In his book, Matthew N. Green investigates Speakers' purposive goals, tactical options, and legislative influence. The overriding thesis: Speakers' actions do not simply reflect “the majority of the majority's” interests and preferences, but rather emerge from a more diverse set of goals. As Green argues: “Speakers may exercise legislative leadership on behalf of the preferences of others besides the majority party in Congress [including] representing his or her own district … achieving his or her own preferred policy outcome … helping the party's president, the institutional presidency, or the House as a whole” (p. 17).
Building on this “theory of goal-driven leadership,” Green outlines four hypotheses. First, “Speakers may exercise legislative leadership on behalf of the preferences of others besides the majority party in Congress” (p. 17). Second, “the Speaker may adopt a legislative strategy that satisfies the preferences or desires of more than one individual, institution, or entity, thus achieving one (or more) goals” (p. 17). Third, “leadership exercised to achieve reelection goals will occur the most often and the most consistently, followed by leadership exercised to achieve other goals” (p. 20). Finally, “the Speaker is most likely to exercise legislative leadership” when a) there is “division in the majority party” and/or b) “the bill or measure is salient to the actors or institutions related to the basic goals of the Speaker” (p. 20).
To interrogate these predictions empirically, Green compiles reports about legislative bills/motions where the Speaker displayed “discrete instances of leadership” between 1941 and 1998 (Appendix A, p. 225). This “sweep” of secondary sources identified 418 cases in which the Speaker made a specific plea during a floor speech and 95 cases in which he was reported to execute “non-floor legislative leadership,” such as shaping the agenda, drafting legislative language, strategically referring a bill to a particular committee, or creating an ad hoc one, as well as “miscellaneous legislative leadership that does not fall into the other categories” (p. 158).
From this population, Green's most important analyses entail evaluating Speakers' motives in select cases. Introducing the chapter on non–floor leadership activities, for instance, the author states: “Because of the large number of cases, rather than discussing them all, in this chapter I provide an in-depth case study analysis of a subset” (pp. 157–58). The third chapter offers a similar multiple-case-study approach focused on the Sam Rayburn and John McCormack speakerships; the penultimate chapter takes the same tack for Speaker Dennis Hastert's tenure.
The author's conclusion? “In short, while partisan goals remain dominant for the Speaker of the House, Speakers have yet to abandon completely their other objectives, including reelection to the legislature, passage of desired public policy, assistance to the presidential party, support for the institutional presidency, and support for the demands of the House as a whole” (p. 222).
The Speaker of the House has many virtues, foremost among them that it faithfully depicts the real-world complexities that are the hallmark of decision making in the Speaker's office. Like some of the best scholarship on Congress—R. Douglas Arnold's The Logic of Congressional Action (1992); C. Lawrence Evans's Leadership in Committee (1991); Richard L. Hall's Participation in Congress (1996)—Green's book captures nicely the uncertainty and hard work that legislative leadership entails. Speakers deciphering how best to shepherd bills from the congressional hopper to the president's desk know that policy entrepreneurship is not “one size fits all”; effective lawmaking requires a deep understanding of the institution, issues, preferences, personalities, and political circumstances. Green's depiction is surely one that Speakers themselves would recognize and appreciate.
Perhaps the best illustration of the way in which the author's “multiple goals” approach informs Speakers' choices comes with Hastert's efforts to combat drug production in Colombia (pp. 186–88). As Green documents, Colombian drug production was not an issue that animated partisans of either stripe, nor was it a priority for Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) or President Bill Clinton. But it was an issue near and dear to Hastert. Indeed, the author discusses how Hastert's personal interest motivated him to intervene, repeatedly, in the face of bipartisan obstacles. The result: Congress ultimately passed a billion dollar aid package supporting Colombia's antidrug initiatives. Here, as elsewhere, Green argues convincingly that Speakers' motivations extend beyond serving the caucus, and in some cases this helps explain congressional outcomes.
Of course, the book offers more than a thoughtful reminder that Speakers occasionally act independently of the House majority party's preferences. Actually, from start to finish, the book explicitly contrasts Green's “multiple goals theory” against Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins's “party cartel theory,” introduced in Legislative Leviathan (1993) and extended in Setting the Agenda (2005). A recurring verdict is that the former is not merely complementary to the latter, but outperforms it across an array of important cases.
I like Green's theoretical moorings and appreciate that he tackles the area's most important works. I also agree there remains profitable turf to till regarding Speakers' independent influence. For, as Cox and McCubbins point out, with the Speaker empowered to act on their behalf, there may be differences between the House majority's preferred outcome and that which the Speaker actually advocates. Research disentangling the principle–agent tensions between Speakers and their members would be valuable, especially in areas that are hardest for the caucus to monitor (e.g., behind-the-scenes bargaining between the Speaker and minority leader, Senate leaders, and the president). On this path, Randall Strahan's Leading Representatives (2007) offers many insights.
Although Green identifies specific goals that could pull Speakers away from the House majority, he leaves unstated when (or where) extrapartisan goals will prevail over the caucus'. Moreover, the causal mechanisms by which Speakers translate extrapartisan goals into operational tactics and, in turn, legislative outputs remain unspecified. Take, for example, Speakers' goal of supporting their party's president. Though an important objective, there is no explanation that indicates when Speakers will side with the president over his fellow partisans, nor are there clear a priori expectations about evidence that would corroborate that they did. Instead, Green examines various cases and infers from elements therein that a Speaker's behavior reflected, at least partially, his desire to support his party's president.
This is fine as far as it goes, but it speaks to the study's limitations vis-à-vis more parsimonious theories. Whereas cartel theory ties one specific goal (serving the party median's preferences) to one specific mechanism (negative agenda control) and thereby yields several predictions about House processes and products that apply broadly and can be falsified empirically, it is unclear what Green's multiple-goals theory predicts in any given case or how it would be proven wrong. After all, it is hard to imagine a case where the Speaker's actions could not be explained by his own or his party's policy preferences, his or his party's electoral needs, or by deference to the president.
This falsifiability issue is especially acute considering that the book's crucial tests involve interpreting cases selected precisely because they described “discrete instances of leadership.” To his credit, Green recognizes and acknowledges as much: “To more systematically determine what factors increase the probability of Speaker leadership on legislation, one would ideally compare instances of legislative leadership against the universe of all possible opportunities for such behavior. The case studies in earlier chapters do not readily lend themselves to this sort of comparative analysis” (p. 204). I would argue that similar caveats apply to the quantitative data. For in having selected cases because the Speaker exhibited “discrete leadership,” the data cannot test what, all else equal, predicts when Speakers attempted to lead, nor can they compare whether it made a difference.
In short, because House rules funnel legislation through the Speaker's office, its occupants have an extraordinary opportunity to shape the legislative process, not to mention its output. That The Speaker of the House offers a serious attempt to explain how Speakers harness those opportunities is in its favor. Indeed, the book invites readers to sit on the Speaker's shoulder, observe the striking array of issues he or she confronts, envision the multitude of goals he or she hopes to achieve, and witness the myriad obstacles he or she faces along the way. Also, I am convinced that the book's overriding lesson is correct: Speakers are motivated by a multitude of goals, which Green identifies. Less certain, however, is how much explanatory power Speakers' extrapartisan goals have or how much they affect the House's legislative processes and products.
