In her new book, theorist of international law Anne Orford embarks on an aggressive intellectual war against professional historians, cheekily insisting that these rowdy upstarts required a massive show of writerly force. There may, as is common in such cases, have been some border skirmishing before Orford's breathtaking escalation, the kind of low-level if petty sniping across lines that occurs in a world composed of disciplines and fields, each guarding its turf and waving its flag. But as with most such interventions in “self-defense” that misrepresent the prior state of play (and their own offensive purposes), the rationales for Orford's action turn out to be flimsy on inspection. And the fog of war that the book leaves behind—while she certainly knocks out one or two legitimate targets—obscures that the biggest clashes of ideology and interest are hardly between disciplines. Rather than a defense of our various intellectual homelands, our best politics is athwart borders. Make love not war—or save war for when it is worth the fight.
The gist of International Law and the Politics of History is that, a few years ago, historians began profaning the sacred precincts of international lawyers. Orford, a professor of international law at the University of Melbourne, says that historians took it upon themselves to police epistemological simplicities, and especially the anachronistic and teleological attempts at historical narrative to which international lawyers were prone. More controversially and surprisingly, Orford associates this interloping with a lurking “neo-formalist” threat, by promising to provide impartial accounts of international law's history and meaning. The casus belli, Orford emphasizes, is that it turns out that historians have generally relied on extremely primitive assumptions about facts, reality, and truth, as if studying the past (of international law or anything else) were merely about getting it right. Naïve empiricists, historians believe they can correct accounts of international law forged inside the field by contextualizing and researching it from outside. And their posturing is having deplorable effects. History, Orford fears, has lured too many to think there really is an “objective ground” for legal claims (p. 5).
After providing her own account of the origins of a recent turn to history in international legal scholarship, Orford begins International Law and the Politics of History by offering up a genealogy of the beliefs of the so-called “Cambridge school” of intellectual history, which Orford sees as an especially pernicious source of objectivist assumptions. In turn, Orford's intervention on behalf of her fellow international lawyers is the reminder that law is political—with the difference that lawyers know it, and make this disturbing and hard-won truth central to their practice. “For lawyers,” Orford patiently explains, “the relation of the world of evidence and the work of interpretation is more complicated” (p. 219). The outcome of the contrast, Orford concludes, is that historians should learn rather than teach. Indeed, it is international lawyers who should adopt the tutelary responsibility of explaining to historians of law how to live in epistemologically strenuous conditions of the modern world. Like the rest of reality, law is not found but made. According to Orford's (self-)promotional account, international lawyers bring the politics of knowledge to the center of their practice. Fact and truth about the past are no refuge from the continuous struggle over the present and future, and certainly no rationale for restoring formalism.
Was this really what happened, and does it justify military shock and awe, or—like most belligerency—prompt melancholy reflection amidst the carnage? In an illuminating recent account of international law's “history wars,” Natasha Wheatley shows that there was an Australian tinderbox for the inferno.Footnote 1 Ian Hunter, Orford's fellow Australian, antagonized her by accusing international lawyers of presentism, or the anachronistic introduction of present-day perspectives into their accounts of the past. And her genealogy of contemporary historicism culminates in him, a frequent presence in this book (far beyond the lengthy section about him) who manifestly prompted Orford's response. Yet there were several extraordinary ironies about the local origins of the campaign, and the picayune spat in response to which Orford embraces Armageddon.
The first was that Hunter, while an affiliate of a kind (mostly elective and strategic) of the so-called “Cambridge school,” is hardly a charter member, and arguably quite unrepresentative of it. The second was that the Cambridge school is itself hardly definitive or representative of contemporary historical practice. Orford's attempted intellectual history of the Cambridge school, in the longest chapter of International Law and the Politics of History, inadvertently helps isolate just how idiosyncratic Hunter is. He is especially so in his amiable penchant, which clearly rubbed Orford the wrong way, to declare vast tracts of modern thought a bankrupt metaphysical project (pp. 157–71). Though it is a proposition that Hunter deployed the Cambridge school's antiquarian rhetoric and contextualizing procedures to defend, he is far too original to epitomize its approach. And if it is idiosyncratic within the Cambridge school, Hunter's metaphysics-baiting is even more alien to the historical profession as a whole.
Alas, the antipodean sparks ignited the blaze of Orford's wrath anyway, which seems neither necessary nor proportionate. A conference that brought critical legal scholars into confrontation with the current crop of Cambridge University historians ratified the impression of brewing hostilities, albeit largely because it skirted any heterogeneous representation on either side of the divide between law and history. Historians from the ancient university town faced the founders of the specific current of the critical legal studies movement to which Orford claims fealty—even though both tendencies have been in a state of disintegration from their glory years for some time.Footnote 2 As early mobilization commenced, Lauren Benton, a leading historian of international law from outside such confined networks, warned Orford not to confuse the Cambridge school with the diverse and pluralistic discipline of history.Footnote 3 Unfortunately, Orford treats this plea for caution, abating tension before the deployment of further heavy weaponry, as just more antagonizing incitement (pp. 100–01).
In Orford's finished account, International Law and the Politics of History concedes, mostly in one or two footnotes, just how contested and even isolated the Cambridge School in particular really is (pp. 88–91). The Cambridge school's notorious antiquarian pose, as Orford briefly mentions, has been abandoned even by its own scions, while its contextualist mode is anything but dominant (pp. 89–90). Much might be said about Orford's readings of Herbert Butterfield, J.G.A. Pocock, and Quentin Skinner, antecedents to Hunter, but the main thing is that her concentration on them testifies to Orford's continuing and uncorrected sense that such traditions can stand by proxy for historical practice today. They cannot. But to the extent this is true—and it is far truer than Orford either knows or lets on in the book—the rationale for her war collapses.
In fairness, Orford is correct that some historians have implausibly pulled rank on lawyers. There are a number of successes in her attack plan in response, in part because indiscriminate onslaughts can hit some legitimate targets (whether earlier exchanges justify a larger war is another matter). I should acknowledge that in a more than decade-old book The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (2010), I contributed to the strife. In a moment of bravado and immaturity I hope I have outgrown, but that Orford cites no fewer than eight times including in the table of contents, I promised to furnish the “real history” of human rights (cited at pp. vii, 79, 80, 81, 254, 262, 264, 265). Of course, I forthrightly accept and appreciate Orford's reprimand: there is no such thing as real history. Mea culpa. Orford was also annoyed by other condescending statements of mine to the effect that historians often do a better job than lawyers in reconstructing the past (pp. 99–100). Even if they do—it is their job, and there certainly are better and worse histories even if there are not real ones—Orford's annoyance in response is even fairer if only because, contrary to her misrepresentation, The Last Utopia was not even offered up as a history of international law in the first place.
Yet notwithstanding Orford's sometimes well-founded frustrations with those who overclaim, little else about recent scholarship, on either side of the disciplinary line she ventures to police in her book, is recognizable to someone who has spent some time in both territories. To castigate historians and idealize lawyers, Orford systematically distracts from the actual (dare I say real?) state of play in both history and law. For example, it was not a disciplinary historian but an international lawyer—Martti Koskenniemi—who famously initiated a good part of the current historiography of international law, with professional historians inspired by his work to join him.Footnote 4 Strangely, while obsessed with Hunter, Orford does not mention this “fact,” which is sort of like Tom Stoppard's elevation of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to centrality, only without the absurdist intent.
True, international law discourse is sometimes more openly political and presentist than the writings of some academic historians. But few historians—or at least not many—reject presentism in some form, and even fewer regard history as independent of politics. Now, it is true that historians are empiricists of some kind. But lawyers are too. By this I mean that in both fields there are discursive obligations to make claims about the world, past and present, and to provide evidence for them. In the main, members of both disciplines understand that acquiring, characterizing, and managing facts is part of their intellectual practice. And it is also part of their discursive habits to present themselves as making truth-claims, indicting false or inadequate representation along the way. Orford does so all the time, offering an attempt at a contextual history of the recent turn to history and a deeper history of the Cambridge school.
But such descriptive and explanatory practice, with its claims to adequacy, is hardly objectivist in the sense Orford means. If depictions of the world—the way it is or has been—are essential to both history and law, and the adequacy of representation has to be tested, it by no means follows that many think that either the representation or the testing is somehow immune from ideology or interest. This is not the place to work out a precise account of what historians think about our universal epistemological situation. Some historians have attempted to rescue objectivity from the lure of neutrality, while others have accepted (or celebrated) that discourses of truth-claiming are constituted by conventional practice, and that there is therefore a politics of historiography—just as sophisticated lawyers learned over the same twentieth-century timeline to acknowledge that there is a politics of law. For example, German theorist Jörn Rüsen has argued that the criteria for adequacy in representation (which are never static) are provided by ongoing disciplinary activity.Footnote 5 No one, however, thinks that anything goes. Not even critical international lawyers get to just make it up, however politically inspiring their purposes.
Much of The Politics of International Law reads as if historians have never grappled with epistemological quandaries, and as if saying that history is political were either novel or useful in itself. They have, and it is not. No understanding of the trajectory of the discipline of history in the twentieth century could miss the intramural struggles around its own procedures and politics. There is certainly a case to be made that the outcomes leaves a great deal to be desired.Footnote 6 But large tomes chronicle how history moved beyond the empiricism and objectivism Orford finds pervasive, and the historical profession has even attempted to work out the histories of the concepts of “anachronism,” “context,” “fact,” or “objectivity” on which Orford implies the profession as a whole unthinkingly relies.Footnote 7 Indeed, acquaintance with this background, absent in Orford's book, is the mainstay of training in the field.
Worse, what is lost in the fracas of Orford's clash of fields is the endurance of genuine epistemological quandaries shared across disciplinary lines with which historians and lawyers alike wrestle, whether with help from each other or from philosophers or social theorists.Footnote 8 At present, no one can claim epistemological superiority—especially not by suggesting that they alone grapple with indeterminacy and uncertainty. Everyone knows, after all, that there are bad history books, just as there are bad law books. The difficult question—debated by historians as by lawyers in their different modes and literatures for decades—is where constraint in description and interpretation comes from (especially when the “reality” most history and law represents is not a human-independent one but instead reprocesses prior human representations). Yet such inquiry into actual and desirable forms of control of and constraint on inevitably presentist agendas in scholarship is simply missing from International Law and the Politics of History, as if barefoot historians refer to “reality” and sophisticated lawyers understand that it is not there.
In any event, Orford's brief against empiricism and objectivism is not an attack on remotely the same target as the “formalism” in legal interpretation that seems to be her ultimate concern. Orford charges that historians are inadvertently strengthening the hand of those lawyers who pretend that law is apolitical, out of a desire for an “exit from the uncertainty, self-doubt, or existential dread produced by arguments about the indeterminacy of legal rules or the lack of transcendent values upon which to base a shared law” (7, cf. 296–98). However, she presents no reason to think that historians wrote their work, and little evidence that it was received, in the spirit of restoring formalist assumptions. If anything, in fact, it is the other way around. Just as Orford omits that it was an international lawyer who most influentially catalyzed attention to the history of international law, she fails to mention that it was also Koskenniemi, not historians on the other side of any disciplinary line, who called for a new “culture of formalism” in his initial foray into history.Footnote 9
If there are common or at least cognate quandaries that historians and lawyers share, it is on both sides of the demarcation line between them that there is a risk of epistemological simplification. Mistakenly or strategically, historians can pretend they are “telling the truth about history,” just as lawyers can feign innocence—actually are more likely to do so, especially in judicial settings, where the rules of the game require it—in claiming to identify not just facts about the world but also what law requires on putatively neutral criteria. It is strange, however, to scapegoat historians for believing (or claiming to) in formalism. Historians have not ever volunteered to pretend to say “what the law is” even as lawyers are still trained from their earliest days to do so. Both sides of Orford's divide are facing the modern world with its strenuous epistemological conditions together—and can indulge in the common temptation to deny them. But that does not mean that any historian is to blame for the lawyer's characteristic form of avoiding the political stakes of her practice. In sum, Orford's suggestion that international lawyers were pursuing peaceful coexistence before armed attack justifying her self-defense falls flat. Not all or even much of the discipline she raids is guilty of the excesses she denounces, even as a great many in the field she defends are.
But what is most depressing about International Law and the Politics of History is not epistemological; it is that Orford sets back her own declared politics. If historians have had no detectable interest in restoring a lost foundation for legal authority, in fact, it is because in recent times they have generalized a growing skepticism about the credentials of international law as a credible source of moral improvement or even defensible political order. When they got interested in the topic, they abetted, or tried to, the scholarship of critical international lawyers in what was self-consciously a common project against comparable enemies with both disciplines—and, even more, in response to the adulation of international law in the makings of the “end of history” after 1989. To the extent Orford's own past and future work has been part of that project, her friendly fire against fellow historians on slender justification is nothing short of bewildering.
Orford has declared the wrong war. Her book offers a defense of and tutorial on behalf of a tiny number of “critical” international lawyers in the face of supposedly threatening historians. It does not acknowledge how much Orford's fellow lawyers have resisted her school's brand of critical insight, while also repudiating historical perspectives that put disciplinary orthodoxy in question. Orford is so taken by her framing that she disregards how resistant mainstream international lawyers have been to critical accounts by those inside and outside the discipline to rewrite the origins and trajectory of legal fields. There are no more “Whigs to write history” and therefore no need for a critical historiography debunking progressive and teleological accounts of international law, Orford laughs at one point, as if such accounts of international law were not dominant in her own field and in public culture (p. 78). For example, consider the global discourse claiming that, before Donald Trump despicably flouted it, a beneficent “rules-based international order” governed the world.
The pity of Orford's war is that she forsakes critical historiography as a crucial weapon in her own campaign not for disciplinary hegemony but for a more desirable future. Orford complains that historian Quinn Slobodian, in his already classic account of the makings of economic neoliberalism, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (2018), did not cite her articles on trade law. But while Orford reports feeling “[t]he flash of recognition” when “reading the Ordoliberals” because “their work offered a normative account of the vocabulary and assumptions underlying the project of European integration, the GATT, and the WTO agreements,” the pieces Orford insists Slobodian should have footnoted did not do the historical work he undertook (p. 269).Footnote 10 Magnifying trivial slights while obviating team spirit, such failure of engagement typifies Orford's book. As usual across its pages, Orford discusses how Slobodian characterizes his work but not the work itself, alleging that he gave himself too much credit. But the important fact is that Globalists enormously abetted Orford's concurrent aspiration to identify imperial continuities and economic injustice in contemporary international law—only to face her comeuppance for no credible reason.
In her concluding pages, Orford makes the provocative suggestion that liberal internationalism requires no more critique, and therefore historicism no longer serves the purposes for which it was devised (pp. 318–19). There is a lot to ponder in this claim, yet Orford introduces it too late and too tentatively to lend credence to the operation it closes. Regardless, readers of International Law and the Politics of History will not emerge with a sufficient understanding of what is actually required to reconstitute the making of liberal or neoliberal law—or the making of any other legal order—with its biases and injustices. The historical profession, for sure, invites challenge from within and critique from without for blind spots, errors, and parochialisms. But then, none of its members have written a book about the study of the past that shows so little interest in it.
