Data privacy and protection are inextricably intertwined, whereas the former often slides into a national security concern. Amid geopolitical tensions, the U.S. aims to preserve TikTok’s independence and prevent its use in cognitive warfare. The landmark case presents potentially groundbreaking trade-offs for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the balance between data privacy and national security. The TikTok ban can be seen as a Catch-22 situation, presenting a Hobson’s choice for both the U.S. and China in the ongoing data war. The U.S. faces national security concerns regarding Chinese influence over the app’s data and its potential use for surveillance and propaganda. Conversely, banning TikTok risks setting a precedent for censorship and digital platform manipulation, undermining the U.S.’s long-standing commitment to free speech and open markets. The dilemma lies in whether to prioritize national security over the principles of free expression and open trade or to accept the risks posed by adversary-owned platforms operating in the U.S. This decision underscores rising tensions as the two powers grapple with data governance, digital sovereignty and geopolitical rivalry – an outcome that will shape global data governance and the technological landscape for years to come. A paradox emerges as China’s ideological aims and the U.S.’s technical concerns converge on a cutting-edge global challenge, that is, cognitive warfare in shaping global discourse and public opinion. This study examines how these conflicting forces shape TikTok’s quest to become a global platform, delving into the root causes of these tensions and exploring strategies to address the associated challenges.

Canada has had a meaningful impact on international law through its participation in the development of the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Several arbitral awards involving Canada, even before the establishment of the ICJ’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, were instrumental in shaping subsequent jurisprudence in different areas of international law. Canada’s participation in proceedings before the Court, as a party and intervener in contentious cases and as a participant in advisory proceedings, has been rich in legal arguments on fundamental issues, such as the functioning of the United Nations, the ICJ’s jurisdiction, the law of the sea, environmental law, and the law of state responsibility. Perhaps even more significantly, the activities and statements made by Canada’s courts, executive, and legislature are frequently relied-upon examples of state practice in pleadings before the Court. Finally, although Canada has had only one elected judge on the bench of the ICJ, Canadian jurists have frequently served as judges ad hoc and as counsel and advocates for states.

In the late nineteenth century, increasing demand for sealskins by the fashion industry led to an expansion of the seal hunt in the open waters of the Bering Sea. This practice of pelagic sealing was blamed for a severe drop in the population of the north Pacific fur seal herd that bred on the Pribilof Islands off Alaska and was harvested on shore by US interests. US officials began seizing Canadian ships and crews in international waters in contravention of the accepted principle of freedom of the high seas. After years of diplomatic stalemate and jingoistic sabre rattling, the United States and Great Britain, which still controlled Canadian foreign affairs, agreed to put the legality of the seizures before an international tribunal. The so-called Bering Sea Arbitration, held in Paris in 1893, built on the legacy of the Alabama Claims Arbitration from twenty years earlier and was a major step in Canada’s emergence as a fully independent nation with Canadians playing significant roles as arbitrator, counsel, and agent. The tribunal found the seizures contrary to international law and also found that, while the seals bred on US soil, the United States had no property rights in them. However, to restrict the size and scope of the seal hunt as a means of preserving the species from extinction, the tribunal also set down regulations that are now seen as an early foundation of modern environmental law.

This research supports the singularity of the Spanish case. The lessons we can learn are a product of the short transition in the mid 1880s from a city-based monetary system (supported by private actors) to a central banking system in the absence of a developed banking system with a nationwide scope, unlike what occurred in the rest of Western Europe. Introducing market arbitrage, we provide novel evidence – using new data – of how price formation in city-based money markets was driven by more than one price. Furthermore, factors such as market conditions, political circumstances and the asymmetrical development of market potential in the Spanish economic geography also played an important role. We also show new empirical support that transaction cost reduction was not associated with improving efficiency during the 1875–85 period when city-based money markets were still operating. The inland payment system was struggling even before its takeover by the Bank of Spain.

This article argues that the temporality of the financial economy ought to be seen as radically synchronistic. ‘Synchronism’ refers to both an epistemological and practical approach that addresses finance neither with a view to the past nor to the future, but is instead focused on the moment that a financial transaction is settled (i.e., the horizon of trading). From this perspective, the article expands the scope of current social theorizing on financial markets, which is characterized by a preoccupation with the futurity of financial markets and products. It suggests that financial synchronism can be traced back to certain developments in economic theory since the so-called ‘marginalist revolution’, which enabled the transfer of a certain optics informing market theories into financial practices. On these terms, financial synchronism is interpreted as a powerful social imaginary that crucially mediates the way contemporary societies face the contingency of the future.

This paper considers the pricing of long-term options on assets such as housing, where either government intervention or the economic nature of the asset limits large falls in prices. The observed asset price is modelled by a geometric Brownian motion (“the notional price”) reflected at a lower barrier. The resulting observed price has standard dynamics but with localised intervention at the barrier, which allows arbitrage with interim losses; this is funded by the government’s unlimited powers of intervention, and its exploitation is subject to credit constraints. Despite the lack of an equivalent martingale measure for the observed price, options on this price can be expressed as compound options on the arbitrage-free notional price, to which standard risk-neutral arguments can be applied. Because option deltas tend to zero when the observed price approaches the barrier, hedging with the observed price gives the same results as hedging with the notional price and so exactly replicates option payoffs. Hedging schemes are not unique, with the cheapest scheme for any derivative being the one which best exploits the interventions at the barrier. The price of a put is clear: direct replication has a lower initial cost than synthetic replication, and the replication portfolio always has positive value. The price of a call is ambiguous: synthetic replication has a lower initial cost than direct replication, but the replication portfolio may give interim losses. So the preferred replication strategy (and hence price) of a call depends on what margin payments need to be made on these losses.

Following a review of the etymology and modern usage of the term ‘arbitrage’, this article explores the relevance of historical context to possible instances of ancient arbitrage activity. Types of possible ‘arbitrage’ associated with the use of overvalued coinage in regions of Greek influence are considered. Comparison with Roman civilization reveals the relevance of social attitudes and legal institutions to the ability to execute arbitrage trades. Specific attention is given to the possibility of arbitrage across the Roman frontier to India and the impact of debasements during the imperial period. Recognizing that sources prior to early modern times are scant, numismatic, epigraphic and literary evidence that is available to make inferences about ancient arbitrage activity is assessed.

We introduce and study the notion of sure profits via flash strategies, consisting of a high-frequency limit of buy-and-hold trading strategies. In a fully general setting, without imposing any semimartingale restriction, we prove that there are no sure profits via flash strategies if and only if asset prices do not exhibit predictable jumps. This result relies on the general theory of processes and provides the most general formulation of the well-known fact that, in an arbitrage-free financial market, asset prices (including dividends) should not exhibit jumps of a predictable direction or magnitude at predictable times. We furthermore show that any price process is always right-continuous in the absence of sure profits. Our results are robust under small transaction costs and imply that, under minimal assumptions, price changes occurring at scheduled dates should only be due to unanticipated information releases.

Under proportional transaction costs, a price process is said to have a consistent price system, if there is a semimartingale with an equivalent martingale measure that evolves within the bid-ask spread. We show that a continuous, multi-asset price process has a consistent price system, under arbitrarily small proportional transaction costs, if it satisfies a natural multi-dimensional generalization of the stickiness condition introduced by Guasoni (2006).

Received internationalization theory argues that firms occupy domestic space before going abroad; in other words, large, oligopolistic firms are most likely to internationalize. The experience of China, whose economy is fragmented and whose firms are small by global standards, suggests otherwise. We construct a model of small firm internationalization driven by the relative transaction costs of crossing domestic (in the case of China, provincial) and international borders. When the costs of crossing domestic borders exceed the costs of crossing international borders, firms will internationalize at a relatively early stage of development. In the case of China, local protectionism and inefficient domestic logistics increase the costs of doing business domestically; moreover, protection of property rights in the West and the advantages afforded Chinese owned firms reconstituted as foreign entities operating in China decrease the costs of ‘going out’. We coin the term ‘institutional arbitrage’ to capture Chinese firms' pursuit of efficient institutions outside of China. We argue that strategic exit from the home country rather than strategic entry into foreign markets may explain the internationalization of many Chinese firms.