One of the many fascinating ideas explored in Plato’s Sophist is the Stranger’s explanation of being relative-to through his account of the kinds being and difference in conjunction with the notions of capacity and combination, as well as what he invokes as the “forms” “itself by virtue of itself” and “relative to.” The discussion is remarkable in its clever use of an array of characters including Parmenides, the Pluralists, the Earthborn materialists, the Friends of the Forms, and the Late-learners to sort through a variety of challenging philosophical concerns, retaining what works while leaving behind what does not. The Stranger understands being as an intrinsic functional and structural dimension of all beings that makes them beings. Being just is capacity and the concurrent active “realizing” of capacity in “combinings” of forms with themselves and perceptibles. In lieu of an ontology of relations, there is an ontology of realizations of capacity relative to something. I show how this innovative account of a dynamic constellation of interwoven kinds and forms, where being and difference “go through all and each other,” provides a foundation for meaning, truth, and falsehood.

This chapter challenges the long-standing view that the orality of the law in early modern England meant that deaf people were denied a legal personhood because they could neither hear to understand nor speak to give their consent. While prejudice about deaf people’s intellectual capacity persisted, legal records show a growing acceptance of sign language as a legitimate alternative to vocal speech. Courts increasingly recognised that consent could be communicated through signs, allowing deaf individuals to make contracts, convey property, give evidence, and make binding decisions. The process was uneven: some magistrates questioned the credibility of deaf people or their signs, and procedures varied across jurisdictions. Yet by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, both civil and criminal cases demonstrate an acceptance that signed communication could establish understanding and rational capacity. Rather than excluding deaf people from legal personhood, the period reveals a gradual but significant expansion of their recognised agency, reshaping assumptions about speech, reason, and participation in the law.

This chapter begins by introducing international administrative tribunals – independent, judicial, subsidiary organs of international organizations, competent to compulsorily adjudicate employment-related disputes involving international officials – that whilst ubiquitous, are implied, but not expressly stated, by the treaty-basis of all multilateral institutions. Second, the legal characteristics of international administrative tribunals are identified, namely: (1) Capacity to establish administrative tribunals is treaty-based; (2) Administrative tribunals possess an independent and judicial status; and (3) The jurisdiction of administrative tribunals is determined by their statute. Third, the chapter considers the ability – and related approach – of administrative tribunals to impose administrative relief upon, and financial awards against, the employing international organization. Fourth, and in conclusion, this legal basis of international administrative tribunals is restated.

This chapter answers the book’s foundational question: Does collaboration matter? If so, how and why does collaboration improve watershed outcomes? By summarizing the previous chapter’s findings, Chapter 8 offers a complex and nuanced answer. Results suggest that collaboration does matter, although it depends on the relevant goals. For water quality, collaboration’s impact is more muted. In other words, our results suggest that collaboration does not inherently lead to measurable improvements. However, data consistently supports the idea that collaboration matters relative to social/perceived measures such as perceived water quality, stakeholder trust, engagement, and perceptions of success. These factors, as the chapter suggest, are important precursors for effective watershed collaboration. The chapter then concludes with lessons that could be applied elsewhere such as mechanisms to strengthen collaborative capacity, promoting regional organizations, leveraging technology such as blockchain, and identifying revenue stable streams.

This review article explores the legislative differences across Canadian jurisdictions with respect to involuntary admission and treatment pending appeal. Some jurisdictions restrict involuntary admission for mental illness to when there is a risk for serious bodily harm or physical impairment. However, the majority of jurisdictions recognize non-bodily harms or substantial mental or physical deterioration as grounds for involuntary admission when other criteria are met. Once a person is involuntarily admitted, jurisdictions differ on how treatment is authorized and whether treatment can commence while a person contests a finding of incapacity to treatment to the courts. Some jurisdictions permit treatment pending appeal while others do not. This article compares Canadian jurisdictions’ mental health legislation and addresses discrepancies through the lens of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canada Health Act.

In conflict and conflict-affected areas, the environment can take a backseat to other pressing issues. Whether due to limited capability, capacity, or will, the environment is often neglected during conflict activities, resulting in substantial risks to human health and environmental quality. Understanding how this happens and what can be done is critical to prevention and, where needed, remediation in conflict settings to promote human and environmental flourishing. This chapter explores how and why the environment can become neglected in conflict and what the key implications of this are.

Chapter 6 explores different types of emissions and non-emissions (socio-economic) outcomes of mitigation policies and their relationship to reformulations of the politics of mitigation from 2008 to 2018. Here, social interaction is particularly important, as it is at this stage that social responses to policies can be better identified and accounted for in policymaking debates. Conceptually, this chapter leans quite heavily on public policy scholarship on how policy decisions, once made, can shape the politics of further rounds of policymaking – but with a greater degree of emphasis on the place of policy outcomes in these processes. Mitigation policy outcomes have had greater levels of impact on other policy goals, have been increasingly varied, and are contingent upon policy design. In this phase, then, mitigation policy became politicised in a number of ways – but with some emphasis on new constituents and on higher degrees of social interaction.

Chapter 3 constructs the broad and historicised conceptualisation of mitigation politics by building on, critiquing and combining insights from constructivist political economy; climate policy, political economy of transitions; and socio-technical transitions research. The aim of this chapter is to present a perspective on mitigation politics that at once allows for analysis of different phases of climate mitigation policymaking and politics over time, recognises and incorporates mitigation-related constraints and opportunities, and takes account of a wide range of features of politics – collective choice, agency and capacity, deliberation, and social interaction. Doing so also offers up a more nuanced and detailed account of different but related varieties of politicisation – and how they interact with one another. The following four chapters apply this broad, inclusive, and historicised framing to explore and interpret different phases of constructing mitigation policies that have emerged over the past 40 years or so.

Which of the following is FDA-approved to treat negative symptoms of a primary psychotic disorder?

Houston Smit argues that Kant’s conception of the faculties possessed by a rational mind makes use of Aristotle’s notion of energeia and proposes an interpretation of the transcendental deduction of the categories built on this idea. On this interpretation, it is a central plank of the deduction to argue that such a mind possesses the capacity to think only if it is the subject of activities that exhibit characteristic features of Aristotelian energeiai. This shows that Kant conceives of the thinking subject as what Smit calls a robustly Aristotelian substance, even while insisting (consistently) that we do not have cognition of ourselves as “thinking things.” However, this point can be fully appreciated, Smit argues, only if one realizes that the deduction relies on a distinction between objective and non-objective uses of the categories

Stephen Engstrom argues that judgments that amount to knowledge constitute the end of the faculty of understanding. This implies that true judgments and false judgments are not on par in relation to the attainment of this end. False judgments are incomplete realizations of the understanding whose explanation requires reference to a factor that prevents it from attaining its end. Engstrom takes this to show that truth is essential to judgment (and belongs to its form) whereas falsity is not. This is reflected in our original, a priori understanding of judgment, according to which the capacity to judge is the capacity to know (rather than the capacity, say, to judge either truly or falsely). In an appendix, Engstrom relates this account to the notion of objective validity.