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How should criminal law come to grips with the banality of evil – the phenomenon of a normal person who is unable to tell right from wrong, and who commits grave crimes under circumstances that make it hard for him to know or feel that he is doing wrong? Those circumstances include not only the enthusiasm of Eichmann’s superiors” to “In Eichmann’s case, those circumstances include not only the enthusiasm of his superiors for the Final Solution but also the very nature of Nazi legality, which the chapter analyzes through Ernst Fraenkel’s concept of the “dual state,” where the law in books forbids murder but the dictator’s will supersedes the law in books without repealing it. The problem that preoccupies Arendt is that under these circumstances Eichmann and his ilk lack the subjective mens rea that “civilized jurisprudence” demands to justify punishment. At times she flirts with the idea that unforgivable crimes cannot be punished; the criminals can only be “eliminated.” The chapter argues that this is a mistake. That leaves the question of how to justify punishing criminals who lack subjective mens rea. The chapter concludes with a proposal that thoughtlessness, abdication of judgment, and culpable credulousness are a sufficient mens rea – and thus that the solution to Arendt’s problem is the banality of evil itself.
This book is about conscience and moral clarity. It asks how some people keep their judgment steadfast even when many around them are swept away by conspiracy theories, moral panics, and murderous ideologies-or, on a smaller scale, by immersion in a corrupt and corrupting workplace culture. It asks about the surprising fragility of common sense, including moral common sense, and it asks where morality fits into a meaningful human life. Beyond this, the book asks about legal accountability for crimes committed when moral judgment fails on a vast and deadly scale. Hannah Arendt addressed all these questions in a profound and original way. Drawing on her published works, letters, diaries, and notes, David Luban offers clear accounts of Arendt's contributions to moral philosophy and international law, showing how her ideas about judgment and accountability remain crucially important to the moral and legal life of our century.
Chapter 3 is a close reading of several documents and transcripts of the Case of Duch of the Cambodia Tribunal. Interestingly, notions of humanity and inhumanity were used by several parties: prosecutors, attorneys for civil parties but also the defendant’s lawyer and Duch himself declared that the latter was dehumanised. In a second move, these findings will be put in a philosophical context by bringing them in conversation with the work of Hannah Arendt, thus showing the structure of dehumanisation and rehumanisation.
This essay was originally published as an Opinion Editorial in the <italic>Los Angeles Times</italic> as “Free Speech, Even if it Hurts” on February 22, 2006. It was in response to the news that Holocaust denier David Irving, whom I wrote about in my co-authored 2000 book (with Alex Grobman) <italic>Denying History</italic> (2nd edition 2009), had been sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in Austria for violating one of their “hate crime” laws, a misguided, impractical and, in my opinion, immoral attempt to combat hate speech with censorship (and punishment) rather than with free speech. Unbidden and unbeknownst to him, before Irving’s sentencing, I wrote a letter to the judge along the lines of what I argue here, asking not just for leniency in his sentencing but for Irving’s freedom. I have no idea if the judge ever read my letter, and unfortunately I no longer seem to have a copy of it in my archives. That Irving was arrested at the airport in Austria well before he was scheduled to deliver his speech means that this was worse than an assault on free speech; it was an assault on free thought – literally a thought crime. How Orwellian.
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