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Chapter 29 returns to the story of Marshall Bloom, who became obsessed with St. Augustine after his trip there over spring break. He follows developments in the city as closely as he can from Amherst College by reading the New York Times and by checking in with Amherst’s civil rights-minded pastor, Lew Mudge. Learning about the SCLC’s plans for heightened activism and the expected arrival of Martin Luther King in St. Augustine, Bloom decides to bolt from campus before final exams and return to the city.
The night marches and violence in the city are escalating amid a gathering Klan presence at the end of May. The city moves to squelch the marches. On June 1, Andrew Young and Robert Hayling appear in federal court in Jacksonville, urging Judge Bryan Simpson to allow the marches on First Amendment grounds. The 3-day hearing takes a dramatic turn when Simpson interrogates Sheriff L.O. Davis about Klan infiltration among his deputies. Simpson convinces Young and Hayling to pause marches for ensuing days while he prepares his ruling.
The deepening civil rights tension in St. Augustine is ratcheted up still further by the unresolved legal showdown between one of Martin Luther King Jr.’s top lieutenants, Andrew Young, and St. Johns County Sheriff L.O. Davis. Young has gone to federal court in Jacksonville to make his case that the night marches need to continue because of First Amendment rights regarding free speech and freedom of assembly. Davis and Mayor Joseph Shelley maintain that the marches present a clear and present danger and must be prevented to protect the public. Finally on June 9, Judge Bryan Simpson issues his ruling, a decisive victory for Young, saying that law enforcement has a duty to protect the marchers, and further, that Davis’s tactics (including the stockade behind the jail) represent “more than cruel and unusual punishment.”
That night, Young is tricked into leading the night march by Hosea Williams. Throngs of local whites are massed in the Plaza in anticipation. Young is attacked multiple times on the sidewalk, but ultimately leads the marchers back to safety at a Lincolnville church.
This chapter examines the diplomacy of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe in 1977, as they were now confronted with the development of an internal settlement plan between Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa and others in Salisbury. The chapter examines how Nkomo and Mugabe worked together on the diplomatic front to push back with British foreign secretary David Owen and US secretary of state Cyrus Vance, who had at first hoped to resume all-party negotiations. Nkomo and Mugabe insisted that they would only negotiate with the British and not with Smith at this stage. The Frontline State presidents, however, also pressured Nkomo and Mugabe to negotiate, arguing that time was running out if the international committee would eventually recognize the Internal Settlement government. That Internal Settlement was agreed upon in March 1978, which then put more pressure on the Patriotic Front to negotiate while also increasing the war efforts. The chapter discusses a challenge to Mugabe’s leadership from within ZANU in early 1978.
This chapter examines the diplomacy of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe in 1977, as they were now confronted with the development of an internal settlement plan between Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa and others in Salisbury. The chapter examines how Nkomo and Mugabe worked together on the diplomatic front to push back with British foreign secretary David Owen and US secretary of state Cyrus Vance, who had at first hoped to resume all-party negotiations. Nkomo and Mugabe insisted that they would only negotiate with the British and not with Smith at this stage. The Frontline State presidents, however, also pressured Nkomo and Mugabe to negotiate, arguing that time was running out if the international committee would eventually recognize the Internal Settlement government. That Internal Settlement was agreed upon in March 1978, which then put more pressure on the Patriotic Front to negotiate while also increasing the war efforts. The chapter discusses a challenge to Mugabe’s leadership from within ZANU in early 1978.
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