” authors Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne, and Peter Leeson review the calculation debate and show how the Austrians, in order to effectively criticize their socialist opponents, gradually moved away from the neoclassical framework. Evidently, the arguments rehearsed here complement those that Pennington raised against Stiglitz. For a further and more detailed treatment of these themes, interested readers should consult these authors’ writings on “robust political economy” (e.g., Boettke and Leeson Reference Boettke and Leeson2004; Pennington Reference Pennington2011).
The last four chapters deal, again in very different ways, with the relevance of Hayek’s ideas for policy. Whenever I talk about Hayek and people ask what his views on “policy x” would have been, before hazarding any guesses I usually begin with the disclaimer that Hayek was no policy wonk. That is, often we must sift through his work to discern what he might have believed, and sometimes even a careful search does not yield definitive answers. In trying to figure out what Hayek would think about free trade and globalization, Steven Horwitz is able to identify two places where Hayek did explicitly address certain aspects of the problem, and reviews what he said. Horwitz’s innovation, though, is to use some of Hayek’s later writings on hubris and atavism to critique protectionism and “globophobia.” Specifically, protectionists share the planners’ hubris in thinking that they can control market outcomes, and those who see the spread of globalization as being the result of some group’s evil intention have fallen prey to atavistic thinking. In his chapter on Hayek and labor unions, Charles Baird makes a double contribution. He reviews in some detail twentieth-century union labor laws in the US and Britain, then describes what Hayek had to say about unions. Perhaps not surprisingly, Hayek’s knowledge of the details of the laws does not seem as extensive as it might have been, and as a result, in Baird’s view he missed some targets that would have been easy to criticize. The third chapter on policy, by Enrico Colombatto, takes Hayek to task more globally, and on a number of grounds: for relying too much on “the rule of law” and on procedural, rather than substantive, limits on the state’s coercive activities; for failing to provide foundations or justifications for his policy views; and for being quite vague in enunciating what those views are. Anyone who has struggled over the precise meaning of the sentence in The Road to Serfdom that “there can be no doubt that some minimum of food, shelter, and clothing, sufficient to preserve health and capacity to work, can be assured to everybody” (Hayek [Reference Hayek and Caldwell1944] 2007, p. 148) will sympathize with Colombatto. (For those who think that this is an invitation to the welfare state, though, one should note that his next sentence reads, “Indeed, for a considerable part of the population of England this sort of security has long been achieved.”) Still, it is fair to ask: What does Hayek think? Colombatto’s frustration is understandable, but in Hayek’s defense, the sets of institutions around the world that might qualify as “liberal” varied immensely. For better or worse, he was trying to come up with general descriptions of their characteristics. The last chapter, by Robert Nef, is the most original. It consists of twenty propositions, each one followed by a few paragraphs of commentary, addressing the question: “What Remains of Hayek’s Critique of Social Justice?” Nef shares Pennington’s view that Hayek’s critique of social justice was not effective, for the term continues to provide the justification for the welfare state, and more generally, to be widely used and invoked. Footnote 1 Pennington calls for a renewed attack; Nef, more negative, thinks that its importance in political language will keep us from ever gaining clarity. He also views the welfare state as unsustainable in the long term and “sooner or later will therefore bankrupt both the welfare system and the democratic state” (p. 377).
There are a few niggling errors that the pedant in me cannot allow to go unmentioned. It was William Beveridge, not Lionel Robbins, who invited Hayek to the London School of Economics—Robbins’s biographer Sue Howson corrected me when I made the same error (p. 12). Hayek’s initial appointment was as a visiting professor, not as the Tooke Chair, when he first went to London (p. 159n12). And it was John Nef, not Neff, who was instrumental in bringing Hayek to Chicago (p. 17). I close by congratulating and thanking Roger Garrison for bringing this work of Norman Barry’s to completion.
