This book argues that making the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) more accountable would make it more productive and Evans’s analysis answers three critical questions. First, as regards why the UNSC should be accountable, she notes that since UNSC’s productivity depends on whether its output is complied with by states, the UNSC must be perceived by states as being legitimate. Lack of accountability would adversely impact UNSC legitimacy. Second, as regards to whom the UNSC must be accountable, Evans notes that a number of actors interact with the UNSC (including the General Assembly, International Court of Justice, non-governmental organizations, and individuals) and that the UNSC should at the very least be accountable to United Nations (UN) Member States, who are responsible for ensuring the implementation of UNSC decisions. Third, as regards for what the UNSC should be accountable, Evans submits that the UNSC should be accountable for the selection of issues on its agenda, its determinations, the implementation of its output by UN Member States, and the impact of its actions on the maintenance of international peace and security.
Drawing on the above analysis, Evans then proposes how the UNSC can be made more accountable. She suggests that the UNSC answer “accountability questions” (i) to account for the apportioning of UNSC effort, the status of matters on the UNSC agenda and reasons why items were excluded; (ii) to account for effort spent in pursuit of UN Charter purposes, the ends to which UNSC determinations were made and why published determinations were not made on other matters; (iii) to account for the implementation of UNSC work, whether UNSC conclusions were made according to Charter law, whether unambiguous directions were provided to clearly identified actors, and whether those actors were persuaded to implement the determination. Evans considers that the elected, non-permanent members of the UNSC (E10) are “representatives” of the UN Member States as a collective and are best placed to address the accountability questions (pp. 163, 175, 199).
Evans’s analysis calls for greater reflection on whether productivity necessarily follows from accountability. Evans speculates in her discussion about the UNSC’s failure to implement Article 43 of the UN Charter that there is “no saying that the blockage could not have been solved if the [UNSC] had engaged with being accountable” (p. 74). However, there is no guarantee that using the accountability questions would have operationalized Article 43. Further, Evans proposes that the General Assembly memorialize the E10’s accountability role, accompanied by rules for how the E10 must comport themselves in the UNSC (p. 226). The absence of a greater exploration of the precise form and language of the decision and rules leaves one wondering whether her framework may be tough to implement in practice.
A significant strength of Evans’s work lies in its skilful use of UNSC practice to buttress her analysis. In demonstrating her hypothesis, Evans has drawn as widely as the UNSC’s practice on peacekeeping, agenda-setting, admitting new member states, voting procedures, and the election of the UN Secretary-General.
In sum, Evans’s book is analytically rich and persuasively written. It is essential reading for those interested in UNSC reform.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
