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During the Second World War, psychiatrists, psychologists, and other experts confronted unprecedented numbers of patients, including distressed servicemen, bombed civilians, unaccompanied children, returning veterans, displaced persons, and Holocaust survivors. In the first comprehensive analysis of treatment during and after the war, Elizabeth Roberts-Pedersen examines how British and American experts interpreted and responded to these diverse patient populations. Looking at both combatants and civilians together, she demonstrates that wartime psychiatry was less concerned with individual suffering than with managing mental distress at scale, revealing profound tensions in psychiatric thought over the causes of wartime mental disorder and its treatment. Perhaps most significantly, Human Salvage shows how the Second World War brought mass violence into the clinical realm, transforming psychiatric theory and practice for decades to come.
Chapter 3 analyzes the evolution over time of EU-Russia natural gas interdependence in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. It considers that popular support for trade with Russia varied widely in selected dyads regardless of material benefits. It applies the viewpoint of dominant narratives in different contexts to understand the processes of foreign policy formation and change in contexts of internal and external contestation. The chapter details two notable trends: (1) internally, ultimately dominant narratives emerge from domestic political struggles and the priorities of those norm entrepreneurs who are in a position to engage in “framing” practices for the remainder of the society; (2) externally, especially in markets such as gas where finding substitutes is difficult (due to the rigidity of trade via pipelines), new international economic opportunities can alter domestic interests and power relations among different segments of society. The study integrates responses to both (normative) local aspects and (material) international influences. Finally, a post-scriptum considers the war in Ukraine and the resulting near-termination of contested EU-Russia gas trade.
Chapter 4 focused on leaders’ attributes and dispositions to demonstrate the incompleteness of rationalist explanations for Sino-Russian gas interdependence variations. The chapter presented evidence of significant trends. In 2014, Russia and China concluded a thirty-year, $400 billion deal to ship Russian gas to China. The chapter emphasizes the importance of historically contextualizing such turning moments and deals of large geopolitical value. Second, the culmination of Sino-Russian gas cooperation in 2014 was undergirded by important personal relationships between Presidents Putin and Xi and between Russian and Chinese corporate partners. The chapter highlights the role of political entrepreneurs to shape worldviews. The international and domestic contexts in which states are embedded shape their societies’ identities in powerful ways. It suggests how China’s rapid adoption of net-zero targets fits a broader normative turn in global climate governance and Russian gas is bound to play a bridge role in Beijing’s low-carbon future. Finally, it considered the war in Ukraine and the further deepening of Sino-Russian gas trade.
In this path-breaking history, Tobias Rupprecht offers a revisionist account of Russia's post-Soviet marketisation from the perspective of the advisors and ministers who oversaw this transformation. Based on extensive interviews with economists and research in state and private archives, he uncovers a significant minority of economic liberals from late Soviet academic and dissident circles who sought to chart a new path, believing free prices and private property were the foundations of a 'civilised country'. This provides a vital challenge to the dominant narrative that neoliberal advisors and organisations imposed harmful reforms on Russia after the collapse of Communism. Liberal reformers faced a profound dilemma – one for which Western advisors had no solution either: should they commit to democratic political activism and risk irrelevance, or align themselves with those in power and be co-opted by an authoritarian state determined to reassert its imperial strength?
Chapter 3 argues that, starting from 1985, the Russian hawks consolidated as an idea network built around their common opposition against perestroika. Modernist conservatism served as the ideological magnet of this eclectic group aggregating national-conservative intellectuals with pro–status quo members of the Soviet political and military establishment. The newspapers Den (1990–93) and Zavtra (1993–) became the intellectual and social fabric of the group’s identity and cohesion, which were maintained across the 1991 regime change. The chapter also demonstrates that some of the hawks’ ideas spread in the ruling elites’ discourse as early as the mid-1990s to legitimate the authoritarian nature of the turn to a superpresidential system and to foster the construction of post-Soviet state patriotism.
Chapter 5 introduces the analysis of popular opinion in electoral autocracies with a comparative analysis of the paradigmatic case of Russia. The chapter first outlines the scope and consequences of Russia’s catastrophic post-Communist cataclysm, and how this traumatic experience prompted ordinary Russians to place an absolute premium on restoring order and stability – outlooks that made Vladimir Putin’s tough-mannered style of governing incredibly popular. Using a uniquely rich dataset of 418 surveys for the 1993-2011 period, produced by Russia’s Levada Center, this chapter demonstrates that in societies traumatized by upheaval, the strongman appeal trumps ideological, programmatic, and value orientations, and aligns mass opinion and political competition along a new cleavage: the choice of whether to accept or reject electoral authoritarianism as a regime that can impose order. I show that this cleavage inhibits and divides the opposition and highlights its shortcomings, allowing even weakly performing autocracies to retain power through elections.
The immediate afterglow of the failed coup attempt in August 1991 must rank as one of the more optimistic periods in Russian history. In August 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin was the most popular figure in Russia. Yeltsin's priority was not the creation or consolidation of a new democratic political system. Rather, Yeltsin turned his attention to dismantling the command economy and creating a market economy. Yeltsin's greatest achievement as president was the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation and their allies, the Agrarian Party of Russia, won less than 20 per cent of the vote, while new 'centrist' groups combined for nearly a quarter of the vote. In early August, a multi-ethnic force headed by Chechen commander Shamil Basaev invaded the Russian republic of Dagestan, claiming Dagestan's liberation from Russian imperialism as their cause. Russian armed forces responded by launching a major counter-offensive against the Chechen-led 'liberation' movement.
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