It's perhaps hard to imagine today, but when the Arab Spring started in 2010 there was widespread excitement that new technologies such as the smartphone and new media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube were playing a crucial role in driving the popular movements demanding democracy. Fast forward five or six years and we're far more likely to hear how those same technologies undermine democracy and even the very possibility of truth. Donatella Della Ratta's Shooting a Revolution (Reference Della Ratta2018) and Joshka Wessel's Documenting Syria (Reference Wessels2019) both diagnose the role of new media technologies in the Syrian revolution and war, offering different doses of optimism and pessimism.
When the Syrian revolution began in 2011, Della Ratta and Wessels had already conducted lengthy periods of fieldwork in the country. Della Ratta worked on popular satellite television series (musalsalāt) from 2008–11, and Wessels shot an anthropological documentary about a small desert village in Aleppo Province from 1997–2002. Their monographs are divided into two parts, with the first dealing with the period before the 2011 revolution and older media technologies and the second addressing the role of new media technologies since 2011. This has the important benefit of historicizing the post-2011 developments in Syria, as well as understanding the place of new media technologies within a broader Syrian mediascape. Wessels favors continuity in her account, arguing that the 2011 revolution “was the outcome of an accumulation of years of indirect and silent, but strong, civil resistance against the Assad regime, expressed in a variety of arts, including cinematic documentary.” (Wessels, 6) Della Ratta, on the other hand, favors an explanation of rupture, analyzing the “shift” entailed in the “mutual interaction between a disruptive political event (the uprising turned armed conflict) and a disruptive medium (networked communications technologies)” (Della Ratta, 11).
The first part of Della Ratta's Shooting Syria is a fascinating account of musalsalāt production in Syria under Bashar al-Asad, building on the important scholarship on the topic by Christa Salamandra (Reference Salamandra1998; Reference Salamandra2008; Reference Salamandra2011). Much of Della Ratta's critique relates to Miriam Cooke's notion of “commissioned criticism” (Reference Cooke2007, 65–80), the idea that the Assad regime periodically gave an artistic elite the room to criticize as an ingenious tactic to defuse public opposition (in Arabic tanfīs or “letting off steam”). Lisa Wedeen, however, had previously critiqued the notions of commissioned criticism and tanfīs as overly functionalist. They failed, she argued, to take stock of the fact that artistic transgressions can also be the site of politics in all their “ambiguity,” beyond good and bad policy, oppression and resistance (Wedeen Reference Wedeen1999, 88–92).
But Wedeen was writing about Hafiz al-Asad's rule, and Della Ratta's analysis makes the intriguing suggestion that artistic transgression—in all its continued ambiguity—might have different political implications under Bashar al-Asad. Unlike under Hafiz, artistic transgression under Bashar al-Asad ceases to be a site for tacit contestation, but rather feeds into the image of the young leader as a would-be reformer hamstrung by his father's old guard (an image that his actions during the 2011 uprising gave lie to). In the wake of Wedeen and with the benefit of hindsight, one could say that Bashar harnessed the ambiguity of artistic transgression to nourish his own sort of personality cult.
Della Ratta describes how favored producers and directors used to discreetly gain presidential approval for satellite TV shows that would have previously been censored for dealing with transgressive subjects such as sectarianism or corruption. However, discreet interventions by the president, which she calls the “whisper strategy,” allowed some controversial shows to bypass the official censors. Whereas “under Hafiz al-Asad, institutions (mu'assasāt) still seemed to prevail over personal interventions,” the opposite became the case under Bashar al-Asad (Della Ratta, 22). The result might have seemed like the loosening of state oppression, in that TV shows were broadcast that would previously have been censored. But this anti-institutional tactic also centralized power in the hands of Asad and his personal network of relatives and business cronies.
This strategy allowed Bashar al-Asad and his favored cultural producers to promote a tanwīr (or enlightenment) political ideology (Chapters 1 & 3). Della Ratta traces tanwīr's genealogy back to Gamal Abdel Nasser's mediatized ideology of modernity and progress, whose influence on the Syrian elite she sees as a hangover from the short-lived union between Egypt and Syria under the United Arab Republic. (I would also have been interested in a comparative reading between tanwīr and earlier media modernization theories on the region [see Lerner Reference Lerner1964].) According to Della Ratta, in the case of Syria, tanwīr has meant that reform becomes the preserve of top-down policy; it cannot be a demand made from below. Della Ratta thus sets up the ineluctable confrontation between the Bashar al-Asad regime's mode of government and the popular protests that would begin in March 2011.
A version of “The Whisper Strategy” (Chapter 2) originally appeared in an edited volume of essays titled “Syria, from Reform to Revolt” (Salamandra and Stenberg Reference Salamandra and Stenberg2015) alongside an article by Salamandra. In that article, Salamandra argued that the “notion of rupture… attributed no role to Syria's artistic establishment… [and] assumed the ‘traditional opposition’, which includes many media makers, had been marginal to the protest movement. Through omission, media accounts of dissident youth implied the older generation's impotence.” (Salamandra Reference Salamandra, Salamandra and Stenberg2015, 36) In line with Salamandra's criticism, Joshka Wessel's makes the case for the continued relevance of the older generation of filmmakers to the revolution. She describes her research as an exploration of “the relationship between an older and younger generation of Syrian filmmakers, exposing how these Syrians already resisted and criticized the authoritarian regime indirectly, without going on the streets, decades before the protests in 2011” (Wessels, 5). Wessels offers short biographies of those she terms the “Masters of Syrian Documentary,” pioneers such as Omar Amiralay, Ossama Mohammed, and Mohammed Malas, and includes lengthy scene-by-scene descriptions of their most celebrated films.
Wessel's intention is to spot “signs of the popular uprisings” to come in the work of documentary filmmakers. While based on extensive and deep familiarity with Syrian documentary film, Documenting Syria is unfortunately blunted by poor editing. She doesn't claim to be encyclopedic, although her selection is based on criteria that makes her thesis about the older generation's resistance sometimes seem like a self-fulfilling prophecy. She only discusses those “who have been influential and either indirectly or directly resisted or criticized oppression and the rule of the Asad regime.” Thus, numerous pages are devoted to the likes of Hala Abdullah and Omar Amiralay, while Abdellatif Abdelhamid gets only a single paragraph because apparently “he's never been very critical of the Asad regime, and he still works in Syria”—despite the fact that she admits he's “widely acclaimed.”
In the following chapter, “Inspired by the Masters, a New Generation”, she applies the same mix of biography and scene-by-scene description to those she terms “a new generation,” but whom I would call an intermediate generation. In effect, they are filmmakers who neither navigated the Hafiz al-Asad regime's institutionalized censorship nor had the support of the National Film Organization (NFO), but who experimented with digital video in the years leading up to the 2011 uprising. I'd quibble some of her categorizations of specific filmmakers, such as placing Ali al-Atassi in this intermediate generation rather than the older “Masters” generation. There are also surprising omissions, such as the anonymous collective of filmmakers Abounaddara, who've won numerous prizes since 2011. I'd then have separated off a younger generation, who began making documentaries in the wake of the 2011 revolution, sometimes starting out as media activists. This would include the likes of Avo Kaprealian, Sara Fattahi, Orwa al-Mokdad, and Saeed al-Batal, as well as the inspiring Bassel Shehadeh, who was killed by regime bombardment in Homs in 2012 and to whom Wessels devotes an entire chapter that acts as a bridge between her history of documentary filmmaking in Syria and her analysis of media activism post-2011.
It's not until the second part of both monographs that the authors broach the question of the relations between new media and the Syrian revolution and war. For Wessels, the two-part structure of the text suggests a chain of influence from documentary cinema to new media, but she doesn't really succeed in proving it. In the vein of Elias and Omareen, who saw the young new media activists as fulfilling the long-heralded Third Cinema (Reference Omareen, Elias, Halasa, Omareen and Mahfoud2014), she describes smartphone wielding activists as “many Dziga Vertovs with digital video cameras used to document reality of war [sic] as experienced and seen by the person holding the camera” (Wessels, 179). However, documentary cinema did not serve as a direct precedent for the work of media activists (whether pro- or anti-regime, secular or Islamist). Rather, with the onset of the 2011 revolution, new media technologies were not only influencing documentary filmmakers but also transforming their fundamental conditions of production. Films such as Ossama Mohammad's Syria Self-Portrait, Silvered Water (2014) include great big montages of user-generated content. Firas Fayyad behaved like a one-man satellite news station, subcontracting members of the Aleppo Media Center to shoot his Oscar-nominated Last Men in Aleppo, rather than risk his own life in the besieged city. And the Abounaddara collective's six years of weekly shorts responded to the deluge of YouTube clips even while critiquing their content.
In Della Ratta's case, although her aim is to understand the shifting relations between media and power caused by digital networks, she sometimes fails to theorize the implications of what she conceptualizes as a rupture in her introduction. In the latter sections, the shift from satellite TV to digital networks often seems to be more one of intensity, in which conceptual schema centered on overlapping notions like “the image” or “the network” gloss over any noticeable contrasts. This has the benefit of allowing her to think about new media technologies with some of the seminal texts of critical theory, from Deleuze to Rancière via Debord and Baudrillard (see also Zabunyan Reference Zabunyan2016). For example, Della Ratta draws on Debord to claim that “social beings have become image-defined and image-determined; and even more so now that networked media have come into play” (Della Ratta, 180). But at points, her use of these scholars can also lead to muddled concepts. Referring to Baudrillard, Della Ratta claims that two concepts “in today's networked age have come to play a role more central than ever: the mass and the media.” (183) But in her analysis, “image-production” under conditions of “networked communications technologies” is “diffuse, decentralised, and fragmented,” it “disjoints people, rendering them into shareable commodities and disintegrating everything but itself” (182). The implication of the “mass,” however, is that it turns everyone who watches a screening or listens to a broadcast into one great big anonymous crowd consuming scheduled content. Hence why media scholars use terms like “swarm” or “multitude” for social collectivities in relation to digital media (see Galloway, Thacker, and Wark Reference Galloway, Thacker and Wark2014; Han Reference Han2017).
Whether we are optimistic or pessimistic about the role of new media technologies in social movements, and whether we theorize in terms of continuity or rupture, they force us to re-think the relationship between older media technologies and the political systems and social collectivities they cohabited with (see also Gitelman Reference Gitelman2008). And this is something that both these monographs, discussing satellite TV series or documentary cinema alongside digital media, hint at.
Della Ratta's concept of “expansion” captures something of this idea. In an interesting final section of the last chapter by Della Ratta, she describes how in August 2012, armed rebels seized the set of Syria's most popular satellite TV show, Bab al-Hara, located in the Damascus green belt. They began using the set to make YouTube clips referencing the anti-colonial struggle for independence from the French that is the subject of the musalsal. Regime forces besieged them in an attempt to wrest the symbolic site back, and once they did, they began producing their own clips, claiming in turn the mantle of being the only legitimate anti-colonial force. For Della Ratta, the episode demonstrates that the effect of “networks” is that “the message of unity and shared identity once promoted by the TV series is disrupted, as Bab al-Hara itself is transformed into, at the same time, a pro-regime and an anti-regime work.” What this episode showed, according to Della Ratta, was how these digital media technologies dissolve the national consensus and “build new personalised versions of Syria's past and, therefore, future.” (191) Expansion is the process whereby digital media seeps out of a designated context and parasitically attaches itself to previously settled articulations between media formations and political collectivities.
The analysis is provocative and the implications striking. New media technologies become not only the conditions of possibility for practices in the present, but also the medium through which Syrians can re-view the past in the present, just as they become the yardstick by which scholars measure articulations between political systems and media technologies during past conjunctures. It's common to think about the effect new media technologies will have on the future, but that means we often end up paying less attention to how they change our relationship to the past.
