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Chapter 2 explores the history of the Leading Indicators developed at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Founded in an entrepreneurial, intervention-critical context, the NBER aimed to provide entrepreneurs with the tools and expertise needed to navigate future economic challenges. Initially, researchers sought to uncover recurring patterns in statistical data to forecast business cycle movements. However, the newly compiled data and analyses revealed that each business cycle was unique, contradicting their initial expectations. The introduction of the electronic computer further reinforced this finding, highlighting the need for economic experts who could interpret and evaluate each economic situation individually. As business cycle research and forecasting at the NBER progressed, it laid the basis for a fundamental transformation of the relationships between economists, economic and political decision-makers, and the economy. The NBER’s work ultimately entrusted policymakers with a new responsibility of economic stability, while also establishing the notion of a “national economy” that could be measured and administered.
Orthodox monetary policy scholarship assumes that central bankers act to maximize the public welfare. If imperfect incentives enter the model, it is on the part of the public. We challenge this assumption. Monetary policymakers are just as prone to incentive problems, which cause them to act according to their own self-interest. Furthermore, the self-interest of policymakers is not always the same thing as the public welfare. The two diverge frequently, in fact. We survey the history of the Federal Reserve and show the numerous ways discretionary central bankers have been compromised. These incentive problems are an inherent feature of discretion. They can only be eliminated by embracing true monetary rules.
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