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The Australian Militia Battalions of the Second World War remain one of the most underexplored and misunderstood aspects of Australia's wartime history. Following the only Australian wartime fighting organisation of conscripted men at the time, As Good As Any: The Australian Militia Battalions, 1939–1945 brings together the political, social, and operational dimensions of the Militia with the lived experiences of its individuals. Structured chronologically, this seminal work traces the Militia's evolution throughout the war, from early years on the home front, to Port Moresby and Kokoda, the Beachheads Battles, Salamaua and the Huon Peninsula, culminating in the final campaigns in Bougainville, New Britain and Aitape-Wewak. Drawing on war diaries, personal letters, and parliamentary records, the book reveals the tensions between the Militia and the Second Australian Imperial Force (AIF). As Good As Any provides readers with fresh insights and a nuanced understanding of a force that shaped Australia's wartime identity.
Chapter 1 briefly covers the Militia during the interwar period before charting the first two years of the war. While the Militia did not conduct any fighting during this time, it was an important time in shaping (and perhaps even defining) perceptions of this organisation. Over this period, the Australian government and Army, to a lesser extent, applied a First World War attitude towards maintaining two distinct fighting organisations.
Chapter 3 is the first to look at Militia units in battle and covers those on the Kokoda Trail and Milne Bay from July to November 1942. As well as representing their initial combat experience, these battles highlighted how the prejudices of senior officers resulted in spiteful judgements on the capability of Militia units and sweeping generalisations that would never occur with the AIF. Although some senior officers such as Blamey were less critical, the self-serving nature of his views and others who praised the Militia, along with the deprecations, would recur. Among various misleading beliefs associated with the Kokoda campaign, it has come to symbolise a moment when the ‘two armies’ bonded and AIF–Militia relations improved. As will be seen, this is a specious interpretation that has been bolstered by a myth that Militia units were filled with ‘boys’.
Chapter 7 concludes with an analysis of the controversy over granting militiamen membership to the RSL, which was finally resolved in early 1945. This protracted process was a microcosm of perceptions of the Militia and the experience of militiamen throughout the war and, therefore, makes for a fitting ending. This book is not a ‘complete’ history of the Militia. Instead, it mostly uses battalions, battles and campaigns to highlight themes that allow for an integrated understanding of a collection of men and an organisation that played a vital role in the nation’s conduct of the war and rightly contributed to its ‘cherished military tradition’.
In his wartime account of the Australian Army’s operations in New Guinea, the journalist Alan Dawes insisted that the ‘volunteer fighting services … in a conscript world are Australia’s proudest boast’.Written in 1943, his account typified the importance that Australian society placed on volunteers at the time.This, and an attachment to ‘citizen’ soldiering, were the two defining attitudes towards military service before and during the Second World War. While the Australian Militia exemplified the latter trait, it was not the nation’s ‘boast’ because it partly comprised conscripted men. Among its various features, the presence of conscripts and an association with the more general notion of conscription influenced perceptions of the Militia more than anything else.
Chapter 5 focuses on the opinions of AIF officers, some of whom were newly appointed to command, and the performance of Militia battalions during the Salamaua campaign from April to September 1943. This chapter highlights the dissonance between the expectations of battle-hardened AIF officers and the capability of their ‘green’ Militia units (and formations) in their first battles. It also shows the extent to which Militia units had improved because of the efforts of these very officers in addition to the Army’s broad adaptation to the demands of fighting in the jungle. Salamaua, nonetheless, also demonstrated underlying prejudices towards the Militia and a broader antipathy from the AIF. In the years afterwards, a number of officers who served with the Militia during Salamaua provided some of the most forthright opinions and many accused the official history of having an AIF bias.
Chapter 4, which covers the Beachhead battles in late 1942 and early 1943 and then the disbandment of three participant units in July 1943, further reveals the biases of senior officers towards the Militia. It examines the extent to which Militia battalions sustained casualties (an emotive and often misinterpreted aspect of these battles) and the degree to which these reflected the strategic imperatives and the Army’s unpreparedness for jungle warfare as much as their inadequate training. This chapter also analyses the policy and political interest in militiamen transferring to the AIF and the reasons why some men refused to offer unrestricted service, matters of central importance to understanding the Militia that have lacked detailed examination. It concludes by documenting how the obstinance of militiamen and a disregard for esprit de corps within Militia units among senior officers brought about the disbandment of the three most experienced battalions at the time.
Chapters 6 and 7 examine the Militia’s operations on the Huon Peninsula (October 1943 to September 1944) and during the final campaigns (October 1944 to August 1945). More than any other aspect of its service, the Militia’s contribution to the Huon Peninsula campaign and the extent of its garrison duties have been ignored. Chapter 6 seeks to fill this gap in light of broader perceptions within the Army and public of ‘unequal sacrifice’ between the AIF and the Militia. It revisits the issue of AIF transfers and the gazetting of Militia battalions as ‘AIF’, expanding the focus to cover the entire war before briefly examining residual political interest in the reinforcement of units.
Chapter 2 examines the first six months of 1942, which saw the return of a large number of AIF officers from the Middle East, who assumed command of Militia units and formations. Their views of the Militia and the resultant ‘purge’ of old and unfit militiamen need examination. During this time, six Militia battalions were despatched to Papua that fought either on the Kokoda Trail, during the Beachhead battles or both. Their experience garrisoning Port Moresby, alongside what occurred in Australia, should be analysed independently from the fighting that followed.
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