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The character of the State of Nature that humanity sought to escape divided natural philosophers. There was a sharp reaction against the pessimism of Hobbes’s Leviathan and Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees. The end result of a long process was the development of the ethical theory of utilitarianism: ‘it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong’ (Bentham). The seed-bed of utilitarianism was the idea of utility; but utility is an empty vessel, with no fixed or clear definition. During the eighteenth century, happiness became its preferred content. The role of Hutcheson was key here: he coined the phrase (in 1725) that became the Benthamite slogan, and pioneered the application of mathematics to moral philosophy. Later thinkers, notably Helvétius, were less optimistic than Hutcheson, arguing that mankind was not by nature benevolent, but self-interested: it was thus incumbent on legislators to raise the sights of the citizenry to embrace the interests of the whole society. In this Beccaria followed the lead of Helvétius.
This chapter attempts to historicise the concept of civil society and reflects on the fall of communism in Eastern Europe from the perspective of the eighteenth century.
Enlightenment thinkers rarely used the word “consumption,” but they spoke incessantly of “luxury,” a multivalent term that became the principal idiom through which writers discussed the moral, social, and political implications of consumption. Controversy over luxury was a proxy for the first modern debate on consumption. The discussion of luxury shifted decisively at the turn of the eighteenth century, when two writers – François Fénelon and Bernard Mandeville – laid the foundations for a vigorous Enlightenment debate. Drawing on ancient and medieval critiques, Fénelon argued that luxury corrupted morals, scrambled the social order, and destroyed states. Mandeville countered by advancing a bold apology for luxury. Far from weakening states, he argued, luxury generated prosperous and powerful nations. Gender would play a key role in the debate that ensued. Whereas critics of luxury like Jean-Jacques Rousseau warned that excessive consumption effeminized men, rendering them unfit for public service, defenders of luxury like David Hume claimed that material well-being was the sign of a civilized society in which men and women frequently interacted. In the second half of the eighteenth century, certain thinkers sought to resolve the debate. Political economists argued that if consumption was directed toward productive ends, wealthy and powerful nations would avoid corruption and endure. Meanwhile, luxury producers incorporated critiques of luxury by designing natural and healthy products. Criticism of luxury did little to slow the pace of consumption.
In the first chapter of Recognizing Resentment, I historically situate the debate about the passions and their role in sociability to which Joseph Butler responded at the outset of the eighteenth century. I correct the mischaracterization of the seventeenth cenutry as the age reason reigned supreme, highlighting instead how a host of philosophers in the rationalist tradition began to pay particular attention to the importance of passion in moral and political motivation and obligation. For rationalists and psychological egoists like Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, and John Locke, passions were influential but socially destabiizing and “vicious.” The same was true of the philosophy of the father of the natural law tradition, Hugo Grotius. However, Grotius's disciple, Samuel von Pufendorf, and the heir to the egoist tradition in the eighteenth century, Bernard Mandeville, began to view the passions in a new light. However vicious they might be, Pufendorf and Mandeville believed passions positively contibuted to our ability to live together in large, diverse societies.
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