Why do we seek out the advice, counsel and guidance of those we deem to have integrity? Consider these “data points,” as Sherkoske calls them in his provocative new book: persons of integrity are usually held to be resolute in their convictions, responsive to reasons, morally “sane,” truthful, internally coherent, and more (6-8). These intuitions about agents with integrity do not always fit together, however, which is why Scherkoske further identifies at least six analytically distinct philosophical approaches to the phenomenon. Thus, integrity has been variously conceived so as to stress strength of will, the commitment to clean hands, proper regard for one’s moral judgment, moral purpose, the integrated self, and fidelity to “ground projects” (10-16). Scherkoske’s main goal is to provide a unified account of integrity, one that both captures the data points (as well as the theories that express them) and explains why we value persons of integrity.
The book’s main argument is that, in contrast to what every philosopher has said about the concept, integrity is not actually a moral virtue at all. Rather, it is an epistemic virtue. The main problem with the moralized version of integrity is ‘moral danger.’ Think of the types of people who are sometimes praised for their integrity: often such people are dogmatists or fanatics. This is a pressing worry if we understand integrity as psychic wholeness, strength of will, and so on. It is all too easy to see how these qualities might go hand-in-hand with moral indecency. This problem disappears if integrity is an epistemic virtue, however, at least as Scherkoske understands the notion, because having integrity is now centrally bound up with being responsive to reasons, which is itself closely allied to the practice of defending one’s beliefs to a community of epistemic peers. Scherkoske thus takes one of the data points just mentioned and makes it the essential quality of the agent with integrity. This raises two questions. First, what exactly is integrity thus construed? Second, is Scherkoske’s version of integrity, in spite of his claim to have captured all of our intuitions about the concept, unduly revisionist?
The first question brings us to the heart of the book. Here are the key elements of Scherkoske’s view of the person of integrity:
Since the person of integrity is the sort of person who seeks to have justifiable and correct convictions, has the appropriate regard for her capacity to identify what convictions would have these properties, and is reliably disposed to act on the convictions precisely on the basis of the reasons that ground her convictions, she will exhibit an unswerving fidelity to the aim of having only defensible convictions that are worthy of acting on and affirming to others (27-28).
Three elements of this account are noteworthy. First, the virtue of integrity is essentially social. Its characteristic manifestation is in the field of disagreement and the recognition of epistemic dependence. It is thus intimately related to other epistemic virtues: openness, tolerance and a respect for epistemic equality. These qualities help ensure that the agent does not succumb to fanaticism or dogmatism. Second, integrity demands resolute adherence to suitably defensible claims, a quality that helps agents avoid weakness or irresoluteness. The strength of will characteristic of the person of integrity is a function of her responsiveness to reasons (88-89). In this way, the epistemic commitment grounds the resolve, rather than having the latter guide or ground the former. Finally, the person of integrity thus construed is uniquely trustworthy, and because of this she is also a paragon of self-trust (115-119). This explains why we seek out persons of integrity in a context of divided epistemic labour and interdependence.
This brings us to the question of concept revision. Scherkoske is keen to provide an account of integrity that is both descriptively and normatively adequate. That is, he wants to explain and retain as much of the data both about what we think integrity is and why we value it. With a concept as contested—and perhaps vague—as this one, these commitments pull against the effort to provide a conceptually unified account. It is not obvious that Scherkoske is successful here. Although the account of integrity as an epistemic virtue is persuasive and interesting on its own terms, it is difficult to square with our intuition that the virtue is essentially about strength of will or resoluteness in the face of moral challenge. Scherkoske is correct to say that this conception invites the problem of moral danger, but perhaps that is why we approach persons of integrity with some caution. That is, it may be that our central intuition about such people is that the admiration we have for them is qualified by our recognition that their strength is often purchased by a degree of moral or epistemic blindness. In other words, integrity may not be the unqualifiedly positive virtue posited by Scherkoske’s reconstruction. If it isn’t, then he has not provided an account of the virtue that is fully descriptively adequate.
One more worry is worth mentioning. Because he has tied the concept of integrity so tightly to social norms of justification and defensibility, it is not obvious that Scherkoske can make sense of the moral revolutionary. Again, for Scherkoske, integrity is a “necessary virtue for communities of shared inquiry and cooperation” (241). The question is what happens to the would-be person of integrity when the values of such a community are thoroughly indecent? In this scenario, her attempts to convince members of her community that their values are askew would likely fall on deaf ears. Therefore, she could not adequately put those views to the test of interpersonal justification. She may in this case be invoking standards derived from one or another conception of impersonal morality, and she may be unwavering in upholding these principles to her benighted compatriots. So we might be inclined to think of her as possessing integrity. But if this is the case, it looks as though—in applying the label—we cannot be thinking of integrity the way Scherkoske does. The moral revolutionary does not derive her self-trust from having become a trustworthy member of her epistemic community, for these people place no trust in her (in fact, they think she’s a bit crazy). Scherkoske is aware of these problems, but I’m not convinced that his emphasis on the essential sociality of this virtue allows conceptual space for the moral revolutionary.
These problems aside, the book is an intriguing addition to our understanding of the complex virtue of integrity. The attempt to construct an account of integrity that preserves its honorific character while avoiding the problem of moral danger is philosophically challenging, and the arguments are laid out with exemplary clarity.
