The work of Hannah Arendt (1906–75), the brilliant German-Jewish émigré writer in the United States perhaps most widely known for her explosive, critical analysis of Adolf Eichmann's 1961 trial in Jerusalem, has hardly left the limelight of contemporary intellectual culture. The subject of several full-length biographies and philosophical interpretations, she has come to figure as a historical personage in controversial retrospectives on the ideas and Nazi politics of her early mentor Martin Heidegger. She has gained new currency as a distinctive voice in the revived field of political theory. This volume, however, views Arendt not as philosopher, theorist, journalist, or historical figure, but as a thinker who, while not a historian as such, undertook “analysis in terms of history” (255). Attention here focusses on the second volume of her landmark Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) and its key thesis: that European imperialism, from 1884 to 1914 – and particularly the “boomerang effect” that European racism and violence in the colonies had on domestic politics – provided one of the key factors that “crystallized” along with economic crisis, the “alliance between capital and mob,” anti-Semitism, and other elements to produce the hideous new world of modern despotism and its apparatuses of prison and extermination camps (180).
Oddly, this most “eurocentric” writer, preoccupied with the traditions and fate of “the West,” has recently been compared with such black intellectuals as W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James, and identified as an influence on “postcolonial” writers such as Paul Gilroy, all of whom have argued that imperialist politics, white racial domination, slavery, and colonial atrocity – however much they were kept at a distance – were central factors shaping “Western civilization” or “modernity,” signs of the modern world's infernal side unmasked on home ground during the world wars. But Arendt's thesis is a tricky one. While it bravely insists on “the circular impact of ideas and practices between metropole and colony” (69), it also nearly exonerates a self-contained “Western” culture imagined to characterize Germany before that country's late nineteenth-century entry into overseas colonizing – a belated advent, indeed, of all those forces occasioning what in Arendt's view made the modern age a catastrophe. Decrying the “profound heedlessness of human life” evident in colonial practice (3), she also thought Europeans abroad had been “traumatized” by their inability to make sense of human groups who were “uncivilized”; that is, who lacked the capacity, as defined by Classical Greek thought, to realize themselves as truly political beings (33, 49–50). This book's authors examine the perplexities in Arendt's thesis from all angles.
Despite some unevenness, the book features gems such as Ned Curthoys's lucid demonstration that Arendt's short but potent book On Violence (1970) stemmed from her engagement with decade-old disputes over rebel tactics in the Algerian war involving Sartre, Camus, Fanon, and Albert Memmi. Robert Eaglestone explains the notion of “deep history” in Heidegger, while Dan Stone shows how, for Arendt, the dread attempt to “redefine what it is to be human” (by identifying “superfluous,” hence disposable, persons) made totalitarianism a “deep-historical” event in ways Heidegger himself could never grasp (206–9, 236). Finally, Richard King's refined, synoptic essay ties together the book's themes in an elegant reflection on Arendt's definition of “the right to have rights” as the key to being human, while questioning her trust in the state as the guarantor of that right (256). Achieving breadth and keeping focus at the same time, the editors prove that we will not have leave of Arendt's work for some time to come.
