Of all the catechisms in American politics, perhaps none is so widespread yet as fundamentally misguided as the asserted truism: “The Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is.” For those who profess their faith in it, there is no alternative form of constitutionalism other than judicial supremacy. If there is no Supreme Court to determine the constitutional boundaries beyond which the political branches cannot go, then there is no Constitution. In this important and impressive book, George Thomas fundamentally challenges this catechism. He articulates more clearly than ever before the alternative “Madisonian” Constitution, which, unlike judicial supremacy which vests all constitutional authority in one body, “is based on a refusal to vest sovereign authority in any single body” (3). Where proponents of judicial supremacy assume that it alone can solve what they view as the intractable danger of constitutional conflict if there is no supreme constitutional authority, Thomas's approach aims to “make us more comfortable as a polity with constitutional quarrels” (7). In fact, constitutional quarrels follow from and are even encouraged by the Constitution's separation of powers. Quoting Madison, Thomas writes: “This division [of power] necessarily invites a ‘concurrent right to expound the constitution,’ yielding multiple and conflicting views of the Constitution as an inherent—even healthy—part of the constitutional order” (15).
By describing a vision of the constitutional order that is fundamentally at odds with judicial supremacy, Thomas's book contributes a great deal, not just to our understanding of the founders' Constitution but also to our contemporary discourse about the judiciary's role in politics. Moreover, as he shows well in his book, his Madisonian approach is different (and better) than the two currently dominant alternatives to judicial supremacy: departmentalism and popular constitutionalism. It is different than departmentalism insofar as departmentalism is taken to mean only “that each department is the primary interpreter of its constitutional power; that is, it interprets those provisions of the Constitution that apply to it specifically” (25). Instead, the Madisonian Constitution allows and encourages each branch to “look to the ‘whole genius’ of the Constitution” (25) as it emphasizes those virtues it was institutionally designed to achieve. Constitutional conflict arises from the inevitable friction that comes from an emphasis on different kinds of virtue. For instance, the executive's concern for energy might come into conflict with the judiciary's concern for the protection of individual rights. As for “popular constitutionalism,” Thomas argues that the impetus of this argument stems from the same desire for final constitutional authority, that is, “the people themselves,” as motivates judicial supremacy. He writes: “The Madisonian Constitution rejects both judicial supremacy and popular sovereignty as mechanisms for making the Constitution authoritatively binding” (3).
Besides describing the theory of the Madisonian Constitution, Thomas also aims to show that the theory best explains the history of constitutional transformation in the United States. Although other, previous books have articulated versions of the departmentalist theory of constitutional understanding, in its aim to explain the actual history of constitutional transformation, Thomas's book follows most closely the true spirit of the Madisonian Constitution. After all, Madison's argument in Federalist #51 depends on interest, rather than principle, to motivate men to be concerned about the “constitutional rights of the place.” If the Madisonian Constitution has been successful, we should observe politicians who assert their constitutional rights regardless of whether they know about the principle of the Madisonian Constitution. Thus, Thomas promises to do better than the many departmentalist accounts that depart from Madison insofar as they seem to depend on a recommitment to the principle of departmentalism. He aims to provide us with empirical evidence of its explanatory power in political history. He writes: “The Madisonian Constitution illuminates how countervailing power plays an ongoing role in maintaining, creating, and recovering constitutional meaning and authority” (13).
As impressive as this aim is in his book, it is, however, not wholly fulfilled by the book itself. To illustrate this contention, Thomas would seem to need to focus substantively on the ways in which political actors draw power and authority from their constitutional roles in the separation of powers. Given that they are situated in a polity constructed around a fundamental Constitution with an authority higher than any of them, the political actors draw on that authority to ground their own power. As Thomas writes in describing the theory, “The result, if I may steal a phrase, is a ‘living constitution,’ where constitutional meaning and authority are constructed with the Madisonian Constitution.” The Constitution remains “living” because it empowers, shapes, and constrains the political actors who call on it. As Thomas himself notes, this new understanding of a living Constitution is best “captured by President Lincoln's confrontation with Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott decision, or FDR's attempt to turn the language and intent of the Constitution against the Court” (21). Given this argument, one would have expected Thomas to focus his attention on the sorts of historical episodes that illustrate the Madisonian Constitution at work. Instead, the book is oddly preoccupied with a history of the very institution that he claims is less important than we previously thought in understanding constitutionalism. Thomas spends a great deal of time investigating the transformation in the Supreme Court's approach to the Constitution, especially in the wake of the New Deal or what he calls the “constitutional revolution of 1937.” While his argument in this respect is both nuanced and important, it is not entirely clear how it bears upon the more fundamental and, to my mind, more important claim he makes about the relation between politics and the Constitution. Moreover, even when he investigates the broader claims about the Constitution advanced from sources outside the Supreme Court, he does not sufficiently ground those arguments in the separation of powers itself. For instance, Thomas discusses Woodrow Wilson's “progressive reconstruction” of the Constitution's meaning, but he does not much explore the ways in which Wilson as president sought to ground his presidential authority in that reconstruction. Or, Thomas notes Henry Cabot Lodge's resistance to Wilson's Treaty of Versailles by insisting on the “Senate's constitutional prerogatives,” calling it a “nearly perfect illustration of Madison's ‘living’ Constitution” (92). But he only notes this in passing at the conclusion of a chapter that concentrates on a very interesting but nonetheless not entirely relevant discussion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence during the progressive era; Thomas does not explore this fascinating episode that would best illustrate and prove his argument about the explanatory power of the Madisonian Constitution. In other words, there is a curious disconnection between his very powerful and well-articulated theory of constitutionalism and the separation of powers and his actual discussion in the bulk of the book.
That being said, Thomas's book paves an important new path for the rest of us in our study of the Constitution and its effect on politics. His account of Madison's principle of constitutional contestation might well be the best account that yet exists of the reigning principle of our founder's political thought. Thomas writes: “The Madisonian framework necessarily invites struggles over constitutional meaning and identity.” In providing the blueprint for the contours of that struggle insofar as they are shaped by a separation-of-powers “framework of countervailing power” (38), Thomas has done the rest of us a great service. Moreover, he has successfully shown that constitutionalism both does not require and may even be threatened by a single “‘sovereign authority to settle our disputes’” (21). Insofar as he does not provide a fuller account of the constitutional practice that bears out his theoretical framework, we might also be thankful to Thomas: he has left something for the rest of us to do.
