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The consolidation of authoritarian populism depicting democratically elected leaders and parties aggrandizing their power through the routines of the democratic process has gained significant traction in the last decade. It re-engages the question of the role of courts in protecting the democratic process by reviewing the work of governing institutions prone to abuse. However, the question has for now mostly been asked in the context of a ‘self-contained’ constitutional democracy. In this article, I transpose the question onto the plane of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Central to this transposition is the conceptual challenge that while the ECtHR adjudicates rights over and above the state, in the Court’s case law these rights are significantly defined in procedural terms, often deriving institutional implications that resemble the prescriptions of the ‘political process theory’ of judicial review originally put by John Hart Ely in the context of the US constitution and recently expanded by Stephen Gardbaum and other scholars in comparative constitutional law. In surveying thematic portions of the case law, I aim to show that the concerns of ‘political process theory’ regarding institutions and procedures as core subjects of judicial review can take the route of rights. I argue that the ECtHR’s account of ‘democratic society’ provides an exemplar of such rights-based political process theory in the European human rights context and discuss both its merits and limits.
This chapter examines the justiciability of the right to science, identifying historical, conceptual and legal factors that have contributed to its marginalisation. It first addresses the historical evolution of human rights from the unified Universal Declaration of Human Rights into two distinct Covenants, leading to misconceptions around ESC rights’ justiciability. Clarifying the concept of justiciability, the chapter distinguishes between formal justiciability existing mechanisms for adjudication – and material justiciability, concerning clarity and enforceability of the right’s normative content. The analysis systematically challenges misconceptions about ESC rights’ alleged non-justiciability and evaluates contemporary international, regional and national enforcement mechanisms. Highlighting a significant gap between established formal justiciability and underdeveloped material justiciability, the chapter argues for greater definitional clarity regarding the normative content of the right to science, setting the stage for the subsequent chapters which further articulate this right’s substantive elements and promote its practical enforcement.
What is unprincipled adjudication and when, if ever, is it justified? In addressing those questions, this essay attempts to complete a project begun with Professor Fred Schauer.
This introduction offers an overview of the evolving role of artificial intelligence in civil dispute resolution, discussing current developments against the background of broader technological, regulatory and institutional contexts. It examines the dual forces of genuine innovation and persistent hype, clarifies the book’s open and technology-neutral definition of AI, and articulates an equally broad conception of civil dispute resolution encompassing adjudicative but also consensual, formal but also informal mechanisms. The introduction also outlines the book’s comparative ambition and structural organisation, ultimately framing AI as a transformative yet contested actor whose integration into justice systems demands careful, context-sensitive governance.
This chapter attempts to articulate a new framework for a modern (contemporary) conception of ICA. It asserts that the current Free Proof rubric is but an ad hoc black-box paradigm of unworkable adjudication. Even though an aprioristic exclusionary evidential approach is discouraged, the point is made that such understanding of evidence is hardly foreign to ICA, and is contained in the IBA Rules. A fine line, so that argument says, must be drawn between preserving the inherent powers of arbitrators and the workings of an objective evidential regime. Hypotheticals are offered in this regard. Lastly, the chapter examines the need to have a workable approach to witness examination. Here the myth that cross-examination has its origins in Anglo-American trial work is substantively challenged by the classical writings of Plato.
Edited by
Monika Zalnieriute, Law Institute of the Lithuanian Centre for Social Sciences,Agne Limante, Law Institute of the Lithuanian Centre for Social Sciences
Failure to deliver a fair trial within a reasonable time is the most common violation found by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as almost half of all its judgments include a violation of Article 6. If the ECtHR were subject to its own jurisdiction, however, it, too, would be in violation of Article 6 in a sizable portion of its judgments. Therefore, both reports by the Court itself and academic literature have urged the Court to increase digitalisation and employ new technologies, including AI, in its procedures. Historically, the Court has employed an ambivalent approach to new technology, incorporating it in its caseload management, but insisting on the use of fax and physical mail in its communications with applicants. There are indicators, such as allowing electronic applications from Ukraine due to the suspension of physical mail during the war with Russia, that the Court may be abandoning this ambivalence. This chapter accounts for the current and potential use of AI at the ECtHR in each of the steps in its adjudication, evaluating the potential of existing AI technologies and the risks involved, considering the procedures and divisions of labour at the ECtHR.
The Permanent Court of International Justice (1919–1946) may be seen as an unprecedented institutional experiment. Its impact and output have been substantial, and consequently its legacy might equally be called fundamental. This chapter seeks to demonstrate the veracity of the foregoing statements, situating the Court in its contemporary context while building on similar scholarly ventures that were undertaken previously. In contrast to earlier inquiries, the study reflects rather more broadly on the institution’s positioning, especially on how it interacted with the principal organs of the League of Nations. It begins by placing a focus on the Court’s inception, from an idea to fully settled status. Thereafter, the chapter analyses the environment within which the Court functioned, and the interplay with its League interlocutors. Next, a review is undertaken of a series of leading pronouncements, both judgments and advisory opinions, concentrating on those verdicts that have obtained a genuinely enduring value. Drawing from these analyses, an assessment is made of the Court’s overall contribution to the multilateral order against the background of interwar-era politics followed in turn by a brief series of concluding observations.
This chapter begins by elaborating on the concept of a dispute, before providing a historical perspective on the evolution of the requirement to settle disputes peacefully. The chapter then explores diplomatic and legal methods of dispute settlement. Diplomatic forms of dispute settlement (also known as political or non-legal forms of dispute settlement) include negotiation, mediation, inquiry, and conciliation. Legal forms of dispute settlement include arbitration and adjudication. Resort by states to dispute settlement procedures, and in particular legal methods of dispute settlement, has grown exponentially in the last decades. Since the 1990s, the International Court of Justice has had an increasingly active docket of cases; in addition, the Permanent Court of Arbitration has undergone a sort of renaissance. The focus of this chapter is on the settlement of inter-state disputes, as opposed to disputes between states and non-state actors or between non-state actors.
Judges on apex courts sit in panels to resolve the most consequential legal issues within their jurisdiction. On occasion, these panels are closely split on the outcome. Where that split reflects only one judicial opinion or vote, the decision is rendered by a ‘bare majority’. That decisions with the potential for seismic legal, political and social importance can be made by such slim margins has received increasing academic attention in recent years. Yet, many of the responses to this ‘bare majority puzzle’ are of a conceptual nature, grounded in theory and addressing the normative implications. This article adds a perspective on the practice of bare majorities to this wider discussion. It does so by drawing on the practice of bare majorities at the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights and identifying six questions of salience to the nature, style and implications of the division. Engagement with these questions demonstrates that the theoretical discomfort posed by bare majorities is not always replicated in their practice.
This Chapter, the final chapter, concludes and discusses the future directions of the research on security exceptions. It examines the evolving role of security exceptions in international economic law, particularly within the WTO framework. While traditionally viewed as shields for states to implement necessary security measures, these exceptions increasingly serve as tools for economic protectionism and geopolitical leverage. The Chapter explores the complexities of balancing trade commitments with national security concerns, highlighting inconsistencies in adjudication and the risks of opportunistic state behavior. It proposes a dual framework distinguishing between conventional and novel security measures, advocating for clearer rules, procedural safeguards, and a compensation mechanism to deter abuse. Additionally, it calls for WTO reforms, stronger cooperation with the UN, and revisions to regional trade agreements and investment treaties to ensure security measures remain transparent, time-bound, and economically efficient.
This Chapter proposes a coherent approach to the review of security exceptions under international trade and investment agreements by international adjudicators. The contribution of this Chapter is two-fold. First, it examines whether the clarification of the scope of the existing security exception clauses and their coherent application by international adjudicators under both regimes could help restrain the securitization of states’ trade and investment policies. Secondly, and conversely, it aims to draw some conclusions about the extent to which existing security exception clauses provide sufficient policy space for WTO members to protect their national interests.
Abstract: This chapter considers three key types of international judicial remedies, exploring their content, availability, and behavioural influence. Through Mere Adjudication, an adjudicator establishes the existence, applicability, and content of legal rules. Through a Declaration of Breach, a court declares that a party’s conduct violates legal obligations. Where a violation is found, international courts often establish Consequential Duties, determining how a wrongdoer must act to bring an end to its violation and provide reparation for injury. Overall, international judicial remedies seek to prevent states’ adoption of unilateral remedies, grounded on their own understanding of the law and facts. International courts are unable to determine the application of coercive measures against states. Thus, every remedy is a communication regarding either the interpretation of the law or the application of this law to conduct. Judicial pronouncements have remedial value if they are able to mobilise pro-compliance forces, internal and external to states, by which the international normative framework guides state conduct.
In his rich discussion of the rule of law in Reciprocal Freedom, Ernest Weinrib observes that the prospectivity central to the rule of law seems incompatible with the apparent retroactivity of adjudication, for “parties to litigation are held to a norm of which they had no specific notice when the impugned conduct occurred.” Weinrib offers a deflationary response. Insofar as the legal materials from which any judicial opinion is crafted exist antecedently, parties are in fact on notice prior to the adjudication of their dispute. All a judicial decision does, on Weinrib’s view, is make “definitive what ought to and could have been done earlier on the basis of the law as it existed earlier.” This, I argue, does not take seriously the choices that judges face in resolving cases, for while they are constrained by existing legal materials, those materials seldom demand only one resolution, and so the problem of retroactivity remains.
This chapter explains the various mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, chiefly arising out of violations of the rules of the ITF, ATP and WTA. It focuses on ITF mechanisms, starting with internal processes and on-site quasi adjudicatory mechanisms. It then goes on to examine the ITF’s Internal Adjudication Panel, especially its first-instance, appellate and supervisory function, followed by the Independent Tribunal, which is an arbitral body. It proceeds to look at the various types of powers and functions conferred on the Tribunal and the jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) arising out of appeals against the Independent Tribunal. The chapter examines briefly the very narrow ATP and WTA dispute resolution mechanisms and the role of national courts in dealing with contractual tennis disputes.
Courts are institutions within the broad body politic of their society, which comprises not only the branches and institutions of the state, but also political parties, the media, civil society and the legal profession. The role that courts play in modern bodies politic has expanded significantly since the Second World War, mainly as a result of the practice of writing constitutions. These constitutions have often been adopted at a time of transitions, such as decolonisation, following a war or a period of autocratic rule or civil war and have accordingly often been accompanied by uncertainty and fragility. Responding to the expanded role of courts with a general normative claim that the expanded role of courts is democratically inappropriate without a careful consideration of the circumstances in which the role of courts has been expanded is unsatisfactory and in a world in which democratic backsliding is largely characterised by an expansion in executive power is probably also unwise.
In this chapter, the authors frame the interwar period as instrumental for the institutionalisation of international dispute settlement, with respect to both the establishment of institutions and the development of new applicable law. The chapter focuses on the institutions, but equally emphasises the foundational principles which govern the field, with the principle of consent at the forefront; with all their characteristic features and limitations, such principles are conspicuous and remain valid today. The chapter gives context to the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and the subsequent establishment and the main features of the Permanent Court; last but not least, it pays homage to the mixed arbitral tribunals, with their impressive machinery and cases decided. The interwar period was undoubtedly a time of experimentation, but it would be naïve to believe that it has come to an end: experiments remain ongoing.
The journey of mediation as a non-authoritative process into the court system has come full circle with one utterly different model emerging in contemporary times. As mentioned in the previous chapters, mediation has inspired hybrid judicial roles and settlement promotion and introduced consent as the foundation for many hybrid legal processes. Yet this hybridization has worked both ways, affecting mediation as well. Authority-based mediation is emerging as an advanced judicial process that generates public norms. This new sophisticated model for dealing with polycentric legal problems while preserving soft qualities of the process and keeping a narrow focus on a legal outcome is, in fact, a novel form of private adjudication. We describe this emergent form of mediation and its theoretical underpinnings.
This chapter introduces Review Bodies as accountability mechanisms for fundamental rights violations by the EU executive. As an umbrella concept, Review Bodies includes all actors except courts that, upon individual petition, independently review potential fundamental rights violations by EU actors. For the EU, these Review Bodies are the European Ombudsman, Boards of Appeal, and Fundamental Rights Officers. Albeit vested with weaker authority than courts, Review Bodies offer two crucial elements for comprehensive access to justice. First, Review Bodies are complementary to courts, meaning that they are often more accessible and more specialized. Second, Review Bodies focus less on individual issues of legality but on structural problems that produce repeated fundamental rights violations. In principle, this would place Review Bodies in a prime position to advance executive accountability in the EU. However, too often, Review Bodies are underfunded and lack the ‘teeth’ to discipline EU executive actors. Therefore, to improve access to justice and remedy structural problems engrained into the Union’s burgeoning executive power, authority and funding of Review Bodies should expand and other actors, especially courts, should team up with Review Bodies to effectuate their structure-focused expertise through the ‘teeth’ of judicial authority and public pressure.
Chapter 8 focuses on the imperial state level to examine the legal and political logic informing the final adjudication of the case in 1799, a decision that constituted a shift in the decisions the Council of the Indies and colonial tribunals had been taking in the 1780s. The chapter examines the political reasons related to mining utility and security that informed the shift and the juridical basis imperial jurists used to ground the case’s outcome. Ultimately, the Bourbon Crown ruled in favor of the cobreros but attached caveats related to Indian law to their collective freedom. The chapter ventures into the immediate aftermath of the Freedom Edict of 1800 to examine the challenges that emerged in the colony regarding the actualization of the decreed emancipation. It also interrogates the possibility of compensation or reparations to the cobreros for their wrongful enslavement.
To litigate or not to litigate, that is the question any Chinese companies operating in the United States long enough must contemplate. For American companies, litigation is nothing but an unavoidable business risk and often a vital competition strategy, routinely dealt with by legal and managerial professionals applying monetarized cost–benefit analysis. Such analysis typically incorporates attorney fees and other litigation expenses, potential reputational damage, time and human resource consumption, and the present value of expected litigation gains or losses. By contrast, litigation in China carries complex social meanings and is often avoided to preserve long-term cooperative relationships or to signal desirable attributes to uninformed third parties. When lawsuits do occur, they are often handled by stakeholders without professional legal assistance. Disputants consider a wide range of material and nonmaterial interests that are shaped by both formal institutions undergoing significant transformation and complex, entrenched social norms governing dispute resolution. Chinese companies immersed in these two disparate institutional environments approach legal disputes in the United States.