INTRODUCTION
Research on panethnicity has long been focused on the United States and centered on the experiences of racial minority communities, especially those of Latinos, Native Americans, and Asians (Okamoto and Mora, 2014). This work has emphasized that panethnicity is not simply a response to xenophobia or a pre-existing natural form of bonding; rather, it is a complex form of identification that becomes institutionalized through the work of organizational actors. Researchers have thus shown how state classification agencies, such as the U.S. Census Bureau, spur panethinc mobilization by creating broad ethnoracial categories that lump subgroups together (Espiritu Reference Espiritu1992; Lopez and Espiritu, Reference Lopez and Espiritu1990; Mora 2014; Nagel Reference Nagel1996). Ethnic leaders initially resist these homogenizing classifications, but they eventually come to attach such categories to organized political and media market efforts (Cornell Reference Cornell1988; Dávila Reference Dávila2001; Padilla Reference Padilla1985). Over time, as more panethnic civic and media organizations emerge, panethnicity becomes popularized as a salient identity (Mora 2014; Padilla Reference Padilla1985).
While important for generating insight into U.S. race relations, the literature’s overwhelming focus on the United States suggests that panethnicity is an American phenomenon (see Portes and Macleod, Reference Portes and Macleod1996). Yet panethnic organizations have been established in countries whose racial politics and immigration histories differ starkly from those found in the United States. Latino and Arab immigrants, for example, have developed panethnic civic groups in Spain and England (Lacomba Reference Lacomba2016), while pan-tribal Igbo organizations have mobilized in Nigeria, and panethnic Roma associations have been established in several Eastern European areas (see Okammoto and Mora 2014). Hence, scholarship has recently called for the internationalization of research on panethnicity (Okamoto and Mora, 2014) to reveal the various contexts in which panethnicity develops.
In this article, I examine the rise of Latino panethnic coalitions in Spain to shift the panethnicity literature beyond the United States. Latino immigrants are the largest non-European immigrant group in Spain, surpassing Arabs and Africans (Sabater and Massey, Reference Sabater, Massey, Domingo, Sabater and Verdugo2015), and within the last decade they have built several panethnic organizations (Moraes et. al., Reference Moraes, Bermudez, Escriva, Raya, Espada and Aboussi2013). In Barcelona, for example, Ecuadoran, Columbian, Bolivian, and Peruvian groups regularly sponsor panethnic cultural events, civic information campaigns, and even panethnic protests against government policies they deem harmful to Latinos. In addition, “Latino” lobby and social service organizations that oversee big-budget programs have emerged there (Larralde-Velten Reference Larralde-Velten2007), and Latin American immigrant media entrepreneurs in cities like Seville and Madrid have established new Latino panethnic media outlets (Navaz Reference Navaz2011).
Such robust panethnic efforts present a quandary for race and ethnicity scholars who have long contended that the state, through its racial classification efforts and policies, plays a central role in institutionalizing panethnicity (Dávila Reference Dávila2001; Espiritu Reference Espiritu1992; Goldberg Reference Goldberg1997; Lopez and Espiritu, Reference Lopez and Espiritu1990; Mora 2014). In contrast to the United States, the Spanish government does not use racial/ethnic census classification, nor has it implemented the race-conscious, affirmative-action-like policiesFootnote 1 that have historically helped foment Latino, Asian, and Native American panethnicity (Cornell Reference Cornell1988; Espiritu Reference Espiritu1992; Padilla Reference Padilla1985). This seeming “race neutrality,” proponents claim, is part of a larger attempt to prevent segregation and promote the adoption of a broader Spanish “intercultural” identity among immigrants and their descendants (Arocena Reference Arocena2011).
The Spanish case is also puzzling because Latinos have developed panethnic institutions despite the deep color and class differences that typically challenge solidarity. Argentinean, Uruguayan, and first-wave Chilean migrants are more likely to be phenotypically White and compose the majority of the Latino middle or professional class. Their experience in Spain differs starkly from that of Ecuadoran and Bolivian migrants, who have more indigenous features and are more likely to be in the working class (Connor and Massey, Reference Connor and Massey2010), and from that of Caribbean Afro-Latinos, who are now becoming a more vocal segment of the Spanish Latino populace (Oso and Catarino, Reference Oso and Catarino2013). Moreover, Latin Americans maintain deep connections to their countries of origin, developing transnational lifestyles and nationalistic identities that can further undermine attempts to develop a unifying identity (Bermudez 2011; Escandell and Tapias, Reference Escandell and Tapias2009), but yet panethnic unity does seem to be coalescing.
Drawing on over fifty interviews with state and civic leaders, as well as over fourteen weeks of participant observation, I examine how Latino panethnic organizations emerged in Barcelona, Spain. I show that ethnic minority leaders and media play an important role in popularizing panethnicity as a form of collective identification; these factors make the Spanish case similar to that of the United States. However, the Barcelona case differs starkly from the U.S. case because political parties there play a critical role in formulating and sustaining panethnic civic coalitions. Parties provide startup resources for panethnic groups and use media to publicize the efforts of these organizations. Immigrant leaders both accommodate and resist these party efforts. Specifically, immigrant leaders develop ties that cross party lines, use media to promote alternative, nonpartisan panethnic activities, and develop their own narratives about the nature of Latino identity. Through this interaction between parties, immigrant leaders, and media, panethnicity becomes expressed as a natural grouping based on immigrant political necessity, experience, and culture. As a result, the direct role that political parties initially play in forging panethnicity gradually becomes obscured.
In the following pages, I first assess the literature on panethnicity and show how its U.S. focus generates blind spots for understanding the variety of contexts in which panethnicity can emerge. Next, I discuss the research on parties and ethnic mobilization and provide an overview of the Latin American experience in Spain more generally and the broader Barcelona region in particular. I then analyze the Barcelona case, focusing on the ambivalent relationship between political parties, immigrant leaders, and the media. Last, I discuss the implications of this project for understanding the structural role that political parties play in the institutionalization of panethnicity more generally and point to avenues for further international research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Panethnicity (in the United States)
Panethnicity as a form of identification is complex, in large part because of the competing demands of subgroup identification. “Panethnicity” refers to the consolidation of different subgroups or tribes into one metagroup (Okamoto and Mora, 2014). This consolidation does not necessarily imply that subgroups lose their distinctiveness; rather, panethnicity is meant to complement existing national, ethnic, or tribal identifications (Lopez and Espiritu, Reference Lopez and Espiritu1990; Nakano Reference Nakano2013). In the United States, for example, the Latino identity is meant to coexist with, but not replace Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Salvadoran identities (Beltran Reference Beltran2010).
Much of the research on panethnicity examines the extent to which people, mainly Latinos and Asians, identify as being part of a panethnic group. Education, nationality, generational status, and geography all influence panethnic identification (Kibria Reference Kibria2002; Okamoto Reference Okamoto2003; Park Reference Park2008). For example, the research shows that Cubans are least likely to identify as Latino (Fraga et al., Reference Fraga, Garcia, Hero, Jones-Correa, Martinez-Ebers and Segura2009), and Filipinos are least likely to identify as Asian (Okamoto Reference Okamoto2014). But how do panethnic categories become institutionalized in the first place?
While early research suggested panethnicity stemmed from a common experience of discrimination or “othering” (see Lopez and Espiritu, Reference Lopez and Espiritu1990), subsequent comprehensive analyses revealed more complex processes at stake. Indeed, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans suffered from discrimination and violent forms of repression in the United States, including the lynching of Mexicans in the Jim Crow South, long before Latino/Hispanic panethnicity became salient. Comparatively, Japanese and Chinese people were also discriminated against in a more or less similar fashion in the early twentieth century, but it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that Asian panethnic organizations emerged (Espiritu Reference Espiritu1992; Mora 2014; Okamoto Reference Okamoto2014). The literature on panethnicity has thus pointed to collusion between state, civic, and, in some cases, market forces to explain the rise of panethnicity. Research reveals that U.S. government officials, motivated by a historical interest in forging and policing the Black/White racial divide, developed broad administrative categories that lumped together otherwise diverse subgroups (Goldberg Reference Goldberg1997; Hattam Reference Hattam2007). The practice of clustering Blacks and distinguishing them from Whites, it is argued, helped justify later practices of clustering Asian and Latino immigrant groups into their own categories (Goldberg Reference Goldberg1997). In turn, panethnic census data became the basis for government reports that further reified the existence of panethnic communities. Government agencies drew on census data about Asians, for example, to delineate the education, unemployment, and family patterns of “Asian Americans” (Espiritu Reference Espiritu1992). Over time these data were also used to inform race-conscious policies like affirmative action (Skrentny Reference Skrentny2002), which further reified panethnicity. Felix Padilla (Reference Padilla1985) thus shows how equal opportunity legislation designed for those falling into the “Hispanics/Spanish Origin” category reinforced the notion that Mexicans and Puerto Ricans belong to the same aggrieved minority group.
Typically, ethnic civic leaders respond negatively to these classification efforts, framing them as homogenization tactics that eliminate important differences between subgroups. Yet this resistance tends to ease as leaders realize that state categories provide minority groups with the terminology and data with which to make claims on government resources (Mora 2014; Vo Reference Vo2004). In addition, civic leaders promote panethnicity by arguing that their communities should unite for political gain, and as such they forge alliances across subgroups and pool their resources in the hopes of constructing larger, more resource-rich organizations. Cristina Mora (2014) thus shows that Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban immigrant leaders in the 1970s forged national Hispanic coalitions in part because they believed that unity could help them harness strength in numbers. William Wei (Reference Wei1993) highlights a similar process among Asian American college students who organized to direct government resources to low-income Asian communities (see also Umemoto Reference Umemoto1989).
Ethnic media also helps to further popularize panethnic identities. In the 1970s, Latino media entrepreneurs began connecting broadcast television stations across the country and producing media content that promoted a panethnic, Latino look (see Rodriguez Reference Rodriguez1999). To build this media empire, entrepreneurs used the emerging “Hispanic/Latino” census data to convey the size of the Latino market to advertisers. And as Latino media leaders expanded their efforts, they also developed ties with Latino civic leaders, providing them with opportunities to publicize the effort of their panethnic “Hispanic” lobby organizations. While their efforts have not been as expansive as Latino ones, Asian marketing agencies have also used “Asian” census data to relay the characteristics of the Asian market (Dávila Reference Dávila2001). Moreover, Asian civic leaders regularly use Asian panethnic media to publicize the political needs of the Asian community (Wei Reference Wei1993).
While we know much about how panethnicity became institutionalized in the United States, we are still unclear about how panethnicity might emerge in countries that do not share the United States’ long history of racial politics. Panethnicity does, of course, exist elsewhere—the Igbo in Nigeria, the Malay in Malaysia, and the categories “Eastern European” and “Indian” are all examples of panethnic communities around the globe. However, existing research has mainly viewed these categorizations through ethnic, tribal, or national lenses and has thus not prioritized an analysis of how these purported groups are constructed out of subgroup consolidation (see Okamoto and Mora, 2014). As a result, we know little about whether the state classification, immigrant leadership, and media market factors that are found to have been important in the United States represent general conditions for panethnic mobilization.
There are, however, some important exceptions that have pushed the study of panethnicity in an international direction, although these studies have focused more on issues of space and identity rather than panethnic institutionalization processes. For example, several scholars have recently examined how gender, education, and nationality influence Roma panethnic identification (Prieto-Flores Reference Prieto-Flores2009; Prieto-Flores and Sorde-Marti, 2011), while others have examined perceptions of European panethnic identity (Bruter Reference Bruter2005; Diez-Medrano Reference Diez-Medrano2010; Fligstein Reference Fligstein2008). Beyond this, exploratory work has also emerged on Latino spaces and panethnic cultural messages in Europe. Francisco Jose Cuberos-Gallardo (Reference Cuberos-Gallardo2014) has focused on how public spaces like sports arenas and nightclubs provide opportunities for Ecuadorans, Colombians, Bolivians and others to come together in Seville. Moreover, Liliana Navaz (Reference Navaz2011) has examined how Latin American immigrant media professionals develop panethnic radio content in Spain and Italy.
This article extends the emerging research by focusing on the development of prominent Latino panethnic organizations in Barcelona, Spain. I argue that Spain is an important site for analysis because it lacks the state classification efforts found in the United States. Nonetheless, Latino leaders have built some of Europe’s largest Latino panethnic organizations there, headquartering them in Barcelona. The case will show that in the absence of formal state racial classification, political parties play a critical role in fomenting panethnic mobilization.
Political Parties, Ethnicity, and Immigration
The idea that political parties can play a role in race relations has been developed in two overlapping literatures: one that focuses on race and immigration in the United States and a second that focuses on ethnic mobilization abroad.
The work focused on the United States reveals that political parties have historically used their resources to court the White vote, thus leaving minorities with comparatively less representation (Hajnal and Lee, Reference Hajnal and Lee2011). Indeed, U.S. political parties have established political machines in European immigrant communities (Golway Reference Golway2013; Ignatiev Reference Ignatiev1995), used racially coded language (Frymer Reference Frymer1999; Haney-Lopez Reference Haney-Lopez2014), and developed media campaigns that negatively stereotype minorities (Mendelberg Reference Mendelberg2001) in an effort to secure White support. U.S. parties have also purposely designed their agendas in ways that ignore the rights of racial minorities and immigrants (Jones-Correa Reference Jones-Correa1998; Wong Reference Wong2006). While parties have increased their interest in minority voters since the 1980s (Barretto Reference Barretto2005), this interest still pales in comparison to the resources and attention provided to Whites (Hajnal and Lee, Reference Hajnal and Lee2011).
But what of the relationship between parties and ethnic minority groups outside of the United States? The literature reveals two broad political approaches. The first approach is evident in Europe, where research has shown that parties are largely noncommittal towards, or suspicious of, immigrant minority constituents. Some parties overlook immigrant needs when planning their agendas (Norris and Lovenduski, Reference Norris and Lovenduski1995; Yurdakul Reference Yurdakul2009); other parties serve as gatekeepers for formal immigrant political inclusion (Fanning et al., Reference Fanning, Howard and O’Boyle2010; Michon Reference Michon2013; Michon and Vermuelon, 2013), while still others even develop anti-immigrant platforms (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, Reference Gropas and Triandafyllidou2012; Tiberj and Michon, Reference Tiberj and Michon2013).
The work on Asian and African politics reveals, however, that parties can also pander to ethnic groups when their voting power could sway elections; in these cases, the parties attempt to attract and configure minority group coalitions (Arreola Reference Arreola2012; Chandra Reference Chandra2001; Horowitz Reference Horowitz1985; Posner Reference Posner2004). To ensure loyalty, parties promise that if elected, they will allocate resources to coalition members and grant them patronage positions (Elischer Reference Elischer2008; Horowitz Reference Horowitz1985; Scarritt Reference Scarritt2006). Infighting often develops as minorities vie with one another over the amount of resources and positions their respective communities should be awarded (Guss and Siroky, Reference Guss and Siroky2012; Mayan et al., Reference Mayan, Turner, Ortiz and Moffatt2013). To reduce these tensions, political parties often focus on forming “minimum winning coalitions,” which include just enough groups to win an election (Scarritt Reference Scarritt2006 p. 234; but see Birnir and Satana, Reference Birnir and Satana2013).
Overall, the race and ethnic politics literature reveals how political parties selectively recruit and organize minorities, yet it leaves open the question of whether parties can actually construct and institutionalize ethnoracial identities.Footnote 2 This blind spot likely results from the literature’s focus on multiethnic rather than panethnic coalitions. The former are created when parties mobilize distinct, pre-existing identity groups on a more or less temporary basis (see Horowitz Reference Horowitz1985); the latter are constructed by uniting groups with a new long-term identity. Indeed, a party might forge an African American and Jewish multiethnic coalition by simply emphasizing the instrumental advantage of coming together (Sonenshein Reference Sonenshein1993), but it might unite Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos by arguing that these groups share an identity.
How then do political parties promote a new collective identity? Although not part of the traditional ethnic mobilization literature, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1985) work on classification struggles provides some insight. He argues that parties help bring groups into existence when they purport to speak on behalf of a new constituency, such as “the working class” in one of his examples. Bourdieu contends that parties name and label the new constituency (here, as “workers”), define who belongs in the group and who is excluded (e.g., the bourgeoisie), and outline the needs and wants of the group in their platforms and speeches. Drawing on Bourdieu, Luc Boltanski (Reference Boltanski1987) further argues that parties even create cultural narratives about the collective identity they construct. Taken together, this work shows that political parties can do more than unite pre-existing groups to create a coalition of distinct identities; in fact, parties can and do play a key role in forging new identities.
The aforementioned gap in the political parties literature around ethnoracial identification ultimately leaves several questions about ethnic identity unanswered. Specifically, how do parties shape the ethnic identities of immigrant constituents? And how might immigrants react to these efforts? In considering these questions, I argue that parties construct panethnicity as part of an interactive process with immigrant leaders and ethnic media.
The Spanish and Catalan Context: Latino Immigration and the Issue of Nationalism
Spain is an important site in which to examine panethnicity because the nation has recently dealt with issues of large-scale immigration and, consequently, questions of multiculturalism.
Between 1999 and 2013, Latin American migration to Spain increased over fivefold, from about 400,000 to about 2.3 million (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2014). The sudden influx of new immigrants came at a time when Spain was in need of new and younger workers to help maintain its economy (Reher and Requena, Reference Reher, Requena, Reher and Requena2009). During that period, Spanish policy makers enacted a series of immigration reforms in hopes of making Spain a more viable destination for immigrants (Aja Reference Aja2012; Lopez Reference Lopez2007). Ecuadorans, Bolivians, Colombians, and other Latin Americans entered Spain in unprecedented numbers, helping to fill the labor demand in the construction, eldercare, and other sectors.Footnote 3 Today, Latinos are the largest non-European immigrant group in Spain, and because of a favorable preference in Spanish citizenship law, Latinos display among the highest rates of naturalization (see Cachón Rodriguez 2009).Footnote 4
This wave of immigration has brought the issues of multiculturalism and Latin American identity to the fore. Officially, Spain has adopted a race-neutral stance and refuses to classify naturalized Latin Americans as anything other than Spanish. This understanding has been supported by the broader political discourse of Spanish “interculturalism” and the idea that contemporary Spain represents a cosmopolitan nation (Arocena Reference Arocena2011; Goode Reference Goode2009). In such a vision, Latino citizens are expected to see themselves as culturally (not necessarily racially) unique, but also as definitively Spaniard. Importantly, Spain’s lofty, race-neutral stance does not necessarily reflect everyday reality for Latino immigrants, many of whom face racial discrimination and stereotyping on a regular basis (see Suarez et al., Reference Suarez, Gil-Gonzalez, Ronda Perez, Porthe, Paramio Perez, Garcia and Gari2009; Zapata Barrero 2010).
Yet Latin American immigration also comes at a time in which economic upheavals have intensified nationalism in Spain’s Catalan region, where Barcelona is located. Over the last few years, Catalan political leaders have coordinated a series of massive pronationalist rallies (Pi Reference Pi2011).Footnote 5 Between 2009 and 2011, more than half of Catalonia’s 500-plus municipalities staged unofficial referendums where just over 50% of voters opted for independence (Muñoz and Guinjoan, Reference Muñoz and Guinjoan2013).
Nationalist calls for independence have been supported by arguments about the existence of a distinct Catalan culture. The region has long preserved the Catalan language, which was suppressed by the Franco regime but became the operating language of government agencies and schools in 1983 (Artigal Reference Artigal and Keith Johnson1997).Footnote 6 The region also has a different political, economic, migratory, and literary history than the rest of Spain (Guibernau Reference Guibernau2004). This distinct history is enshrined in Catalan museums and textbooks that also memorialize nationalist figures (Cultiaux Reference Cultiaux, Dieckhoff and Gutierrez2001). Moreover, many of the region’s athletic, cultural, political, and civic organizations have labored to keep Catalan traditions alive (Folch-Serra and Nogue-Font, Reference Folch-Serra, Nogue-Font, Keating and McGarry2001).
Within this context, political parties have come to see Latinos as potential difference makers in coming referendum calls (Rios Reference Rios2014). Because of regularization and positive- preference immigration policies, Latinos are the largest naturalized constituency in Spain (Domingo and Ortega-Rivera, Reference Domingo, Ortega-Rivera, Domingo, Sabater and Verdugo2015). Parties have sought to capitalize on the Latino vote by forming outreach campaigns to secure their allegiance (El Periódico 2013; Rodriguez 2013). Whether these immigrants will identify as subnationals, as Spaniards, as Catalans, or even as panethnic Latinos has become of considerable interest to state and political leaders.
This article hones in on the issue of panethnicity by focusing on the rise of Latino panethnic coalitions in Barcelona, the largest metropolitan area in Catalonia. It is here that Spain’s most well-established panethnic civic organizations emerged as political parties designed campaigns to secure Latino interests and stoke, or dampen, nationalist fervor.
DATA AND METHODS
The research is based on fifty-two in-depth interviews conducted in the fall of 2013 with leaders of Latin American immigrant organizations, government bureaucrats, media personnel, and political party operatives in Barcelona. Interviews with immigrant leaders were conducted in homes, cafés, or after organizational meetings and ranged from one to two hours, with most interviews lasting over 1.5 hours. About 70% of interviewees were men, and 30% were women. Interviewees tended to have a higher educational and class background than their coethnics (a trend consistent with other studies [see Lacomba Reference Lacomba2016]). All interviews were semistructured and conducted in Spanish. I began by asking questions about the Latino organization—how it was founded, what events it sponsored, and so forth. I then proceeded to ask more detailed questions about collaborations between Latino subgroups, the role of political parties in establishing organizations and events, and the role of government policies on organizational activities.
The seven government officials whom I interviewed worked at the city, country, and state levels. Most were career bureaucrats, although two had been appointed by the ruling political party. I also interviewed seven appointed political party operatives about how the party interacts with immigrant leaders and organizations. Furthermore, I interviewed five Latino immigrant media professionals, all of whom had worked in media in their home country.
In addition, I spent fourteen weeks attending Latino events throughout Barcelona and its suburbs. These events included: subgroup general assemblies (e.g., the general body meeting of a Bolivian immigrant group); annual panethnic coalition events (e.g., a Latino art and cultural fair); large-scale independence and nationality celebrations (e.g., the Mexican Independence Day celebration); and panethnic political protests. For each of these events, I paid careful attention to the kinds of visitors and members present, as well as to the ethnic and panethnic narratives that were being offered up, implicitly or explicitly, at the proceedings.
Before presenting my findings, it is important to describe how Latino organizations vary according to their community’s size and presence. Ecuadorans are the largest group, comprising an estimated 1.5% of Barcelona’s population, and they have established a variety of folkloric, entrepreneurial, political, and social service organizations. Argentines comprise 1.3% of the city’s population, and they have historically used their cultural capital to lead some of Barcelona’s largest political and cultural panethnic organizing efforts. Colombian, Peruvian, and Bolivian organizations are somewhat smaller despite comprising 1.1, 1.4, and 0.9% of Barcelona’s population. Hondurans, Paraguayans, and Salvadorans are among the newer migrant streams, and their relatively small community size (each is less than 0.5% of the population) make them least able to organize large-scale events (IDESCAT 2014).
Most Latino civic associations, from social service organizations to dance troupes, are registered with the city and compete with other associations (both immigrant and nonimmigrant) for city, county, and state funds. The larger populations (Ecuadorans, Colombians, Peruvians, and Bolivians) have developed federations, like the Federation of Colombian Associations in Catalonia, that represent the variety of subgroup cultural, social, and political entities. Schisms surrounding leadership issues have led to some splintering, explaining why there were three Bolivian federations at the time of this study.
RESULTS
The results show how panethnic civic organizations emerge through political party interest. Put simply, political parties help establish these organizations in hopes of gaining Latino political loyalty. Immigrant leaders, in turn, both accommodate and resist party efforts by adopting three strategies: 1) developing cross-party networks; 2) using Latino media to establish nonpartisan visibility; and 3) deploying cultural and instrumentalist narratives about panethnicity. Panethnicity in Barcelona has thus emerged as a complex form of political and cultural identification involving the interactive efforts of parties, immigrant leaders, and the media.
Political Party Interest
In 2005, members of the governing Socialist Party helped establish Barcelona’s major panethnic Latino federation. In an interview, one federation board member recalled that the party actively sought out leaders capable of establishing a Latino panethnic civic organization: “They helicoptered in a group to establish the organization…because they knew the Latino vote would soon be important” (Joan, social worker).Footnote 7 Headed by a panethnic executive board, this organization had no official ties to the party, but its directorship was comprised of party sympathizers (Fran, academic). Within months, the organization had obtained state, county, and city grants to provide social services to Latinos and to produce Latino cultural events. The federation also quickly developed a list of affiliated groups, from Ecuadoran cultural organizations to Colombian entrepreneurial clubs, and provided them with assistance and funding for their events.
Around the same time, the Socialist Party also helped establish a Peruvian federation, providing it with technical grant-writing assistance and, according to one of its leaders, an office in which to operate (Lupe, unemployed). The establishment of Colombian and Ecuadoran federations soon followed, although the scope of the Socialist Party’s involvement in these cases is less clear, perhaps only including minimal grant-writing assistance. Regardless, as these efforts show, the governing political party understood that establishing one panethnic federation would not suffice; there also had to be room for individual, subnational federations that could provide immigrants with more ethnically focused activities.
Since 2005, Socialist Party leaders have continuously supported Barcelona’s panethnic federation and have also pushed Latino immigrant civic groups to coordinate activities and coauthor grant proposals (Xol, operative/lawyer). For example, a Colombian federation requesting funds to put on an independence day celebration would be encouraged by the party to include opportunities for Ecuadoran, Bolivian, and other groups to dance, sing, recite poetry, or speak about their national traditions. The panethnic Latino federation has also been consistently encouraged to write grants in cooperation with other nationally focused federations, and these urgings lay the party’s groundwork for panethnicity.
Over time, other political parties also started to take an interest in Latino associations. In 2011, a dominant nationalist party, Covergencia i Unio (CiU), began establishing ties with the heads of different Latino organizations. CiU acquired a building to house what it called the “Latino Space,” which included rooms for Latin American civic groups to hold meetings. Later that same year, the conservative and antinationalist Partido Popular (PP) convened party loyalists to develop their own “Hispanic” panethnic group (Zulimar, political operative). By that time, each party, be it the Socialists, the CiU or the PP, had come to recognize the political importance of panethnicity.
Today, several new civic associations have emerged from the more organic processes of population expansion. Salvadoran, Paraguayan, and Honduran civic associations, for example, formed as migration from these countries increased and as immigrant leaders witnessed the growth of Latino federations. For these new groups, however, the choice to join a panethnic federation takes on a distinctly political aspect because they fear that accepting resources will tag them as socialist, nationalist, or conservative. A Salvadoran leader noted that joining a panethnic federation might grant a given group access to meeting space and money, “but they always want you to take pictures with party leaders, and in some way you become associated with [a] party” (Isidra, eldercare aide). Another leader of a small association lamented that “political parties have just really complicated…federations” (Jaime, carpenter). It is important to note that these smaller upstart organizations fear political party intrusion in large part because such affiliations have spurred divisions among the larger, more established Ecuadoran and Colombian communities. Leaders from smaller communities weigh the more limited benefit they receive from partisan affiliations against the fear of dividing their comparatively smaller constituent base.
Yet how intertwined is the relationship between parties and civic associations in Spain? Officially, associations that receive government funds are not supposed to take money from parties and are expected to be nonpartisan. However, there is no official rule about whether individual immigrant organizational leaders can work for political parties or about whether organizations can convene their meetings in party buildings. Moreover, although they had no definitive proof, several immigrant leaders conveyed to me the belief that federations with ties to the ruling party enjoy preferential access to government resources.Footnote 8
Today, each major political party has an operative whose job it is to maintain links with Latino associations. All are current or former board members of panethnic federations who attend Latino organizational events, provide Latin American leaders with technical assistance, and generally maintain a line of communication with the party. These operatives, most of whom are Latino, build web pages and social networking sites where they publicize the events of Latino civic groups and trumpet the emergence of the “Latino vote” in Catalonia and broader Spain.
When asked about the current relationship between parties and Latino associations, political leaders first assured me that no funds had ever been given directly to groups and that party loyalty was not a prerequisite for any support. Second, they spoke broadly about how their respective parties wanted to help immigrants become integrated and more visible within the city. A Socialist leader noted, “it’s important for [Latinos] to have their space, and we try to help them to…be visible in the city…but we want to help them do this in a way that they come together” (Xol, lawyer/operative). On the other side of the political spectrum, a pronationalist CiU leader also explained that his party helps civic associations because it “wants to give Latinos a voice…make them feel visible, like they are Catalans, not permanent outsiders” (Rio, political operative).
Some party members were more forthcoming, admitting that party loyalty underlies much of their involvement with the Latino community. One PP operative stated bluntly, “Look, we need the Latino vote. We don’t just want the Peruvian or the Ecuadoran vote—we want the Latino one. It’s more people and more votes—we do things, then, to get these votes” (Dana, political operative). As such, parties are ever-present at most major Latino events. “I stay on top of all the associational Latino events,” recalled a PP party official as he showed me his packed calendar for the month (Zulimar, political operative). Moreover, parties are sure to use their media contacts to publicize their panethnic efforts. Hence party operatives make sure to take a camera crew with them to panethnic gatherings and to post press releases about the party’s role in such events.
But how do parties characterize Latinos? The answer depends on political leanings. The conservative, antinationalist party in Barcelona defined panethnicity as excluding Brazilians to signal that Latino identity was tied to a deep cultural connection to “la madre patria,” or the Spanish colonial motherland. “We are connected culturally and historically, so our organization [that the PP helped develop] is called Hispanic, to emphasize the ties between Latin America and Spain,” reflected a PP operative (Zulimar, political operative). The pronationalist Catalan party, on the other hand, took pains to argue that subgroup nationalist identities within Latin America, such as the Cambalan movement in Bolivia, are important aspects of the Latino identity, implicitly arguing that their own Spanish subgroup should be similarly respected (Rio, political operative). We can contrast these sentiments with those of the PP operatives, who often use the Cambalan issue in their case against Catalan independence:
When [Latinos] ask about the [Catalan] independence question, I always point to independence efforts in Latin America….It would be absurd to think that [a Latin American country] would split…so why should Latinos support this in Spain? (Zulimar, political operative)
In effect, parties not only helped to construct panethnicity but also sought to create their own, often politically motivated understandings of who should be included.
Immigrant Leaders: Accommodation and Resistance
Panethnicity emerged in Barcelona because parties took a leading role in establishing panethnic organizations and because immigrant leaders responded to party efforts. In this section, I describe three ways that immigrant leaders respond to parties by: 1) creating cross-party alliances; 2) using Latino media to broadcast non-partisan aspects of panethnicity; and 3) developing cultural and instrumental narratives of Latino commonality. These efforts help immigrant leaders to define panethnicity on their own, albeit limited, terms, and as a result, the influence of parties in constructing panethnicity becomes obscured.
Cross-Party Networks
Immigrant leaders both accommodate and resist the panethnic efforts of parties. On the one hand, they readily join Latino federations, thus linking their Peruvian, Ecuadoran, or Columbian organizations to party organizations. On the other hand, they construct their own independent alliances with other subgroups. For example, a Colombian organization will join with an Ecuadoran one to stage a “know your rights” workshop for Latino immigrants. Such coordination is often undertaken independently of any Latino federations to which they might belong.
These independent alliances are not made haphazardly. Latin American immigrant leaders have unwritten rules for determining with whom they will collaborate, and trust and past experience are important factors. One Colombian leader told me that she only collaborates with a certain Bolivian federation because that leader “has been there for me…so I’ll be there for him” (Mar, notary). Organizational size is another important factor, as smaller groups tend to seek to cosponsor events with larger groups who can attract more members. Finally, leaders form alliances in order to accrue social capital. The head of one organization explained how she had often helped certain groups by connecting them to corporate firms: “If I have the connections to banks or to companies that can sponsor events, I’ll help get event sponsorship for them. Later on they will have things that I need” (Belen, lawyer).
In effect, these cross-party networks allow subgroups to hedge their political bets. Given the possibility of political turnover, immigrant leaders construct independent links with groups associated, openly or not, with different parties. A Peruvian organizer confided that she often coordinates with a certain Ecuadoran leader even though she is not fond of him personally and doesn’t completely trust him. “He’s a sellout,” she tersely explained. Furthermore, that Ecuadoran leader is closely connected with the CiU party, while she has connections to the Socialist Party. Nonetheless, she admitted that “we need each other. Today he has the support of the party that’s in power…but tomorrow it might be my guys in power. We all know this” (Lupe, unemployed). As a result, the Peruvian leader chooses to cosponsor events with that specific Ecuadoran leader, and vice versa; both leaders are therefore able to maximize the benefits of their respective political connections.
Regardless of these cross-party networks and their rewards, immigrant leaders are, however, generally suspicious of party motives. As one leader whose federation meets in a space provided by a political party told me, “All of the parties tell us one thing and do another; the immigrant is not a main concern…[we] have to look out for ourselves” (Joan, social worker). Another noted that parties just want Latino votes, which is why “they call us and want to appear with us on stage [at Latino events]” (Isidra, eldercare aide). Still another leader reflected that Latinos could become a real political force in the city if “parties would just stay out of our business” (Paz, secretary).
Cross-party alliances, then, help immigrants buffer themselves against political turnover, but they also represent a way for Latinos to try and become independent from political parties. However, their task is complicated because wish as they might for autonomy, Latino organizations cannot afford to ignore the benefits of being associated with parties.
Broadcasting Panethnicity
Along with cross-party alliances, the Latino media plays a critical role in sustaining panethnicity in Barcelona. The relationship between political parties, civic organizations, and the media is an interdependent one. Latino media uses immigrant leaders and political operatives to produce local content. Latino leaders, in turn, use the media to promote their panethnic efforts.
Beginning roughly in 2007, after the founding of Barcelona’s major Latino federations, the city witnessed a growth in Latino print and broadcast outlets. These media entities produce content in Spanish, not Catalan, and differentiate themselves from others by: reporting on Latin American news; playing salsa, bachata, mariachi, and other Latin American-based music; and generally focusing on the experience of Latino immigrants. At the time of this research there were two major Latino radio stations in Barcelona, at least two Latino sports radio programs, and one long-standing digital Latino newspaper.Footnote 9
It is important to note that Latin American immigrant media professionals, not political parties, established these panethnic media outlets. However, Latino media does indirectly support various party efforts by regularly featuring commentaries from Latino party operatives, who “can easily be reached for quotes…[about] politics and Latinos” (Ramon, editor). Indeed, operatives are regularly invited to speak about the importance of the Latino vote, discuss how political developments will affect the Latino community, and opine on what position Latinos should take on the issue of Catalan independence.
Yet media also provides Latino leaders with an opportunity to advertise the nonpartisan aspects of panethnicity. Barcelona’s radio stations, for example, provide Latino federation leaders with a regular programming segment. Media personnel see this as a way to supplement public affairs programming and “give back” to the Latino community (Jana, disc jockey). In their segments, Latino leaders take care to avoid party politics and instead focus on policy developments and social and cultural events. Thus, the head of a major panethnic federation has a radio regular show in which she takes calls about Spain’s immigrant legalization process and announces the events that her federation is sponsoring with other groups. Another leader hosts a call-in show to speak about local developments in Latino neighborhoods, job openings, and advertisement for Latino business ventures. Moreover, the leaders of Latino federations produce cultural and social commentaries that are printed in Latino media. These and other such efforts are decidedly nonpartisan in nature.
In effect, the media provides an important channel over which to broadcast the notion of panethnicity. The political implications of panethnicity are extolled by political operatives, while civic leaders take more care to provide a nonpartisan image of panethnicity. Media thus facilitates a more complex understanding of Latino identity, one that is multifaceted and not exclusively linked to political leanings
Panethnic Narratives
It is crucial to note that the development of panethnic federations and networks does not fully eradicate subgroup antagonisms. Coalitions can, in fact, exacerbate tensions as subgroups quarrel over how organizational resources should be distributed. Organizations representing smaller groups can become upset when they see that larger groups are commanding the majority of resources within panethnic coalitions. At the same time, larger groups can feel that resources should be apportioned according to population size rather than doled out equally. These competing views create tension and resentment that groups must work through. For example, during the time I was in Barcelona, a coalition of Bolivian, Ecuadoran, Colombian, and Peruvian groups attempted to come together and lobby the city to fund a series of Latino cultural events. The coalition, however, was on the verge of breaking apart after its members started quarreling over how the resources would be allocated. I asked the Colombian leader to explain:
[The Ecuadoran leader] comes in and shouts, “I represent the largest group, we are 200,000,” meaning they should get more…So what! Who cares? We Colombians are 150 [thousand], and about half of us are professionals that have masters or doctorates…and so what? Because if I am going to compare, then look at the Bolivians…many are {undocumented} and they don’t even have a high school education. I don’t say they shouldn’t get anything. We have to all share resources equally. (Joan, social worker)
As his frustrated explanation demonstrates, groups can use different rationales, such as size, cultural capital, and even legal status, to argue that they should obtain more resources. Often, these arguments are accompanied by faulty stereotypes, in this case that all Colombians are well-educated professionals.
In the face of these antagonisms, immigrant leaders rely on two broad and seemingly contradictory narratives to forge a sense of community. The first is strategic or instrumental. It concerns resource needs and stresses that leaders must work together because a united front will provide more visibility. As an Ecuadoran leader put it:
All of us know that we stick to our own group—this Latino thing, it’s not really real…. Even within our countries there are differences—and I can tell you a million stereotypes about other [nationalities]…but this won’t help me get more monies….We don’t have to love each other, but we have to work together. (Paz, secretary)
During my interviews, leaders highlighted the similar need to overcome differences and stick together in the face of political uncertainty. They consistently emphasized that by not bickering (and by shedding the influence of political parties), they would gain the leverage to enact immigration reform, provide policy input, and take control of their cultural pride events:
Divisions tear us down…but when we finally come together on our own terms [without parties] …we will be unstoppable. We’ll control everything… immigration law, social service provision, [immigration] return policies. (Natividad, entrepreneur)
We should note that this instrumental narrative is connected to ideas about a common immigrant experience of disenfranchisement and underrepresentation. Leaders portray immigrants as facing various social disadvantages, from poverty to discrimination, and suggest that these ills can be addressed by uniting to achieve a visible political presence. In this vein, one leader who has contemplated running for local government office commented,
[Latinos] face discrimination, unjust immigration laws, and the difficulties of adjusting to here as a newcomer. The laws don’t always work protect us…we need to come together and find ways to represent ourselves politically. (Armando, lawyer)
In effect, this narrative of political necessity is based on the broader understanding that Latinos share a common immigrant struggle (see also Cuberos-Gallardo Reference Cuberos-Gallardo2014).
A second narrative used to foster panethnicity concerns culture. Leaders often spoke of Latinos sharing cultural aspects they did not share with other groups. For example, a Paraguayan group leader noted,
What do I have in common with an Asian? I don’t know his language, I don’t know his customs. There is nothing. With a Latino, even if I have not been to his country, we have certain values and a language that make us familiar to one another. (Elvira, retired secretary)
Other panethnic advocates spoke of the deep historical roots of the Latino cultural bond, highlighting a colonial connection to Spain. Take, for instance, this observation from a Colombian leader:
Latinos share an affinity [for] one another by our history and connection to Spain. There is a cultural and a language connection to Spain. We are more similar and more connected to Spain, whether we like it or not. (Armando, lawyer)
However, the Spanish connection can ultimately prove to be more divisive than unifying because it positions Spain as a foreign culture against which Latinos are defined. In one interview, a Dominican community leader contradicted his Colombian counterpart, who stressed the affinity between Latinos and Spaniards:
Latinos are different from Spaniards. They are more ready to think about now versus the future, but they are also ready to work hard and they like to enjoy life. Spaniards are more dry, and we are more welcoming. We can throw a party and really enjoy ourselves…we are very different from them. (Estella, unemployed)
As this example indicates, Latino leaders create cultural narratives about the way that certain values and experiences—perhaps industriousness or vitality—connect them to one another. These hazy cultural narratives allow leaders to argue that Latinos are both similar to and different from Spaniards. More broadly, the arguments about Latino culture provide a way to define panethnicity less in terms of political benefit and more as an organic, natural bond arising from a basic set of common values, however defined.
When we step back to consider these two narratives—instrumental and cultural—they seem to be at odds. The political necessity narrative suggests that Latino panethnicity is merely instrumental, while the cultural narrative suggests that Latinos are united by some set of values. And yet, surprisingly, the narratives work well together precisely because they reflect the complications inherent in panethnicity: Tensions arise as various groups come together while trying to maintain their individual distinctions. These seemingly contradictory narratives, then, don’t so much invalidate each other as paint a more nuanced picture of panethnicity’s cultural and strategic basis.
Ultimately, though, the narratives allow panethnicity to carve out a space independent from political parties. By claiming that panethnicity is either a Latino community strategy for achieving political visibility or all about culture, immigrant leaders obscure the role played by intervening political parties. They portray panethnicity as an organic notion springing from the Latino experience and not as an organizational strategy that has been spearheaded by parties.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Studies on panethnicity have primarily focused on the United States, where a unique confluence of state, civic, and media efforts are credited for helping to institutionalize panethnicity. The Barcelona case shows that panethnicity can emerge in international contexts as well, even those that lack a long history of overt racial politics and international migration. In Barcelona, political parties have forged panethnic coalitions that they hope will garner them support. In doing so, they have helped establish organizations that make claims about the needs, desires, and makeup of the given panethnic group. As we have seen, immigrant leaders tend to cooperate with political operatives because of the associated benefits. But they also resist political pressure by using Latino media to publicize the alternative, nonpartisan aspects of their group, creating cross-party networks and generating narratives about how political necessity and culture unite immigrants. As they deploy these strategies, ethnic leaders strive to make panethnicity seem as if it emerged organically, thus obscuring the role of political party involvement. Nonetheless, because immigrant leaders still depend on party resources, panethnicity always remains partly tied up with party interests.
It is the role of political parties that makes the Barcelona case a clear contrast to the United States. As in the United States, the media and immigrant community leaders in Barcelona play a role in fomenting panethnicity, but it is the efforts of political parties that set the case apart. While historical studies have noted that select politicians did help establish some panethnic organizations in the United States (Cornell Reference Cornell1988; Espiritu Reference Espiritu1992; Mora 2014), these actions were by no means representative of political party efforts. Indeed, U.S. parties have only recently begun to court panethnic votes, these efforts emerging decades after the founding of several panethnic organizations. To be clear, in Barcelona parties are necessary—but not sufficient—for developing panethnicity. Immigrant leaders and Latino media also play important interactive roles. The media publicizes the efforts of parties but also provides immigrant leaders with an opportunity to broadcast and define panethnicity on their own terms—often in a nonpolitical fashion as a set of cultural values or common experiences.
Is Barcelona a unique case? Not necessarily. Large-scale panethnic federations in Spain emerged in Barcelona first, in large part because parties were responding to nationalist political developments. Yet over time, the political operatives attached to national party structures also began to organize Latino panethnic efforts in Madrid and other Spanish regions that were not mired in nationalist struggles (Xol, political operative; Zulimar, political operative). Here parties also collaborated with immigrant leaders and used the media to broadcast their efforts. This suggests that nationalist regional contexts can spur panethnicity initially, but that parties—through their national connections—may be able to institutionalize panethnicity more broadly across state regions. Future research could further examine this phenomenon by tracking the relationship between political parties and panethnic organizational formation across time and place.
But what about the broader set of states that might not have prominent nationalist struggles? How might political parties play a role in constructing panethnicity in these contexts? The answer could lie in the nature of civil society. Barcelona has a vibrant civil society that is often tightly, yet informally, connected to political parties. The barriers to entrance are low, as most anyone, including first-generation immigrants, can develop and register their own organization. Future research could thus examine whether panethnic organizations might eventually arise in areas in which a similarly close connection between civil society and politics exists, especially as international migration increases.
Last, future research could examine the short- and, potentially, long-term effects of political parties on panethnicity. This work could answer the question of whether the ethnic mobilization efforts of parties endure over time in states that lack race-based policies and classifications. The Barcelona case shows that parties help develop panethnic organizations, but how long these efforts will last is unknown. Do parties eventually win office and institutionalize visions of panethnic blocs into government practice? Is this done officially or unofficially? Further work might thus examine how the ethnicity-constructing efforts of parties play out over time and consider the extent to which parties might lay the structural groundwork for state racialization practices.
More broadly, the Barcelona case has implications for how we think about the strategic aspects of panethnicity. Specifically, it suggests that panethnic networks are not concerned with expanding to as many different groups as possible. Rather, this case indicates that ethnic leaders weigh their decisions about whom to include in their panethnic coalitions carefully. In Barcelona, immigrant leaders rely on trust, past experience, political party affiliation, and potential access to resources to make decisions about how they will build their panethnic coalitions. In effect, this study encourages researchers to imagine panethnicity as an umbrella that selectively covers certain groups rather than all groups equally.
Ultimately, the results show that panethnicity is a multifaceted form of ethnic mobilization. It is not simply a boundary imposed by the state, nor is it a pre-existing identity that is activated in certain settings. Rather, it is a form of organizing that reflects political interests, cultural and instrumental narratives, and antagonistic interdependencies. And while seemingly unstable, panethnicity is a form of organizing that has proven surprisingly resilient, flourishing in states that have a long history of immigration and racialized politics as well as in those that are only now contending with these issues.
