In this ambitious book, Daniel Cohen argues that in the nineteenth century, mathematicians' minds were thought to be in touch with the underlying properties of the universe. A mathematics-based philosophy suggested a ‘true and universal faith’ that transcended sectarian boundaries. This was not just warmed-over Platonism; it was intricately linked with the social, economic, religious and institutional features of Victorian society. Mathematics could combat both the threat of secular materialism and the uninspired religiosity of the established church. Cohen sees theology also as having motivated the turn from applied to pure mathematics. Only in the 1860s and 1870s did academic mathematicians, he says, begin to isolate themselves from theology.
Cohen's best three chapters discuss the views of Benjamin Peirce, George Boole and Augustus De Morgan, based on their manuscripts as well as their published writings. The eminent American algebraist Benjamin Peirce spoke of mathematical formulae as coming from ‘the divine source of all geometry’. Cohen places Peirce's idea of the ‘divinity of mathematics’ in the context of American Transcendentalism and Unitarianism, whose adherents idealized the state of knowledge human beings could achieve. Along with Peirce, Thomas Hill, president of Harvard in the 1860s, wanted to make mathematics central to higher education, ‘to unleash genius and reveal eternal laws’. This went beyond pure mathematics: the close fit between mathematical concepts and the universe, Peirce said, was no accident; it too was of divine origin.
The logician George Boole had an epiphany at age seventeen: he was struck by the idea that the mind sees objects in relation to an all-encompassing unity. Boole never forgot this divine manifestation. He saw mathematical ideas arising from the mind of God, and hoped that his symbolic logic could advance religious belief. Boole's logic, in which the unit 1 represents the universe of thought, satisfied his longing for unity. Horrified by the Irish famine and the disputes between Protestants and Catholics, Boole saw logic also as ‘an unbiased way to analyze contested doctrines’ (p. 98), as logicians could replace words with symbols which could be consistently manipulated without reference to their meaning. Boole's illustrations of his symbolic logic included analyses of the Jewish dietary laws and Samuel Clarke's proof of the existence of God.
De Morgan's relation to religion was different. He wanted mathematics to become a profession. For this to happen, De Morgan thought mathematics could no longer be ‘transcendental’ but had to circumscribe and secularize itself. He also wanted a technically exact symbolic logic so that logic could be taken back from the metaphysicians and used instead as a tool to refute dogmatism and diminish social strife. He applied statistical methods to analyse biblical texts, concluding that the Authorized Version ‘was no more than a translation of distant copies of fragments of contradictory accounts … by a multitude of authors’ (p. 114). Surprisingly, De Morgan was attracted to spiritualism, which he saw as linked to progressive politics, and he attacked the dogmatism of the anti-spiritualists. Finally, his interest in the history and philosophy of mathematics came from his decision that mathematics was a human construction, not ‘equations from God’ (p. 132).
Cohen's chapter on mathematics in the late nineteenth century describes mathematicians organizing themselves, systematizing mathematics education and judging and sanctioning nonprofessional behaviours ranging from circle-squaring to putting theological ideas in technical papers. The escape from sectarian conflict and the idea that mathematics is a human construct promoted both professionalization and secularism. Meanwhile, developments on the Continent, especially the progress of mathematical analysis from Cauchy to Cantor, made mathematics seem even more professional and abstract.
Unfortunately, the author often does not consider alternative sources for the views he attributes to nineteenth-century theology. For instance, Leibniz took the first steps in constructing a symbolic logic, a ‘universal characteristic’, which he said would end disputes by reducing them to calculation; Cohen does not even mention this. Condorcet, whose name does not appear in Cohen's index, described symbolic algebra as potentially applicable to all combinations of ideas. Although Cohen alludes to the Cambridge Analytical Society, he does not discuss the influence of their formalism on Boole. George Peacock makes it into the index as an educational reformer, but not for the discussion, in his Treatise on Algebra, of manipulating algebraic symbols without regard to their meaning. The ‘modesty’ championed by De Morgan was anticipated in France in 1821 by Cauchy, incidentally a conservative Catholic, who said mathematics should be confined to its proper domain, not used to address problems in history and ethics. Indeed, Cohen treats the increasing abstraction and professionalization of Continental mathematics in the nineteenth century with no reference to any philosophical and theological underpinnings, not even mentioning the theological background of Cantor's ideas about the actual infinite. As for the enlistment of mathematical methods to avoid sectarianism, in the eighteenth century the universal agreement geometry commanded had already made it a weapon, in the hands of men like Voltaire, to attack partisans in religious and philosophical disputes.
There are some statements that seem to me to be errors. For example, I doubt that it was mathematical notation that Plato saw bridging the gap between the Forms and the physical world. John Dee's idea that mathematics involves the perfect demonstration of necessary conclusions cannot, as the author seems to imply, be the same as Peirce's ‘mathematics is the science that draws necessary conclusions’ since Peirce, unlike Dee, was well aware that there are other consistent algebraic systems than generalized numbers (such as the noncommutative quaternions), and other geometries than the Euclidean. And Euclid's fifth postulate is not, as the author asserts, the statement that parallels are unique.
Readers, then, should be cautious about the book's sweeping causal claims, and should check unfamiliar details. Nonetheless, Cohen has successfully situated the work of Peirce, Boole and De Morgan in social and religious context, making this book a valuable contribution to the literature on the mathematics of the English-speaking world in the nineteenth century.
