DEFINING NEW ATHEISM

New atheism is a loosely defined movement that has emerged over the past decade as prominent scholars and public intellectuals have made their opposition to religion public. Because new atheism is not a clearly stated ideology and because it lacks clear leadership as a social movement, there is no definitive statement of new atheist theory. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify points of agreement that many or most new atheists share, as well as their disagreements with other variants of atheism. As new atheists see it, traditional atheism is characterized by quietism about the role of religion in public life, a willingness to allow science and religion to coexist as separate discourses, and the view that atheism is a personal belief, not a political cause.

The most important defining characteristic of new atheism is that its advocates attempt to carry out a more aggressive fight against religion's influence on political and social life, especially when religion comes into conflict with science. Victor Stenger, who is himself part of this movement, says that new atheism is characterized by the belief that atheists should “take a far less accommodating attitude toward religion, including moderate religion, than has been exhibited in previous years by atheist authors and, in particular, by non-believing scientists” (Stenger Reference Stenger2010, 12). In other words, new atheism is primarily defined by the goal of ending atheists' silent opposition to religion in favor of public debate about the merits of theism and secularism. New atheism has strong transformative goals, as its leading representatives have contested the extensive role of religion in politics and sought to combat it by promoting secularization, both in politics and in society more generally.

New atheists' political commitment is less exceptional than Stenger's and other self-descriptions suggest. Many past atheists have vehemently criticized religion and sought to expose its harmful political effects. Marx famously describes religion as giving solace to the oppressed and directing their attention away from the economic and political struggles that would allow them to improve their condition (Marx Reference Marx1967). Bakunin argues that religion serves as a model of state authority and that it helps to legitimize that authority by giving it a theological basis (Bakunin Reference Bakunin2008). Nietzsche blames Judeo-Christian religion for initiating a slave revolt in morality that led to an obsession with death and a decline of the life-affirming moralities of antiquity (Nietzsche Reference Nietzsche1989). Freud, Stirner, Ayer, Russell, and many other philosophers writing from myriad theoretical perspectives similarly link religion to social problems. Each of these philosophers, as well as many other critics of religion, condemns the political and social consequences of religion. This tradition is largely overlooked by the leading new atheists. Their desire to reformulate political discourse on the model of scientific reason, which will be discussed later, leads them to dismiss these other atheists as introducing quasi-religious political ideologies. Nevertheless, new atheists' critique of religion differs from that of many other atheists in at least two important respects.

First, new atheists think that religion itself is the source of serious social problems, rather than a manifestation of other more basic problems. This is a much different type of position from those taken by philosophers who consider religion to be a contributing factor in, or a symptom of, other more fundamental issues. Although not all atheists outside the new atheist movement take this indirect approach to critiquing religion, many do. For example, Marx does not see religion itself as a problem. Instead, he describes religion as a way of coping with and hiding exploitation that facilitates that exploitation (Marx Reference Marx1967). Moreover, Marx does not advocate a direct attack on religion. Instead, he thinks that economic transformation would eliminate the need for religion. Similarly, Bakunin's argument against religion is primarily an attack on the model of irrational authority that religion promotes (Bakunin Reference Bakunin2008).

Second, new atheism is defined by confidence in the natural sciences and scientific methods. Many prominent new atheists are scientists (Stenger Reference Stenger2009; Reference Stenger2010; Reference Stenger2007), including the biologist Richard Dawkins, who is often described as the leader, or at least the leading representative, of new atheism (Wilde Reference Wilde2010; Plantiga Reference Plantiga2011). Moreover, those who are not trained as scientists, including Christopher Hitchens and Daniel Dennett, often describe new atheists' struggle against religion as being a battle between science and faith (Hitchens 2007; Dennett Reference Dennett2007). This confidence in science sets new atheists apart from the many atheists, including Nietzsche and Freud, who are either suspicious of the natural sciences or conduct research that new atheists would consider to be pseudo-science.

The new atheists' view of science as being irreconcilable with faith also distinguishes them from other strands of atheist thought. New atheists reject Stephen Jay Gould's Non-overlapping Magisteria (NOMA) thesis. According to NOMA, science and religion are engaged in two distinct discourses, or magisterial, and that they should each limit themselves by only dealing with questions within their own magisterial (Gould Reference Gould1999). In rejecting NOMA, new atheists reject the belief, held by many moderate atheists, that religion and science can coexist by restricting themselves to separate discourses.

Richard Dawkins exemplifies the movement's enthusiasm for the natural sciences and its opposition to giving religious explanations of natural phenomenon equal status with scientific explanations. He has written books and articles criticizing religion and defending scientific theories against religious explanations of the world. He has also produced several television documentaries to promote atheism, including The Root of All Evil?, The Enemies of Reason, and Faith School Menace?. Dawkins' critique of religion is an extension of his work on evolution and is even foreshadowed in his books about evolution (Dawkins Reference Dawkins1996a; Reference Dawkins1996b). Although Dawkins opposes faith in all forms, he devotes special attention to the points at which religion and science come into conflict, such as they do in debates over the theory of evolution and debates about how evolution should be taught in schools. He attacks theories of creationism and intelligent design, and shows that evolutionary theory does not assume that life arose by chance, as many creationists claim, but through a process of natural selection. He maintains that religious organizations continually block scientific progress, that they distorts scientific theories in order to refute them, and that they hinder scientific education by insisting that religious doctrines should be taught to children as alternative views of the world.

While Dawkins' critique of religion starts by challenging religion's influence on science, Dawkins ultimately develops a critique of religion as a social practice that has ruinous political consequences. Foremost among these consequences are discrimination against outsiders and minorities, suppression of alternative points of view, and policies that undermine children's autonomy and allow religion to spread to future generations. Although Dawkins does not challenge the individual right to hold religious beliefs, he is concerned that religious beliefs are rarely treated as matters of personal opinion. Dawkins argues that religion tends to be spread in a way that parallels biological evolution. He calls religion a meme — an idea that spreads like a virus from generation to generation — and says that the process through which religion is transmitted can account for why it has persisted for millennia. People are receptive to religion and other memes because of their natural inclination to use communication as a means of survival. This is especially true of children. Because children rely on the survival instinct of uncritically accepting information from their parents, religious ideas are easy to perpetuate over successive generations. Dawkins argues that this process of transmitting religion to children who are predisposed to uncritically accept information makes religious education a form of child abuse. It violates children's autonomy because they are taught religion before they are capable of critical thinking. Moreover, Dawkins argues that children suffer lasting harm because they are taught a set of beliefs that discourages them from considering alternative views of the world and encourages intolerance of those who propose these alternative perspectives.

Dawkins has been rightly criticized for his attempts to provide scientific explanations for social phenomenon (McGrath Reference McGrath2004). As the meme theory shows, Dawkins' social theory tends to create simplistic models of social interaction, which rely on the deeply problematic assumption that people and social systems act according to the same processes as natural phenomena. New atheism is at its weakest when it its proponents attempt to construct naturalistic theories of social life (Schulzke Reference Schulzke2013). Nevertheless, new atheists' social theory should not be dismissed because of this fault, as much of the new atheists' political and moral thought is more convincing.

NEW ATHEISM POLITICAL CRITIQUE OF RELIGION

Christopher Hitchens may be the new atheist who is most concerned with casting the struggle against religion as a political conflict, as his critique of religion deals primarily with religion's social and political consequences (Hitchens 2007). His goal is to expose the harmful effects religion has on society, on individual health, and on liberal values such as freedom of expression and freedom of conscience. This position can best be summed up by the subtitle of his book God is Great: Religion Poisons Everything — a subtitle that correctly implies that Hitchens is less interested in ending religious belief as such than in exposing its deleterious effects.

Free expression is among the values that Hitchens considers most threatened by religion. In his writings and speeches, he frequently tells the story of the Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie to illustrate religious extremists' intolerance (Hitchens 2007). The fatwa, which was issued in response to Rushdie's book The Satanic Verses, resulted in many death threats made against Rushdie and his publishers, as well as acts of violence. Bookstores selling the book were burned and several of the book's publisher's translators were shot or stabbed. Hitchens also uses the 2005 controversy over the publication of cartoons of Mohammed in the Danish newspaper Jyllads-Posten as an example of how religious people use violence against those who criticize their beliefs and attempt to regulate expression (Hitchens 2007, 281). Although these are extreme cases of religious hostility toward free expression, Hitchens thinks that religious moderates often hinder free expression in subtler ways, such as with censorship and special protections for religious expression. This opposition to free expression is symptomatic of a deeper incompatibility between religion and contemporary liberal democratic values. This incompatibility is evidenced in the many statements of intolerance found in Judeo-Christian religious doctrines, as well as in Hinduism and Buddhism. These include the legitimization of discrimination against women, homosexuals, and members of other religious groups.

Hitchens argues that religion is responsible for serious harm to both adherents and their enemies. As he says in his characteristically iconoclastic manner: “religion kills” (Hitchens 2007, 15). To substantiate this strong claim, he describes his visits to places torn apart by religious violence, such as “Belfast, Beirut, Bombay, Belgrade, Bethlehem, and Baghdad,” emphasizing that this is a long list considering that he has limited himself only to names beginning with the letter “B” (Hitchens 2007, 18). He argues that violence in each of these places is primarily motivated by religious beliefs and that they would benefit from secularization. Hitchens also finds that religion kills indirectly by discouraging adherents from caring for their own health. For example, the Catholic Church has long opposed the use of condoms to prevent the transmission of HIV and to prevent unwanted pregnancies — a decision Hitchens thinks is partly responsible for the prevalence of HIV and AIDS in developing countries (Hitchens 2007, 45). Similarly, Muslim opposition to the polio vaccine allowed a resurgence of polio in Nigeria, which was then transmitted throughout Africa and the Middle East (Hitchens 2007, 45). Many religious practices are themselves responsible for serious health risks. Female genital mutilation can lead to infection and the spread of HIV, and traditional Jewish circumcision practices have caused the spread of herpes and even the deaths of several young boys (Hitchens 2007, 50).

Sam Harris shares many of Dawkins' and Hitchens' concerns and presents arguments similar to theirs. However, of the three, Harris' arguments tend to be the weakest because he can be reductionist. Like Dawkins, Harris sees religion as a threat to science and to the progress of human knowledge in general. Both are naturalists in the sense that they think the natural sciences provide a model for all types of research, yet Harris goes further than Dawkins. He argues that the natural sciences not only provide a model for how research should be conducted but that they can also answer all of the problems raised in the social sciences and humanities. For example, he claims that even moral theory can be reduced to neurology (Harris Reference Harris2005; Reference Harris2010).

Like Hitchens, Harris is concerned with religion's power to inspire violence. Harris' book The End of Faith opens with a hypothetical look into the mind of a suicide bomber making preparations for an attack, and throughout the book he criticizes religion for inciting violence. Among Harris' most controversial claims is that moderate theists help to protect extremists, even suicide bombers, by legitimizing extremists' strong faith and protecting it from criticism. As he says, “religious moderates are, in large part, responsible for the religious conflict in our world, because their beliefs provide the context in which scriptural literalism and religious violence can never be adequately opposed” (Harris Reference Harris2005, 45). Moreover, Harris argues that religious moderates who advocate religious pluralism misunderstand their own religious doctrines, as they ignore that monotheistic religions are sectarian and that they make claims of superiority over other religions. This leads Harris to consider monotheistic religions inherently opposed to religious pluralism. “As long as a Christian believes that only his baptized brethren will be saved on the Day of Judgment, he cannot possibly “respect” the beliefs of others, for he knows that the flames of hell have been stoked by these very ideas and await their adherents even now” (Harris Reference Harris2005, 15). This critique of religious moderates is one of Harris' most influential arguments, and has been supported by the philosopher Daniel Dennett (Dennett Reference Dennett2007, 299), who is also among the leaders of the new atheist movement. It has strong political implications. If it is correct, then it provides grounds for treating religious moderates as being fundamentally the same as religious extremists, and for considering secularization essential to pluralism.

RESPONSES TO NEW ATHEISM

Many of the responses to new atheists come from theologians who attempt to refute new atheists' arguments against the existence God, to show that intelligent design is a convincing alternative to the theory of evolution, or to dispute new atheists' reading of religious texts (McGrath Reference McGrath and McGrath2007; Reference McGrath2004). Some have also challenged new atheists' competence to speak about religious matters (Eagleton Reference Eagleton2006). While these responses are important to consider when assessing the strengths of new atheists' critique of theology, they are beyond the scope of this article. The most relevant critiques are those from political theorists and philosophers who challenge new atheists' claims religion generally has harmful effects on society.

Peterson's “Ethics, Out-Group Altruism, and the New Atheism” offers an example of a response to new atheism from an ethicist's perspective. Peterson criticizes new atheists for failing to provide an alternative theory of ethics that can replace religious ethics (Peterson Reference Peterson and Amarasingam2010, 175). He argues that new atheists might be able to explain why people with no religious inclinations would behave morally to members of groups that they belong to (in-groups), but that they fail to provide a basis for moral obligations that extend to people with different group affiliations (members of out-groups). This poses a serious problem from a political standpoint. As Peterson correctly points out, social life depends on interaction between members of different groups and therefore requires some way of forming relationships that exist despite group differences. If new atheism cannot provide an alternative set of values to serve as the basis for out-group altruism, then it cannot establish a foundation for a secular theory of politics.

The source of Peterson's misunderstanding of the new atheist position lies in his characterization of new atheists' ethics. Peterson acknowledges that Dawkins and other biologists in the new atheist movement have offered theories of in-group altruism. Their evolutionary theories show that humans and other animals protect members of their kin groups and engage in acts of reciprocal altruism because these offer survival advantages. Peterson also correctly notes that new atheists tend to derive their theories of morality from biology in an attempt to ground these theories in science rather than metaphysical speculation. However, this insight leads Peterson to the conclusion that new atheists do not make claims about morality or social organization beyond those derivable from evolutionary biology. As I will show later, Peterson's concern is misguided. Although new atheists do reject any absolutist moral theories that rest on metaphysical systems, they defend a liberal political program that embodies their understanding of a fallibilistic and rationalistic scientific method. New atheists' liberal political thought therefore provides the framework for sustaining relationships between members of different groups.

Peterson not only thinks that new atheists cannot account for out-group altruism but also maintains that their critique of religion challenges “the idea of toleration, embodied in principles of freedom of speech and freedom of religion, which have been staples of western democratic understanding of civil rights and moral expectations” (Peterson Reference Peterson and Amarasingam2010, 175). Peterson accuses new atheism of violating the basic liberal democratic values and of promoting intolerance for people with religious beliefs. Thus, by his interpretation new atheism is not only defective as a philosophical position but also as a social movement. As I will show later, this point is also incorrect. The methods new atheists use to contest theism are not only consistent with their liberal values but also offer a model for open debate.

Wilde is one of the few scholars to assess new atheism from a political theory perspective (Wilde Reference Wilde2010). His reaction to new atheism is therefore particularly important to consider here. Wilde agrees with many of Peterson's points, as he considers new atheism to be intolerant and incapable of providing an alternative to religion. He also defends religion against new atheists on pluralist grounds, saying that religion is an important component of culture and that religious tolerance is therefore essential to multiculturalism.

Wilde's primary target is Richard Dawkins, whose statement of new atheism has three faults. First, Wilde argues that Dawkins' critique of religion undermines the possibility of constructive dialogue between secularists and religious people because it is both abusive in its tone and unfair in focusing on religion's harmful effects while overlooking the positive influence religion can have. Second, he accuses Dawkins of maintaining a simplistic dualism between reason and faith. Dawkins thinks that only reason can help us understand the world, and he considers faith to be irrational belief that is not supported by evidence. Third, new atheists have too much confidence in science's power to answer all of our deepest questions about the universe and our existence. Wilde says that “in failing to see anything positive in religious thought he implicitly makes claims for science which are beyond its capacity to deliver” (Wilde Reference Wilde2010, 268).

To some extent, the second and third criticisms are justified. Dawkins does indeed defend a relatively simplistic view of rationality, and he seems to overlook the possibility that there may be rational explanations of social phenomena that do not simply reduce social phenomena to natural processes. He also seems to think that science is totally rational and never tinged by the illusions of faith, which as Kuhn showed, is an ideal that scientific research often fails to live up to (Kuhn Reference Kuhn1996). Nevertheless, these weak points in Dawkins' work are not essential to the new atheists' critique of religion's effects. They are therefore insufficient to show that Dawkins and other new atheists are incorrect in maintaining that religion tends to be a harmful force.

However, Wilde does have more serious charges against the new atheists, which could, if they were correct, be decisive. In addition to his specific concerns with Dawkins' claims, Wilde makes several general claims against new atheists. First, like Peterson, he argues that new atheism does not offer an alternative to religion — or at least not one that could serve as the basis for a secular society. “For the most part this ‘aggressive atheism’ is intent on attacking religious thought and its influence on society, setting to one side the question of what a radical secular alternative might look like” (Wilde Reference Wilde2010, 266). Second, Wilde adds to this by saying that Dawkins and other new atheists are intolerant and unwilling to consider alternative points of view. He says of Dawkins that “his aggressive atheism mirrors the unreflective certitude it deplores in religion” (Wilde Reference Wilde2010, 268). This not only makes new atheism hypocritical but also makes it hostile to open discourse.

Unfortunately, Wilde's negative assessment of the movement leads him to take a relatively narrow perspective on what new atheism is and what kind of political values it promotes. He interprets it almost entirely through the work of Richard Dawkins, who he considers to be the most popular and probably the most aggressive representative of new atheism, and conflates Dawkins' critique of religion with an intolerant refusal to consider opposing points of view. Moreover, as the following sections will show, Wilde mischaracterizes new atheists' political views and their styles of activism.

THE POLITICS OF NEW ATHEISM

Peterson, Wilde, and other critics are right to say that new atheism does not offer a comprehensive alternative value system to replace religion. However, what critics of new atheism often fail to recognize is that this lack of an alternative system of absolute values is deliberate, that it is an essential part of new atheists' defense of the values of political liberalism, and that it follows a well-established style of liberal political theory. New atheists do not defend a complete philosophy of liberalism, as they focus on social issues and are almost entirely silent about economic issues. Their liberal theory of politics is also not derived from a particular political philosopher or school of thought. Nevertheless, new atheists are highly consistent in advocating a secular view of liberal politics, in which religion and other absolutist systems of values are classified as matters of personal belief and not allowed to intrude into public life. Their connection with liberalism comes through their attempt to imagine politics as a neutral space in which to debate competing interests. They are therefore primarily concerned with the aspects of liberalism that promote freedom of expression, the separation of public and private life, and fallibilism.

The new atheists' variant of liberalism is best understood in terms of Chantal Mouffe's characterization of liberalism as a type of political thought that gives precedence to “a framework of rights and of fundamental liberties over the different conceptions of good that are permitted to individuals” (Mouffe Reference Mouffe1993, 26). According to this view, liberals attempt to formulate basic rights that are strong enough to protect individual liberties but that are nevertheless weak enough to ensure a high degree of individual freedom. New atheists agree with liberals in relegating questions of the good to the private sphere and maintaining that political institutions and the values they embody should be as open as possible in order to allow people to pursue different visions of the good life.

John Rawls' political philosophy provides one of the best examples of a liberal order in which individuals are free from institutionalized values, except in the minimal values that are necessary to establish the political order, and yet free to have their own values and beliefs in private. In A Theory of Justice, as well as in some of his later restatements of the ideas contained in it, Rawls attempts to formulate the most just organizing principles of society (Rawls Reference Rawls1999; Reference Rawls2001). He seeks to establish a framework in which people are free to pursue their own conceptions of the good while still being protected by rights. His two principles do rest on some basic values, but these values are deliberately restrained. His two principles of justice guarantee citizens' liberties and ensure that each has citizen adequate primary goods, but Rawls is deliberately vague when describing the particulars of his theory. He does not offer a list of goods that qualify as primary goods, nor does he say exactly what policies a society following his difference principle would enact. In doing so, he provides those who must live by his principles of justice the freedom to determine what values they wish to live by and to fill in the particulars of his theory based on these values.

New atheists employ much the same style of reasoning as Rawls, although their reasoning takes a different path. Rather than starting from a state of nature or an original position and formulating basic organizing principles that all members of a society would assent to, as Rawls and other liberal contractarians do, new atheists assume that societies should be organized according to a liberal model and attempt to demonstrate that this model is desirable by showing that religion and metaphysical value systems are harmful when they intrude into public life. Their goal is to defend the liberal framework in which people are free to choose their own values by questioning the tendency of religion to impose a universal conception of the good.

As new atheists see it, other atheists contradict themselves if they critique religion only to replace it with a comprehensive secular ideology. Instead, new atheists argue that liberal values can only be sustained if atheists purge absolute values and metaphysical systems from politics. This does not mean that politics must be value-free or value-neutral but that any values must be provisional, open to debate, and potentially falsifiable. Their concern with religion, as well as with secular metaphysical systems, is that these are not falsifiable. As I showed earlier, new atheists' arguments against theism in politics are based on the claim that infallible religious systems are lend support to extremism, stifle free expression, and discourage the consideration of alternative opinions. New atheists' liberal values are therefore inextricably linked to their own concern with fallibility; this is expressed in their reason vs. faith dichotomy.

DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE VISION

In typical liberal fashion, new atheists' alternative to religion is not a universalistic theory of the good but rather a theory about how political and social issues should be resolved: through reasoned debate based on empirical evidence rather than an absolutist value system. The centrality of reason in their conception of politics raises the question of what new atheists mean when they use this term. Wilde's critique of new atheism is largely based on Dawkins' characterization of the reason vs. faith binary, which is one of the central themes of Dawkins' writings on religion. This binary also appears in Hitchens' and Harris' writings, making it a prominent theme in new atheist thought in general and one of the core elements of their political thought. Harris argues that faith is religion's fundamental flaw, and that belief based on faith leads religion to “perpetuate man's inhumanity to man” (Harris Reference Harris2005, 15). Similarly, Hitchens says that “faith and superstition distort our whole picture of the world,” leading the faithful to commit terrible atrocities (Hitchens 2007, 41).

Dawkins provides the most complete description of how new atheists understand the concepts of faith and reason. He juxtaposes them as the two alternative and incompatible ways of seeing the world, while making no explicit mention of alternative ways of understanding the world. This implies that he thinks these are the two basic modes of thought. This may seem like a simplistic view, but it is not as problematic as Wilde seems to think, especially when one considers what Dawkins means when he refers to reason and faith. Wilde characterizes reason and faith as one might expect from a political theorist or philosopher. Referencing Weber and Fromm, he shows that there is a long history of debate over the meaning of reason and that there may be various types of reason (Wilde Reference Wilde2010). He shows that reason is a contested concept that can be construed in multiple incommensurable, if not incompatible, ways. This makes Dawkins' discussion of reason as a single, clearly identifiable concept appears reductionist. Nevertheless, Dawkins uses these terms in a very broad sense that can encompass alternative conceptions of reason and faith and that demonstrates new atheism's strong affinities with political liberalism.

Dawkins defines faith as belief in something despite contrary evidence (Dawkins Reference Dawkins2006, 5). When a person claims that they have faith in something, they implicitly claim that they are not open to new evidence and that no amount of evidence can lead them to revise an article of faith. Dawkins' concern with faith is that this refusal to hear new evidence makes faith-based beliefs immune to challenge and not open to serious debate. Faith of any type should be avoided because it prevents us from considering alternative explanations and new evidence. Thus, as he defines it, faith is a relatively broad term that describes any belief that is immune to criticism and cannot be challenged by contrary evidence.

Rationality is defined as the opposite of faith: openness to new information and willingness to consider the limitations of one's own beliefs. Dawkins thinks that rationality demands that people live by a standard akin to Popper's falsificationist definition of science (Popper Reference Popper1968); all beliefs, without exception, should be open to revision or disconfirmation. Dawkins continually praises the natural sciences for providing a model for what openness to new ideas should look like. Although his uncritical confidence in the natural sciences is one of Dawkins' theoretical weaknesses, the reason vs. faith binary that he and other new atheists discuss helps to illustrate why they object to religion's influence on politics. Far from being simplistic, as Wilde argues, the reason vs. faith dichotomy is an important point of agreement between new atheists and liberals.

Many of the canonical figures in the liberal tradition emphasize human fallibility and maintain that this fallibility makes it imperative to avoid creating any political institutions that affirm absolute value systems. Gaus describes John Stuart Mill as being “struck by our fallibility: no matter how much we have thought an issue through, we can never be certain that we are correct — it is always possible we have fallen into error” (Gaus Reference Gaus2003, 2). This belief in fallibility leads Mill to argue for a sharp distinction between public and private life and for the highest level of individual freedom that can be made consistent with the freedom of others (Mill Reference Mill1999). Karl Popper's Open Society is likewise heavily informed by human fallibility (Popper Reference Popper1966). The Open Society rejects metaphysical value systems and embraces epistemological uncertainty, according to which all beliefs and values are provisional and open to disconfirmation.

There are two ways in which religious faith, as Dawkins defines it, hinders open political discourse. First, faith has a special status that allows faith-based beliefs to be unchallengeable. Many people in religious societies, such as those of the United States and Britain, consider it respectable or even admirable to have strong faith. This societal approval of faith allows people to insulate their beliefs from criticism by claiming that they are articles of faith; those with faith can claim the privilege of not having their ideas subject to debate. Faith's ability to confer immunity to contestation makes faith antithetical to meaningful political deliberation, as anyone can invoke faith to justify discriminatory policies or to demand restrictions on rights. This is why Harris considers religious moderates to be complicit in the actions of religious extremists. While he acknowledges that religious moderates have much different values than extremists, he argues that moderates make faith-based claims' immunity from criticism appear legitimate (Harris Reference Harris2005, 15). Extremists reap the benefits of this because widespread respect for faith makes their potentially dangerous ideas exempt from debate.

By contrast, new atheists' conception of reason as belief that is based on evidence and that is open to challenge and revision, offers a good standard for meaningful political discourse. Dawkins demonstrates this type of reason when formulating his own atheist beliefs. He thinks that God is improbable, but admits that he lacks the evidence to claim that he knows that there is no God (Dawkins Reference Dawkins2006, 50). Rather than claiming certainty that no God exists, Dawkins makes the far more limited assertion that the evidence supporting atheism is stronger than the evidence for theism. He goes on to speak out against any claims of absolute certainty, even those made by atheists, saying that “reason alone could not propel one to total conviction that anything definitely does not exist” (Dawkins Reference Dawkins2006, 51). He also says that when there is no strong evidence for or against something, it is usually best to be agnostic (Dawkins Reference Dawkins2006, 46–47). Hitchens and Harris make statements against claims of certainty and agree with Dawkins that all claims, even those based in faith, should be open to debate (Hitchens 2007, 11; Harris Reference Harris2010). Of course, one could argue that these assertions are only rhetorical and that new atheists are more dogmatic than these statements imply. However, even if this were true, the standard of rationality they favor is nevertheless a promising standard for political contestation and coherent with the liberal values the new atheists are attempting to protect.

Second, societal approval of faith allows religious groups to unfairly claim a special privilege of being offended by other people's private conduct. Religious leaders claim to be offended by such things as the way women dress, homosexuality, and satire of their beliefs. Dawkins emphasizes that this is one of his central complaints with faith:

Thus, invoking faith not only provides a way for religious people to claim that certain beliefs are immune to criticism but that those beliefs can still be used to make claims against other people's rights.

The ongoing debate over gay rights in the United States provides a good example of how respect for faith can allow religious groups to maintain that other people's rights should be restricted. Many religious leaders claim that homosexuality is immoral, and say that this belief must be respected because it is an article of faith (Burack Reference Burack2008). Although religious leaders may express this belief in a political forum it is an apolitical claim in the sense that most of those who make this claim do not seem to consider it open to debate. Many of these same religious leaders then go on to argue that because they are offended by homosexuality their apolitical claim that homosexuality is immoral must be treated as though it was a political claim that should inform policy decisions. The consequence of this is an apparently intractable debate over gay rights, in which many religious opponents of gay rights do not seem to be open to new evidence or to opposing points of view.

It is important to note that although new atheists' writings tend to focus on critiquing faith and its social consequences, their discussion of politics is not purely negative. They also defend liberal values of freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and tolerance for minorities. These values complement the new atheists' view of reason, as they are essential to the free and open exchange of ideas that reason demands. Hitchens (Reference Hitchens2011), who considers “free speech” to be “the most beautiful apposition of two of the simplest words in our language,” is especially forceful in defending freedom of speech and conscience against religious interests. Hitchens' arguments in favor of free speech are based in liberal political thought. He routinely draws support from John Stuart Mill, John Milton, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson and portrays these and other canonical figures in the liberal tradition as providing the basic values that must be protected against religious interests (Hitchens Reference Hitchens2007a; Reference Hitchens2007b; Reference Hitchens2009). Hitchens also calls for a second Enlightenment to reaffirm these values and to elevate reason and science to a higher status, allowing them, rather than faith, to be the primary means through which humans make sense of the world. (Hitchens 2007, 277). This is a sentiment Dawkins and Harris would certainly agree with as they make similar statements about the importance of free expression and of the importance of leaving every claim open to contestation and falsification.

CONTESTING THEISM

New atheists issue harsh assessments of religion and argue that religion should be abandoned. However, they do not propose to abolish religion in a way that would contradict the liberal values they defend, or in a way that would threaten the ideal of rational deliberation based on evidence that they offer as an alternative to belief based on faith. They do not call for state suppression of religion or for atheists to carry out acts of violence against theists. They openly advocate atheism, but their advocacy is not “aggressive” or intolerant as critics like Peterson and Wilde maintain. Rather, it is the kind of advocacy typically associated with social and political causes in liberal democracies.

New atheists' advocacy strategies include writing books and articles, giving speeches, holding debates, making appearances on news programs, advertising, and the establishment of nonprofit groups. Even Dawkins, who Wilde considers the most extreme new atheist (Wilde Reference Wilde2010: 267), is relatively restrained in his attempts to promote atheism. Dawkins characterizes his approach to promoting atheism as “consciousness-raising,” and says that he self-consciously models his advocacy on the women's rights movement (Dawkins Reference Dawkins2006, 115). His goal is to convince people of the merits of atheism through argumentation alone. Even atheists' most overt challenges to theism are relatively restrained. For example, in 2008, the British Humanist Association paid for advertisements on London buses that read “There's probably no God. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life” (‘No God' Slogans for City's Buses 2008). This kind of advertising may seem shocking because it is strange to see atheism promoted so publicly, but it is no more extreme than the tactics used by other advocacy groups. The word “probably” even indicates a lack of certainty about the claim. Moreover, atheists' attempts to promote religious skepticism are far less aggressive than the methods employed by many mainstream religions to attract followers, such as door-to-door soliciting, distributing bibles, and advertisements with much stronger messages than the one presented by the British Humanist Association.

Awareness raising is essential given prevailing attitudes about atheism. Most of the prominent new atheists are from the United States or Britain, countries with strong pro-religious biases in which the discussion of atheism is severely constrained (Cimino Reference Cimino and Smith2007; Reference Cimino and Smith2011; Smith Reference Smith2011). Atheists in both countries have faced a great deal of discrimination, and opinion polls consistently report that there is little tolerance for atheism (Arcaro Reference Arcaro2010). Even after women, African-Americans, homosexuals, and other minorities have openly held national elective offices in the United States, it is difficult to imagine an avowed atheist being elected to Congress or the Presidency. A 2011 survey found that around 67 percent of potential voters would feel uncomfortable with an atheist president (Jones Reference Jones and Daniel2011). In the United States, it is difficult to affirm atheism in any way that does not provoke hostility. Claiming to be an atheist involves “emerging from invisibility to claim a personal and social identity that has carried a fair degree of stigma” (Cimino Reference Cimino and Smith2011, 24). This antipathy toward atheists puts significant constraints on the extent to which open debate between theists and atheists is possible, but these constraints are ones the new atheists have not chosen and that they have attempted to overcome through dialogue.

Wilde argues that “attacks on religion per se can be seen as attacks on claims for the public recognition of all religious identities” (Wilde Reference Wilde2010, 267). He also says that “aggressive atheism's wholly negative view of the social impact of religion allows no space for such a constructive dialogue” (Wilde Reference Wilde2010, 281). Peterson similarly argues that new atheists are intolerant of difference (Peterson Reference Peterson and Amarasingam2010, 175). However, these criticisms are much too strong. They do not account for the growing diversity of the new atheism movement and its proponents' efforts to promote dialogue between theists and atheists. Although new atheism is defined by a specific attitude toward theism and other variants of atheism, it is an inclusive movement that incorporates members of many different groups. Various types of new atheism, such as Atheism + , have emerged with women and other minorities that taking a leadership role (Jones Reference Nelson2012).

New atheists also show their tolerance through their willingness to engage in constructive debate about religion and its place in public life. Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens have each made frequent public appearances, often to debate prominent theologians and philosophers. In these debates, they have not sought to construct a straw-man view of theism but rather to take on some of theism's most competent defenders. Dawkins has debated Oxford Professor John Lennox, Alister McGrath, an Anglican priest and professor of theology, and many others. Harris has debated Rick Warren, an evangelical minister, William Lane Craig, a philosopher and theologian, Chris Hedges, a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, and Reza Aslan, a noted public intellectual who has written several books about Islam. Hitchens debated John Lennox, Alister McGrath, Dinesh D'Souza, Al Sharpton, and Tony Blair. He also jointly produced the documentary Collision with the Presbyterian Pastor Douglas Wilson. Each of these debates, as well as the hundreds of others involving leaders of the new atheist movement, offer enlightening discussions about the social and political consequences of religious beliefs and serve as a model for respectful dialogue between people with radically different views.