To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Pragmatists have typically been more concerned with positive epistemic states (knowledge, warranted assertibility, etc.) than with the negative state of ignorance. Atkins, however, looks both to Charles Peirce and to C. I. Lewis in order to gain new insights into ignorance itself, into the conditions that keep us ignorant, and into the ways in which ignorance can be valuable. Atkins draws on Peirce’s account of our doxastic machinery – including how beliefs are formed and the various ways they become “fixed” – to formulate lessons about the kinds of information environments that can keep believers “mired in ignorance” and the virtues we should cultivate in order not to succumb to the forces that would keep us ignorant. Making use of Peirce’s and Lewis’s ideas about the good and the right, Atkins also maintains that ignorance is sometimes preferable to knowledge – in some circumstances, ignorance is instrumentally good and the right thing to do is to see that it be maintained.
From 1912, C. I. Lewis attempted to construct a logic of entailment. In doing so, he created his modal logics, S1–S5, of which his chosen logic of entailment was S2. Although his logics avoid the so-called paradoxes of material implication, they still fall prey to the problem of explosion (that every proposition follows from any contradiction) and the problem of implosion (that every tautology follows from every proposition). These problems, and the inadequate treatment of nested entailments, make Lewis’s logics of limited use as logics of entailment. The chapter also discusses the systems devised by Lewis’s students Everett Nelson and William Parry. Nelson’s connexive logic avoids many of the problems with Lewis’s system but is found to have severe difficulties of its own, and Parry’s analytic implication, although it introduces an interesting version of the notion of meaning containment, does not adequately avoid the problems with Lewis’s logics.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.