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By the beginning of the chapter, eight Kuwaitis have been sent home and four remain to have habeas hearings in federal court. The hearings considered whether these men had become “part of” the Taliban or Al Qaida. They were all tried before the same judge in 2009. Two had their habeas petitions granted, and two were denied. This chapter considers the evidence at the hearings in depth and analyzes the differing results. Two of the detainees’ proceedings were tainted by evidence and confessions procured by torture; while the other two detainees were abused, they were not the focus of the hearings. The underlying facts relating to the four men had numerous similarities, but the judge had changed her focus in the later hearings, looking far more closely at inconsistencies in the stories of detainees, inconsistencies that she ignored in the first two hearings. The chapter also highlights the conduct of a few detainee informers whose stories kept hundreds of men incarcerated and how easily their evidence was picked apart by a neutral judge.
More than 2.7 million men and approximately 65,000 women served in Vietnam or in the Southeast Asian theater between 1963 and 1975. Yet much of the literature on the American side of the Vietnam War discusses the role of decision-making by presidents and their civilian advisors, along with military strategy developed and directed by general-grade officers. This chapter instead deals with the combat soldiers and marines who actually did the fighting in the jungles and rice paddies of South Vietnam. These “grunts” had to first be selected, then trained, then sent to “repo-depots” where they became replacements for those who had been killed or wounded by the National Liberation Front or People’s Army of Vietnam soldiers. They were then sent to the field with their new units and would serve one year before “coming home.” Society would then have to deal with thousands of returning veterans, many with PTS(D) and some with a newly identified condition – moral injury.
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