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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2004
There have been three waves of studies on Iran after the Islamic Revolution. The initial series of studies debates the causes of the revolution. A second collection investigates the ideological and theological underpinnings of the Islamic Republic. Most recently, a set of monographs has begun to probe the praxis of the regime and the dynamics of post-revolutionary politics. Mehdi Moslem's Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran is an insightful and thought-provoking contribution to this newer research agenda.
There have been three waves of studies on Iran after the Islamic Revolution. The initial series of studies debates the causes of the revolution. A second collection investigates the ideological and theological underpinnings of the Islamic Republic. Most recently, a set of monographs has begun to probe the praxis of the regime and the dynamics of post-revolutionary politics. Mehdi Moslem's Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran is an insightful and thought-provoking contribution to this newer research agenda.
Moslem asks three questions: what are the roots of the ideological disputes among the Islamic Republics' elite; how do factions express, impose, and translate their views into policies; and how has this factionalism influenced the political development of the regime? His meticulously researched and clearly written narrative shows that ideological plurality emerges out of the three founding components of the Islamic Republic: the populist, religious, and revolutionary dimensions. Consequently, political cleavages and factional discord are based on the relative weight given to these essential principles, with “the left” initially stressing the populist and revolutionary dimensions and “the right” favoring an elitist and religious interpretation of Islamic government. Moslem, building on Behzad Nabavi's typology, carefully illustrates that this initial inter-elite division evolved into four ideological groupings—specifically, the “conservative right,” “modern right,” “reformist left,” and “neo-fundamentalist” populist left. Given the specific junctures and depending on issue areas such as economic, foreign, and cultural policy, these factions have clashed or cooperated with one another. Ostensibly writing an analysis of the ideological development and public discourse of the political elite in the Islamic Republic, Moslem is at his best when he delves into an extensive array of newspaper archives and the parliamentary record to present and juxtapose the factional conflicts and trajectories of these groupings. For instance, he demonstrates that because factional debates are framed in terms of the different interpretations and synergies of the religious, populist, and revolutionary dimensions, all factions since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini have resorted to methods of co-opting the legacy of the founder of the Islamic Republic and the interpretation of its principles.
Second, these ideological differences and conflicts, argues Moslem, have increasingly been channeled by the plethora of state institutions and bodies of the state. The diffused institutional configuration, which was enshrined in the Iranian Constitution and entrenched by Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani's “rationalization of the regime” (chap. 4), is the linchpin reinforcing and shaping the factional conflict and competition. Moslem provides ample examples of how factional clashes revolve around elections, laws defining the powers and responsibilities of particular government bodies, and five-year development plans and budgets. Moreover, Moslem takes the institutional argument further by arguing that once factions control particular state institutions (e.g., the parliament or the judiciary), they transform them into instruments and forums to challenge and subvert their opponents. Thus, institutions result in “patterned and predictable” factional politics. A plausible and complementary line of argument not followed by Moslem would be that once factions begin to coincide with a particular institution, factional conflicts will become even more intransient, because ideological distinctions will be buttressed by institutional interests. Given the narrative's emphasis on the ideological dynamism of these factions, more weight should be given to the power of institutionally generated interests and contestation than Moslem's treatment is ready to bear.
The third question, the effect of factionalism on the political development, receives far less treatment than the first two questions. This is unfortunate in that, without an argument about the consequences of ideological pluralism and conflict, it is difficult to appraise the importance of the study as a whole. It is suggested that factionalism has undermined long-term planning and stable policies, but factors such as fluctuations in oil revenue or class conflict may have been equally important. In the Conclusion, Moslem raises the issue of “unintended consequences” but does not enumerate these consequences or how they relate to factionalism. He alludes to potentially intriguing outcomes such as “cracks in the historical alliance of the clergy and the bazaar” (p. 270), yet we are not told what these cracks entail, why they have occurred, and what their relationship is to factional politics.
This limitation points to a more fundamental shortcoming of the study—namely, the lack of attention paid to how disputes among the Islamic Republic's elite seep down and resonate at the level of the bureaucracy, civil society, and social groups, and if they do not, why not? Does this political factionalism reflect and perpetuate social and economic cleavages within Iranian society? Are these factions able to mobilize popular support for their positions, and to what extent does this vary across groups and over time? Non-elites are absent from Moslem's account. It is not until the last few pages that we read such statements as “the 1997 presidential election should be an alarm for all factions in power that the society will no longer accept oppressive measures” (p. 272), or that “the society sets agendas” (p. 273). However, since factional politics are not mapped onto society or civil society, and factional competition is never linked to electoral politics and the mobilization of the electorate, it is difficult to access these statements or comprehend “the epic of the second of Khordad.”
Finally, and related to the analysis's disconnect between ideological cleavages and social forces, Moslem does not address a question that seems to hover over his study: is there a possibility for a form of politics in the Islamic Republic other than factional politics? Is there a possibility that factional conflict can be transformed into party competition? Or are these ideologies and diffused institutions incommensurable with a party system that represents the interests of social groups? The impact of Moslem's carefully researched and rich narrative would have been far greater if he had paused to contemplate the society, economy, and history that accommodates, if not produces, the ideologies and institutions that he treats so systematically and judiciously. Even though I wish Moslem had broadened his scope analytically, I firmly believe that this monograph will be a useful source for students of Iranian politics for many years.