Perilous it is indeed to write about contemporary Middle East politics, especially in book form, as rapid change, crisis, and surprise are integral parts of the factors that make the region not only a hard place about which to make predictions but also an area of such overwhelming public interest. Still, events may quickly show how an analysis was badly flawed precisely because the forces that made for a different outcome were already visible—and were ignored—before they happened.

Such is the fate of Amal Jamal's The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005. Works on the internal politics of the PLO and Fatah are clearly most needed and useful. Yet Jamal, a senior lecturer in political science at Tel Aviv University, has been caught in a time warp partially of his own making.

To see the problem, one must quote extensively from the book's opening lines, which set its theme. He writes, “The election of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) on January 9, 2005, as the head of the Palestinian Authority by a majority of 62 percent marked a very important shift in the Palestinian national movement in general and in the PA in particular.” What were these developments? Abu Mazin has now “won legitimacy” in a way that shows the “institutionalization of Palestinian democracy,” and this development shifted the region's political atmosphere “in raising the chances that the peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis might be resumed in the near future” (p. xi).

The problem is that almost one year later to the day, Hamas won a landslide victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections after doing extremely well in the local council elections. That year had been marked by ample proof of Abbas' lack of meaningful legitimacy. And if Palestinian democracy had been institutionalized—a factor undercut by civil strife and a situation of dual power between Fatah and Hamas—it was certainly not in a way that enhanced the chances for peace.

In addition, the author claims that the 2005 election had caused other important changes, all of which were soon proved wrong. “First, a majority of Palestinians now seemed to believe that negotiations were a better strategy for achieving national goals,” rather than the use of violence. Second, Abbas' victory had “put new limits on the maneuvering space of the national and Islamist opposition in the PA,” resulting in a weakening and moderation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Third, the 2005 elections “institutionalized the domination of the national political elite that crystallized after the return of the Fatah/PLO leadership to the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1994 and the establishment of coalitions between external and internal leaders in a new matrix of power under the auspices of Yasir Arafat” (p. xi).

Yet, the triumph of Hamas, the continued activities of Islamic Jihad, and the dedication of a large part of Fatah to terrorist attacks on Israel seemed to suggest the opposite conclusion, although public opinion polls also showed a continued mass interest in negotiations that was not reflected in leadership strategy. Neither Hamas nor Islamic Jihad acted as if they had been constrained. Within Fatah itself, the splits between the former external and the internal leaders grew to unprecedented extents and were a factor in the Hamas victory of January 2006.

This totally erroneous analysis is not merely the result of misfortune on the part of the author but of an analysis that greatly overestimates the extent of Arafat's strategy and the political situation between Abbas and his people, between Abbas and Fatah, within Fatah, between Fatah and Hamas, and on other fronts as well.

The book is also marred by a tendentious tendency that makes it partly a political document in its own right. For example, the key event of the 2000 Camp David summit is hardly mentioned whereas the plan offered by President Bill Clinton that same year is not referred to at all. However, this critical moment of decision, when a serious peace plan was offered that met most Palestinian demands as a starting point for negotiations, must be a centerpiece for any discussion of Palestinian politics. At this point, there was a split over how to react, ignored in the book, that was a crossroads over the future. By failing to take the road of negotiation and moderation at this point, Arafat and Fatah doomed themselves.

This does not mean, however, that the book is without real positive value. The author is aware, of course, of “fragmentation,” “elite disunity,” and “major splits” (p. 167). He narrates in detail such issues as the interrelations between the PLO elite and the local leaders in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the strategy of the Islamist leadership, the shortcomings of the Palestinian Authority and its style of management, and the impact of the 2000–2005 intifada.

This book is a contribution to the study of the Palestinian movement's structure and internal issues, including the power struggles within it. However, it is of less value for understanding the conflict and issues of the period under study. Like many other books, this study is also useful for mining facts and developments, although less so for its analysis of what they have meant.