This book is a remarkable and penetrating study of what has come to be known as the Socratic turn, namely, Socrates's having turned away from his youthful quest for a (materialistic) science of nature in favor of the kind of inquiry that he is known for, an examination through dialogue of such humanly significant matters as justice and the good. And since the main evidence that there was such a turn comes from a rather short passage in Plato's Phaedo, Sebell's book is primarily an interpretation of that passage. Now as Sebell himself makes clear, his chief motive for engaging in this work was not a merely scholarly one, but rather his concern to know whether genuine science—of good and evil in the first place, but ultimately of the whole—is attainable or even something that should be pursued. For having seen that Socrates's intellectual autobiography in the Phaedo articulates these questions and suggests that he had found an adequate response to them, Sebell wanted to understand that response to see if it is truly adequate. It is clear, moreover, that he has come to think that this might well be the case, or as he writes in his concluding sentence, “if Socrates’ reason [for denying that anyone is in possession of a knowledge superior to his own, merely human knowledge] was a sufficient one, unlikely as it may seem, then the scientific method would be nothing other than the Socratic method” (146). Yet it seems to me to be a sign of genuine openness on Sebell's part that this conclusion remains conditional.
Over the past few decades, a number of works have been published that interpret the Phaedo in the same general way that Sebell does. According to this interpretation, Socrates suggests an argument that seeks to justify the philosophic way of life without any reliance on a belief in the immortality of the soul. Thus his arguments for the immortality of the soul are not seriously meant, but are intended, rather, primarily to console his young companions and to help them maintain their faith in philosophy without confronting them with the harsh truths that the genuine case for the philosophic life requires. But while this approach to the Phaedo is not new, no one before Sebell has given nearly the attention that he does to the precise difficulties that Socrates saw in both the materialistic and the teleological approaches to natural science, difficulties that led him to doubt the possibility of science altogether. And no one has given nearly the attention that he does to the question of why Socrates's mature focus on such matters as the noble and the good was a necessary part of his attempt to justify philosophy, that is, the pursuit of science, in the face of these doubts. And not only does Sebell give attention to these and other crucial subjects, but his treatment of them is both original and enlightening.
According to Sebell, pre-Socratic natural scientists wanted to find some unchanging, eternal material of all things, a material whose fixity would confirm the philosophic presupposition that there is no coming into being from nothing. But as Sebell persuasively argues, a simply unchanging material cannot account for the manifest changes that occur within our world (49–50); nor can any elemental material account for the characters of the things around us, as it would have to do in order to become known as the ultimate cause of everything (51–55). Sebell also presents a powerful argument against teleology, namely, that in order to make intelligible its claim that the good is the cause of everything, it must understand the good as good for some being or beings that are in need of it; accordingly, the natures of those beings must be more fundamental than the good, and yet teleology also persists in regarding the good as the ultimate cause (82, 86, 90–91). And as for Socrates's mature attention to the noble and the good, Sebell makes the powerful suggestion that incoherence in men's unreflective opinions about these matters, an incoherence not unrelated to that which he finds in teleology, stands in the way of an adequate understanding of death, without which understanding the fundamental presupposition of philosophy would seem to be arbitrary (100, 139, 142–43).
Sebell's arguments regarding these and other subjects are worked out almost entirely through his interpretation of the Platonic text and as a response to questions that arise from the text itself. But here I must raise a caveat. For even though I find his treatment of the text to be persuasive and illuminating on the whole, there are times when it seems to me that he might be forcing the text to fit his argument rather than allowing the argument, in a possibly even superior form, to emerge from the text. And I wonder whether a more patient wrestling with the many difficulties that the text presents might not have allowed him to deepen his account. Let me limit myself to a single example of the tendency I have in mind. As part of his argument that a being cannot be reduced to its material components, Sebell refers to Socrates's remark that when he was young he had assumed that ten is bigger than eight through two being added to it, and he interprets this as an assumption on the young Socrates's part that ten is “nothing but” five twos. And when Socrates says in the sequel that it had seemed to him that two cubits were more than one cubit through exceeding the latter by half of itself, Sebell interprets this as meaning that two was conceived by him at the time “not as a one or as a whole, but rather as a compound, consisting of materials or elements (two ones) of its own” (52). But Sebell contends that two is not in truth a compound, but rather its parts together, and as such “not (two) ones,” but “just two (once), and nothing more” (53). Now I myself do not have an adequate interpretation of this passage. But it doesn't seem to me that Socrates's youthful claim that ten is bigger than eight through the addition of two meant that ten is nothing but five twos. Nor do I see that two being its parts together, that is, two (once), means that it is not also (two) ones. (The passage that Sebell cites here from Aristotle's Metaphysics says that the being or “beingness” [ousia] of a number is what it is once [e.g., once six, and not twice three]; but this is not to say that the number itself is not also a compound.) More generally, the relations between a being, its form, and its material components seem to me to be more complex than Sebell, or I for that matter, have yet understood.
If I am right in this criticism, and in my suspicion that there are other instances of this sort of weakness, Sebell's book is not yet a wholly adequate account of the Socratic turn. But we should be grateful for it nevertheless, since it makes it much clearer than previous scholarship has done what such an account would be.
