DIMENSIONS OF VARIATION

We understand armed group ideology “as a set of more or less systematic ideas that identify a constituency, the challenges the group confronts, the objectives to pursue on behalf of that group, and a (perhaps vague) program of action” (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014, 214). Having established this basic understanding, what are the variants and dimensions of ideology that help us to understand its role and effects?

The most obvious variation is the programmatic orientation—such as Marxism, ^{Footnote 2} Djihadism, or Ethnic Nationalism. While the programmatic differences between ideological schools are meaningful and consequential (Balcells and Kalyvas Reference Balcells and Kalyvas2015; Toft and Zhukov Reference Toft and Zhukov2015), a focus on broad typologies also fosters the temptation to overlook variations within these categories—variations that are of crucial importance depending on the outcome we aim to explain (see also Moro Reference Moro2017, this issue, and Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014). The National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia or the Shining Path (PCP-SL) and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru are just a few examples of Marxist insurgent groups operating in similar environments, yet with striking divergences in their ideological doctrines—with significant implications for group internal organization, institutional setup, and behavior towards civilians. Other differences arise from combinations or the lack thereof between these often contrasted ideological types, such as Marxism and Ethnic Nationalism, which may or may not overlap, again with dramatic implications (Balcells and Kalyvas Reference Balcells and Kalyvas2015), most obviously regarding the constituencies on whose behalf particular actors claim to fight. The different constituencies and modes of governance embraced by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN IM) and the Naxalite CPI (Maoist) in India are cases in point (Suykens Reference Suykens, Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly2015).

In what other ways do programmatic typologies fall short of capturing consequential variation in armed group ideologies? One is a dimension we call the “external intrusiveness” of ideology (see also Weintraub, DeBruin, and Schubiger Reference Weintraub, DeBruin and Schubiger2015): How broadly and deeply ideological content aims to penetrate other social structures. The ideologies of armed groups and radical movements differ not only in their orientation and content, but also in the extent and level of detail with which particular institutions and strategies are modeled and prescribed (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014, 214). The level of external intrusiveness of such ideological prescripts is perhaps best visible in the extent to which particular armed groups aim to govern details of the everyday private, political, and economic lives of civilians (Arjona Reference Arjona2014; Reference Arjona2016). The revolutionary or non-revolutionary character of a group has been identified as a possible explanation of its aspired reach (Kalyvas Reference Kalyvas2015b), as have programmatic orientations such as Marxism (Balcells and Kalyvas Reference Balcells and Kalyvas2015; Huang Reference Huang2016; Mampilly 2011). However, whether a group is revolutionary or not, and to which ideological school it subscribes, still leaves ample variation in ideological intrusiveness—and its implications for armed group governance, violence, and mobilization—unexplained.

In addition to the external intrusiveness, there is also considerable variation in the internal institutionalization of ideology, without which the study of ideology is incomplete. Here, we refer to the degree to which armed group institutions internally disseminate ideology (in particular through institutions for recruitment, socialization, and indoctrination), ideologically saturate the life of combatants, and transform and align their values and beliefs with those of the group (Hoover Green Reference Hoover Green2011; 2016; Gutiérrez Sanín 2012; Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Wood Reference Wood, Bergsmo, Skre and Wood2012; Zelina Reference Zelina2016). The institutional manifestations of ideology often penetrate the everyday life of combatants, continually connecting individual experiences to the goals and principles of the group. One ELN fighter described his experience as the following: “Time was reduced to a mentality in which it was necessary to think 24/7 about revolution [...] There was no time for other thoughts, neither for love, recreation or leisure” (Correa Reference Correa1997, 176-77, quoted in: Sánchez Sierra 2011, 129). Importantly, even in armed groups that are known to place a high emphasis on intensive ideological indoctrination across all ranks—such as the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), the PCP-SL, or the FARC—substantial variation in indoctrination length and practices is documented between localities and subunits (Hoover Green Reference Hoover Green2011; Ugarriza and Weintraub Reference Ugarriza and Weintraub2015; Weinstein Reference Weinstein2007).

Indeed, the extent to which both internal institutionalization and external intrusiveness are ideologically prescribed may differ markedly from the extent to which they are realized in practice. Ideological tenets as embraced by the core leadership of an organization may, for example, be encoded in written form in internal rules and regulations, but their implementation may be hindered by the hardships of warfare. While such discrepancies are indeed to be expected given the numerous external constraints armed organizations and their subunits face (such as state repression, pre-existing institutions, and resources), more research is needed to understand the varying degrees of success with which ideologically driven aspirations are met. How do doctrines, principles, and ideas trickle down from the leadership of an organization to subgroups and individual cadres, and how is this transmission reinforced and sustained? When do armed groups’ aspirations to penetrate civilian and other institutions succeed, and when do they fail? These questions are vital if we are interested in how high-risk collective action is triggered and sustained, and in explaining other important outcomes such as armed group cohesion (Schubiger 2014), governance (Arjona Reference Arjona2014; Reference Arjona2016) or violence (Hoover Green Reference Hoover Green2011; Ugarriza and Weintraub Reference Ugarriza and Weintraub2015; Wood Reference Wood2009; 2012).

We suggest that scholars interested in ideology should more often consider cases with seemingly weak manifestations of ideology. Research on armed-group ideology tends to focus on those cases where ideologies seem both intrusive and firmly institutionalized within armed organizations, and where ideological beliefs are ostensibly well internalized across all ranks. ^{Footnote 3} Acknowledging that there is ample variation in the intrusiveness and institutionalization of ideology, however, leads us to advocate an increased attention to the apparent weakness or absence of ideology to counter the truncation of studied cases on one extreme end of the spectrum. Exploring the “weaker” end of the spectrum might teach us much more about the meaning, variation, and consequences of ideology than what is currently known. Here we locate groups such as certain vigilante organizations with more conservative, defensive, or parochial agendas (Osorio, Schubiger and Weintraub Reference Osorio, Schubiger and Weintraub2016) or street gangs and other criminal organizations with seemingly non-ideological character (Kalyvas 2015a). ^{Footnote 4}

In short, we advocate to broaden the spectrum of empirical manifestations of ideology that we study in our field. Such an expanded focus may also help identify alternative and complementary explanations, which do not privilege the analytical value of ideology alone.