Mapping and measuring corporate harm to human rights and the environment remains difficult due to limited data transparency and inconsistent reporting standards. Yet robust information is essential to understand the magnitude of the problem, track progress and support an empirical research agenda capable of identifying what effectively curbs business-related misconduct. This paper introduces a new open-access dataset documenting alleged human rights and environmental abuses—the REBALANCE Business-related Human Rights and Environmental (BRAVE) database—involving 83 of the largest publicly listed European multinational corporations between 2000 and 2020. Built from systematic data collection from the Business & Human Rights Centre, the dataset codes allegations by type of abuse, country, victims affected, corporate involvement (direct or indirect) and severity, enabling comparative and longitudinal analyses. By offering a replicable empirical foundation, BRAVE aims to support evidence-based research, policy development and stronger corporate accountability in the business and human rights field.

The rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies across corporate value chains has exposed fundamental gaps in traditional approaches to ensuring respect for human rights. This article analyzes the transition from fragmented compliance mechanisms to unified governance models that seek to embed human rights standards within AI deployment, focusing in particular on the European Union’s regulatory framework and its global implications. A central focus is placed on the EU’s AI Act, which introduces the Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment (FRIA) as the first mandatory evaluation mechanism for selected high-risk AI systems. We demonstrate that FRIA marks a significant regulatory innovation. Alongside FRIA, we examine the Council of Europe’s voluntary HUDERIA methodology, which while conceptually aligned with FRIA, enables organizations to undertake comprehensive rights assessment across their entire AI portfolio. We argue that the convergence of mandatory (FRIA) and voluntary (HUDERIA) frameworks strengthens corporate responsibility for human rights in AI, extending ethical obligations where legal norms may not reach. However, we also highlight the real-world challenges to universalizing these standards – growing regulatory divergence between the EU’s rights-driven approach and the US innovation-focused “America’s AI Action Plan.” The resulting tension threatens the global harmonization of human rights protections in AI.

This article examines the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (Directive) and its proposed amendment, especially from a Third World view. It establishes that, practically, the Directive has a limited value for Africans because it cannot stop corporate human rights abuses and economic exploitation in Africa. In contrast, the Directive entrenches neocolonial norms in the Business and Human Rights (BHR) field. This article also argues that it is futile for Third World Peoples to look to international law, given its capitalist history and the growing EU dominance in the BHR treaty discussions. Instead of looking to Europe or international law to save Africans from corporate abuses and economic exploitation, African states must look inward to create subsidiary norms that challenge and resist neocolonialism in the BHR field. To achieve this, it discusses the normative agency of the African Union in leading an Africanization agenda.

This article argues that the global Business and Human Rights movement demonstrates a push towards a human-rights type of sustainable corporation, reconciling economic development and human rights. It explains the necessity for and significance of a definition of a sustainable corporation at the intersection of traditional international human rights and sustainable development instruments. It argues, inter alia, that an internationally recognised definition of a sustainable corporation can settle fundamental questions and create a minimal framework for meaningful discourse on corporate accountability for human rights, climate change and the environment. It identifies difficulties of defining a sustainable corporation such as the integration problem. It suggests ‘direct human rights obligation’ as a minimally sufficient normative criterion for the definitional correctness of a sustainable corporation. The suggested definition of sustainable corporation requires taking a normative position which makes the term ‘essentially contested’ resulting in discursive and behavioural norm contestation in the search for definitional determinacy and consensus within the divide between international and domestic law.

The existence of international legal obligations which bind domestic non-State actors (DNSAs) is well-established throughout public international law, particularly in international criminal law and international humanitarian law. Yet the conceptual foundation of such obligations remains unclear—whilst the obligations of States and international organisations are rooted in the concept of consent, the international obligations of DNSAs are inherently non-consensual. There have been several attempts to explain the existence of DNSA obligations in particular areas of international law, but no account has provided a convincing general explanation. The unsettled conceptual basis of DNSA international obligations has given rise to controversy around their existence and legitimacy and whether it is desirable or possible to create international obligations for DNSAs in other areas, such as international human rights law. This article fills this gap by advancing a general account of the basis of the international obligations of DNSAs. The article builds on the most persuasive elements of existing accounts to argue that States have a capacity to impose international obligations on DNSAs which does not depend on any preexisting relationship or connection.

While international investment law (IIL) and business and human rights (BHR) could have been one legal domain, they are today seen as distinct legal worlds. States’ National Action Plans (NAPs) on BHR, aimed at prescribing policies to realize the UN Guiding Principles, are one of the many places where this phenomenon can be observed. Embracing a Law and Political Economy (LPE) perspective, this article contributes to the existing literature by enhancing the understanding of how NAPs on BHR currently engage with the intersection between BHR and the international investment regime. This article is the first to offer an analysis of the integration of BHR with the IIL in all publicly available NAPs, through the lenses of Fineman’s ‘vulnerability theory’, which we relate to LPE. Our analysis shows that NAPs, while not binding, can in principle be mobilized for change. Yet, despite their relevance and potential, we have also shown that, in their current forms, these instruments tend to replicate the BHR/IIL separation. As such, they perpetuate existing power dynamics that favour foreign investors over other actors negatively impacted by foreign investments. The analysis also demonstrates that the limited recognition of the interplay between foreign investment and human rights in separate NAPs, coupled with restricted inclusiveness of affected stakeholders and states’ readiness to adapt their legal and policy frameworks, significantly hampers the ability of NAPs to foster the resilience of individuals adversely affected by foreign investment.

This article critically evaluates three attempts to overcome the problem of fit between international human rights law (IHRL) and the digital ecosystem, through an expansion of the existing IHRL framework to big tech companies. The attempted expansions considered here include standard-setting initiatives involving the imposition on states and companies – large technology companies and other business enterprises – of certain duties to apply IHRL in connection with potentially rights-infringing business practices. As I discuss below, most of the duties identified and/or developed in this regard within the context of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Business and Human Rights (BHR) agenda constitute soft law for the time being. Negotiations for a Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) designed to strengthen the applicable legal framework are ongoing, but their prospects of success remain unclear. Another attempted expansion involves self-regulation by big tech companies through corporate policies aimed at incorporating certain IHRL norms into their business practices. The efforts of Meta to incorporate IHRL into its corporate policies and to offer an IHRL grievance mechanism through the operation of the Meta Oversight Body (focusing mainly on protecting freedom of expression, as articulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) represent a key case study in this regard. A third attempt to address the aforementioned problem of fit that I consider below involves efforts by special procedures of the Human Rights Council to exercise its standard-setting and monitoring functions in connection with the practices of large technology companies. The work of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression in this area is particularly noteworthy. These three examples of expansion attempts provide useful insights into the potential of IHRL to serve as a legal framework to govern the operations of large technology companies, as well as about the limits of its potential.

The article starts by discussing recent developments in the BHR agenda, including efforts to conclude an LBI. The extent to which this agenda represents a promising avenue for holding large technology companies accountable to IHRL norms is then considered in the second and third parts of the article, which discuss two normative initiatives that derive largely from the BHR agenda: this section specifically examines Meta’s espousal of IHRL as part of its corporate BHR policy, and considers attempts by Human Rights Council special procedures to apply IHRL to technology companies.

This article proposes a theoretical framework for explaining the motivations behind the early adoption of international public policy innovations. While there has been a proliferation of transnational policy diffusion studies, there is less research on why some governments become early adopters when new international policy norms are promoted. Most research on the topic looks only at monocausal explanations without considering their interactions in a coherent, integrated framework. The article proposes four motivations for early adoption: normative, reputation, competition, and locking-in. The framework is then illustrated by application to the early adoption of business and human rights policy innovations, with Colombia and Ecuador serving as two cases for comparative analysis. The article advances understanding of early adoption and policy diffusion by highlighting particularly important explanations for what motivates early adopters to begin processes of subsequent diffusion and suggesting how motivations may interact to strengthen the case for early adoption.

Human rights due diligence (HRDD) is a buzzword in business and human rights (BHR) activities. However, multinational corporations (MNCs) often conduct it as a tick-box exercise without transparency. Using a relational contract theory, this article argues that when MNCs contract with local communities through community development agreements (CDAs) to perform HRDD, such contracts are internationalized relational contracts that attract a level of good faith. An established principle in international economic law, good faith serves as a standard for assessing conduct designed to discharge obligations in international contracts between states and MNCs (investor-state contracts). Similar to how investor-state arbitration tribunals use good faith jurisprudence in regulating the relationship between states and MNCs, this article proposes a BHR good faith jurisprudence to prescribe how HRDD obligations should be discharged. The article concludes that a good faith interpretational exercise in BHR would (1) reduce MNCs’ cosmetic compliance with HRDD principles; (2) increase transparency in the HRDD exercise; and (3) become a source of rights for local communities to enforce corporate accountability.

Ben & Jerry's – the famous ice cream brand known for its quirky flavours and social justice ethos – announced in 2021 that it would withdraw its products from Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). This announcement sparked controversy, with an impact on the company and its parent, Unilever. While the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) (UNGP) have established themselves as the leading international governance framework for the social responsibilities of businesses, their application to conflict-affected areas lacks clarity. Questions remain, including when is a company legally complicit in violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), and when is a corporate exit from an area under military occupation the appropriate and responsible thing to do. This article uses Ben & Jerry's withdrawal from the OPT as the basis for investigating these questions. It finds that while it is unlikely that Ben & Jerry's would be exposed to any legal liability for violating IHL through its product sales in Israeli settlements in the OPT, its withdrawal aligns with its responsibilities under the UNGP as a reasonable and prudent corporate action in response to its activities being linked to enduring and severe IHL violations.

Multiple independent studies have highlighted the remarkable process of multistakeholder dialogue in the development of Peru’s first National Action Plan (NAP) on business and human rights. While facing several challenges, not least a global pandemic, the process was indeed a success in so far as it opened up a new path for policy making in Peru: that of multistakeholder dialogue including actors who traditionally deeply mistrust each other. This piece describes the key enabling conditions and operational strengths that allowed for such a highly participatory process and, ultimately, resulted in some strong commitments on business and human rights.