The Democracy-Decarbonization Dilemma

Democratic countries bear a large share of the blame for the woefully inadequate pace of decarbonization relative to agreed climate goals. A 2022 study found that although 24 democracies had achieved sustained emissions reductions, these declines were mostly due to factors unrelated to climate policy (such as the collapse of communist central planning in former Soviet states), and that most of these countries are not achieving sustained decarbonization at rates consistent with meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement (Lamb et al. Reference Lamb, Grubb, Diluiso and Minx2022).Footnote ² Even these democracies—let alone the many more with emissions that are still rising or have plateaued—will therefore need to enact and implement stringent climate policies to achieve deep decarbonization (Sharpe Reference Sharpe2023; Vogel and Hickel Reference Vogel and Hickel2023).

Yet democracies struggle to enact and implement stringent climate policies. Short-term electoral cycles are grossly mismatched with the time horizon in which “investments” in climate policy may yield payoffs (Di Paola and Jamieson Reference Di Paola and Jamieson2018; Jacobs Reference Jacobs2016). Responsive politicians and parties are thus only likely to enact and implement such policies when incentivized to do so by electoral considerations, including voter and interest-group mobilization (Jordan et al. Reference Jordan, Lorenzoni, Tosun, i Saus, Geese, Kenny, Saad, Moore and Schaub2022). But stringent climate policies impose upfront local costs, including on key production inputs and salient consumption items like petrol and electricity in return for the promise of uncertain and seemingly remote global, long-term benefits (Rabe Reference Rabe2018; van der Linden, Maibach, and Leiserowitz Reference van der Linden, Maibach and Leiserowitz2015). It is therefore unsurprising that such policies tend to be unpopular among majorities of voters, especially when the costs are salient (Ansolabehere and Konisky Reference Ansolabehere and Konisky2014; Stadelmann-Steffen and Dermont Reference Stadelmann-Steffen and Dermont2018).Footnote ³ Moreover, stringent climate policies entail concentrated costs on powerful incumbent industries, which can use their power to block or weaken proposed policies directly and/or mobilize opposition from the voting public, leveraging institutional veto points in democratic processes (Di Paola and Jamieson Reference Di Paola and Jamieson2018; Mildenberger Reference Mildenberger2020; Tsebelis Reference Tsebelis2002). These challenges potentially reflect structural constraints on the modern state’s capacity to undertake the deep transformations necessitated by planetary-scale sustainability crises: Hausknost (Reference Hausknost2020, 18) calls this phenomenon the “glass ceiling of transformation.”

Various worrisome trends amplify these challenges. Rising inequality combined with weakened protections against private political influence has exacerbated the political-power asymmetries benefiting corporations and economic elites over citizens, strengthening the capacity for fossil fuel interests to obstruct climate policies (Darian-Smith Reference Darian-Smith2023; Welton Reference Welton2020, 75–78). The ongoing rise of populism, polarization, and “post-truth” politics in many democracies (Naím Reference Naím2022), amid widespread voter disengagement and mistrust of political institutions (Hay Reference Hay2007; Stoker Reference Stoker2017), has made the task of decarbonization even harder—principally by fueling group divisions and unleashing torrents of misinformation (Blühdorn Reference Blühdorn2020; Falkenberg et al. Reference Falkenberg, Galeazzi, Torricelli, Di Marco, Larosa, Sas and Mekacher2022; Fiorino Reference Fiorino2022a). These trends have been supercharged by changes in the media landscape, including the decline of local news media (Hayes and Lawless Reference Hayes and Lawless2018; Pickard Reference Pickard2019), the corporate capture of legacy media (McChesney Reference McChesney2015; Schiffrin Reference Schiffrin2021), and the rise of social media platforms (Zuboff Reference Zuboff2018), which have been weaponized by tech billionaires and authoritarian governments toward antidemocratic ends and with environmentally destructive consequences (Aronczyk et al. Reference Aronczyk, Boykoff, Coan, Lahsen, Morris, Russill, Roberts, Carlos, Jacquet and Downie2025; Beacham, Hafner-Burton, and Schneider Reference Beacham, Hafner-Burton and Schneider2024; Lahsen Reference Lahsen2024). When even moderately stringent climate policies have been imposed, in many instances they provoked a backlash among politically significant groups of citizens—from suburban commuters in France protesting an increased carbon tax on fuel (the gilets jaunes) to more recent mobilizations against mandates concerning vehicles, driving, and heat pumps (Colantone et al. Reference Colantone, Di Lonardo, Margalit and Percoco2023; Paterson, Wilshire, and Tobin Reference Paterson, Wilshire and Tobin2023; Royall Reference Royall2020). In the face of these democratic constraints and headwinds, it is all too tempting for elected politicians to abjure decarbonization altogether or adopt weak, tokenistic policies that fail to decarbonize at the scale and speed required (Geden Reference Geden2016; Howlett Reference Howlett2014). We call this pattern democracy without decarbonization. Footnote ⁴

In response to the challenges democracy poses to stringent climate policy, some have proposed insulating climate policy from democracy. The environmentalist James Lovelock has argued that decarbonization necessitates suspending democracy in favor of authoritarianism (see Hickman Reference Hickman2010). Some invoke China’s world-leading investments in clean energy as evidence of what can be achieved without the veto points and accountability structures of democracy (Beeson Reference Beeson2010; Gilley Reference Gilley2012). A less radical suspension of democracy has attracted more mainstream support. Under this proposal, government would delegate authority over climate policy making to an independent statutory body to insulate it from electoral pressures—much as countries have done with monetary policy by delegating it to independent central banks (Brunner, Flachsland, and Marschinski Reference Brunner, Flachsland and Marschinski2012; Helm, Hepburn, and Mash Reference Helm, Hepburn and Mash2003; Nemet et al. Reference Nemet, Jakob, Steckel and Edenhofer2017).Footnote ⁵ But this approach, to be successful on its own terms, would need to be de facto authoritarian. Whereas central banks have proximate control of the money supply, no governmental authority has proximate control over more than a fraction of society’s carbon supply.Footnote ⁶ Because point-sources of greenhouse gas emissions are widely dispersed across society, governments seeking to decarbonize must incentivize millions of nonstate actors to change their practices. This means that any technocratic authority with a mandate to achieve jurisdiction-wide decarbonization would need extraordinarily wide-ranging powers to direct changes across virtually the entire economy. Via one route or another, then, the main alternative to democracy without decarbonization seems to be decarbonization without democracy.

We refer to this apparent trade-off between democracy and (deep) decarbonization as the democracy–decarbonization dilemma.Footnote ⁷ The dilemma is tragic: in the long run, whichever horn of the dilemma a society grasps, by sacrificing one value it will amplify mechanisms that will undermine the favored value, threatening the latter’s long-run viability too. If we continue the path of democracy without decarbonization, the varied earth-system impacts of global heating will tend to exacerbate economic inequality, economic instability, migration, violence, and crime—phenomena that often provoke repressive responses and are associated with and believed to contribute to the rise of authoritarian populist politicians who undermine democratic institutions and processes (Beacham, Hafner-Burton, and Schneider Reference Beacham, Hafner-Burton and Schneider2026; Burnell Reference Burnell2012; Hafner-Burton et al. Reference Hafner-Burton, Mildenberger, Ross and Schneider2025; Lindvall Reference Lindvall2021; Millward-Hopkins Reference Millward-Hopkins2022; Mittiga Reference Mittiga2024).

Conversely, pursuing decarbonization without democracy—by instituting a powerful, independent climate authority—might yield emissions reductions for a time, but we doubt that it would succeed in achieving deep decarbonization in the long run. This is because deep decarbonization entails major distributive trade-offs that raise important questions of fairness and justice, necessitating political choices (Landemore Reference Landemore and Orr2023). Handing such extensive power to make such decisions to technocrats would likely fuel the rise of authoritarian populists, who thrive when people perceive technocratic elites to be making important decisions that affect their lives without their democratic input (Landemore Reference Landemore and Orr2023; White Reference White2023).Footnote ⁸ Authoritarian populists already frame climate change as the project of an out-of-touch, cosmopolitan elite hell-bent on imposing sacrifices on ordinary people (Brown Reference Brown, Crow and Boykoff2014; Lockwood Reference Lockwood2018; White Reference White2023), and they tend to be outspoken opponents of climate policy (Dickson and Hobolt Reference Dickson and Hobolt2024; Fiorino Reference Fiorino, Holm and Deese2022b, Reference Fiorino2022a; Schaller and Carius Reference Schaller and Carius2019; Vihma, Reischl, and Nonbo Andersen Reference Vihma, Reischl and Andersen2021). Empowered authoritarian populists would inevitably pressure mainstream political parties to reverse the hypothesized climate authority’s mandate and weaken commitments to decarbonization (or win power themselves and do these things directly).

If the DDD is correctly diagnosed, then finding an escape route should be an urgent priority for humanity and especially for political science.

Deepening Democracy: An Escape Route?

Increasingly, scholars argue that tackling climate change will require a deepening of democracy through an increasing reliance on democratic innovations, among which CAs have attracted the bulk of the attention (Dryzek and Niemeyer Reference Dryzek and Niemeyer2019; Ellis Reference Ellis2025; Fiorino Reference Fiorino, Holm and Deese2022b; Fischer Reference Fischer2017; Landemore Reference Landemore and Orr2023; Pickering et al. Reference Pickering, Hickmann, Bäckstrand, Kalfagianni, Bloomfield, Mert, Ransan-Cooper and Lo2022; Smith Reference Smith2024; Willis Reference Willis2020). Could the increasing use of these processes provide an escape route from the DDD? After introducing these processes, this section reviews the theory and evidence for their influence on the attitudes and behavior of the wider public toward both decarbonization and democracy. The review is based on peer-reviewed, English-language publications identified using a keyword search of the ProQuest database,Footnote ⁹ snowballing from these publications, and accessing the Knowledge Network on Climate Assemblies’ (KNOCA) climate assemblies database.Footnote ¹⁰ The literature considered in this review includes some studies on CAs, although most of the studies reviewed are of DMPs about other topics.Footnote ¹¹

The Impacts of DMPs on the Wider Public: Theory

The literature discloses three main, broad pathways by which DMPs could influence the attitudes and behaviors of the nonparticipating public, visualized in figure 1.

Figure 1

Visual representation of the three main causal pathways linking DMPs with policy acceptance and policy support among the wider public

First, nonparticipants could become aware of the DMP’s procedures, thereby increasing their perceptions of the legitimacy of or their trust in policy-making institutions (Boulianne Reference Boulianne2018) and potentially resulting in their greater acceptance of the policy outcome, regardless of whether it aligns with their preferred outcome (Gangl Reference Gangl2003; Pow, van Dijk, and Marien Reference Pow, van Dijk and Marien2020; Sorial Reference Sorial, Meyerson, Mackenzie and MacDermott2021; Tyler Reference Tyler1994).Footnote ¹⁶ There are two posited causal steps in this pathway: from awareness of DMPs’ procedures to perceived legitimacy and from perceived legitimacy to acceptance of policy outcomes. Thus, via this pathway, DMPs could yield benefits for both democracy and decarbonization: political trust and public perceptions of the legitimacy of policy making processes are important social conditions for democracy, whereas increased acceptance of climate policy could reduce the pool of citizens willing to actively mobilize against climate policies they disagree with (Nakatani Reference Nakatani2023; Porumbescu and Grimmelikhuijsen Reference Porumbescu and Grimmelikhuijsen2018).

Second, nonparticipants could become aware of the DMP’s recommendations and treat them as a heuristic for desirable policy when formulating or revising their own policy preferences, resulting in wider support for (or increased intensity of support for and greater prioritization of) the recommended policies. As one group of scholars puts it, “knowledge that a group of randomly selected ordinary citizens came up with the proposal after extensive work independently of government and political parties could be enough [for non-participants] to support the recommendation” (Fournier et al. Reference Fournier, van der Kolk, Kenneth Carty, Blais and Rose2011, 132–32).

Third, the provision of reasons by a DMP could inform nonparticipants’ knowledge about a policy issue such that they are more likely to vote in accordance with their values (Suiter and Reidy Reference Suiter and Reidy2020). Given the amount of misinformation that typically hampers climate policy debates, we should expect that any such effect would tend to promote support for climate policies.

All pathways depend on the public becoming aware of the DMP and its procedures, recommendations, or reasons (where provided). Certain mediating actors and processes, such as the news media, influence the extent of such publicity and its content and framing (Fleuss and Suiter Reference Fleuss, Suiter, Escobar and Elstub2025; McGovern and Thorne Reference McGovern and Thorne2021).

We turn now to consider the empirical evidence for the three pathways and then discuss the evidence concerning publicity.

The Impacts of DMPs on the Wider Public: Empirical Evidence

Pathway 1: Impacts of the DMP Process on Perceived Legitimacy and Outcome Acceptance

As noted, there are two causal steps in the first theoretical pathway. Some empirical studies are concerned with the first link only (from awareness of DMP processes to perceived legitimacy) and some with the second link only (from perceived legitimacy to outcome acceptance). We discuss each in turn.

Before doing so, we note that some scholars have found a link between DMPs and outcome acceptance that is mediated by a feeling of similarity between the general public and members of the mini-public: the “like me” effect (Pow, van Dijk, and Marien Reference Pow, van Dijk and Marien2020). The effect has been documented even in the case of divisive and salient issues (Arnesen and Peters Reference Arnesen and Peters2018; Pow, van Dijk, and Marien Reference Pow, van Dijk and Marien2020). For instance, Pow, van Dijk and Marien’s (Reference Pow, van Dijk and Marien2020) survey on a citizens’ assembly on the constitutional future of Northern Ireland revealed that respondents were willing to accept the outcome of the assembly, even if it went against their beliefs, because they identified with the ordinary citizens who constituted the DMP.

As for the link between awareness of DMP processes and perceived legitimacy, several experiments have shown a positive effect of DMPs’ procedures on nonparticipants’ perceptions of the legitimacy of the specific policy-making process or of democratic institutions more generally (Esaiasson, Gilljam, and Persson Reference Esaiasson, Gilljam and Persson2012; Germann Reference Germann2025; Herian et al. Reference Herian, Hamm, Tomkins and Zillig2012; Jacobs and Kaufmann Reference Jacobs and Kaufmann2021; Jäske Reference Jäske2019; Webb Reference Webb2013; Werner and Marien Reference Werner and Marien2022). These findings also apply in non-Western democracies (Grillos Reference Grillos2022; Kramon Reference Kramon2025). Similarly, a survey-experiment conducted in Canada by Boulianne (Reference Boulianne2018) found that trust in the municipal government to make good decisions about climate change was higher among those made aware of the municipal government-sponsored DMP on that issue.Footnote ¹⁷

Other studies identify the following factors that mediate the link between nonparticipants’ awareness of a DMP and their perceptions of the legitimacy of the associated policy-making process (see also table 1):

• • descriptive representativeness of the DMP (Germann Reference Germann2025)

• • political genesis of and context (e.g., partisan conflict) surrounding the DMP (Kevins and Robison Reference Kevins and Robison2025)Footnote ¹⁸

• • whether and how a DMP’s recommendations are incorporated into the formal policy-making process (Bryant and Stone Reference Bryant and Stone2020; Germann, Marien, and Muradova Reference Germann, Marien and Muradova2024; Giraudet et al. Reference Giraudet, Apouey, Arab, Baeckelandt, Bégout, Berghmans and Blanc2022; Goovaerts, De Fine Licht, and Marien Reference Goovaerts, De Fine Licht and Marien2025; Iusmen and Boswell Reference Iusmen and Boswell2017; Kuntze and Fesenfeld Reference Kuntze and Fesenfeld2021; van Dijk and Lefevre Reference van Dijk and Lefevre2023)

• • group identities/divisions: experimental results suggest that, in divided societies, minorities tend to assign higher legitimacy to DMPs than majorities (Pow Reference Pow2023), and ideological and affective forms of polarization reduce people’s perceptions of DMPs’ legitimacy (van Dijk, Turkenburg, and Pow Reference Pow2023)

• • regional and national structural economic inequalities and national democratic cultures (Kramon Reference Kramon2025; Paulis, Sipma, and Talukder Reference Paulis, Sipma and Talukder2025)

Table 1

Summary of Empirical Findings, by Pathway

Table 1 Long description

The table is organized into two columns: Finding and Relevant Papers. It is divided into three thematic sections.

Pathway 1: Impacts of D M P process on perceived legitimacy and policy acceptance.

* Finding: Like me effect where identification with participants increases policy acceptance. References: Arnesen and Peters 2018; Pow, van Dijk, and Marien 2020.

* Finding: Awareness of D M P processes increases perception of democratic legitimacy. References: Boulianne 2018; Esaiasson, Gilljam, and Persson 2012; Germann 2025; Herian et al. 2012; Jacobs and Kaufmann 2021; Jäske 2019; Kramon 2025; Webb 2013; Werner and Marien 2022.

* Finding: Legitimacy perception correlates with ideological, identitarian, and religious cleavages. References: van Dijk, Turkenburg, and Pow 2023; Kevins and Robison 2025; Pow 2023.

* Finding: Government adoption or explanation of D M P recommendations increases perceived legitimacy. References: Bryant and Stone 2020; van Dijk and Lefevre 2023; Giraudet et al. 2022; Germann, Marien, and Muradova 2024; Goovaerts, De Fine Licht, and Marien 2025; Iusmen and Boswell 2017; Kuntze and Fesenfeld 2021.

* Finding: Prior familiarity with D M P s increases perceived legitimacy. References: Bedock and Pilet 2023; Christensen 2020; Goldberg, Lindell, and Bächtiger 2025; Kübler et al. 2025; Pilet et al. 2023; Walsh and Elkink 2021; Webb 2013.

* Finding: Coupling D M P s with referenda or advisory roles increases legitimacy. References: Bedock and Pilet 2023; Gastil et al. 2016; Garry et al. 2022; Germann, Marien, and Muradova 2024; Goldberg 2021; Goldberg and Bächtiger 2023; Itten and Mouter 2022; Jacquet 2019; Kübler et al. 2025; Persson, Esaiasson, and Gilljam 2013; Renwick, Lauderdale, and Russell 2023; Rojon, Rijken, and Klandermans 2019.

* Finding: Perceiving processes as legitimate increases policy acceptance. References: De Blok and Kumlin 2022; Grillos 2022; Liu et al. 2020; Strebel, Kübler, and Marcinkowski 2019; Paulis et al. 2025; Werner and Marien 2022.

Pathway 2: Impacts of D M P recommendations on policy support.

* Finding: Nonparticipants use D M P outcomes as a cognitive shortcut for preferences. References: Boulianne 2018; Fournier 2011; Ingham and Levin 2018a, 2018b; Warren and Gastil 2015.

Pathway 3: Impacts of D M P reasons (where provided) on policy support.

* Finding: Awareness of D M P reasons increases policy knowledge or reasoning. References: Ársælsson and Gastil 2025; Christensen et al. 2022; Gastil et al. 2018, 2023; Már and Gastil 2020, 2023; Suiter and Reidy 2020; Suiter et al. 2020.

* Finding: Awareness of D M P reasons influences voting preferences. References: Christensen et al. 2022; Gastil et al. 2018; Már and Gastil 2020.

A range of subjective beliefs, attitudes, experiences and resources of respondents also seem to matter. Multiple studies used standard or conjoint surveys to determine that the following factors are associated with higher support among citizens for DMPs in general: their familiarity/experience with DMPs (Goldberg, Lindell, and Bächtiger Reference Goldberg, Lindell and Bächtiger2025); their political engagement or perceived political self-efficacy (Bedock and Pilet Reference Bedock and Pilet2023; Paulis, Sipma, and Talukder Reference Paulis, Sipma and Talukder2025; Walsh and Elkink Reference Walsh and Elkink2021; Webb Reference Webb2013; cf. Kübler et al. Reference Kübler, Gut, Heimann, Stojanovic and Colombo2025; Pilet et al. Reference Pilet, Bol, Vittori and Paulis2023); their trust in or perceived competence of fellow citizens (Bedock and Pilet Reference Bedock and Pilet2021; Goldberg, Lindell, and Bächtiger Reference Goldberg, Lindell and Bächtiger2025; Kübler et al. Reference Kübler, Gut, Heimann, Stojanovic and Colombo2025); and their mistrust of or dissatisfaction with status quo political institutions/politicians/parties (Bedock and Pilet Reference Bedock and Pilet2021, Reference Bedock and Pilet2023; Goldberg, Lindell, and Bächtiger Reference Goldberg, Lindell and Bächtiger2025; Pilet et al. Reference Pilet, Bedock, Talukder and Rangoni2024; Pilet et al. Reference Pilet, Bol, Vittori and Paulis2023; Walsh and Elkink Reference Walsh and Elkink2021; cf. Kübler et al. Reference Kübler, Gut, Heimann, Stojanovic and Colombo2025; van Dijk, Werner, and Marien 2024). Although these studies are not specifically concerned with respondents’ perceptions of the legitimacy of political processes that include DMPs, it seems plausible that these factors might also be associated with legitimacy perceptions.

While not directly contradicting these findings, other studies suggest that DMPs—or at least DMPs alone—may not be the most effective means of enhancing public perceptions of the legitimacy of policy-making institutions. In an influential study, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (Reference Hibbing and Theiss-Morse2002) found that ordinary US citizens neither seek involvement in politics nor believe their fellow citizens are prepared to do so; they simply want a competent and public-serving government and generally are only willing to personally engage as a last resort to stop greedy and/or incompetent politicians from making bad decisions (and in that scenario, direct voting is preferred to deliberative democracy). Experimental studies in other countries have found that direct citizen engagement of one form or another is seen as more legitimate than deliberative processes (Esaiasson, Gilljam, and Persson Reference Esaiasson, Gilljam and Persson2012; Persson, Esaiasson, and Gilljam Reference Persson, Esaiasson and Gilljam2013) and that mini-publics are perceived as more legitimate by nonparticipants when coupled with forms of wider public decision making, such as referendums (Gastil et al. Reference Gastil, Rosenzweig, Knobloch and Brinker2016; Germann, Marien, and Muradova Reference Germann, Marien and Muradova2024) or citizen forums (Itten and Mouter Reference Itten and Mouter2022). Survey studies reveal mixed results in different countries, with majority support for citizens’ assemblies in certain contexts in Northern Ireland (Garry et al. Reference Garry, Pow, Coakley, Farrell, O’Leary and Tilley2022) yet a strong rejection of DMPs as a legitimating tool in Germany, even when combined with referendums (Kersting Reference Kersting2016; Reference Kersting2021). In Switzerland, where there is already substantial direct-democratic decision making, a population survey featuring a conjoint experiment following three CAs found that citizens generally have positive views of DMPs but do not want them to replace existing direct-democratic institutions (Kübler et al. Reference Kübler, Gut, Heimann, Stojanovic and Colombo2025).

Other surveys and experimental studies point to specific concerns among wider publics about the competence of randomly selected citizens as compared with other potential decision makers. Scholars have found that self-selection (Jacobs and Kaufmann Reference Jacobs and Kaufmann2021; Kersting Reference Kersting2021; Kramon Reference Kramon2025; Kübler et al. Reference Kübler, Gut, Heimann, Stojanovic and Colombo2025), appointment (Arnesen and Peters Reference Arnesen and Peters2018), or a combination of random selection and experts’ appointment (Kuntze and Fesenfeld Reference Kuntze and Fesenfeld2021) are seen as either more or equally legitimate when compared with random selection of participants alone (Pow Reference Pow2023). Consistent with these findings, Rojon, Rijken, and Klandermans (Reference Rojon, Rijken and Klandermans2019) found that a majority of US citizens are concerned that the lack of domain expertise of randomly selected people might hinder their capacity to make good decisions. Furthermore, a large body of evidence gathered through experiments (Goldberg Reference Goldberg2021; Goldberg and Bächtiger Reference Goldberg and Bächtiger2023), qualitative interviews (Jacquet Reference Jacquet2019), and public surveys (Bedock and Pilet Reference Bedock and Pilet2023; Christensen Reference Christensen2020; Renwick, Lauderdale, and Russell Reference Renwick, Lauderdale and Russell2023; Rojon, Rijken, and Klandermans Reference Rojon, Rijken and Klandermans2019) reveals that public concerns about ordinary citizens’ competence, legitimacy, or both also explain why advisory DMPs are largely preferred to DMPs whose recommendations are authoritative/binding.

Turning to the posited link between perceived legitimacy and policy acceptance, there is again considerable evidence supporting this theory. An experiment by Liu et al. (Reference Liu, Bouman, Perlaviciute and Steg2020) found that, because of perceived procedural fairness, people are more inclined to accept an energy project in their area if they are allowed to define key aspects of it, such as its exact location. A survey study of Norwegian citizens confirmed that procedural fairness is a key factor in maintaining or increasing policy acceptance (de Blok and Kumlin Reference De Blok and Kumlin2022). A large comparative survey (N = 5,000) run in eight metropolitan areas across four European countries (France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) demonstrated that participatory decision-making processes that are perceived to be inclusive and fair increase policy acceptance independently of the policy outcome. This effect remains significant even for decisions affecting policy areas in which citizens are usually most concerned about policy outcomes and less concerned about policy-making processes, such as public transport (Strebel, Kübler, and Marcinkowski Reference Strebel, Kübler and Marcinkowski2019). A survey experiment in Kenya determined that deliberative processes are more effective than majority rule in increasing perceived procedural fairness and policy acceptance (Grillos Reference Grillos2022). This study, one of the very few conducted in Africa, is particularly important because it confirmed this effect of DMPs outside Western liberal democracies.

Despite the growing body of evidence, we are far from reaching a conclusive understanding of the causal link between perceived legitimacy and policy acceptance. For example, a vignette experiment on COVID-19 restrictions conducted by Muradova and Suiter (Reference Muradova and Suiter2022) found that DMPs only slightly outperform politicians’ debates and public consultation in stimulating compliance and even decrease the likelihood of compliance among individuals with low political trust in randomly selected citizens.

Moreover, whether a person perceives a policy-making process to be legitimate appears to have a lesser impact on their acceptance of the policy than whether the outcome of the process aligns with the person’s preexisting views (known as “outcome favorability”). Scholars have long debated the respective weights of perceived procedural fairness and outcome favorability in determining the acceptance of policy-making outcomes (Tyler Reference Tyler1994). Building on previous work (Esaiasson, Gilljam, and Persson Reference Esaiasson, Gilljam and Persson2017), Esaiasson et al. (Reference Esaiasson, Persson, Gilljam and Lindholm2019) conducted a vignette field experiment that pointed even more strongly than the first paper to the overwhelming importance of outcome favorability in determining people’s acceptance of policies. Arnesen’s (Reference Arnesen2017) vignette survey experiments yielded a similar result: outcome favorability mattered more for decision acceptance than whether the respondent had a say in the decision. In recent years, other studies have supported outcome favorability as the stronger determinant of policy acceptance (Goldberg and Bächtiger Reference Goldberg and Bächtiger2023; Marien and Kern Reference Marien and Kern2018; Pilet et al. Reference Pilet, Bol, Vittori and Paulis2023). Importantly for our purposes, this was also confirmed in a study of the public’s acceptance of a CA’s recommendations in Luxembourg, with the nuance that respondents’ perceptions of its procedural fairness increased acceptance among the policy’s “losers” (Paulis et al. Reference Paulis, Pilet, Vittori and Rojon2025).

Still, even if outcome favorability is more important than the perceived legitimacy of the policy process, that does not mean the latter is irrelevant to policy attitudes. Werner and Marien (Reference Werner and Marien2022) argue that what matters is that democratic innovations like DMPs stimulate legitimacy perceptions in both “winners” and “losers” of the policy decision, as shown by their survey experiment in the Netherlands and in Sweden: increasing legitimacy perceptions thus facilitates losers’ consent more than the status quo of policy making (i.e., representative democracy).

To summarize, the core procedural features of DMPs do seem to increase nonparticipants’ perceptions of the legitimacy of policy-making processes (even if other means increase perceived legitimacy to a greater extent), and perceived legitimacy does seem to increase policy acceptance (even if outcome favorability increases acceptance to a greater extent).

Pathway 2: Impacts of DMP Recommendations on Policy Support

There is some empirical evidence supporting the theory behind the second pathway (albeit considerably less than for the first), according to which citizens alter or reinforce their policy preferences based on awareness of the outcomes of a DMP, at least under certain conditions. Boulianne (Reference Boulianne2018), in one of two survey experiments, finds that respondents who were made aware of a DMP and its recommendations were more likely to support those recommendations, although the findings were only statistically significant for three of the six recommendations (of these, the effect sizes ranged between five to seven percentage points). The effects in the second experiment were not statistically significant. The different results of the two experiments, she speculates, are likely explained by the much greater length of time the DMPs spent deliberating in the first study (six Saturdays) compared with the second (2 hours). Plausibly, the longer time that DMP participants spend learning about the policy issue and deliberating about it, the more the public sees them as experts worthy of deferring to. Ingham and Levin’s two US survey experiments—one at a national level (Reference Ingham and Levin2018a) and the other at a state level (Reference Ingham and Levin2018b) find additional evidence for this second pathway linking knowledge of a DMP’s outcome to increased support for that outcome. However, this result holds among only a subset of the samples: those who were either uninformed or not aligned with a party.

To the extent that at least some groups of nonparticipating citizens formulate or shift their policy preferences in line with DMP recommendations, can doing so lead nonparticipants to change their behavior, so that they actively support policies based on the recommendation? The only evidence we uncovered on this point concerned the potential for Citizens Initiative Reviews (CIRs) to alter voting intentions on ballot initiatives (see the later discussion). The effect of DMPs on participants’ political behavior varies, with not all those who come to support a policy then becoming active supporters (Boulianne, Loptson, and Kahane Reference Boulianne, Loptson and Kahane2018; Gangl Reference Gangl2003). The effect of a DMP-induced policy preference shift in nonparticipants seems likely to be even more attenuated, given they would have far less exposure to the relevant information and are not involved in the deliberative process. We take up this issue in the discussion section.

Pathway 3: Impacts of DMP reasons (Where Provided) on Policy Support

Evidence for this pathway is largely limited to CIRs or similar processes, which aim to inform voters about the case for or against a specific referendum or ballot initiative, rather than to provide recommendations on a broad topic. Experimental studies relating to such processes have shown that exposing nonparticipants to reasons increases their policy knowledge (Ársælsson and Gastil Reference Ársælsson and Gastil2025; Christensen et al. Reference Christensen, Leino, Setälä and Strandberg2022; Gastil et al. Reference Gastil, Knobloch, Reedy, Henkels and Cramer2018; Reference Gastil, Ársælsson, Knobloch, Brinker, Richards, Reedy and Burkhalter2023; Már and Gastil Reference Már and Gastil2020; Reference Már and Gastil2023; Suiter et al. Reference Suiter, Muradova, Gastil and Farrell2020)Footnote ¹⁹ and influences policy/voting preferences (Christensen et al. Reference Christensen, Leino, Setälä and Strandberg2022; Gastil et al. Reference Gastil, Knobloch, Reedy, Henkels and Cramer2018; Már and Gastil Reference Gastil2023). Christensen et al. (Reference Christensen, Leino, Setälä and Strandberg2022) find that improved knowledge was the mechanism by which exposure to reasons led nonparticipants to update their policy/voting preferences. Various studies have found that exposure to such reasons affects other democratic attitudes and capabilities (Christensen et al. Reference Christensen, Leino, Setälä and Strandberg2022; Knobloch, Barthel, and Gastil Reference Knobloch, Barthel and Gastil2020; Suiter et al. Reference Suiter, Muradova, Gastil and Farrell2020).

By contrast, other kinds of DMPs, including CAs, deliberate on broad topics that produce a range of positions on which participants vote, rather than a mutually exclusive “yes or no” choice; therefore, they tend not to publish the underlying reasons for their policy recommendations. However, we see potential for reason-giving to play a greater role in future CAs—a point to which we return in the discussion section.

Findings from the studies discussed so far are summarized in table 1 and mapped to the three stylized pathways.

The Importance of Publicity

All pathways linking DMPs to effects on nonparticipants depend on them becoming aware of the DMP’s procedural features, recommendations, or reasons (Boulianne Reference Boulianne2018; Fournier et al. Reference Fournier, van der Kolk, Kenneth Carty, Blais and Rose2011; Jäske Reference Jäske2019; Pow Reference Pow2023). The publicity the DMP receives is therefore a crucial variable mediating the DMP and its effects on nonparticipants.

Empirically, the essential role of publicity has been observed in multiple studies. Fournier et al. (Reference Fournier, van der Kolk, Kenneth Carty, Blais and Rose2011, 134), who studied citizens’ assemblies in British Columbia (2004) and Ontario (2006–07)—which led to unsuccessful referendums to change the electoral system—observed that the public’s low awareness of the mini-publics “severely hampered the referendums’ prospects.” They concluded that “awareness of the citizen assembly led to votes for change: those who recognized that common people were behind this project tended to endorse it” (153). Corroborating these findings experimentally, Goldberg (Reference Goldberg2021, 178), analyzing public perceptions of mini-publics in Germany, found that “citizens who are aware of [Deliberative Citizens Forums] tend to have more positive attitudes toward them.”Footnote ²⁰

The media play an important role in determining whether and how information about a DMP is publicized. A survey experiment in Finland showed that learning about a DMP and its recommendations had varied effects depending on whether respondents read its original statement or a newspaper article about it; this finding highlights that the media can distort DMP information in ways that undermine the operation of the identified pathways for public influence (Leino, Jäske, and Setälä Reference Leino, Jäske and Setälä2025).

Other studies illuminate the important role that media and political messaging can play in promoting acceptance of a policy among those who do not support it (our pathway 1). After conducting three survey experiments with Norwegian and Swedish citizens, Esaiasson et al. (Reference Esaiasson, Arnesen and Werner2023) discovered that if elite opinion leaders in politics or media publicly accept an unfavorable policy outcome (regardless of the policy-making process), their followers will be more inclined to take the same view. Tilley and Hobolt (Reference Tilley and Hobolt2024, 1180) reached a similar conclusion after conducting an experiment on the emotional reactions of losers of the Brexit referendum and of the 2019 General Election, finding that “politicians may be able to influence voters’ faith in democracy by mobilising emotional responses.”

The two largest climate assemblies held to date provide valuable contrasting cases that reinforce the importance of publicity in mediating DMPs’ public influence. The French government paid considerable attention to communication and outreach for the French Citizens Convention on the Climate (CCC). The 150 participants were encouraged by the organizers to interact with the media, which stimulated extensive public debate (Cherry et al. Reference Cherry, Capstick, Demski, Mellier, Stone and Verfuerth2021; Mellier and Wilson Reference Mellier and Wilson2020; Rozencwajg, Gaborit, and Jeanpierre Reference Rozencwajg, Gaborit, Jeanpierre, Escobar and Elstub2025; Smith Reference Smith2023; Reference Smith2024; Wells Reference Wells, Howarth, Lane and Slevin2022). The CCC’s capacity to generate public debate and the overall positive reaction of the public to the policy recommendations gave a clear political mandate to the parliament to act decisively on climate change (Geib Reference Geib2021; Wells Reference Wells, Howarth, Lane and Slevin2022).

Additionally, the CCC was publicly commissioned by President Macron himself in the aftermath of public unrest (Smith Reference Smith2024). Because of Macron’s commitment, the CCC had more policy impact and generated more public debate than most CAs. One week after the start of the assembly, 70% of the population was aware of its existence. A survey conducted after the Convention showed that public opinion was broadly aligned with its recommended policies (Cherry et al. Reference Cherry, Capstick, Demski, Mellier, Stone and Verfuerth2021; Mellier and Wilson Reference Mellier and Wilson2020).Footnote ²¹ The association between the heightened public debate and the survey results provides suggestive evidence of the potential for well-publicized CAs to influence public support for climate policies, although causation cannot be inferred (survey respondents’ attitudes may have pre-dated the CCC), nor can the precise causal pathway.Footnote ²²

In comparison, the UK Climate Assembly (UKCA) failed to engage most of the public, despite the involvement of celebrity naturalist Sir David Attenborough and favorable media coverage at the beginning of the assembly and around the launch of the resulting report (Carrick and Elstub Reference Carrick, Elstub, Jacquet, Ryan and van der Does2023). At the start of, during, and after the UKCA, up to 40% of the population knew nothing about it, and the rest knew very little (Carrick and Elstub Reference Carrick, Elstub, Jacquet, Ryan and van der Does2023; Elstub et al. Reference Elstub, Carrick, Andrews and Ivings2025). This was thought to be due to the limited budget for publicity, the lack of an effective communication strategy, and the failure to engage younger generations via social media (Elstub et al. Reference Elstub, Carrick, Andrews and Ivings2025). Moreover, DMPs are not seen as “debate-starters” in the United Kingdom, and a genuine participatory and deliberative culture is not widespread among its political institutions and citizenry (Davidson and Elstub Reference Davidson and Elstub2014). Furthermore, competition for media attention with other major events such as Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic (Stasiak et al. Reference Stasiak, Averchenkova, Azucena and Renn2021) and the absence of a strong endorsement from a popular political leader likely limited the UKCA’s perceived political relevance, as reflected in its low coverage on TV and radio (Carrick and Elstub Reference Carrick, Elstub, Jacquet, Ryan and van der Does2023).

Another means by which information about a CA can be publicized is via its participants who, with newfound motivation and capabilities resulting from the deliberative process, seek direct involvement in the public sphere. A longitudinal study found that CA participants become more likely to take an active role in politics (Knobloch, Barthel, and Gastil Reference Knobloch, Barthel and Gastil2020). For example, some of the participants in the French CCC subsequently ran for political office or became high-profile climate activists (Vernaillen Reference Vernaillen2020), and the French and Austrian national CAs evolved into permanent climate-change advocacy organizations after the ad hoc initial mandate expired: “Les 150” in France and the “Association of the First Austrian Citizens’ Climate Assembly” (Buzogány et al. Reference Buzogány, Ehs, Plöchl and Scherhaufer2022; Rozencwajg, Gaborit, and Jeanpierre Reference Rozencwajg, Gaborit, Jeanpierre, Escobar and Elstub2025; Wells Reference Wells, Howarth, Lane and Slevin2022). However, there have not yet been any studies of the impact of these fledgling organizations on wider public attitudes toward climate policy and democracy.

Participants can also influence others within their own social networks. A deliberative field experiment in the United States found that “attending the deliberative session dramatically increased interpersonal political discussion on topics relating to the event” among participants’ social networks (Lazer et al. Reference Lazer, Sokhey, Neblo, Esterling and Kennedy2015, 552). Similarly, in the climate domain, interviews with participants of a local CA in Devon in the United Kingdom found that participants “had spoken about the topics, or the assembly itself, to family, friends, or others outside of the assembly” (Moseley, Sandover, and Devine-Wright Reference Moseley, Sandover and Devine-Wright2025, 9).

Discussion: How Can DMPs Be Leveraged to Escape the DDD?

The recent wave of CAs has provided an invaluable laboratory for real-world experimentation with climate-specific deliberative processes, both testing and adding to the much larger body of theory and evidence concerning DMPs that has emerged over recent decades. This experimentation has yielded useful lessons about how to optimize CAs’ design. Common recommendations are that CAs should be government commissionedFootnote ²³; advisory in function but with a transparent, upfront commitment from the commissioning government to take account of the recommendations and provide reasons in case they are not adopted; and well publicized, so that the wider public is made aware of the CA’s existence, purpose, structure/process, and outcomes (Bryant and Stone Reference Bryant and Stone2020; King and Wilson Reference King and Wilson2023; Kuntze and Fesenfeld Reference Kuntze and Fesenfeld2021; Pfeffer and Newig Reference Pfeffer and Newig2025; Sandover, Moseley, and Devine-Wright Reference Sandover, Moseley and Devine-Wright2021; Stack and Griessler Reference Stack and Griessler2022).

Our review has focused on the extent to which CAs could be expected to increase the wider public’s acceptance of and support for climate policies, as well as their perceptions of the legitimacy of democratic processes. On this score, the measures usually proposed for optimizing CAs are all sensible, as far as they go. Our evidence review suggests that such measures together could achieve appreciable, albeit incremental, increases in climate policy acceptance and support (somewhat increasing the likelihood of decarbonization) and in public perceptions of policy-making institutions’ legitimacy (somewhat reducing authoritarian populists’ appeal). In particular, the frequent recommendation for a well-resourced and systematic communication strategy (Elstub et al. Reference Elstub, Carrick, Andrews and Ivings2025; Moseley, Sandover, and Devine-Wright Reference Moseley, Sandover and Devine-Wright2025; Stasiak et al. Reference Stasiak, Averchenkova, Azucena and Renn2021; Thorman and Capstick Reference Thorman and Capstick2022) seems essential if the identified public effects are to be realized. However, our review also suggests that these recommended measures alone are unlikely to be sufficient to stimulate the widespread shifts in knowledge, capacities, attitudes and behavior necessary to achieve mass public support for deep decarbonization and to defend democratic institutions against the gathering forces of authoritarian populism, polarization, and disinformation.

In light of these limitations, we suggest that, to escape the DDD, DMPs need to be expanded in three ways—their use, their institutionalization, and their orientation—and complemented by a range of other measures designed to deepen democracy (although we focus on the DMP-related recommendations here). Our proposals are informed by and consistent with a strand of deliberative democratic theory focused on “deliberative systems” (Curato and Böker Reference Curato and Böker2016; Elstub and Escobar Reference Elstub, Escobar, Escobar and Elstub2025; Mansbridge et al. Reference Mansbridge, Bohman, Chambers, Christiano, Parkinson, Fung, Thompson, Warren, Mansbridge and Parkinson2012; Niemeyer Reference Niemeyer, Bächtiger, Grönlund and Setälä2014; Ravazzi Reference Ravazzi2023). Only by attending to the interactions between DMPs and elements of the wider sociopolitical systems in which political expression occurs will it be possible to trigger reinforcing feedback effects needed to escape the DDD.

First, the use of deliberative democratic mechanisms—including but not limited to DMPs—for policy making should be expanded. The expanded adoption of deliberative processes will help routinize their use within government and increase citizens’ direct and indirect exposure to a means of doing democracy that, for most people, will be foreign. The evidence we reviewed suggests that as citizens become more familiar with DMPs and accustomed to seeing their fellow citizens participating in policy-making processes, they will be more inclined to perceive deliberative-democratic processes as legitimate. But there is also a need for governments to clarify exactly what the functions of DMPs are and how their outputs will be considered and used (Fernandez-Martínez, Font, and Smith Reference Fernandez-Martínez, Font, Smith, Jacquet, Ryan and van der Does2024). In the climate domain, citizens are arguably better equipped to deliberate over how to decarbonize than the more abstract and complex questions of whether and how much to do so (Welton Reference Welton2020). Consequently, while there is still value in broad-based, national-level CAs focused on national policies and measures, there is also merit in proposals for more localized and sector-specific CAs that address narrower topics, such as the terms on which renewable energy infrastructure is sited in a particular community, or the appropriate technologies and policies for decarbonizing household heating (Ainscough and Willis Reference Ainscough and Willis2024). Given that populist opponents of climate policy often target tangible, local changes, such as wind farms, electric vehicles, heat pumps, and low-traffic neighborhoods (Paterson, Wilshire, and Tobin Reference Paterson, Wilshire and Tobin2023), building consensus among local citizens on these kinds of changes should build support for decarbonization while undercutting populists’ appeal (see also Jacobs Reference Jacobs2024).

Second, the expanded use of DMPs could also help prepare the ground for their institutionalization, whether they are climate-specific or general in focus. This would boost DMPs’ autonomy and status and hence their potential impact (Elstub and Escobar Reference Elstub, Escobar, Escobar and Elstub2025). Already, at least two subnational governments (Brussels and Milan) have adopted permanent CAs as part of their policy processes (Abbas and Smith Reference Abbas and Smith2024), and at least two others (Paris and the Ostbelgien region of Belgium) have adopted citizens’ bodies with a more general mandate (Bedock and Pilet Reference Bedock and Pilet2023; Elstub et al. Reference Elstub, Carrick, Farrell and Mockler2021; Rovers and Dejaeghere Reference Rovers and Dejaeghere2022). Another permanent assembly was launched in 2022 in Rouen (Smith Reference Smith2024), and in 2026 the Catalan government approved legislation establishing a “universal right to participate” in public policy making and creating a comprehensive legal framework for citizen participation in the region.Footnote ²⁴

There are political obstacles to the greater institutionalization of DMPs, insofar as it would require elected politicians to relinquish power and would diminish the capacity of powerful interest groups to influence political outcomes (Ejsing, Veng, and Papazu Reference Ejsing, Veng and Papazu2023; Koskimaa and Rapeli Reference Koskimaa and Rapeli2020; Niessen Reference Niessen2019).Footnote ²⁵ However, design choices can help diminish opposition and build popular support for this process. In particular, we suggest that institutionalization efforts should aim to establish advisory DMPs that play an “epistemic” role within the wider deliberative system. In effect, they would become similar to select committees, which aim to inculcate norms and processes of “iterated deliberation” and involve “rounds of revisions of policy proposals based on deliberative exchanges” (Setälä Reference Setälä2017, 857). Such proposals are more likely to garner popular support (given the clear findings about citizens’ concerns with random selection and clear preferences for advisory DMPs) and to be less opposed by existing politicians and powerful interest groups (because less power is being relinquished).Footnote ²⁶ As more and more citizens become familiar with DMPs, they are likely to become more supportive of their expanded use (Goldberg Reference Goldberg, Reuchamps, Vrydagh and Welp2023). They may even come to prefer DMPs with legislative authority (at least of a shared kind, alongside an elected chamber)—and may do so in numbers sufficient to overcome the earlier mentioned political obstacles—which would significantly strengthen the prospects for decarbonization (Verret-Hamelin and Vandamme Reference Verret-Hamelin and Vandamme2022).Footnote ²⁷

As well as informing policy making, more frequently used and institutionalized assemblies will provide more opportunities for citizens to participate in and become familiar with deliberative institutions generally and climate-related deliberation specifically (Abbas and Smith Reference Abbas and Smith2024, 4). Still, the limited scalability of DMPs constrains the number of people who can participate in them. Moreover, there is a risk that more frequently used and institutionalized DMPs become less likely to attract media attention and more vulnerable to co-optation by powerful interests (Elstub and Escobar Reference Elstub, Escobar, Escobar and Elstub2025). Ultimately, building civic and climate capacities among the public and improving the quality of government require expanding the orientation of DMPs to engaging the wider public (Elstub and Escobar Reference Elstub, Escobar, Escobar and Elstub2025; Rozencwajg, Gaborit, and Jeanpierre Reference Rozencwajg, Gaborit, Jeanpierre, Escobar and Elstub2025).

Proponents of deliberative democracy have debated the most appropriate function for DMPs: Should they be aimed primarily at directly influencing the policy-making process or at influencing their fellow citizens and thus indirectly influencing the policy-making process (Curato and Böker Reference Curato and Böker2016; Lafont Reference Lafont2019; Ravazzi Reference Ravazzi2023)? Certainly, much of the literature on CAs has focused on their potential to improve climate policy making directly. In our view, escaping the DDD necessitates that DMPs have a dual function: not only informing policy making but also improving the epistemic quality of and facilitating wider participation in public debates over complex policy issues such as climate change before, during, and after the DMP (Ejsing, Veng, and Papazu Reference Ejsing, Veng and Papazu2023; Elstub and Escobar Reference Elstub, Escobar, Escobar and Elstub2025; Smith Reference Smith2024). Regardless of whether DMPs’ policy-facing role is advisory/“epistemic” or not, we do not see any necessary conflict with DMPs having a public-facing “epistemic” function too. However, we argue that this expanded, public-oriented function would necessitate three types of changes to the way DMPs, especially CAs, usually operate.

First, it requires a greater focus on reason-giving. As noted, DMPs (other than CIRs) currently tend to publish only their recommendations and not the reasons for them. Consensus on both recommendations and the underlying reasons for them would be improbable in a DMP (List Reference List2011), but it is plausible that assembly members could come to a meta-consensus on the strongest reasons for (and, potentially also, against) their recommendations (cf. Dryzek and Niemeyer Reference Dryzek and Niemeyer2006), summaries of which could be published alongside them. This process could facilitate nonparticipants’ deliberation about climate policy—“internally” and with others (Goodin and Niemeyer Reference Goodin and Niemeyer2003)—and hence develop their underlying democratic capabilities in line with the third pathway (van der Does and Jacquet Reference van der Does and Jacquet2023). This would also help mitigate a risk associated with the second pathway: that citizens blindly follow the policy recommendations of the DMP (Lafont Reference Lafont2019). Providing summaries of reasons raises challenges, including requiring more time for deliberation; making outputs more complex, which could attenuate other DMP effects (Suiter et al. Reference Suiter, Muradova, Gastil and Farrell2020); or complicating publicity efforts, so a balance needs to be struck. If more localized and sector-specific CAs become more common—as we recommended earlier—the narrower range of topics requiring recommendation could create more space for reason summaries. This topic merits further experimentation and research.

Second, DMPs’ public-oriented function requires means of empowering participants to transmit DMPs’ outputs to the public and mobilize public engagement in both democracy and decarbonization, potentially reinforcing all three pathways. Empowering participants requires both recognizing participants’ unique position, motivations and capacities and making concerted efforts to facilitate their impact beyond the assembly (Ejsing, Veng, and Papazu Reference Ejsing, Veng and Papazu2023). For instance, DMP participants can be provided with professional media training (as occurred in France) and supported to engage with legacy and social media, which has been observed to increase public awareness and understanding of CAs (Rovers and Dejaeghere Reference Rovers and Dejaeghere2022). However, a more public-facing role does not come without challenges, as it compromises participants’ anonymity and independence and, consequently, may reduce their willingness to participate or alter their opinions (Boswell, Dean, and Smith Reference Boswell, Dean and Smith2023; Rozencwajg, Gaborit, and Jeanpierre Reference Rozencwajg, Gaborit, Jeanpierre, Escobar and Elstub2025). In polarized environments, media exposure can leave participants open to public abuse and even raise safety concerns (Smith Reference Smith2024). But this public-facing role need not be taken up by all participants to be effective. As we noted earlier, many CA participants have been transformed by their experience and have become active in the media and politics after their CA concluded.Footnote ²⁸ Moreover, participants could also be trained in how to facilitate small-group “conversations” about climate change in their social circles (Klein Salamon Reference Klein Salamon2023)—a realistic means of “reaching out to broader publics and setting deliberative rather than confrontational terms of public discourse” (Curato and Böker Reference Curato and Böker2016, 178). Public discourse relating to this outreach is also likely to be less polarized in more localized DMPs, which may escape the national media spotlight.

Third, there should be channels by which the wider public can engage with DMPs/CAs, which could strengthen the mechanisms in the first pathway. Digital tools have a crucial role to play in creating such channels, because they enable large numbers of citizens to participate meaningfully at various stages of deliberative and policy-making processes (Fischli and Muldoon Reference Fischli and Muldoon2024; Fishkin et al. Reference Fishkin, Bolotnyy, Lerner, Siu and Bradburn2024; Gastil Reference Gastil2023). The wider public could help frame the CA’s agenda (Elstub and Escobar Reference Elstub, Escobar, Escobar and Elstub2025; Mellier and Wilson Reference Mellier and Wilson2020); for instance, via digital tools that allow people to propose and upvote topics. The public could also contribute proposals and comments (Elstub and Escobar Reference Elstub, Escobar, Escobar and Elstub2025; Muradova and Suiter Reference Muradova and Suiter2022; Suiter, Saude, and McNally Reference Suiter, Saude and McNally2025), as occurred in the Irish Citizens’ Assembly and in the French CCC. In Ireland, the public reacted well to this opportunity and sent thousands of written contributions to the assembly.Footnote ²⁹ Another option is to allow the public to vote and comment on the DMP’s final recommendations/proposals (Elstub and Escobar Reference Elstub, Escobar, Escobar and Elstub2025), as was done successfully to build support for climate policies in the Dutch Municipality of Súdwest-Fryslân (Itten and Mouter Reference Itten and Mouter2022).

Using digital tools, however, creates risks and challenges of its own. It is crucial that citizens feel as though their inputs are listened to, meaning that careful thought must be given to how digital tools are designed and integrated into the relevant process (Fischli and Muldoon Reference Fischli and Muldoon2024). This aspect was not well thought through in the French CCC, for instance: even though approximately 3,400 public contributions were received, “this material was left largely untapped” (Giraudet et al. Reference Giraudet, Apouey, Arab, Baeckelandt, Bégout, Berghmans and Blanc2022). Such failures create their own risks of causing disillusionment among citizens (Suiter et al. Reference Suiter, Muradova, Gastil and Farrell2020; van Dijk and Lefevre Reference van Dijk and Lefevre2023). There are, moreover, limitations to the scope and quality of engagement that can be expected from the use of digital tools as means of scaling engagement with deliberative processes (Mikhaylovskaya Reference Mikhaylovskaya2024). For instance, digital engagement may not be conducive to having transformative experiences of the kind that have been found to occur in face-to-face DMPs (Fishkin et al. Reference Fishkin, Bolotnyy, Lerner, Siu and Bradburn2024), and because of the “digital divide,” such tools risk excluding certain groups from engagement opportunities (Mikhaylovskaya Reference Mikhaylovskaya2024). Still, experiments with digital engagement are growing and yielding valuable lessons about how these issues can be addressed (Fischli and Muldoon Reference Fischli and Muldoon2024). Many scholars also see promise in artificial intelligence to improve online group deliberation at scale (Gastil Reference Gastil2023; Gastil and Broghammer Reference Gastil and Broghammer2021; Mikhaylovskaya Reference Mikhaylovskaya2024; Tessler et al. Reference Tessler, Bakker, Jarrett, Sheahan, Chadwick, Koster and Evans2024).

The expanded orientation of DMPs that we propose could be expected to expose DMPs’ proposals and arguments to scrutiny by civil society groups and social movements. When addressing climate change, this would mitigate another risk that some scholars have identified with (government-established) CAs, namely, that they promote incremental solutions, rather than the more radical socioeconomic transformations that an effective response to climate change demands (Ainscough and Willis Reference Ainscough and Willis2024; Blühdorn Reference Blühdorn2013; Elstub and Escobar Reference Elstub, Escobar, Escobar and Elstub2025; Hammond Reference Hammond2020; Knops and Vrydagh Reference Knops, Vrydagh, Reuchamps, Vrydagh and Welp2023; Rozencwajg, Gaborit, and Jeanpierre Reference Rozencwajg, Gaborit, Jeanpierre, Escobar and Elstub2025; Willis, Curato, and Smith Reference Willis, Curato and Smith2022).

Overall, the expansion, institutionalization, and reorientation of DMPs and CAs that we propose seem likely to significantly increase the prospects for escaping the DDD. Still, DMPs, even when configured as we recommend, are unlikely to be sufficient for that purpose. Consistent with our commitment to deliberative systems, a wider set of reforms must be pursued in parallel (Curato and Böker Reference Curato and Böker2016; Niemeyer Reference Niemeyer, Bächtiger, Grönlund and Setälä2014)—not only to enhance the impact of DMPs/CAs but also to address other features of contemporary democracies that undermine both democracy and decarbonization, which we cataloged earlier. Specifying the additional reforms needed would take us beyond the scope of this article, but we highlight one area of democratic life that is likely to be closely coupled with the success or failure of DMPs in catalyzing democratization and decarbonization: the media (including social media). As discussed, whether and how information about DMPs is covered in the media in large part determine their effects on the public, yet media and information systems themselves are in structural crisis, posing discrete challenges for democracy. An important strand of reform advocated by media scholars concerned with the democracy-undermining effects of commercial media is to foster greater public ownership and governance of media organizations and digital platforms (Fenton et al. Reference Fenton, Freedman, Schlosberg and Dencik2020; Pickard Reference Pickard2019). The more public-spirited media that such reforms would foster would be more likely to engage the public in the processes and outcomes of CAs and other DMPs. Meanwhile, DMPs focusing on media reform could help build support for such reforms in the first place (Matasick Reference Matasick2020). This is but one illustration of a wider imperative for scholars and practitioners to explore how future DMPs can be creatively coupled with the wider democratic reform efforts needed to escape the DDD.