Power and International Relations is more than forty-five years in the making, the culmination of a long and distinguished career thinking about the subject. The focus, as the title suggests, is conceptual analysis, with the aim of fostering a clearer understanding of what power is so that it can be properly measured and theorized. Baldwin's inspiration, in this respect, is Robert Dahl, whom he lauds as “arguably the great political scientist” (xii) of the twentieth century and who famously defined power “in terms of A's ability to get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (12). The book can be read as an extended brief for Dahl's approach to power and its relevance to contemporary International Relations (IR).
An able intellectual historian, Baldwin begins the book adjudicating the so-called community power debate (12) that took place between Dahl and his critics in the 1960s and 1970s. Triggered by Dahl's 1961 study of governance in New Haven, Connecticut, the community power debate is, at first blush, detached from contemporary IR concerns. However, in pitting those who saw predominant influence residing in a small group of elites against those (like Dahl) who saw influence varying by the issue area, the community power debate prefigures the one that Baldwin wants to cultivate in IR over whether it makes sense to talk about power in general terms, as a property of actors such as great powers, or whether power means little except in relational terms, where the relevant questions include “power with respect to whom?” and “power with respect to what?” (domain and scope, respectively).
Having provided the reader with a firm foundation in Dahl's approach, Baldwin surveys how the concept of power has threaded through the discipline of IR, from the interwar period onward. He does so both chronologically and thematically, highlighting six different analytical perspectives on power in the IR literature: power as identity, as goal, as means, as mechanism, as competition, and as capability. In the process, Baldwin raises several hard questions for realist scholars, in particular: What is meant by the term “great power” (102–4)? Does it make sense to say that states maximize power (104–8)? Has military force received too much attention relative to other instruments of power (109–11)? What is being observed and measured when we talk about the balance of power (111–13)? How zero-sum is power (113–14)? And, finally, how should capabilities be analyzed (114–21)?
Arguably, realists have the most to gain from being reflective about power, as it is so central to their theories. Here Baldwin obliges with a chapter-length critique of realism from a power analysis perspective, noting at one point that “power is the conceptual Achilles’ heel of realist theory” (129). As evidence, Baldwin documents how realist luminaries like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer have struggled to conceptualize power in a clear and consistent manner. This is not to say that realism is singled out for abuse, or that other theoretical paradigms emerge unscathed. Constructivism and neoliberalism are scrutinized in their own chapters. If anything, Baldwin is even more unsparing in his assessment of constructivism than realism, concluding that “constructivist contributions to power analysis have thus far been rather limited” (154). He is most sympathetic to neoliberalism, specifically, the treatment of power in Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's landmark Power and Interdependence (Little, Brown, 1977). This is not surprising when one considers that Keohane and Nye most fully embrace the relational approach to power that Baldwin favors, via their emphasis on interdependence, multiple foreign policy goals, limited fungibility, instruments of power other than military force, and non-zero-sum relations.
Baldwin concludes the book with a discussion of power and military statecraft. He does not mince words about the price the field has paid for its preoccupation with military force: “The importance of military force has been exaggerated; the role of non-military forms of power has been underestimated; and the field of international relations has been impoverished by its insulation from studies of power in other realms” (178). But if we steal a page from Baldwin's own playbook, is the issue really so zero-sum? Those in the security studies community would be the first to tell you that military force is a blunt instrument, that war is a costly and unpredictable business, and that material preponderance does not always translate neatly into preferred outcomes. This is one reason the security studies community has generally been so critical of the hegemonic streak in post–Cold War American foreign policy: there is an acute awareness that even a unipolar United States faces hard limits on its ability to convert military power into political gains. Barry Posen, to take one prominent example, has argued both that the United States enjoys “command of the commons” and that it should adopt a grand strategy of “restraint” (International Security 28, no. 1 [2003]: 5–46; Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy [Cornell University Press, 2014]).
Baldwin can take issue with security studies’ focus on military force, in other words, but he should not underestimate the extent to which the community has absorbed the insights of modern power analysis. The premise of the small-wars debate, for one, is that conventional military power is only so fungible when applied in an irregular warfare setting (Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars [Cambridge University Press, 2005]). The nuclear weapons debate, in turn, implicates the issue of utility: Are nuclear weapons good just for deterrence or for compellence as well (Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy [Cambridge University Press, 2017])? Finally, military effectiveness scholars are actively grappling with how to define and measure military success at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels (Jasen Castillo, Endurance and War [Stanford University Press, 2014]; Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator's Army [Cornell University Press, 2015]). These are all topics that Baldwin flags as deserving of further study.
Ultimately, Baldwin is misguided in asking the field to downgrade its focus on military force. The stakes are just too high. But he is right to demand that scholars be as clear as possible about what military force can and cannot accomplish.
