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Nominated for the first Bollingen Prize, Muriel Rukeyser’s The Green Wave (1948) would be a turning point in her poetic career, and for women writers in the Cold War period. Its subjects – sex and birth, peace and war – would make space for women writers not only to articulate their interior lives in new ways but to find the forms to demonstrate how the personal and political shape each other. Tracing the collection’s making through biographical and political history, this chapter illustrates the ways that Cold War political and gender norms were being challenged by women poets at the same moment in which they were being constructed by critics and the state.
Chapter 5 provides an in-depth analysis of the far right in Chile, focusing on José Antonio Kast and the Republican Party (PR). It begins by elucidating the ideological bedrock of authoritarianism, nativism, and neoliberalism that fuels the ascent of the far right. Central to this exploration is how these ideologies manifest in the politicization of punitive justice, traditional gender roles, and restrictive immigration policies – all within a framework marked by a staunch anti-communist stance. The chapter then seamlessly connects these political strategies to the tactics of otherization targeting indigenous communities, immigrants, and leftist elites. By doing so, it places these exclusionary practices within the broader context of identity politics, providing a comprehensive understanding of how these dynamics interact and reinforce each other in shaping the far right’s impact on Chile’s political landscape.
Chapter 8 explores two questions: Is there a far right in Colombia? To what extent are far-right ideas present in Colombian politics today, and what are their prospects going forward? Given the internal conflict, a militaristic and anti-guerrilla right has been historically strong and dominant, but it is different from the contemporary Latin American far right. Colombia lacks an organized far-right party, though this should not be taken to mean that far-right ideas are irrelevant to understanding political dynamics. The chapter evaluates the reach of contemporary far-right ideas among key figures in the Colombian political elite, relying on speeches, interviews, social media posts, and legislative output. It focuses on Álvaro Uribe and Rodolfo Hernández, arguing that neither should be understood as an exponent of the contemporary far right, though some far-right ideas can be identified in their discourse at different points, with varying degrees of coherence. The seeds of the contemporary far right are found elsewhere – in subnational politicians, emerging outsiders, and figures within existing parties, most strongly in Senator María Fernanda Cabal. The chapter explores the evolution of Cabal’s public discourse, identifying an inflection point in 2020, when she began emphasizing moral conservatism and became more involved in international far-right networks.
Drawing upon archival records from the Republic of China and first-hand memoirs of direct witnesses, this article examines the June 15 and August 10 incidents of 1948 in Thailand,1 highlighting the intricate interplay between anti-communist and anti-Chinese politics. While existing scholarship has largely located these events within Phibun Songkhram’s anti-Chinese educational policies, this article moves beyond conventional narratives by uncovering their deeper political implications. The June 15 Incident primarily targeted overseas Chinese communists, the Qiaodang, substantially undermining its mobilizational and organizational capacities, whereas the August 10 Incident predominantly affected prominent Chinese merchants and Kuomintang-affiliated groups, reflecting broader anti-Chinese objectives. The article argues that anti-communist and anti-Chinese agendas were mutually constitutive, strategically intertwined by the Phibun regime to garner international support from Western powers and consolidate domestic control. By employing flexible diplomacy and deliberate ambiguity, the Thai government adeptly navigated Cold War tensions and internal political pressures, minimizing geopolitical risks while strengthening regime stability. Ultimately, these incidents reveal the profound consequences of instrumentalizing ethnic and ideological tensions, which significantly reshaped diasporic Chinese communities and the trajectory of Thailand’s early communist movement.
This introduction examines Cold War liberalism as a significant ideological and political force in U.S. history. It argues that Cold War liberalism was characterized by two core features: a deep skepticism of mass democracy and a commitment to American global hegemony. These traits emerged as the result of Cold War liberals’ encounter with perceived existential threats, particularly Soviet communism, which led them to embrace a politics of emergency that sacrificed liberalism for a broadly defined security. While Cold War liberals achieved some progressive domestic reforms, their actions both at home and abroad often undermined liberal democratic principles. In particular, Cold War liberalism’s emphasis on the necessity of U.S. empire had long-lasting consequences, establishing patterns of domestic governance and foreign military intervention that continue to shape the world today.
This chapter explores how Richard Hofstadter’s scholarly work on populism in American history – and his broader theory of populism as a “paranoid style” – was received by his historical contemporaries and how it continues to shape popular and academic perceptions of populism and the American radical right. Hofstadter argued that disparate movements in American history, from the nineteenth-century Populist Party to McCarthyism during the 1950s, were driven by “status anxiety” and a conspiratorial mindset characteristic of populism. In so doing, Hofstadter introduced concepts such as “status anxiety,” “paranoid style,” and “populism” into the popular lexicon, popularizing a Cold War liberal critique of radical political movements as irrational and misguided. While contemporaries such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset supported his views, historians such as C. Vann Woodward and Lawrence Goodwyn criticized Hofstadter’s account of U.S. populism. By the late 1960s, Hofstadter himself moderated his stance, acknowledging the limitations of his psychosocial theory of populism. The chapter concludes by arguing that Hofstadter’s work, while offering valuable insights, has led to analytical blind spots in understanding the structural and ideological dynamics of the American radical right.
The current chapter investigates the relationship dynamics between Germany and the Axis bloc countries. The chapter concludes that the Axis coalition-building efforts were poorly organized, haphazardly coordinated, and dreadfully led, suffering from German racism, mutual mistrust, and systematic lack of resources. Finnish participation in Operation Barbarossa was motivated by two things: the country’s exposed geographical position next to Russia and the unfinished Soviet attempt to occupy it during the Winter War in 1939–1940. Finland was not occupied by the Red Army and thus maintained its liberal democracy.
While most histories describe the Romanian Army as a reluctant ally of the German Army on the Easten Front, this chapter argues that Romania had embraced a far-right ideology that made the country Nazi Germany’s most important partner in the campaign against the Soviet Union. The Italian Royal Army fought an unplanned campaign, under German command, against the Red Army between August 1941 and January 1943. Despite severe limitations, the combatants of the CSIR and the ARMIR fought bravely until German defeat at Stalingrad led to the deadly disaster on the Don River.
This article explores how ontological insecurity shaped Cold War collaboration between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Turkey, and how their shared anti-communist anxiety produced lasting far-right consequences. Drawing on newly examined archival documents, it argues that communism was not merely a geopolitical or ideological threat but an existential danger to the state’s self in both countries. In response, the FRG and Turkey built a security partnership that extended into diaspora governance and intelligence coordination, often empowering far-right nationalist networks as bulwarks against leftist mobilization. These covert strategies – particularly the cultivation of far-right Turkish actors within Germany – were rationalized at the time as necessary countermeasures but ultimately contributed to long-term radicalization and blowback. By applying the framework of ontological security, the article reinterprets Cold War alliance dynamics as driven as much by existential anxieties as by strategic calculations. It concludes that contemporary German efforts to confront Turkish far-right extremism – such as the designation of the Grey Wolves as a security threat – risk obscuring this deeper legacy, producing a form of selective amnesia that externalizes a problem the FRG helped create.
This article examines why, beginning in 1946, the Brazilian government under President Eurico Dutra supplied arms to Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, fuelling a regional arms race and reshaping Caribbean Basin dynamics at the onset of the Cold War. It argues that these transfers bypassed conventional diplomatic channels, reflected radical anti-communist currents within Dutra’s inner circle and undercut US non-proliferation efforts. Far from a passive ally, Brazil emerged as a pivotal, if under-recognised, actor in the continental polarisation that led to democratic collapse in Venezuela (1948), Cuba (1952) and Guatemala (1954). The article challenges assumptions of Brazil’s limited Latin American engagement and repositions Dutra’s foreign policy within broader continental strategies of ideological alignment and regional influence. Drawing on Brazilian diplomatic and press sources, as well as archival and printed materials from across Latin America, Europe and the United States, it addresses historiographical gaps around Dutra’s agency and reveals the material underpinnings of Trujillo’s aggression, contributing to a revised understanding of Brazil’s Cold War trajectory.
Like several of its regional counterparts, Brazil’s 1964 coup attacked a reformist government that threatened the interests of an entrenched elite. To fully understand this attack, we must examine those interests and perceived threats to them, particularly in the realms of culture, religion, and morality. The coup not only fit into international Cold War maneuvering; it also conformed to a decades-long trajectory of moralism-as-countersubversion. Brazil’s coup plotters defined their enemies in terms that were vague, circumscribed by traditionalism, and culturally determined. There was, that is, a determinative tension between the “modernizing conservatism” of the regime and anti-modern forces that helped create it. To putschists and hard-liners, many of whom did not share the developmentalism attributed to the regime’s modernizers, the coup and dictatorship should aim to restore Brazil to a mythic, moralistic, Christian, anti-communist, and hierarchical past. As a result, moralism itself became one of the outstanding characteristics of the regime – and the rise of powerful, often extreme Evangelical conservatism (outsized in Brazil today) grew into the regime’s lasting legacy. Brazil’s towering Evangelical Right, an indomitable hallmark of its twenty-first-century politics, thus owes much to the conspiracy that brought dictatorship to Brazil in 1964.
The Korean War would generate a wide range of cinematic responses. The fledgling film industry of South Korea produced films that, in sync with an ideology of stark anti-communism, tended to emphasise the immediate physical brutality of the communist enemy. The reaction of American film makers was at first to reproduce the narrative shape and tropes of the very successful films from World War II, usually situated in Europe or the Pacific Islands. Gradually, however, Cold War paranoia about enemies within and about the new insidious threat of ‘brain washing’ took hold in Hollywood, as it swept through other social and political discourses and institutions. This paranoia, a sense of diffuse panic was not limited to the war film genre but leaked out creatively into a new genre of science-fiction features.
In December 1960, the international advocates Rev. Michael Scott and Jayaprakash (JP) Narayan met for a conference at Gandhigram Ashram in Madras State (now Tamil Nadu), India. Although Scott and JP did not agree on certain issues – such as the demands of Naga nationalist claimants within India – they both supported anticolonial nationalism across much of the decolonizing world and were committed proponents of nonviolent political action. At the conference, JP called for the creation of a World Peace Brigade, an international civil society organization that would send peace activists to intervene nonviolently in confrontations between states, empires, and nationalist movements. The Brigade’s first endeavor, the Africa Freedom Action Project, was launched in Dar es Salaam in 1962, which they hoped to make the “anti-Algiers” – a training ground for nonviolent, anti-communist, anticolonial national liberation.
There is a rather obvious convergence point between the Cold War, decolonization, and nationhood. The end of formal European colonial rule across most of the globe in the mid-twentieth century precipitated new states, on old territory, which required a national identity for legitimacy. In colonies where colonial rule ended through violent armed struggle, that armed struggle required a particularly potent vision of what people were fighting for. Once independence came, the consolidation of the state also demanded an answer to the question: who are we as a people, what binds us together? The Cold War, founded on an assumed clash between ideas and cultures even if activated as military and strategic conflict, prompted the same questions. The Cold War demanded a statement of national identity in two respects. First, as an ideological conflict the Cold War influenced the language by which nations articulated the belief systems that supposedly bound them together and informed their relationship with others.
This chapter explores the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Increasingly, Provisional Government head Charles de Gaulle and the French Communist Party, for a time maintaining a veneer of Resistance unity, found themselves in a struggle over the complexion of postwar France. The perception of a communist threat, for many in the French government and their American allies, became pressing as new variables complicated relations and intensified the feeling of crisis. The PCF’s growing strength and popularity in domestic politics, and deteriorating relations with the Soviets, brought the threat to the forefront and shaped French domestic and foreign affairs. Some French factions continued to warn of communist subversion and intrigue through their exchanges with US diplomats and American intelligence. Gaullists sought out contact with U.S. intelligence officers to counter the weakness narrative and prove their anti-communist bona fides. For their part, OSS and (subsequently) State Department intelligence analysts argued that many in France viewed the PCF as a legitimate political party and that there were genuine working class grievances that should be addressed. These contacts—informal and formal—acted as powerful constraints on American policy and explain in sharper relief how the United States was drawn into French affairs.
U.S. security interests intensified with the early Cold War. The high ideals of the Good Neighbor Policy rapidly disappeared and after the 1954 invasion of Guatemala, U.S. policy makers could not credibly claim to reject armed intervention. The United States became more openly supportive of dictatorships and authoritarian governance in order to fight against Communist infiltration. Power was once again central. The predominance of security over all else bred dissatisfaction in Latin America. In part to counter U.S. influence, Latin American governments supported the creation of hemispheric pacts and organizations. Latin American citizens protested against poverty and U.S. domination. U.S. policy makers targeted reformist movements because they assumed that they were too weak to resist Communist domination and they threatened business interests. Revolutionary fervor with a distinctly anti-U.S. bent was developing during the early Cold War, though it would not fully flower until the Cuban revolution. This chapter examines how the early Cold War brought national security and self-interest once again squarely to the fore.
In 1961, as the Cuban Revolution radicalized, the newly-formed Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) created training programs for domestic servants to learn tasks like typing, teaching, and taxi driving, thereby eliminating the supply of domestic workers on the island. Members of the FMC reported that they were inspired to create schools for domestics by Fidel Castro himself, who had noticed the high attendance of domestic workers at night schools already open before 1961. This chapter investigates the history of these schools from the perspective of attendees, teachers, and counterrevolutionaries, who were suspicious of the new government’s motives. The schools for domestics, along with rehabilitation programs for prostitutes and schools for campesina (farmer) women, were emblematic of revolutionary integration of the masses into its political project. The transformation of domestic service in the 1960s reflected Cubans’ deepest fears and hopes about the revolutionary future – but the way in which the government chose to address domestic service as a labor field connected back to the republican past.
As discussed in Chapter 4, Norwegian social democrats and conservative German Christian democrats both managed to decisively shape the outcomes of comprehensive school reform attempts. Chapter 5 explores in more detail how they managed to convince large parts of the population to consent to their education policy agendas and how they successfully forged reform packages that appealed to different groups. To this end, the chapter analyzes five dimensions of education politics, which highly engaged at least some parts of the population: struggles over religion, centralization, language, anti-communism, and gender. It becomes clear that especially the center-periphery and rural-urban cleavages shaped Norwegian school politics during the postwar reform period. For the most part, this facilitated coalitions between the rural periphery and the Labor Party. In North Rhine–Westphalia, the state-church cleavage and the communist-socialist cleavage stood in the way of similar coalitions and instead stabilized the internal cross-interest coalition of the CDU.
South Korea's persistent enmity towards its erstwhile colonizer Japan has been a compelling topic of East Asian international relations scholarship for decades. This article argues that the historical evolution of South Korea's democracy offers a vital and overlooked piece of this puzzle. Given that it emerged from one of the most virulently anti-communist dictatorships of the Cold War period, in a society facing an ongoing threat from communist North Korea, any left-of-center opposition movement faced an uphill battle against severe anti-communism. In such circumstances, the only way for a leftist opposition party to survive was by pitting its stronger anti-Japan reputation against conservatives’ anti-communism. After South Korea's democracy stabilized, liberals tried and failed to overturn the anti-leftist institutions left over from the Cold War and then sought equilibrium through parallel rhetoric targeting pro-Japanese elements. Today, neither left nor right can afford to allow a final amicable settlement with its respective target of antagonism. Through analyses of domestic political rhetoric targeting alleged pro-Japanese or pro-communist elements, this paper demonstrates how these competing antagonisms achieved an uneasy equilibrium that undergirds South Korean political dynamics to this day.
This chapter gives an overview of the structure of the book, detailing how it is organized around a series of contests over the expressions of sovereignty made by these four pseudo-states. In identifying the similarities in how these contests over sovereignty played out, inside and outside Africa, this chapter lays the foundation for the argument that Katanga, Rhodesia, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana can be usefully seen as linked parts in a larger story. In this formulation, their individual quests for diplomatic recognition and international acceptance were all in pursuit of a common ideological project, one born out of a reaction to the rapid decolonization of the African continent and the triumph of anti-colonial African nationalism. All four of them harnessed important transnational right-wing networks across Africa, Europe, and North America that were energized by the dissolution of the European empires, the rise of the Afro-Asian Bloc, postcolonial migrations, and the international civil rights movements. Each of these aspirant states ultimately failed to achieve international acceptance and faced collective nonrecognition, which reflected the larger regional and global importance of these challenges to the postcolonial African state system.
This article examines the transnational activism of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (Revolutionary Student Directorate, DRE), a group of exiled Cuban anti-Castro students. In the wake of the Bay of Pigs invasion, with CIA funding, the DRE attempted to challenge student support for the Cuban Revolution in Latin America and elsewhere in the global South. This article uses the DRE's trajectory to rethink the 1960s as a period of anti-communist, as well as leftist, youth ascendancy. It challenges the idea that Cuba garnered universal youth support, stressing instead that the Cuban Revolution helped turn student politics into a key battleground of the Cold War.