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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 November 2005
Economic and business historians continue to carve deep into the niches of nineteenth-century internal improvements in the United States. A framework outlining the reach of the subject was provided a half century ago by George Rogers Taylor (The Transportation Revolution 1815–1860. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1951). Robert Angevine's The Railroad and the State offers many new refinements to our understanding of antebellum internal improvements and, particularly, of the motivating forces behind the initial development of the American railroad network.
Angevine traces a national interest in internal improvements to military imperatives to facilitate the movement of the troops and supplies needed to secure the defense of the early American Republic. On the supply side, indirect subsidies for internal improvements included sophisticated West Point training for civil engineers and a first generation of surveyors, and land grants to newly formed states for road construction. On the political side, Army policies were clear from the first decades of the nineteenth century on how internal improvements would advance military goals to more readily mobilize the militia and its outfittings to defend national commercial and civil interests. The Railroad and the State adds much also to our knowledge of the professionalization of the army by documenting the necessity and evolution of a permanent fighting force capable of rapid deployment throughout the nation. Military mobility, according to Angevine, was the raison d'etre for substantial government-led support for railroad development by the 1830s.
To advance the core argument, Angevine undertakes a review of federal internal improvements in the early republic. As the book subtitle implies, the themes of war, politics, and technology are intertwined and conveyed with great detail in a well-documented historical narrative. The War of 1812 brought the quick demise of the young nation's capital and made the shortcomings in rapid deployment and mobilization for internal defense plain. From this historical moment and point of analysis the argument revisits and deepens the connections tying the necessity of an internal defense capability to the development of internal improvements. The appointment of John C. Calhoun as Secretary of War in 1818 proves pivotal in the political acknowledgment that better roads would mean better national defense, and the General Survey Act of 1824 ultimately institutionalized his goals (pp. 16, 17).
Angevine builds a well-detailed case that situates planning for the orchestration of war on domestic soil as a central focus of public policies for internal improvements. The United States Military Academy made operational the means to wage a defensive war on American soil. A core curriculum created by academy leadership and faculty furnished engineers with the technical training to devise and manage road construction. The curricular emphasis of the educational program rested squarely on the technology of internal improvements, and not on cultivating the expertise to coordinate direct combat operations. Military bureaucracies were slow to respond as many of those educated in the principles of civil engineering were lured away by state governments, and the pilfering of talent was instrumental in diffusing know-how. Much of the evidence for the account is marshaled from an impressive archival review and categorization of holdings in the West Point Library collection.
In itself, the material Angevine presents to support his claims on the role of internal improvements in national security make an important contribution to the literature. But he moves on to consider the railroad as a succeeding technological innovation to diminish the time required for the rapid deployment of troops and supplies. The West Point curriculum, under the leadership of Dennis Mahan in the 1840s, shifted from an emphasis on the art of engineering to the art of war. Commercial advocates and promoters of nascent railroads stepped in to stress their military importance in quelling slave rebellions and suppressing Native American uprisings. War with Mexico in 1846 underscored the challenges of deploying troops to the furthest reaches of the continent. On the managerial side, Angevine suggests that military discipline and precision operations laid the basis for railroad management. System building requirements, and the evolution of hierarchical management, meant “railroads in the East by the 1850s were no longer an asset for the national government to support but a problem for it to regulate” (p. 113).
Angevine notes an absence of political consensus on the role of government with respect to railroads at the advent of the Civil War. But the dramatic impact of railroads on successfully prosecuting the war in the North, juxtaposed to the failures tied to a lack of cooperation between commercial and government interests in the South, infused a new political will to use the military to secure frontier regions after the conflict. Here the story of how the army provided protection and police in the construction of a transcontinental network is more familiar, thus placing the significant contributions of Angevine's book squarely in the antebellum period. The arguments and evidence in The Railroad and the State are impressively advanced, however, and do much to round out our understanding of both the origins of government-led internal improvement construction and the motivating forces that prompted the development of American railroads.