Under the notion of the twin transition, the green and digital transitions were conceptualised as a synergetic pair that should pave the way for a globally competitive green and digital Europe. But are European digital and environmental laws truly twins within the EU’s regulatory strategy, suggesting parallel approaches? In this article, we take a formal approach, focusing on regulatory instruments that are employed in both areas and their defining characteristics. While the twin transition in some respects blurs the boundaries between environmental and digital law, including through the integration of environmental considerations into digital regulations, we adopt an analytical distinction between the two domains. Through a series of steps, we identify key differences that set both regulatory approaches apart and help us understand the different trajectories the transitions have taken. Contrary to the often-invoked claim that form is substance, the analysis reveals that the choice of regulatory instruments does not inherently determine substantive policy choices, thereby underscoring the necessity of their comparative examination. Ultimately, the article argues that fostering dialogue between the two policy fields may yield valuable insights into how regulatory tools can be adapted and deployed across domains.

The European Union (EU) has embraced the “twin transition” – the simultaneous pursuit of digitalisation and ecological transformation – as a cornerstone of its industrial policy. EU lawmakers argue that digital technologies can advance environmental protection by enhancing environmental monitoring, optimising resource use, and enabling data-driven sustainability efforts. However, this vision tends to overlook the environmental costs of digitalisation, including rising energy and water consumption, intensive resource extraction, and the proliferation of electronic waste. This article critically examines whether EU law is adequately equipped to support a twin transition, drawing on a black-letter analysis of EU legal provisions, as well as insights from science and technology studies and critical environmental law. It posits that, while environmental law plays a significant role in the datafication of the environment and the digitalisation of society, it falls short in regulating digital technology and data in ways that advance sustainability. For the twin transition to evolve beyond a political slogan and deliver real ecological benefits, substantial legal reforms would be required. The regulation of digital technology would have to move beyond corporate self-regulation and disclosure-based models of environmental governance. Data governance should be reoriented to emphasise freedom of access and a more deliberatively restrained approach to data generation.

EU policy documents often present the green and digital transitions as “twinned” and mutually beneficial. However, it is now widely acknowledged that new technologies, such as AI, have significant environmental costs. This awareness has induced the EU to recalibrate its approach to the twin transition and prompted the elaboration of new soft-law principles of digital sustainability, an early form of “eco-digital constitutionalism” at EU level. This paper examines the national AI strategies of the twenty-seven Member States to assess the extent to which this revised approach of the EU is reflected at the national level. Our analysis reveals that the strategies in question often differ starkly in the manner in which they prioritise the various matters that pertain to the intersection of environment and AI. We argue that these inconsistencies, which are rooted in different attitudes to the economics of innovation, cannot be solved fully through soft-law harmonisation.

In two fields that are currently of high political salience and strategic significance – the regulation of digital platforms, and the regulation of environmental and human rights impacts in global value chains – the EU has taken a strikingly similar regulatory approach. In the 2022 Digital Services Act and the 2024 Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, it has charged large companies with managing risks to various public values and concerns. In this contribution, we critique this shared regulatory approach. First, we argue that regulating dominant corporations via risk management obligations actually reinforces their power in three ways: it is inherently deferential to corporate power and profitability; it reinforces technocratic framings of policy problems which discourage political contestation of economic governance; and it allows corporations to evade responsibility by framing negative impacts of their activities as external problems against which they protect the public. Second, these problem framings shape the implementation as well as the content of regulations. Specifically, they direct compliance and enforcement efforts to procedure over substance; and create significant practical barriers to public and private enforcement. We conclude by discussing the implications of our analysis in the context of the EU’s current deregulatory agenda.

Over the past decade the European Union (EU) has transformed sustainability into a dense matrix of legally binding ESG reporting obligations for companies. Compliance increasingly hinges on firms’ ability to collect and verify thousands of datapoints deep into global supply chains – an exercise that is costly, error-prone and may yield non-comparable results. (Semi-)centralised ESG data-sharing arrangements – shared hubs where suppliers post one or more verified sets of sustainability figures that all their customers can reuse – can restore some efficiency by eliminating duplicate requests and supplying standardised, audit-ready inputs, but this amplifies competition-law risk. Drawing on competition law and policy and recent Dutch banking practice, the paper devises a set of legal “firewalls” and access rules that neutralise collusive potential resulting from the information exchange that takes place while safeguarding smaller market players from exclusion. These safeguards are essential to ensure that ESG data collaboration supports – not hinders – the EU’s Twin Transition towards a green and digital economy.

Energy has been a fundamental precondition for human survival, economic development, and preserving dignity throughout history. At the same time, the increasing digitalisation of energy systems, especially in the EU’s energy transition, creates new challenges, especially concerning rights such as data protection and privacy. Although European Law restricts the right to energy as a consumer right, it expressly recognises data protection and privacy as fundamental rights. This article outlines the theoretical, historical and legal foundations of the right to energy and analyses the implications of digitalisation for its realisation while also addressing emerging concerns about data protection and privacy rights. Furthermore, it identifies the tension points between the Recast Electricity Directive (RED) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and provides recommendations for a legal framework that harmonises the abovementioned rights.

This afterword examines the intersections between the green and digital transitions within EU law and argues for the development of a coherent regulatory framework capable of addressing their interdependence. Drawing on the contributions to the special issue, it identifies a number of common challenges, including tensions between market structures and the protection of fundamental rights, the environment and the climate, the limits of anthropocentric approaches to regulation and the increasing relevance of interdisciplinary expertise in law-making and adjudication. The paper further distinguishes between two forms of conflict arising from the twin transitions: normative conflicts between overlapping regulatory regimes and substantive conflicts concerning the negative consequences of one transition on the other. To address these issues, the afterword proposes a “pointillist” approach grounded in the coordinated and teleological interpretation of EU law. Finally, it suggests that impact assessment regimes provide a particularly promising case study for future research on theintersections between the twin transitions.

A Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (DAO) is a new form of digital enterprise that operates on blockchain networks. It enables a new model of collaboration through diverse capital contributions and equitable sharing of benefits and risks. This paper explores the legal dimensions of DAO token transferability, a vital aspect for the expansion of DAO operations. First, it evaluates how property law (including the proposal by the Law Commission of England and Wales for a third category of digital asset ownership) might apply to DAO tokens so as to mitigate legal risks and ensure smooth transferability. Secondly, it investigates the potential for DAO software protocols to implement contractual transferability restrictions and examines their technological design. Finally, it looks at the legal enforceability of such restrictions and the policies needed to support their legal recognition.

Digital assets have burst onto global markets as a new class of assets for investment, trade and finance. Their growing popularity and economic relevance have been, however, accompanied by legal uncertainties and regulatory concerns. Together with domestic and regional responses, a strong case for international harmonisation is to be made. This Paper explores the emergence of principles and best practices on proprietary rights, insolvency and enforcement as a crucial process of international legal harmonisation of rules for digital assets.

Tokenised assets are expected to transform finance, yet their legal treatment remains a source of uncertainty. This article presents an analytical framework for categorising legal structures of tokenised assets, addressing a gap in academic literature and regulatory approaches. We introduce a taxonomy based on the legal relationship between tokens and their underlying assets. In complete tokenisation tokens embody legally enforceable rights. It comprises direct tokenisation, where tokens are the primary form of the asset, and indirect tokenisation, where asset-backed tokens are created through intermediary structures. In contrast, incomplete tokenisation results in tokens that function as “digital twins” with limited or no legal value.

Our analysis reveals that the effectiveness of tokenisation depends on the robustness of this legal bond. We compare how these categories impact tokenisation features, including asset transferability, legal certainty, and composability. Furthermore, we identify limiting factors in current regulatory frameworks, such as form requirements, ownership models, and identity mechanisms. Drawing examples from various legal systems and asset classes, including financial instruments, property rights, and digital assets, this work provides a foundation for evaluating tokenisation strategies, with practical insights for regulators and market participants.

Tokens can serve as containers for rights, thereby facilitating the transfer of such rights. On tokenisation platforms, especially in the context of decentralised finance (DeFi), it is assumed that when a token containing a right is transferred, the right itself is transferred as well. This paper uses the “token container model” as a conceptual framework to examine whether European private law frameworks on transfers of rights are compatible with such token-based transfers. Specifically, it explores the rules on the transfer of rights in movables, the rules on the transfer of rights in immovables, and the rules on assignment of claims. This analysis reveals substantial legal obstacles to the use of tokens in transferring absolute rights or claims.

The new EU Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (“MiCA”) emphasises the prevention of market abuse as one of its five main objectives. This paper critically analyzes MiCA’s provisions on market abuse (Title VI), applying the new rules to the primary categories of crypto-asset market integrity risks to provide a coherent interpretation. In doing so, we consider both the pre-existing legal framework for protecting market integrity, chiefly the Market Abuse Regulation (“MAR”), and the unique features of crypto-asset markets. We find that by largely replicating MAR, MiCA presents “new wine in old bottles” challenges, as crypto-assets introduce novel issues that the legislator attempts to address with a subset of existing tools. The extent to which “decentralized finance” (DeFi) activities will incur liability under MiCA’s anti-market abuse provisions remains unclear, particularly regarding various blockchain network participants. Furthermore, classifying MEV strategies as market abuse may prove difficult. The absence of certain safe-harbor provisions present in MAR, such as those for self-insiders and buy-back and stabilisation schemes, may create uncertainty and potentially chill legitimate market behavior under MiCA.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) agents into payment systems signals a profound shift in the architecture of financial transactions. Building on advances in large language models and autonomous systems, “agentic payments” refer to transactions initiated and completed by AI agents without direct human intervention. This article provides a conceptual and technical analysis of agent-enabled payment systems, examining their operational logic, defining features and emerging use cases across retail, e-commerce and decentralised finance. It distinguishes agentic payments from traditional automated systems by emphasising autonomy, contextual reasoning and adaptability. The article further identifies and categorises a range of technical, legal and societal risks, including cybersecurity vulnerabilities, liability gaps, regulatory non-compliance, and potential economic disruption. Through case studies and architectural illustrations, it highlights both the innovation potential and governance challenges posed by agentic systems. It argues that current regulatory frameworks – designed for human-intermediated payments – are ill-equipped to address the dynamic and decentralised nature of agent-led transactions. The article concludes by proposing a multi-layered governance framework combining core regulatory requirements with supporting ecosystem measures to ensure accountability, security, and transparency in the age of autonomous financial agency.

In the past decade, the legal and economic literature on blockchain technology and its applications has flourished. This new technology holds great promise for enhancing the efficiency of contracting. Building on the classic Coase theorem, blockchain as a decentralised mechanism of decision-making should be superior to centralised regulation, possibly yielding substantial efficiency gains. Notably, it also has the potential to improve the allocation of property rights and reduce transaction costs.

However, many of these enthusiastic views about what blockchain technology may bring are overblown. This article demonstrates that blockchain creates a variety of new externalities, which cannot be addressed by the decentralised actors using it. The most obvious of them is the environmental externality stemming from the energy-intensive mining process. In addition, more immediate externalities emerge, for example through the operational and legal risks of being part of a blockchain transaction, which are particularly evident in the crypto economy. Moreover, issues surrounding blockchain governance may exacerbate these challenges.

In conclusion, we propose several regulatory strategies to mitigate these shortcomings and harness the full potential of blockchain technology.

Regulating emerging technologies involves balancing the mitigation of risks with the promotion of innovation; a balance frequently seen as a zero-sum “dilemma of control.” Regulatory sandboxes offer a practical way to address this dilemma by enabling controlled, evidence-based testing of new technologies. In this article, we examine the regulatory sandbox framework introduced by the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA). We argue that the AIA’s multi-level governance structure represents a shift from traditional sandbox models by prioritising regulatory learning over technological disruption and expanding public interest considerations to include strategically aligned commercial innovations. Afterwards, we identify governance challenges across three sandbox phases – pre-testing, testing and post-testing – and propose structured solutions. Our analysis suggests that effective sandbox governance requires specific mechanisms: tailored entry criteria, precise pipeline placement guidance and multi-agency coordination in pre-testing; experimental realism and continuous risk classification updates during testing and clear graduation criteria with robust transition support in post-testing.

Increasing water scarcity forced the European Union to investigate the possibility of supplementing natural water sources with reclaimed wastewater. Regulation (EU) 2020/741 sets minimum requirements for the safe reuse of treated urban wastewater in agricultural irrigation. The risks that wastewater reuse presents are further regulated in the numerous EU law instruments that concern the protection of human health, the environment and the European waters, including both laws and principles. This paper applies the widely applicable framework for risk governance that was developed by the International Risk Governance Council to the EU regulatory framework on wastewater reuse. The analysis identifies regulatory gaps – unclear pollutant regulation, incomplete division of responsibilities, and insufficient attention to the science-policy interface – and concrete means of improving the regulation of risks associated with wastewater reuse.

Botanical supplements occupy a regulatory grey area between food and medicine within the European Union, a situation that has given rise to a series of interrelated challenges. This paper highlights regulatory dysfunctions across several dimensions: definitional voids in EU food law, unclear food–medicine classification boundaries, fragmented market access rules, and inadequate safety monitoring systems. These regulatory gaps impose costs on business operators, restrict consumer access, and result in uneven protection across Member States. The article also focuses on safety concerns, which are, however only one element of this broader puzzle. To address such systemic difficulties, the paper proposes the introduction of harmonised pre-market notification and post-market surveillance mechanisms, with a specific focus on botanical supplements. These measures could help reconcile market accessibility with stronger consumer protection while supporting innovation. Admittedly, they may not resolve all regulatory challenges, particularly the thousands of health claims that remain on hold. Nevertheless, they might offer a practical foundation for addressing long-term, often overlooked safety concerns related to botanicals. It remains to be seen whether they could also contribute to resolving the interconnected regulatory issues in this sector, potentially paving the way for broader reform.

This article presents a novel type of co-regulation under EU law: codes of practice under the AI Act. The introductory section offers an overview on how the AI Act combines general statutory obligations with various non-legislative instruments. Following a brief presentation of the legal basis for codes of practice in the AI Act, the third section provides a detailed account of how the European AI Office put this sketchy statutory framework into practice for the first General-Purpose AI Code of Practice, which was approved on 1 August 2025. Drawing upon this experience, the conclusion highlights two practical and normative issues associated with codes of practice: tech-induced acceleration and a diffusion of responsibility.